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DEDICATION

This 125th issue of the **Darshana Internationa.**
is most respectfully **dedicated** *to*
PROF. JOHN SOMERVILLE

A great American Philosopher, who enriched the field of philosophical literature with his entire zeal and courage till the end of his life.

Professor Somerville was born on March 13, 1905 in New York City where he attended Columbia University and received B.A., M.A. and Doctor of Philosophy degrees. He taught philosophy for thirty years at the City University of New York. Upon retirement he moved to San Diego County, first to La Mesa and in 1968 to a hilltop near El Cajon. He taught at the Point Loma campus of California Western University for five years.

Professor Somerville's scholarly activities are detailed in who's who in American Education. International who's who, who's who in Philosophy, and the Biographical Directory of American Scholars. Five of his books have been translated into Several languages : Swedish, Danish. German Russian, and Japanese.

At age 70, John Somerville wrote a play, the Crisis about the ethical issues and the dangers inherent in Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis. It was translated and performed in Sweden, Germany, and Japan. He then wrote a one-act play, the last irquest, which has been performed by university drama departments.

As a peace activist and a civil rights defender, Dr. Somerville founded several organizations, including International Philosophers for Prevention of Nuclear Omnicide (Ippno). Ippno held conferences in St. Louis, Missouri, in Brighton, England, and in Moscow. Dr. Somerville's writings and activities have received the praise of literary figures and scientists alike,such as Thomas Mann and Albert Einstein. He was given the Bertrand Russell Peace Award and the Gandhi Peace Prize. Ippno was honored as a Peace Research by the United Nations during its International Year of Peace in 1987.

Survivors include his wife of 64 years, Rose Somerville, Professor Emerita of San Diego State University, two sons, Greg of New York and Kent of El Cajon, and two grand daughters, Susan of New York and Tara of San Francisco.

The family suggests donations to the Peace Resource Center in San Diego or to the Fund for the Homeless c/o The Daily Californion.

May God rest his soul in Peace.

ANURAG ATREYA
Managing Editor

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Editorial .

For Darshana International

John O. Nelson

Why should there be, it might be asked, Indian journals of philosophy—for intsance, *Darshana International ?* As the very adjective "international" implies, is not philosophy of trans-cultural scope ? But if so, what does *DarshanaInternational* bring to the market that, say, English or American philosophical journals do not and perhaps better ? How justify the implied duplication of presentations ? Considered globally, is not, then, the publication of *Darshana International* a case of that waste of material and intellectual resources that serious thinkers everywhere condemn ? Might not English or American journals suffice for the presentation and development of philosophy ? Should not, then, *Darshana International* and other Indian journals of philosophy, in the name of economy, be shut down ?

One might retort, of course, that the above argument is double-bladed. Why not say that *Darshana International* and other Indian journals of philosophy be the ones chosen by our global "resource administrators" to present and develop philosophy and the English and American journals be shut down ?

In the above paragraphs I am, plain to see, raising a purely academic question; certainly one that does not apply to the present world. But it *could* to a future world, where, imaginably, printing materials were, globally, so reduced in supply, and where a United Nations ruled everywhere and in everything, that it could make sense or even seem imperative to allocate just to English or American or Indian journals a monopoly in philosophical publication. Then, indeed, the question we have asked, "Why should there be Indian journals of philosophy-for instance,*Darshana International*?" would be a real and pressing question, needing a determinate answer. So let us, in all seriousness, attempt to see what answar could possibly validate the existence of Indian journals of philosophy and *Darshana International* in particular.

The validation that comes immediately to mind is something like the following. Though purhaps not in the realm of the physical sciences, certainly in the realm of values and ethics different cultures adhere to and promulgate different values and ethics, Although there may be overlaps in the values and ethics promulgated, that is not always or averywhere the case. At least some incommensurate values, some partially incommensurate ethics, are by different cultures adhered to and promulgated. On the credible assumption that the philosophical theses incorporating these different values and ethics will be not only different but logically independent, we shall, then, desire-or at least justice will require-that every culture be allowed to possess its own philosophical publications. But not only every culture, holistically speaking but every incommensurate sub-culture or sect within that culture'.

What we are appealing to here is the theory of cultural relativism; that is, the view that all social values and ethics are relative; their *esse* or *being* lies solely in their being entertained by whatever society entertains them. But this is not all.

As so far described, cultural relativism is what one arrives at when one views empirically the various societies of the world. One soon enough discovers that they entertain various different and even incommensurate valus and ethics. But, empirically, one discover nothing more as to their existence than the fact that they are entertained by the respective societies that entertain them.

If, now, we take a scientific, dispassionate stance toward these relative values, including our own, we shall arrive at what might be called "egalitarian cultural relativism." For, in being dispassionate as science and even philosophy dictate we be, it has to seem to us that these different, relative values and ethics of different societies all have no more or less than an equal claim to existence. It is only when we judge these different sets of values of other societies from the standpoint of our own particular society's set of values that we seem justified in setting one society's values above or below another's. But what justifies our judging other systems of values or ethics by our own ? Why not vice-versa ? Surely, if we are truly dispassionate, we shall want to say, "Nothing".

Suppose, for instance, we apply to all these different value-systems and ethics a utilitarian measuring rod: "that which conduces to the greatest happiness of the greatest number". But that measuring rod is not, either empirically or theoretically considered, a value of all cultures. It is an actual value, conceivably, only of the speaker s own culture. It might be, for example, a dis-value of Indian culture (happiness being held (say) to be a self-debasing attachment to illusion). But if the measuring rod to be applied to the values of all cultures is one belonging to our own culture alone or, conceivably, not in fact to all others, our adoption of it as their measuring rod obviously violates our commitment to scientific dispassion and pure reason, for these world find nothing in that value of ours that differentiated it, *authority-wise*,from any other value belonging to any other culture. Hence, as justnow seen, where empirical observation leads us to the conclusion that values and ethice are relative to the particular societies that entertain them, dispassionate reason takes us to the conclusion that one set of values or ethics is no better or worse than another: in short, egalitarian cultural relativism.

As I have already noted, cultural relativism, so conceived (and this seems to be the dispassionate, scientific way of conceiving it), validates the right of Indian journals of philosophy and *Darshana International* in particular to remain in publication, even in that grim future world of scarcity of resources that we have adverted to. To repeat in slightly altered form what we said : egalitarian cultural relativism says that these Indian journals and *Darshana International* in particular are publishing philosophical expressions of sets of values and ethics that not only are not available in the sets of values and ethics of other societies—for example, in English or American sets—but which are of no less intrinsic (though no more) rightness or worth than those of other societies and so are equally justified in seeing the light of philosophical representation and publication.

While, however, the doctrine of egalitarian cultural relativism seems to validate the existence of *Darshana International* and other Indian journals of philosophy, it does so only if it is itself a defensible theory. One cannot, after all, base a claim on an indefensible premise. But is egalitarian ethical relativism a defensible theory ? Demonstrably, it is not.

The main and central argument that commands this denial is the following. If any society is to survive it must possess a moral system binding on its members. If its members are not bound together in such a system, they are free to go each there own way in their personal relations. But what must devolve from this common license to "go one's own way" or "do one's own thing" is, let it be actually adhered to, either a Hobbesean war of all against all or mere social chaos. Even at small scale of a family such license, although only partially adhered to, usually results, as every one knows, in the disintegration of the family. How much more surely this is due to happen at the large scale of a society and where the license in question is complete!

The question, that, is: can egalitarian relativism, pul in actual practice, supply the binding moral system required for the very existence of any society? patently, it cannot.

Egalitarian relativism, viewing with its dispassionate eyes the speaker's own society's sets of values and ethics and those of other societies and finding one set no more authoritative than another, can therefore find none that is authoritative. Suppose, as a last resort, the speaker arbitrarily chooses one set to be authoritative; but then the very arbitrariness of that choice has to deprive that choice of any authority, Under the aegis of egalitarian relativism, the most one can squeeze out of the conflicting sets of values and ethics empirically presented one are conditional imperatives; e.g., "If you want to succeed, you must do such-and-such" or "If you are a Dobu Islander, such-and-such a rules will seem authoritative to you". But what are needed for the moral bindingness requisite for the existence of a society are not conditional imperatives but categorical imperatives, and these cannot be provided by egalitarian relativism, except it be the self-contradictory and thus already indefensible categorical imperative of Nihilism. "Thou shalt have no categorical imperatives".

Take the case, for instance, of the conditional imperative, "If you want to succeed, you must do such-and-such". Addressed to a member of a society that member remains free to say that he does not want to succeed; so what ?

Theorists have tried, it is true, to find antecedents for conditional imperatives or "if, then"s which can be supposed to hold for everyone. Thus, the pursuit of happiness can with some plausibility be proposed, and has been proposed (for example, by Aristotle), as just such an antecedent. One's reasoning might then be, for instance: "If you want to be happy then you must do such-and-such; but since everyone wants to be happy, you must want to be heppy: and hence, you must do such-and-such".

As a matter of fact, though, a person can wish not to be happy. He may, for instance, have committed a heinous crime and wishes to be made unhappy and to be punished, because of his feelings of guilt.

As in the case of even happiness, there would seem to be nothing that a person cannot, in some circumstance or other, wish either to possess or not possess, to be or not be. Hence, conditional imperatives cannot provide us with the general bindingness requisite for the existence of a society.

On the face of it, then, since egalitarian cultural relativism has to deprive us of any binding social imperatives and hence has to eliminate not only morality but society itself, we obviously cannot appeal to that theory in our attempted validation of *Darshana International* and other Indian journals of philosophy's right to exist in that grim world of scarcities that, in many persons' view, looms ahead of us. The cost of our doing so would be much too great. Hence, some other foundation for that validation will have to be found, but what can that foundation be ?

Pure reason has already failed, As commanding common consent, mysticism is out of the question, Empirical observation, the only remaining alternative, though commanding common consent provides us with only some form of cultural relativism. Presumably therefore. the foundation in question will have to consist in some form of cultural relativism: If, though, we opt for cultural relativism, what possible relativism is there except egalitarian relativism? Certainly, the pages of philosophy mention none. Yet, clearly there is another relativism, and one that we are all acquainted with: what might be called "hierarchical cultural relativism".

Unlike the artificially produced egalitarian relativism of dispassionate science or pure reason, this is a natural relativism which is everywhere evinced in actual societies. Moreover, as we shall see, this other relativism does provide us with categorical imperatives, those *sine non qua Nons* of moral bindingness and the existence of any society:

To begin at a beginning. As long as we maintain a purely dispassionate stance in our view of things, consonant with pure reason or science, we shall be unable, it has become evident, to wring any categorical imperatives from the differing values and ethics of the world's different societies: or if any, only that imperative of Nihilism "Thou shalt not have any categorical imperatives", which contradicts itself: But while this dispassionate stance in our view of things may be the prescribed stance of the scientist and the philosopher it is certainly not the actual stance of any normal human being qua human being. The man of the completely dispasionate stance is, like the so-called "economic man", a one-dimensional man, existing only in theory; a mere "reason on stilts". The actual man is many things besides a pure reason: a being full of passions, attachments, instincts or propensities, to name but a few of his exra-rational properties or characteristics.

Now if one steps out of one's role as philosopher or pure reasoner into that of a full human being, a being of not only reason but feeling, one's particular society's values and ethics will not have the appearance of merely conditional imperatives but categorical imperatives. This seems to be a natural effect of our childhood training in the values and ethics of our native culture: a training, by social necessity, of unarguable and therefore binding do's and don'ts. In addition, though, in the case of the man of both reason and feeling or the whole man there seems naturally to come into play with the passage of time a set of feelings and attitudes that complement these categorical imperatives: those feelings of attachment and dutifulness which Socrates, in Plato's *Crito*, as justifying his refusal to escape from prison, attributed to the fact that Athens had been his provider and parent, who had taught him what he knew, and therefore deserved his obedience and gratitude. The normal and that is, the full man, the man, of both reason and feeling, not is likly to have at his command the eloquence to express verbally, like Socrates, the grounds of his feelings of gratitude and obedience, but his actions often testify mutely to their existence. It is with some such mute testimony,for instance, that this whole man, placed on the battlefield, dies "for his flag and country."

This normal, whole man of not only reason but feeling, when confronted with the fact that different cultures entertain different values and ethics from his own, will agree so far with the philosopher: there are indeed different cultures with different values and ethice. But the conclusion he will come to is not the same as the dispassionate philosopher's. Because of his emotional and engrained attachment to his own culture's values and ethics, which he will consider as both sacrosanct and exclusive, he will entertain a cultural relativism that; unlike the dispassionate philosopher's egalitarian relativism, says, not that the values and ethics of all cultures are on a par, but that his own, having a special provenance, are the true values and ethics. He may then think and believe that those of other cultures, where differing, are false. But he need not. Because of the exclusive character that he may impute to his own culture's values and ethics, he may be willing to suppose that other cultures values and ethics are exclusive to them also, and so, in courtesy, even go so far as to say that when in Rome one should do as the Romans do. In this he may seem to be in agreement with the philosopher's egalitarian cultural relativism. But in his special attachment and feelingful commitment to his own culture's values and ethics he is not. In saying, "When in Rome do as the Romans do", he does not envisage himself as subscribing to the Roman mores as categorical imperatives but simply, as a matter of courtesy or prudence, as conditional imperatives. The point is: one may, out of courtesy or prudence, put in temporary abeyance one's own society's categorical imperatives, without their not still in foro interno remaining categorical imperatives. The non-alienated Mormon, for example, who takes a drink of whiskey, realizes that he is breaking a categorical imperative and would readily admit that he *ought not* to be taking the drink of whiskey in question. Put it is, after all, as much actual human nature to sometimes ignore or even flout one's own society's categorical imperatives or ethics as to have an ethics and categorical imperatives.

In our possible future world of severe scarcities, the right of Indian journals of philosophy and *Darshana International* in particular to the wherewithals of print is, under the aegis of this more natural relativism, which on the basis of a special provenance separates in some hierarchical way the values and ethics of one's own native culture from those of other cultures, more unequivocally established than under the philosopher's egalitarian relativism. For the categorical imperatives that rule the individual in this more natural relativism will demand philosophical representation with a categoricalness that conditional imperatives cannot command. According to the philosopher's egalitarian cultural relativism, *Darshana International* and other Indian journals of Philosophy may claim, as a matter of fairness, the right to publish and develop philosophy. According to the hierachrical cultural relativism that naturally prevails in all societies and indeed must if there are to exist societies, *Darshana International* and other Indian journals of philosophy have not just the right derived from fairness but the duty, derived from categorical imperativeness, to publish and developed philosophy as representing philosophically the caregorical imperatives and values of Indian culture. Since a duty, unlike a right, cannot be waived the validation in question is, as we said above, more unequivocal than that posed by the philosopher's egalitraion cultural relativism, even were we to suppose, contrary to fact, that latter were a defensible theory.

I

Preparing for the 21st century : A philosophy for new thinking

Howard L. Parsons

To be philosophical is to create a system of general and comprehensive beliefs about the human being, the world, and their relations to one another as they are and ought to be. Belief implicates an imperative to act. Here are presented a statement of beliefs about our newplanetery world today and some of the new imperatives called for.

The life forms of our human-natural world lie under the threat of death from nuclear weapons and ecological ruin. Population increase is accompanied by widespread starvation, malnutrition, the death of infants, and disease. The external debt of the poor countries deepens their poverty. The gap between rich and poor among nations and within nations is widening. Poverty, spells systematic dehumanization: hunger, homelessness, squalid huts, foul sanitation, joblessness, alienation, violence, and inequalities of gender, race, ethnic identity etc.

This state of the world calls out certain imperatives: consider the fact of our common estate with all persons and life forms; discover the meaning of individual mortality within a large living process; take time seriously, measuring the social and natural consequences of decisions; renounce claims for absolute rule by individuals and groups; practice the social and collective virtues; cherish the eatth; and uphold the people's right of revoluation. The general rule is: maintain the creative transformation of the ecological order.

To live and live well, we interact with the things and persons of our situation, perceive and evaluate them, and organize our thoughts about them. Persuaded that our thoughts are true and pertain to matters of value (ie believing), we are prepare our actions toward things and persons. Belief is implicated with a sense of *oughtness*, an imperative to act toward matters of value: what we *ought* to do arises as the indicated action toward what is thought to have value, actually or potentially. When our system of beliefs becomes general and comprehensive—global, cosmic—and concerns the nature of the human being, the world, and their relations as they are and ought to be, we call it *philosophical*. Many persons and societies have such general beliefs, and many philosophers (up to present skeptical and specialized times) have taken as their task a general, systematic description and evaluation of their world with the consequent specific imperatives called for.

Let us then briefly and generally describe our planetary world to day, taking it as our human situation, and thereafter state some of the indicated imperatives. The importance of such a work will be clear as we grasp the gravity of our world situation and the life-and-death consequences of our thought and action toward it. Today, because the world of humanity-in-nature is more complex, promising, and perilous than in past history and because we know more about it than ever before, philosophy as systematized beliefs about 'the world' faces a unique and necessary project.

The threat of the death of all life forms from nuclear weapons and the threat of catastrophic devastation from other device of mass destruction confront us. Ecological ruin—the breakdown of the ozone layer, global warming, pollution of the biosphere—is already annihilating thousands of species and menacing our own. World population is now more than five billions. with 220,000 persons added every day, a total of 80 millions every year.

Of these newborns 90% live in poor countries. For most societies managed by wealthy and powerful elites, this increase carries a fearful cost: one out of five persons if malnourished; of those one billion, one-half are starving; one out of five children born in the poorest countries dies before reaching the age of one year[1], famine and disease, as always, portend epidemics; and the external debt of the poor countries—more than one trillion dollars—holds the poor in the bondage of ever deepening poverty. The gap between the rich and the poor is widening, and this process in occuring within the richer countries like the United States, Great Britain, and Germany.

Such poverty means systematic dehumanization: hunger, homelessness, unclean water, squalid huts, foul sanitation, debility, illness, little or no health care or schooling or job training, unemployment, listlessness, alienation, loss of hope, violence, violation of personal, social, economic, and political rights, and early death. The poverty is required by class economy—and for some of the centrally planned economies, bureaucratic domination. At the top of class societies, the rich few domestic and foreign, exploit and rule the poor. At the bottom, masses of jobless peasants, unskilled laborers, and industrial, commercial, and other workers toil and suffer. Class oppositions ramify out into inequalities of gender, race, ethnic identity, religion, and language, all sanctioned by the institutions of law, social life, religion, and ideology. Large military apparatuses in the hands of the ruling elites at home and abroad are deployed to keep the poor, quiescent or revolting, in their economic and political place. Such has been the prevailing structure of civilizations since the first ones in the fertile river valleys of mesopotamia and the Nile 5500 years ago. Socialist societies of the 20th century have endeavored to abolish economic exploitation based on class, but in the process they have not been able to overcome tendency of political rule by government and party dictate.

The vital virtue needed for a new world is informed and active concern for the welfare of the whole human community. The whole is all of living, developing human kind individuals and families, communities and nations, in the context of the ecology of the biosphere of earth. The lethal vice is narrow egoism—all forms of self centred interest whether of person or group: prejudice and small-mindedness; advantage taken of the weak; class oppression; national chauvinism and militarism; ethnic and racist discrimination; religious absolutism; sexism; and speciesism.

Yet all these problems are in principle solvable. The lack lies in our mental and spiritual domain. We need the philosophy, the values the vision of ideals, the will, the spiritual elan, and the social organization to seize the opportunities and to shape the material and social conditions to our human desires. We lack the outlook and philosophy called for by the challenge. We must develop the 'new thinking' now desperately required to realize the hope that yearns in the hearts of the world's multitudes as we move toward the new era o the next century.

Let us state some of the imperatives defining this new attitude and outlook.

Consider the deep fact of our common estate and its implications. We share a common origin with all things in the physical universe. We have emerged out of a cosmic process into a form of species life, bearing in our individual bodies some of the stuff the stars are made of. As individuals we share a common genome and genetic nature with one another and much that is common with the millions of other species. We are defined by common human needs and faculties, emotions and actions, a common ground plan of stages of life from infaney through old age, in our social life we participate in a common history and destiny. We live together in a common natural environment on earth in this solar system, with common interdependence with it. To recognize this togetherness is to weigh the great perils now—injustice, poverty, ecocide—that threaten our kind and the structures and processes of our common life in family, workplace, community, economy, and nature.

Discover the meaning of individual mortality. In the existential (Sartrean) perspective, death is a final limit and negation. But like everything else, an individual lifetime is defined by its boundaries and its relatedness to other limited beings. Beyond its physical and temporal limits of conception and death, our individual life finds definition in a physical, biological, and cultural history that both precedes and succeeds it. One's own lifetime must have a stop; but there are many lives. So it is more correctly said that our being is defined than that we defined our being. We are called to inquire what our significance is in a larger and longer life that includes but lies beyond our own coming and going in this passing scene within the long drama of the universe. The sense of mortality can teach us to situate our thought and practice, our time and place, in a world transcending our brief sojourn here in this particular form of life.

Take time seriously. We may become immersed and overwhelmed by time's pleasures and pains, unconscious and unreflecting of its flow. We may withdraw from it, lost in the illusion of eternity. Against these two extremes, the creative passage in and through time is [illegible] critical unifying of the interesting and arrested, the attached and detached. We must awake to the wonders of time, the feel of its qualities, receiving and letting things happen. We must also stand above it, mastering it by looking outward and forward, and [illegible] re-engage with it and redirect it. An art of life is [illegible] the unique quality of the moment and [illegible] the joy and [illegible]. Part of wisdom is alertness to the passing of the moment [illegible] and in our planning to make provision for others [illegible] passing and yet to pass through this world of time.

The imperative of long-range planning [illegible] thinking must be abandoned: for persons and governments, [illegible] immediate gratification and the neglect of careful taking [illegible] consequences to the social and natural environment and their future; for businesses, the pursuit of quick profits for sellers and buyers, the enticements and greed of consumerism; for governments, [illegible] spending and the piling up of arms; for philosophers, [illegible] from the substantive issues of history. For the good of ourselves and future generations, we must weight the costs and benefits of the consequences of our decisions for the human community an planetary space and time.

Renounce and induce others to renounce all claims for absolute rule over others. Enter into creative interaction with others for the constructive transformation of self, others, and humankind; This constructing is the building of the unity of mutually supporting parts with division of form and function. No one individual or set of individual can be final in value, since change is constant and the creativity of values is never finished. Human existence on our planet has no ultimate center, nor is it itself the center; The living ecological process is its own self-sufficient and self-regulating center generated out of the interactions of the concrescent, concentrating individuals whose centering activities are relative and transient.

Therefore all assertions of one part over the others-as capitalism over socialism, north over south, west over east, leader over the mass-and all usurpation of individual person or group over the process of mutual creation and construction are self-defeating. The logic of universal egoism leads to universal death *bellum omnium contra omnes.*

Practice the social virtues demanded by our time of social action and struggle. The internal virtues of the individual soul—purity of motive, humility, self-control, self-respect—and the interpersonal virtues of compassion, kindness, and care are requisite for the good life. In the definition and practice of these virtues, the effective religions of the world have taken the lead. But to the present-day world—a world of huge urban centers, mass production, world-wide information networks, nations and blocks of nations interconnected by economy and culture, an emerging international order in economy, transportation, communication, and law, large classes of workers and peasants, all world scientific community, and mass political movements—we must also bring the strength of collective virtues. These are : the solidarity of people in vision and practice; the unity of political action for shared causes and ends; broad coalition and cooperation; and long-time commitment with others to progressive historical processes extending across decades, years, lifetimes, and centuries.

Cherish the earth : its waters and air and skies, its fields and meadows and mountains, its savannas and prairies and desert, its wetlands and woodlands, its veldts and tropical forests, its communities of plants and animals. This sphere of brown lands and blue oceans and white polar caps, with its changing garment of gauzy clouds, is our one and only home, our yard and garden, our workplace and playground, our universal body that sustains us and calls us as creatures to mature into responsible caretakers and trustees.

Uphold the people's right of revolution. The creativity of history is the breaking through of a new event or events into the flow of events and the integrating of that event with other events to form a new construction of values. There are many orders of value—personality interpersonal bond, economy, art, science etc—and the ultimate and inclusive one is the ecological order and its maintenance and development. But many conditions and institutions can obstruct this creative transformation of value, among them the political order. Hence people within a state must be free to question, alter, and abolish their forms of government and social organization.

So the right to revolution is a sacred right (a) when the right is exercised with proper care for the very principles of creative life, liberty, justice for which the revolutionary action is undertaken; (b) 'when a long train of abuses and usurpations... evinces a design to reduce the, people under absolute Despotism',[3] (c) when lacking the protection of the rule of law the people 'are compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression'[4], and (d) when the balance of good over bad in the consequences of those affected distinctly outweighs the compared balance in the social and natural conditions revolted against.

CONCLUSION :

The ending of the cold war has brought the initiation of disarmament. Primary among the next imperative steps are those devising a new economic order—mobilizing the material and human resources of the developed world in cooperation with the resources of the underdeveloped world to overcome the misery and indignity of poverty and social disadvantage. The best intetest of the developed countries demands this, for not doing so, they must bear the social costs of a hungry, ill, illiterate, uneducated, jobless, angry, violent, and destructive populace and a disordered natural environment—and be dragged down into degradation themselves.

In the drive for a just economy in this century, the socialist idea has inspired throughout large parts of the world consequential changes. Different economic systems have applied certain principles of socialism with varying degrees of success. The states of Eastern Europe, China, and Cuba and the social democracies of Western Europe and North America have adopted in various forms and degrees socialist principles: restraint on the wealth and social control of the owning classes; trade unionism; socialized education; health care and pensions; unemployment insurance; state welfare for the needy; public works and jobs; and state intervention in the economy - agriculture, industry, finance, currency, credit, taxation—for the purposes of productivity and justice. Socialist states in this century have been experiments to implement fully the great humanistic ideas, particularly equality, of the modern democratic movement most powerfully expressed in the French revolution.

For the new era all peoples need a new mode of thinking to correspond to the dramatic objective changes driven by the peoples' needs, so that we can guide and organize those changes for the survival and advance of the planetary living process. The philosophers of the world now have the opportunity and responsibility to help in this task, which is both theoretical and practical. The task is to create a 'moral mutation' (Robert Redfield) that will move masses of men and women to transform their lives and their world as the imperatives require,

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Howard L. Parsons, *Preparing for the 21st Century : A Philosophy for new thinking*. (Copy right).

REFERENCE NOTES

1 Field Castro, *The World Economic and Social Crisis*. Report to the Seventh Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. Havana : Publishing Office of the Council of State, 1983, pp 20, 183. Most of the statistics in this work are taken from studies of agencies of the United Nations.

2 'Even Among the Well-Off, the Richest Get Richer,' *New York Times*, 5 March 1992.

3 'In Congress, 4 July 1776. The unanimousDeclaration of the thirteen United States of America,'

4 Preamble, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1948.

2

Hume's view on External Object : A Critical Analysis

Indu Pandey

The topic strikes as a problem which has been a controversial issue of Hume's ontology till today. Though, as an ontological entities. he accepts the existence of perceptions only, yet unlike other philosophers he attempts to explain the constitutions of external object. The above task, he takes into consideration, in order to clarify, why does one believe or accept the existence of external objects ? While elaborating the constitution of external object, he provides an exaustive analysis. His analysis' regarding the constitutions of external objects is ambiguous as to devide all interpreters into two groups. The one group, out of Hume's analysis, draws the conclusion that he accepts the existence of external object. But another group draws the contrary conclusion while asserting that he denied the existence of any external object. Our basic thrust in this paper, would be to grasp Hume's real position in totality.

The justification of acceptance of any existence, presupposes the possibility of its knowledge. So let us enquire, what is, according to Hume : the source of knowledge of existence of any external object ? Hume devides all knowledge into two—'Relation of Ideas' and "Matter of Fact". The source of knowledge regarding 'Matter of Fact' is 'ex ience' in his views. Since he puts the analysis of 'external ob ' under the domain of 'Matter of Fact', thus, in this sphere, ex ence is the only source of knowledge. He writes : "It is a qu n of fact, whether the perception of the senses be produced by ex al object resembling to them, how shall this question be determi ? by experience".[1]

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[1] ne, David. Enquires concerning human understanding and cerning the principles of morals. (ed. L.A. Salbybigge, Third revised by P. H. Nidditch) Oxford, Clarendon, 1975 p. 153.

It is worth mentioning here that like Lock and Berkely, Hume accepts the primacy of experience for the acquisition of knowedge. They also hold the similar positions that mind can directly know its own ideas. For Hume, all perceptions of human mind are divided into impressions and ideas. Though, in his views, impressions and ideas are different from the point of view of intensity and degree, but qualitatively they are the same. Using Berkeley's tool of to be is to be perceived." Hume denies anything else except perceptions. We may point out here that on the basis of Berkely's argument, Hume denies unknown and unknowlable external material object. He states : ".. ...the existence, which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind and fleeting copies or representations of other existence which remain uniform and independent".[2]

The above quotation has three implications. These implications are following— (a) What the mind knows, according is Hume, are only images and perceptions. (b) Connected with above implication, the second is that there is no independent object and (c) Lastly, that what is called a tree or house is collection of perceptions.

For him, the perceptions, which are presented to us united in the form of external object are basically distinct and unconnected. Now, the question is, if perceptions are distinct and unconnected, how does he believe about continued external object arise ?

For putting forward an answer to the above question, Hume takes help of coherence and constancy of perceptions and three laws of associations i. e. identity. contiguity in space and time and causation. But none of the above mentioned factors, has capacity to present real external object. These factors, make the perceptions to be appeared in form of continued external object. But, neither laws of association nor coherence or constancy has capacity to make perceptions to be appeared in the form of continued external object without help of memory and imagination. Thus, here memory and imagination, two faculties of human mind, play a significant role. In Hume's view memory as a faculty of human mind, "preserves the original form in which its objects were presented[3] and 'imagination' as a faculty of human mind, "...is free to transpo and change its ideas"[4].

Since the role of these two faculties of human mind cannot be discussed, in separation thus, let us explore the actual process of coherence and constancy of perceptions in making the distinct percept tions to be appeared in the form of continued external existence. First of all, we would like to put forward, Hume's argument regarding "coherence is much greater and more uniform, if we suppose the objects to have continued existence and as the mind is once in train of observing an uniformity among objects, it naturally continues, it renders the uniformity or complete as possible[5]".

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[2] Ibid., p. 152.

[3] Ibid., p. 47.

[4] Ibid., p.

Before analysing the above statement, we would like to present Hume's position regarding role and functions of constancy of perceptions. He cites - "...inference from the constancy of our perceptions, like precedent from their coherence, gives rise to the opinion of the continued existence of body which is prior to that of its distinct existence and produce that latter produces"[6].

Here, we may point out that the above given two quotations are significant in clarifying Hume's position. The word 'supposition' in quotation exposes the real sense. The real sense of the quotation is that even the appearance of continued existence of external object presupposes the supposition of continued existence. And he holds that there is no continued existence. The same analysis is true about the word 'opinion.'

In fact, here, Humean position seems to be ambiguous and confusing, Since, he denies the existence of any continued existence of external object. He finds it difficult to explain the appearance of the continued existence of external object. First of all, he attempts to explain the appearance of continued existence of external object in terms of coherence and constancy of perceptions, bnt in the process, he is compelled to explain the coherence and constancy of perceptions in terms of cuntinued existence of external object. This is so because the 'coherence' and constancy of perceptions and continued existence of the external objects which is being perceived in the whole proces's depend for their existence on the existence of independent external material objects

As we have already stated that for Hume's coherence and constancy of perceptions takes the help of memory and imagination in order to make distinct perceptions to be appeared as continued external object thus now let-us put forward the function of imagination. He holds that impressions and ideas (perceptions) of human mind are discrete and unconnected and imagination has got ultimate capacity either to ascociate or to separate them. He asserts that besides imagination and memory, custom and belief are also important means to help in forming the appeared external objects out of unconnected perceptions of human mind In this context he says :

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[5] Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature, Book one (ed. D. G. C. Macnab), Fontana/Collina 1978 p. 249.

[6] Ibid , p. 250.

"If we examine the operation of body and the production of effects from their causes we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us further in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular objects are constantly conjoined together and that mind is carried by a customary transition from the appearance of one to the belief of the other"?

After above analysis, let us proceed toward Hume's analysis and importance of three laws of association. It is worth mentioning here, that he assigns an important role to resemblance also which is otherwise not included in three laws of association. For him, it is resemblance, through which one ascribes an identity to distinct external objects. While discussing the constitution of appeared external objects, out of lose and unconnected perceptions, Hume describes the role of resemblance, contiguity and causation is the following words.

"...the objects which are variable or interrupted and yet are supposed to continue the same are such only as consist of a succession of parts connected together by resemblance, contiguity or causation".[8]

In Hume's views there is no external object but three laws association through imagination and memory make mind to belief in the distinct and continued existence of appeared object. Elaborating this he cites .

"The realism facilitates the transition of the mind from one object to another and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated and continued".[9]

While describing the cause of identity and consequently the importance of 'resemblance' in the forming the false belief in the existence of external object, he states; "The resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake and make us substitue the notion of identity instead of the related objects, However, at one instant, we may consider the related succession as variable or interrupted, we are sure the next to ascribe to it a perfect identity and regard it as invariable and uninterrupted.[10]

While going deep into the analysis, Hume thinks that since mind is intended to belief the continued and distinct existence of of external object, it overlooks the changes and happenings in the objects. Mind, in his view avoids to recogize the change if it is slow and very

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7 Hume, David. Enquiries concerning Human understanding and concerning the principles of morals, p. 92.

8 Hume,David, A Treaties of Human nature (ed. Ernest C. Mossner) Mossner, Baltimore, Marryland, Penguin Book, 1969, p. 306.

9 Ibid.

small. He puts forward the examples of mountains, plains and plants. According to him, the inner changes in any part of mountain and plain and slow growth of plants is ignored by mind and due to imagination, mind believes in the continued existence of these objects. He hold that in every state objects are different because things are changing. While explaining this, in connection with temporal contiguity, Hume says : "But we must observe in these cases the first object is in a manner annihilated before the second comes into existence by which, we are never presented in anyone point of time with idea of difference and multiplicity and for that reason are less scruple us in calling them the same".[12]

Here is a general question : why does mind overlook slow and minor changes ? For, Hume, it is due to the concept of necessary causal relation. He states that mind overlooks the minor and slow cchanges in the appeared objects because of its propensity to believe in necessary causal relations. In his opinion, the concept of necessary causal relation seems so objective that inspite of very slow changes, plants and animals get total change during the years but still we attribute them an identity. The fact, according to Hume, is that their form, size and substance are entirely altered. In his view, the search of connection among changing objects is useless and meaning less because it is merely a customary transition of ideas.[12]

Hume's above position are meant to show that the connection and identity among objects are not objective but they are subjective and thus do not exist in nature. He holds that without this subjective identity and connection, the impression remains loose and unconnected: In this context, he utters: "These are uniting principels in the ideal world and without them every distinct object is separate by the mind and may be separately considered and appears not to have any more connection with any other object..."[13].

Thus, we can sum up Hume's views regarding external object in the following manners. He states that objectively speaking there is no connection among the descrete and unconnected 'impressions and ideas'. The connection which mind intends to belief in the continued existence of external objects in his view is only subjective one and formed through the function of memory, imagination, coherence and constancy of perceptions and three laws of association.

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10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 305.

12 Hume, David. A Treatise of Human nature Book one (ed. D. G. C. macnab) p.

13 Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature (ed. Ernest C. Mosner) p. 305.

After elaborating Hume's position regarding the existence of external object, we have task ahead to examine the conflicts of views which is posed over his ontological position. Gallen Strawson and Deniel E. Flage interprete Hume's position regarding the existence of external object in the light of realism. In order to conclude that Hume's position is realist's one, Strawson refers the use of the word 'external bodies' He writes : "Some may wonder whether Hume's use of the word external necessarily emplies some kind of realist construel of the word 'object or bodies' rather so than some dualist as phenomenal construel"[14]. While confessing his intentions in stating above opinion, he says : "my purpose here, is to merely support those philosophers in the belief that it makes sense to suppose that there is truth of matter here the realist thought. of reality is indeed real and it does indeed have a certain nature whatever we can or cannot know about it"[15].

While analysing the above statement we find two important basis for considering him as a realist. Firstly, mind is intended to believe in the truth, existence of external object and secondly the word external objects or bodies can be used only in order to assert realist construel of object. About first point as we have already stated through the analysis that what mind intends to believe the external object is merely subjective and ideal and not objective one. Thus, on this basis one cannot conclude that Hume's position is a realist one's. The second point is about the use of external object or bodies" while penetrating into argument given by Gallen Strawson, we find the use of word "external world can not be the basis for regarding Hume to be a realist because it was merely his linguistic compulsion. This point has been properly explained by Suman Gupta—"Hume... constantly assumed the existence of the material world although his aim was to deny it. This is bound to be the case because our language which Hume also had to use is meant to communicate a real and not the distorted world view of idealist philosophers"[16]. She opines that we need the language of real world, even in order to talk about the ideal world. In this connection, she writes :

'No communication among human being is possible without assuming human beings their surrounding world their practical activity and their power of acquiring knowledge. Hume wanted to communicate his idealist world view through a language which he logically can not do. Consequently, he assumed everything which he wanted to deny"[17].

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[14] Strawson, Gallen. The secret connection, cousation, Realism and David Hume, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 127.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Gupta, Suman. The origin and theories of linguistic philosophy, a marxist point of view: intellectual publishing House, New Delhi. 1983, p. 69.

Another advocate for considering Hume's position regarding his view of external object to be a realist's one is Deniel E. Flage. Flage's argument may be put in his own words.

"Asking what Hume's view we regarding the problem of perception and existence of external world, I argue that he favoured a from of direct realism, taking external world to be whatever it is described by the laws of Newtonian mechanics and causes one's impressions. This is suggested by Hume's discussion of constancy and coherence in conjunction with metatherotical principles"[18].

Against above interpretations of Hume's position, one may present two interrelated arguments. The one which we have already discussed that the constancy and coherence of perceptions without the assumption of the existence of external substance can not provide the idea of external object. This is so because, in Hume's view constancy and coherence of perceptions can make mind to believe the existence of external object only and only if one assumes the continued and distinct existence of external object as we have already shown in our analysis that the formation of the idea of continued and distinct existence of external object is imagined one. The second argument which may be put forward is provided by E. E. Haris :

> "Constancy and coherence would then have distingerated and imaginative construction of an external world have been revealed as sheer fanrasy with shred of justification. It is however doubtful if we could stop there for if our impressions are nothing but particulars and all ideas are nothing but copies of them, no imaginative coustruction could be made"[19].

If one takes Haris analysis honestly the weight of Flage's interpretation would be last. This may be justified by Hume's epistemology and ontology. Epistemologically, he accepts only 'experience' as the source of knowledge and he defines 'experience' only in terms of fleelings impressions of human mind. Ontologically, he accepts only discrets and unconnected perceptions to be the only entities. Thus in his thinking what is left to be acceptable in only perceptions (idea and impression) of human mind. And all other existence (either external object or the self) constructed out of them b ideal laws of association and coherence and constancy through memory, imagination and customary transition. And no doubt, this is a position of subjective idealist thinker.

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17 Ibid.

18 Flage, Deniel E. David Hume's Theory of Mind, London, New York, Rautledge, p. 126.

19 Haris, E. E. Nature, Mind and modern Science. New Y Humanities Press, George Allen and Unwin, p. 18

3

The Relativity of Scientific Views of Reality

R. Puligandla

We will argue that the contemporary position in the philosophy of science that science enables us to know how the world really is (metaphysical and epistemological realism) is in principle untenable. We shall seek to show that scientific views may be understood and warranted only in terms of their efficacy in realizing the mundane purposes of man. Our position will be based on an examination and application of Nagarjuna's notion of the relativity of concepts, statements, and views of reality.[1] Let us therefore discuss the contemporary philosophy of science after explicating Nagarjuna's position.

Nagarjuna's position concerning the relativity of concepts follows from the Doctrine of Dependent Origination (pratityasamutpada). The latter has both conceptual and ontological interpretations. The ontological interpretation is that everything arises and ceases to be in dependence upon other things. Everything exists conditionally. Therefore there are no self-existent things. The conceptual interpretation is that all concepts arise and cease to be in dependence upon other concepts. Every concept is relative and mutually dependent. Hence no concept has meaning in terms of itself alone. And thus there can be no concept which has self meaning. Thus, for example,[2] there are only two ways any concept, say C, may be explicated. First, we may seek to explicate the meaning of C through itself. But this procedure would be trivial and tautologous since it results in our saying that C means C. Secondly, we may explicate the meaning of C through non-C concepts. This procedure is non-tautologous and significant since C is now stated in terms of concepts other then itself. No one can choose the first alternative to meaningfully understand a concept. For the intelligibility of a concept requires our bringing it in with other concepts, But the conceptual interpretation of Dependent Origination is logically connected to the ontological interpretation For concepts have referents or entities to which they refer. And since concepts are relative their referents are also relative This means that the impossibility of concepts having self-meaning implies the impossibility of their referents having self-existence. For referents are always grasped in terms of the relations between concepts. Thus there can be no meaningful talk of entities in the world apart from concepts which are mutually dependent and relative. And the relativily of concepts logically entails the relativity of their referents.

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[1] Nagarjuna (c. 200 A.D.) was the founder of the Madhyamika school of Buddhist philosophy. He authored, among other works, the *Mulamadhyamakakarikas*, on which we base our position. He has had a profound influence on both philosophy and religion in the Indian culture. Professor Heinrich Zimmer calls Nagarjuna one of the subtlest metaphysicians that the human race has produced (*Philosophies of India*. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 510). Although little or no implications for the philosophy of science have been drawn from Nagarjuna's position, his thought has had an increasing impact on western philosophy as evidenced by the flourish of recent discussions and translations in philosophical journals. Among the most authoritative works on his philosophy in western literature are T. R. V. Murtis *The Central Thought of Buddhism* and F. J Streng's *Emptiness : A Study in Religious Meaning*. I am particularly indebted to Professor R. Puligandla, physicist and philosopher, for my insights.

If the meaningfulness of concepts depends on their relation to other concepts, then statements formulated through concepts are also intelligible only insofar as they are relative to other statements. Hence the statement that such and so are physical entities is understandable inasmuch as it is possible to understand that such and so are non-physical entities, If the one is not intelligible, then neither is the other. Either both are intelligible or neither is. And the physical and non-physical entities to which the statements refer must be relative and mutually dependent as are their respective concepts. For the concepts of physical and non-physical entities are graspable only in terms of their respective mutually dependent concepts.

If statements formulated through relative concepts must themselves be relative for their intelligibility, then so must be views of reality which are formulated through statements. A view of reality is conceptual-linguistic construction purporting to explicate reality. But that no view of reality could be exclusively true follows from its being relative to other views. Thus, for example,[3] Parmenides propounded a view of reality in which it was held that reality is one and unchanging. Heraclitus opposed Parmenides by arguing that reality was flux and pure change. Nagarjuna would hold that the proponent of each view is wrong in arguing that his particular view of reality is absolutely and exclusively true. For taken by itself each view, a construction of statements and concepts, is meaningless. But brought in relation to one another each view is meaningful. Thus the concepts "change" and "many" of Heraclitus' view are not intelligible taken in isolation. They cannot be meaning-fully explicated without bringing in the concepts of "unchanging" and "one" of Parmenides' view. And Zeno's reductio ad absurdum argument which seeks to show that the assumptions of Heraclitus' view lead to contradiction have no force for Nagarjuna. Nagarjuna would hold that one could demonstrate with equal force that the assumptions of Parmenides' view also result in contradiction. The reductio ad absurdum argument, often used by Western thinkers to show the exclusive truth of the opposing view, is unwarranted for Nagarjuna. For here one seeks to establish the truth of view P by assuming not-P and deriving a contradiction. But by showing that not-P leads to contradiction one cannot thereby claim that P is true. For assuming that P alone is true also leads to contradiction. One would then contradictorily hold that both P and not-P are exclusively true. Nagarjuna shows the relativity of concepts constituting the view of reality and consequently the relativity and mutual dependence of the view. He thereby shows that the view is false from the standpoint of its proponent who claims that the view is absolutely and exclusively true. But Nagarjuna shows the relativity of the view without affirming either its falsity or its truth. Nagarjuna's procedure is the dialectic called "prasanga." It shows the relativity of concepts and statements and consequently the mutual dependence and relativity of views of reality formulated through statements and concepts.

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[2] Ramakrishna Puligandla, ' How Does Nagarjuna Establish the 'Relativity of All Views ?" (*Maha Bodhi*, Vol. 81, Nos. 5 and 6), p. 161.

Nagarjuna's demonstration of the relativity of views of reality is to be confused with neither skepticism nor nihilism. He is not a nihilist since he does not deny reality. Rather he denies the absolute and exclusive truth of any view of reality. Nagarjuna distinguishes names and forms (nama and rupa) which make up views of reality from reality itself. He holds that such terms as "true" and "false" are predicable of views of reality and not of reality independently of views. Reality simply is. It neither embodies names or forms nor itself is embodied by them. Further, Nagarjuna is not a skeptic. For by distinguishing between reality and views of it, it does not follow that Nagarjuna is skeptical of the usefulness of experience and reason, Rather he recognizes them with respect to the experienced

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3 Ibid., pp. 159-160.

world of phenomena. Views of reality, whether of the everyday world, science, or philosophy, are pragmatically warranted with regard to various realms of experience. The truth of views of reality is therefore relative, phenomenal and mundane. If a view is disregarded it is not because it is proven to be absolutely false, but rather because it is inapplicable for our purpose. Thus the Newtonian principle that nothing goes clean out of existence may be affected by developments in quantum physics. Yet Newtonian dynamics will still be useful for engineers in constructing buildings. An automobile driver is justified in acting as though he lived in a Newtonian universe. And surveyors are warranted in assuming, for practical purposes, the truth of an earth-centered astronomy. What is not justifiable or logically possible is to say what reality is like apart from relative concepts. In sum, Nagarjuna would argue that views of reality are relative to other views as statements and concepts are mutually dependent on other concepts and statements. What justifies a view of reality is not its showing the nature of ultimate reality, but its efficaciousness in realizing various purposes such as travelling in space, building bridges and so forth. Nagarjuna therefore rejects, not the usefulness of relative truth, but the pretensions of conventional wisdom, science and philosophy to be exclusively and absolutely true.

We have thus far discussed the Doctrine of Dependent Origination and its implication for Nagarjuna with respect to the relativity of concepts and their referents. We have argued that this entails the relativity of statements and views of reality. We have thus distinguished a view of reality which is a linguistic-conceptual entity from reality itself which is not. It has been shown that this leads neither to skepticism nor nihilism. Rather Nagarjuna recognizes the pragmatic value of views in dealing with experienced phenomena. This means for Nagarjuna that the truth of views is of a lower mundane sort and not of an absolute exclusive kind. We have argued that this in turn means that concepts, statements and views can neither intelligibly be taken in isolation nor have self-existent referents. Views of reality cannot therefore be taken as absolutely and exclusively true.

What has the relativity of views to do with the contemporary philosophy of science ? We have summarized Nagarjuna's position. Let us now apply it to a widely accepted perspective concerning recent work in the philosophy of science. We shall begin with an outline of what most contemporary philosophers and scientists perceive as the task of scientific views of reality. We shall then seek to show that this task is misguided. It belies the very conflation of reality with views of it which Nagarjuna sought to distinguish by his dialectic.

Let us begin with a quote from Frederick Suppe's *The Structure of Scientific Theories* which was an outgrowth of an international symposium on the structure of scientific theories held in Urbana, Illinois, March 26 to 29, 1969 ;

> Philosophy of science today......increasingly subscribes to the position that it is a central aim of science to come to knowledge of how the world *really* is, that correspondence between theories and reality is a central aim of science as an epistemic enterprise and crucial to whatever objectivity scientific knowledge enjoys......This has led to an emphatic belief that an adequate philosophy of science must embrace a "hard-nosed' metaphysical and epistemological realism wherein how the world *is* plays a decisive role in the epistemic efforts and achievements of science.[4]

We may say at the start that how the world really is for science, is at bottom, a foregone conclusion. It is a foregone conclusion since a necessary presupposition for the intelligibility of all scientific inquiries is that every event has a cause. Such an assumption is necessary to predict and to manipulate phenomena. And an elliptical way of expressing the statement that every event has a cause is through the concept of "determinism." How the world really is for contemporary science must therefore be, in the most fundamenlal sense, deter ministic. If we can thus show in light of Nagarjuna's dialectic that is absurd to say of the world that it is unqualifiedly deterministic, we shall show the misguidedness of recent philosophy of science. We shall seek to show that the contemporary philosophy of science is mistaken by showing that "determinism" is a conceptually necessary feature, not of the world itself, but of scientific views of the world. Further we will seek to reject the recent perspective of many philosophers and scientists by showing the relativity of scientific views and by examining the structure of scientific theory itself. Scientific theories or deterministic views of reality are formulated for our purpose of understanding and manipulating phenomena with the view of realizing some end. The end may be constructing buildings, curing cancer, or travelling to stars. It is therefore we who treat phenomena deterministically for this reason. Insofar as phenomena are intelligible and manipulable through scientific theory, we may suppose for our purpose that phenomena are deterministic· But let us recall that we do not first know that phenomena are deterministic and then construct views of it. Rather we have no way of knowing what phenomena are like a priori and apart from a view of it. And how we view phenomena is in part a function of our purpose and of the concepts, statements and views we formulate in light of our purpose. If our purpose is to manipulate phenomena, say, construct buildings, then we must assume that things do not occur randomly, without reason, and unpredictably. But this assumption, which leads to the supposition of determinism, is a presupposition of our view of reality. It is not a concept predicable of reality apart from our view of it. The concept of determinism was adopted in the first place to manipuiate phenomena. Nagarjuna would remind us that we do not look into reality apart from our concepts. Rather we organize our experience in a certain way in terms of certain concepts, say, "determinism," with respect to our purpose. Again the notions of "determinism," "truth," "validity',and so forth are predicable of statements and views of reality and not of reality itself.

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[4] *The Structure of Scientific Theories*, Ed. F. Suppe (Urbana, Illinois : University of Illinois Press, 1979), pp. 648-649.

If "truth," "falsity," and "soundness" are predicable of relative statements and views of reality and not of reality itself, then no view can reveal any absolute truth about the world itself. Hence the proponent of one scientific view of reality could not claim the absolute and exclusive truth of his view. The proponent of Newtonian physics, which relies on Euclidean geometry, could not exhaustively explicate the concept of "straight line,' without bringing in the concept of Einsteinian physics, which rests upon non-Euclidean geometry, of a line which is other than straight. Each physics applies its geometry to physical space and time. But neither physics can meaningfully explicate its concepts, say C_1, C_2, C_3......C_K, without bringing in non-C concepts say non-C_1, non C_2, non-C_3......non-C_K. Thus if the scientific view is formulated of C concepts, it may state that "x is a straight line." But this statement is intelligible only insofar as it is possible to understand "y is a non-straight line" with respect to a scientific view formulated through non-C coneepts. If one of the statements formulated through C concepts is intelligible, then the other constructed through non-C concepts must also be intelligible. Indeed, one set of concepts relies for its meaningfulness on the other set of concepts Either both statements and set of concepts are understandable or neither is. Nagarjuna would argue that if concepts are relative and mutually dependent, then so are statements constructed of concepts. And if scientific views are formulated through relative statements and concepts, then scientific views must themselves be mutually dependent and relative. And what is relative and mutually dependent cannot be absolutely and exclusively true.

But the relativity of concepts, statements, and views logically entails the relativity of the entities or referents in the world to which those views refer. Thus one scientific view will have concept C_1 which has referent R_1, and another scientific view will have concept non-C_1

which has referent non-R_1. O rsaying that R_1 and non-R_1 are relative means that they are not mutually exclusive and self-existent entities. Rather they are entities which can be understood with respect only to the relation between C_1 and non C_1 concepts. The referents, say substance and non-substance, could not be independent of one another since then C_1 and non-C_1 to which the referents correspond could then have no relation. And if C_1 and non C_1 had no relation, we could not unpack the meanings of non-C_1 and C_1. C_1 and non-C_1 would then have no meaning and we could not intelligibly speak of entities to which they refer. But if referents were self-existent and independent of other referents, then they would have to be independent of interdependent concepts. They would then exist before and after their respective concepts were adopted and abandoned. But if this was the case how could we account for the fact that "black holes" are referents of relativistic physics, and had no existence in pre-relativistic physics? But this non-existence could not occur if concepts have self-existent referents. Referents which are self-existent imply concepts which have self-meaning, But we have argued that a concept can be explicated through itself only on pain of being trivial and tautologous. If a concept is not to be explicated in a tautologous manner, then it must bring in concepts other than itself. If it does this, then it is relative and mutually dependent, And what is mutually dependent and relative can correspond, not to what is absolute and independent, but only to that which is itself dependent. Hence the relativity of concepts, statements, and views logically entails the relativity of their referents. To think otherwise is to think that independent self-meaning concepts have self-existent referents. But as we have shown there can be no talk of referents independently of concepts, and there can be no meaningful explication of a concept, say C, without bringing in non-C concepts. The relativity of concepts therefore precludes the intelligibility of the notion of self-existent entities. If there can be no self-existent entities, then there can be no intelligible talk of one set of entities to which a view refers being alone real and existent. And if no scientific view can have referents which are alone real, then no scientific view can alone show what reality is like.

We have discussed the relativity of scientific views, and of "determinism" as a relative concept in light of Nagarjuna's dialectical logic. Let us now examine the logical structure of scientific views with respect to Nagarjuna's position.

Scientific views yield theoretical state descriptions or predictions, say b_3, which follow logically from an initial theoretical state description, say b_2 take with a set of substantive axioms, say Ao, and the rules of logical deducibility, sayT/L in the vocabulary of some theory, sat T_0. This may be summarized by the deductive schema $b_1 \wedge A_0$ T/L b_2. Thus it is not mere reports of sense perceptions that make phenomena intelligible, manipulable, and predictable. Rather it is taking our observations in the form of empirical state descriptions, transposing the latter into theoretical idealizations (b_1), and taking b_1 with some set of scientific laws (A_0), which make phenomena predictable and manipulable. But the concepts of empirical state descriptions as well as those of their theoretical idealizations (b_1 and c_2) and laws (A_0) are relative concepts. Further the laws themselves, say "All matter is such that it can neither be created nor destroyed,‚, have the logical from (x) ($S_X \rightarrow P_X$). Such laws cannot be definitively verified or falsified empirically in terms of any amount of transpositions of theoretical state descriptions (b_2) into empirical state descriptions. Thus, how could any scientific view be absolutely and exclusively true if its substantive axioms cannot be definitively verified and its theoretical concepts are relative and mutually dependent ? Finally, the very theoretical concepts and laws in the vocabulary of a theory T_0 that we impose on phenomena will depend on our purpose and physical location with respect to the world we observe. If our purpose is to construct buildings and if our physical location to phenomena is the everyday world about us, we may assume the theoretical concepts and laws of Newtonian physics. But what sense would it make to say of our theory that it alone is true of phenomena? The theory is justified not by showing what reality is really like, but by its usefulness with respect to realizing our purpose, namely constructing buildings. If scientific views are not able to explicate and manipulate phenomena with respect to our purpose, then they are deemed inapplicable with regard to the circumstances in question. What justification could there be for holding a theory other than its efficaciousness and explicative power with respect to phenomena which we seek to manipulate for various purposes ? Our analysis is consistent with Nagajuna's notion that the truth of all views of reality are of a lower mundane sort. Nagarjuna does not reject the usefulness of experience and reason, but only the pretension that views of reality formulated through reason and experiences nan reveal ultimate reality. Such views are not absolutely and exclusively true, but relatively true and useful in the mundane realm of experienced phenomena,

We have thus far discussed the logical structure of scientific theories, the relativity of scientific views, and "determinism" as a relative concept which is presupposed for the intelligiblity of scientific inquiries. Let us in closing expand upon what is meant by view, or system of knowledge about phenomena, in light of Nagarjuna's distinction between reality and views of it.

Our knowledge of phenomena is always relative to some preceptual-conceptual (categorial) framework, say Newtonian physics, behavioral psychology and so forth. That is, it is through the categorial activity of the mind that we apprehend a classifiable, understandable, and knowable world of objects, processes, properties, and relations.[5] Consequently we construct sets of propositions linked by rules of in inference which comprise the various systems of knowledge about phenomena. Thus knowledge as a set of propositions must be free from contradiction and be comprised of a coherent orderly connection among its components. Again, these logical connections binding a set of propositions are the rules of inference and they are part of the categorial framework. They are themselves formulated by man for the intelligibility of the system of knowledge. But the rules of inference are no more inherent in phenomena independently of man's conceptual activity than are the empirical and theoretical propositions they bind together. Such laws and propositions are not, as Newton thought his laws of nature were, built into the very fabric of the cosmos itself. Now freedom from contradiction is a necessary but not sufficient condition for truth, since no proposition in the system should be self-contradictory and no contradiction should be derivable from the conjunction of two or more propositions within the system.[6] But the principle of non-contradiction was not bestowed upon man by phenomena. Rather it is man who formulates it and requlres all knowledge claims to be in accordance with it. The principle of non-contradiction is therefore an epistemological and not an ontological principle, since it pertains to propositions which always arise in some view of reality formulated by man with respect to his purpose. The principle of non-contradiction does not pertain to referents or entities in the world apart from man. Indeed what cognitive significance could an entity have independently of man's concepts and principles? We do not demand that a tree abide by the principle of non-contradiction. Rather we demand of our statements about trees that they conform to the principle of non-contradiction. And thus it is misguided to ask what phenomena are like apart from man's relative concepts and views. It is phenomena which comprise the very referents

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5 Ramkrishna Puligandla, "Determinism and Freedon in Indian Philosophy : A Comparative Analysis." This was the lead paper presented by Professor Puligandla, a physicist and philosopher, at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, San Diego, March 1979.

6 Ibid., p. 12.

which correspond to relative concepts. Nagarjuna would argue that where there are no relative concepts there can be no intelligible talk of phenomena. Nagarjuna would question how the world could be conceived apart from a relative view of it. And what, he would ask, is to determine the acceptance of a view other than its efficacy with respect to realizing a purpose ?

In conclusion, the application of Nagarjuna's insight to scientific views of reality shows that science will never demonstrate what the world is really like. Science cannot reveal ultimate reality. We have argued that scientific views of reality are formulated through relative and mutually dependent concepts and statements. Statements and concepts which are relative make up views of reality. Hence scientific views of reality are themselves relative. Consequently they are dependent for their clarification and intelligibility upon other views. And if scientific views of reality are mutually dependent, then no particular view can be exclusively and absolutely true: This in turn means that no scientific view can alone say how the world really is. For Nagarjuna the world is neither rational nor non-rational. Rather it simply is, and is never ultimately graspable through names and forms which comprise views of reality. The truth of contemporary scientific views belongs to the mundane practical realm. We have therefore concluded that, for Nagarjuna, scientific views are warranted only in terms of their usefulness in realizing the mundane purposes of man.

4

Transmigration Without A Self

Rama Datta

> Hindus play with logic and epistemology at least as early as Parmenides and Zeno of Elea; the Upanishads delve into metphysics and Buddha propounds a very modern psychology some centuries before Scorates is born.[1]

The Buddha came surprisingly close to David Hume and many other modern minds in denying most of our favorite metaphysical concepts. He denied the existence of a thinking entity or ego principle which is commonly called soul-substance and reduced the Upanisadic concept of substantive ego to a phenomenal aggregate of five inter dependent elements called 'Skandhas'[2]. The so-called precious 'self' is nothing but a mere continuity of flickering mental states.

It is quite obvious that such a view would preclude the possibillity of an immortal soul for immortality necessitates the persistence of an identical self, Will Durant seems to be troubled by the Buddhist concept of rebirth and finds it hard to reconcile Buddha's rationalistic psychology with his uncritical acceptance of reincarnation. Luis de la vallee Poussin, who joins Durant in briniging the affinity between David Hume and Gautama Buddha into the limelight discovers similar contradiction involved in the affirmation of moral responsibility on the one hand and a soulless Skandha Theory on the other. In many Buddhist text especially in the Jatakas the personal character of reward and responsibility is depicted quite vividly. The problem is : If there is no individual self existing, who is to take the moral responsibility of an action ?

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[1] Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization*, Part I (New York ; Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 936.

[2] In Gautama Buddha's Terminology, a person can be analysed into five groups or aggregates (Skandhas). They are rupa (bodily form), vedanta (feeling), samjna (conceptual knowledge), Samaskara (synthetic mental states and functions of compound sense affections) and vijnana or consciousness.

T. W. Rhys Davids describes the situation as a deadlock.[3] Buddhism rejects the notion of a soul in order to save what it holds to be a psychological myth. But to save what it holds to be the necessity of justice, it retains the belief in trans-migration. Indeed the question of transmigration has haunted Buddhism from very early times. How to reconcile the doctrine of no-self (anatta or anatman) with the belief in transmigration ? A possible answer to this question was offered by a theory[4] which received quite a fair approval. It suggests that according to the Buddha, there is no transmigration, no passage from one life to another. There is, however, a rebirth of a new heir or inheritant. When an individual dies, both his physical and psychical life come to an end. But the efficient force of his acts which the dead individual has acquired and awaits results' originates another individual who is to inherit karma of the dead individual. This is a sort of 'migration of the character' as C. A. F. Rhys Davids puts it. "So might a man," says Rhys Davids, "murdered as he called for help on the telephone, have set going elsewhere, by his last words, a whole series of actions."[5] Thus a series of psycho-physical states can lead to a completely different psycho-physical series. The early Buddhists who seemed to have accepted the apparent contradiction, did not offer any solution but later, with the development of philosophical concepts like 'causation' and 'continuity' and especially with the compliation of the famos Buddhist compendium the Abhidharmakosha, the Buddhists finally clarified their position.

My claim is that the Abhidharmika interpretation of self (which I call the Santana or serial view of self) reconciles the no-self theory with transmigration. The Abhidharmika analysis reduces the concept of self into a number of discrete but related moment-events without the 'atman' in the background. Theee events are momentary even though they condition one another and thus from a 'series' or 'Santan', As Stefan Anaekar contends[6], the Abhidharmika analysis of a conventional statement like 'X is in a bad mood now would be a series of consciousness-moments corresponding to a materiality-series such that the consciousness-moments are accompanied by unfavorable feeling and volition-moments arising from impluse moments resulting in recurrent anger moments. The result is an abolition of the so-called self and a recognition that the concept of 'self' and 'others' are mere complexes of momentary phenomena which are changing constantly and are following one another in a series.

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[3] On Nirvana and on the Buddhists Doctrines of the "Groups", the sankharas, karma and the "paths", *The Contemporary Review* XXIX (1877). pp. 249 270.

[4] Summarized in "Rebirth is Not Transmigration", H, C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations* (New York : Atheneum, 1963). p. 234

[5] C.A.F. Rhys Davids. *Buddhist Psychology*, London: (George Bell and Sons, 1914), p. 25.

[6] Charles Prebish, Ed. by *Buddhism*: *A Modern Perspective*, (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), p. 62.

The four great masters of the Maha-vibhasa, Ghosaka, the Bhadanta Dharmatrata and Buddhadeva all accepted the basic Abhidharmika position; but they had serious differences of opinion as to the nature of the psychological moment-events. Thus Ghosaka speaks of psycholigical events concomitant to every conscious moment, while Bhadamta vasumitra does not and instead introduces a subtle citta (subtle mind).

One of the four major philosophical schools of Buddhism, Vaibhasika, is founded upon the Mahavibhas which mostly expounds Bhadanta Vasumitra's viewpoint. In the fourth century A. D., an orthodox Vaibhasiko named Sanghabhadra Presents arguments in favor of the Baibhasika thought in his 'Abhidharma Nyayanusara. Conteovesies start when Vasubandhu (who was originally a Sautrantika[7]) gives an unparalleld exposition of the Vaibhasika view in his "Abhidharmakosa" and demolishes it completely from a Sautrantika standpoint. His presentation is powerful that in spite of a furious retaliation by the opponents, Abhidharmakosa becomes the only attainable position and Vaibhasika itself starts losing its importance.

Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa opens with a sloka which says that in order to achieve salvation or mukti, one should have a thorough understanding of the elements which are operative in our life cycle. Vasubaudhu then gives a brilliant exposition of the elements along with their classification and products. As Stcherbatsky rightly points out, in this analysis of elements, there is no mention of any permanent principle called self or soul. Consciousness is mentioned as important, but it is merely an impermanent thing. Upon concluding his analysis, Vasubadhu devotes a special appendix to the controversial question about the Buddhist denial of the existence of self.

The appendix starts with a warning that acceptance of an erroneous view of self would make salvation impossible. The term 'self' or 'soul' is only a conventional world as applied to what is a mere flux of elements. The view that the soul is a reality totally independent and eternal is the root of all evils.

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[7] Sautrantika is one of the twelve different schools which came into existence during the first half of the reign of Emperor Asoka (300 B.C.). Scholars like Keith & Hiriyana consider Kumarlabha (A. D. 200) to be the founder of the Sautrantika school in a systematic form.

The fact that it is actually a mere flux of elements is based on two observations. Firstly, there is no direct perception of an independent self or soul (independent of the elements of color, sound, smell etc.).

Secondly, no inferences is possible as to the existence of an eternal entity called the self (like the existence of the five senses which is known by inferences).

In section XII of the appendix, in an interesting dialogue between Vasubandhu and Vatsiputriya, a Vaibhasika, Vatsiputriya introduces the question of transmigration without a self. If there is no individual existing, who is it then that transmigrates ? Vasubandhu has already examined the expression 'individual' and has declared that it has only a nominal existence rather than an actual one since something can have an actual existence only if it exists by itself or it has an essence of its own. The individual does not have any such essence and it exists only as a combination of elements.

In answer to Vatsiputriya's question, Vasubandhu asks Vatsiputriya a counter question : 'Exactly how does one migrste ?' Vatsiputriya replies saying that the self transmigrates by leaving one set of elements behind and taking up a new set of elements. Vasubandhu rejects the answer and says life goes on like a moving fire which consumes a prairie. The fire disappears at every moment; yet it is called a moving fire on account of its continuity. In a similar fashion, a multitude of sets of elements move on and wander to future birth and death because of craving for life; however, there is no 'same' set of elements which passes from former to a later existence. The multitude of set of elements are, therefore, without any ego, even though we give them conventional names, 'living beings'.

Vatsiputriya objects that if the elements are not the same, then the Buddha's statement that he was 'Sunetra' in one of his past existences would be meaningless. Vasubandhu explains that what the Buddha meant was that his past and present belong to the same lineage of mementary existences' he never meant to say that the elements of past did not disappear and continued to be the same. In common parlance, we say 'it is the same fire which consumed that object and now has reached this object.' We fail to observe the fact that the fire is not the same through out the different moments of existence; at every moment, it is a different fire.

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8 Theodore Stcherbatsky, *The Soul Theory of the Buddhists*, (Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasan, 1970), p. 2,

The word 'transmigration' has a special meaning in the Buddhist vocabulary. It does not mean transmigration of soul : it rather implies rebirth or rebecoming of elements. L. A. de Silva warns :

> The Buddhist belief in rebirth or rather rebecoming must be distinguished from the Hindu belief in a transmigrating soul... The Buddhist teaching is that tanha (thirst, desire, craving), which manifests itself in various ways, is that which gives rise to rebirth. It is the will to live, to exist, to reexist; it is clinging to existence, striving for existence by way of good or bad actions (Kusalakusalakamma). There is no end to the stream of becoming as long as Karma persists.[9]

'Karma' means action. The Buddhists believe in a strict law of Karma. Good results follow good actions and bad actions lead to bad effects. The law of Karma is an exemplification of the law of Pratityasamutpada (the law of causation) The law of Karma operates by itself; every Karma has the potentiality to produce its due effect. The Dhammapada says : "The fruit of a deed is three fold, it may arise here and now, or later, or in a successionof lives".[10] The wheel of Karma goes on in an unending cycle until the Samsara (life flux) comes to an end by being transmuted into Nirvana

As long as the Karma-cycle continues, a being will be born in different stats of existence in accordance with his actions. Nyanatiloka Mahathera describes one's present life process (uppattibhava) is an "objectification of the correspondig prenatal Karma-process (Kammabhava)" and the future life process, as an "objectification of the corresponding present Karma-process." "Thus, nothing," says Nyanatiloka, "transmigrates from one life to the next."[11]

Consciousness perishes at death: but before it dies away, it kindles the flame of another consciousness. Thus in a way, the newborn life-fiux inherits all past experiences. However, the new life flux is a new set of elements; it is neither absolutely alike the past elements, being completely different in its structure and composition, nor is it totally different from the past life-flux, being in the same lineage of Karma-energy.

L. A. de Silva delineates some Buddhist similes which are very appropriate in this regard.[12]

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[9] L. A. de Silva, *Self in Buddhism. The Problem of Self in Buddhism and Christianity.* (New York: Barnes & Noble) 1970, p. 37.

[10] *Dhammapada* 1 & 2 as quoted by L. de Silva, p. 38.

[11] Nyantiloka Mahathera, *Karma and Rebirth*, (Ceylon: Buddhist Publicatication Society) p. 2.

[12] L. A. de Silva, *Self in Buddhism*, p. 40.

(a) Like a seal pressed upon wax at the moment of death the Karma-energy of a person is passed over to the soft wax of a new existence in another womb.

(b) When a man lights a light from another, one light does pass to the other.

(c) A sound produces air-vibrations which, by impinging on the accoustic organ of another man, produce a sound, which is purely a subjective sensation. No transmigration of a sound-sensation takes place (eg. echo)

(d) A wave hastens over the ocean surface, rising and falling each time by the transmission of energy. One wave does not pass into the other, but the impact of the one gives rise to the other.

What is clear from all these is that the transition of the life-flux is immediate. Rebirth takes place instantaneously when one conscious act passes away and another conscious act arises. But the latter does not come into being from the previous one; it's rather the cause contained in the former existence that conditions the present existence. The causal process consists in transmission of potentiality. The proper idea is of some sort of continuity, not identity. There is no agent, but action, no perceiver, but preceptions.

Now, if rebirth means rebecoming, as we have just seen and if there is no identifiable self to rebecome who is to take the burden of morat responsibility ? The Buddhist answer is that there is moral responsibility, because there is a continuity in the process. The successive elements in as eries belong to the same strain of Karma-energy. Moral responsibility is transferred from one element to another, and Karma potentiality belongs to no one else but the successive elements in the stream of life. Thus the theory of rebirth is fully in accord with the doctrine of moral responsibility if we use the word 'rebirth' as rebecoming of elements and not rebirth of the individual. The Buddha does not believe in the permanence of the individual soul and hence he cannot accept the Hindu concept of transmigration of the soul at death to a new body. But he believes in moral responsibility and the consequences of all our actions. Transmigration, for the Buddha means transmission of the consequences to succeeding generations.

Such transmission or transfer of moral responsibility through the relating elements avoids the heresy of wrong personalism as there is no idea of self and consequently no idea of 'mine'. Salvation is not far removed as there is no passionate bond of selfhood in the series of elements, nothing at all to corrupt the life cycle.

5

Swami Vivekananda's Gospel of Universal Religion : A Reconceptualisation of Global Spiritual Unity

Kiran Ramachandran Nair

INTRODUCTION :

The last decade has been one of tremendous upheaval and change altering the globe on all fronts. It has been an era of unifications and disintegrations. We have witnessed a rather disjointed German Unification. The disintegrtion of Soviet Union is another shocking event of the decade. Rapid advances in Science and technology has shrunk the world into a global village. Time and space present no barriers and this has led to a confluence of people and ideas as never before in history. But humanity has yet to awaken to the call of the spirit and discover the underlying thread of spiritual unity that binds mankind to Mother Earth.

Violence fuelled by religious fundamentalism and fanaticism has almost singlehandedly spelt doom in many parts of the world and its flames threaten to engulf the whole human race. Never before has the world felt an overpowering need to give great priority to inter-religious dialogue which is essential in bringing about a reconceptualization of religion, spirituality and usher in an era of peace and Universal brotherhood.

It is at this crucial juncture that we recall with great reverence Swami Vivekananda who was undoubtedly the first prophet to define thoroughly and teach explicitly the unity of all religions. In one of his earliest poems, much before his world famous Chicago Address, he gives expression to the global spiritual unity as revealed by Mother Earth to her children.

The moon's soft light, the stars so bright
The glorious orb of day.

He shines in them His beauty might.
Reflected lights are they.
The majestic morn, the melting eve.
The boundless billowy sea
In nature's beauty, songs of birds
I see through them it is He.[1]

It is a century since Swami Vivekananda's historic address at the world Parliament of Religions at Chicago on 11th September 1893. It was there that he unfurled the banner of a unique Universal Religion By embracing Buddha's great heart and incorporating it in his message to the world he set afire a philosophy that had grown cold through lack of heart, through a lack of spirit of service to others.[2]

He saw the shrinking of the globe with his prophetic eye—economically, politically, socially and culturally and realized, that this interweaving would be a fragile unity without spiritual unity among religions. Romain Rolland has perhaps given the best statement of the impact of Swami Vivekananda's Gospel of Universal Religion on the world when he said :

"But the flame of that pyre is still alight today. From his ashes, like those of the Phoenix of old has sprung anew the conscience of India—the magic bird-faith in her unity and in the Great Message, brooded over from Vedic times by the dreaming spirit of his ancient race—the message for which it must render account to the rest of mankind."[3]

As we stand in the present, amidst diverse revelations of discord, Swami Vivekananda's Gospel holds promise of a renaissance of the human heart that will transcend the barriers of fanaticism and exclusiveness into a communion of Universal Brotherhood.

SWAMI VIVEKANANDA'S GOSPEL OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION :

Swami Vivekananda's early life is very much akin to the plight of the present day despairing mass of humanity whose storm-tossed minds doubt the very existence of God. His all-encompassing love and justice. But it is his transformation into a blazing sun which dispelled the last vestige of ignorance and delusion and his ascent to the apogee of spiritual glory that has left an indelible mark on the world horizon as a 'Prophet of a New Dispensation'.[4]

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[1] Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial Volume, Calcutta, 1963, p. 549.

[2] Burke, Marie Louise, Swami Vivekananda in America : New Discoveries, Calcutta : Advaita Ashrama, 1958, p. 589.

[3] Rolland, Romain, The life of Vivekananda and the Universal Gospel. Calcutta, Advaita Ashrama, 1953, p. 7.

[4] Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial volume, Op. Cit, P. 88

The nineteenth Century saw the birth of the great mystic saint and genius, Sri Ramakrishna who made it his mission to and all religious quarrels and bring mankind to the realisation that God was the all-pervading spirit of the Universe. It was at the feet of this great teacher that Swami Vivekananda rediscovered the meaning of God as a universal and ultimate Reality.

Sri Ramakrishna heralded an epoch making Hindu renaissance which influenced a general spiritual upheaval all over the world. His intensity and diversity of spiritual experiences led to the discovery of a wonderful spirit of catholicism which would spread all over the globe and liberalize all communal and sectarian views. His advent marks a new era in the evolution of religion characterised by the preservation of identity of all communities and their faiths and aims to achieve a harmony that transcends exclusiveness and narrow ideas: This would indeed pave the way for a Universal Brotherhood among all the children of Mother Earth.

Sri Ramakrishna passed away in 1886 leaving Naren, his beloved disciple, to carry his message to the world. In a short span of sixteen years before his passing away in 1902, Swami Vivekananda touched vast multitudes by his love and compassion. He bridged the gap between the East and the West and with his stature as a world spiritual teacher acted as an ambassador on earth, promoting international unity, peace and the most important goal of a Universal Religion.

Swami Vivekananda's form of address comes as a shock initially to mankind labouring under the ages of conditioning which reduced it to the label 'Sinners'. Addressing the gathering at the Parliament of Religions in a lofty strain he announces: "Ye are the children of God, the sharers of immortal bliss, holy and perfect beings. Ye divinities on earth—..."[5] It fills man with renewed hope and a fresh energy in his quest for God and truth. Swamiji began the process of reconditioning mankind by constantly reminding it of the divinity of the soul and the unity of existence. He elevates man to the highest symbol of God and preached that the worship of man was to be the greatest worship on earth. This is indeed a revolutionary idea in the present age where man in his ignorance is constantly searching for spiritual peace outside rather than directing this search within himself.

Dwelling on the necessity of religion and its applications to solve problems, he convincingly advances that; "Of all the forces that have worked and are still working to mould the destinies of the human race, none certainly, is more potent than that, the manifestation of which we call religion... and the greatest cohesive impulse ever brought into play amongst human units has been derived from this power"[6]. It has been proved time and again that the mighty spiritual saprising ceaselessly from its silent reservoir is capable of mobilising such spiralling energy as no other source.

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[5] The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, (Hereafter as C. W.) Calcutta : Advaita Ashrama, 1985, Vol. 1, p. 11.

In his lectures, Swami Vivekananda repeatedly proclaimed that the Kingdom of heaven was already in existence if we would have it, the perfection was already in man if he would see it. Just as the law of gravitation existed before its discovery, so also the laws that govern the spiritual world exist unknown or forgotten by man. "The moral, ethical and spiritual relations between soul and soul and individual spirits and the Father of all spirits were there before their discovery and would remain even if we forgot them."[7] There is no new truth left to be discovered by man in religion, it has all been known just as all religions claim of a unity within us. But it is our duty to realize this perfect unity that is lying buried deep in human nature and bring it to the fore. Man's progress on the spiritual plane will commence when he opens his eyes to a Universal Religion which is existing just as the Universal Brotherhood of mankind.

His gospel aims to propogate a religion which is a perfect blend of the philosophic, emotional and mystic elements and is yet equally conducive to action. In his paper on "Hinduism" he spoke of unity as truth which was the same light coming through glasses of different colours. He opined that religious thought was ingrained in man's very constitution and it was impossible for man to give up religion until he could give up his mind and body, until he could give up thought and life. It is this thinking that has given rise to a struggle which has resulted in different forms of religion. But "amidst this chaos there is harmony, throughout these discordant sounds there is a note of concord, and he who is prepared to listen to it will catch the tone."[8]

It was at the Parliament of Religions that he proclaimed for the first time the necessity for a new and enlightened religion based on universal understanding and tolerance. He defines his unique synthesis of a Universal Religion as one "which will have no location in place or time which will be infinite like the God it will preach...which in its catholicity will embrace in its infinite arms and find a place for every human being......and whose whole scope, whose whole force, will be centered in aiding humanity to realize its own true, divine nature."[9] This expanded vision coupled with boundless energy gives mankind a new lense of life in a more unified and glorious world.

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[6] Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial Volume, Op. Cit, P. 298.

[7] C. W., Vol· 1, P. 7.

[8] Swami Lokeshwarananda (Ed.). The Perennial Vivekananda : A Selection, Sahitya Academy, 1988, pp 84-85.

While advocating the doctrine of a true harmony of religions he exorts man to free himself from the shackles that bind him in religious narrowness and bring down the walls that surround his faith, isolating him from others. Only then could man be more receptive to the spiritual thoughts of all great religions. Variations in religious faiths should be tempered by tolerance to achieve a harmonious and everlasting unity among people of different temperatures and attitudes.

Swami Vivekananda's philosophy of Universal Religion is a delightful fusion of the natural and the spiritual. "As rain falling upon a mountain flows in various streams down the sides of the mountain, so all the energies you see here are from that one Unit."[10] This gentle rain showers itself on Mother Earth and flows as numerous streams of water. These separate streams have assumed distinct identities as reflected by different religious ideologies. But these little meandering streams ultimately converge in the mighty ocean just as all religions are destined to bring us to the fountain of all bliss-God. The same idea is expressed by Swamiji when he says that "all the various forms of cosmic energy such as matter, thought, force, intelligence and so forth are simply manifestations of that cosmic intelligence, or......the Supreme Lord. Everything you see, feel or hear, the whole Universe, is His creation; or to be a little more accurate, is His projection; or to be still more accurate. is the Lord Himself."[11] He empowers man with extraordinary vision in his efforts to achieve unity whatever be the divine form-the Brahman, Buddha, Christ, Allah, or the Spirit of Mother Earth.

Vedanta alone was suited to become the universal religion of man as it provided a common meeting ground for all ideologies. The central ideal of Swami Vivekananda's Vedanta is Oneness. Accordingly, "there are no two in anything, no two lives. There is but one life, One World, One Existence, everything is that One, the difference is in degree and not in kind."[12] It is we who look upon this One In-

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9 Burke, Marie Louise, Op. Cit., p. 583.

10 Swami Vivekananda, Jnana Yoga, Calcutta : Advaita Ashrama. 1981. P. 197.

11 Ibid, P. 241.

12 Swami Vivekananda, Practical Vedanta, Calcutta : Advaita Ashrama, 1991, p. 11.

finite Existence in different froms and under different names and create all images on this vast cosmic canvas. Swamiji's Neo-Vedanta inspires man to see God in everything and as everything. The earth and the heaven, fire and sun, the moon, the stars and the Water are all forms of that One Infinite existence. He quotes from the Upanishads to give man a glimpse of the manifestation of cosmic energy in Mother Earth. "He is in all that moves; He is in all that is pure; He fills the Universe in manifesting himself in all these various forms. As air coming into this universe manifests itself in various forms, even so, the one Soul of all souls, of all beings, is manifesting himself in all forms."[13]

Three central truths dominate Swami Vivekananda's philosophy of Vedanta. Firstly, the real nature of man was divine; secondly the manifestation of this divine nature was to be the goal of human life; thirdly all religions were like the many pearls strung harmoniously on God's necklace.[14] The duty of Vedanta was to harmonise all aspirations and uncover the golden thread of unity by manifesting the similarities between all the religions of the world, however great or small they may be. His Universal Religion would "show the spirituality of the Hindus, mercifulness of the Buddhists, the activity of the Christians, the brotherhood of the Mohammedans"[15] in practical life. Swamiji's concept of Universal Religion not only teaches the fundamentals of tolerance but also defines the principles that would embrace all religions and constitute a lasting unity.

Sister Nivedita, his greatest disciple, in her tribute to Swami Vivekananda asserts that he was the first to formulate the basic character of Hinduism as an integrated system of thought and a way of life in the modern age. He filled the void in the realm of spiritual thought by reconstructing abstract and bewildering ideas into a new approach which conceived of a fusion of all faiths and cultures into one entity, claiming the homage of the entire human race.

In his lecture on " Unity, the Goal of Religion" delivered in New York (1896) he established the eternal relation between the soul and God when he pointed out that religion permeates the whole of man's life, not only the present, but the past, present and future "A straight line infinitely projected becomes a circle, it returns to the starting

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13 Swami Vivekananda, Jnana Yoga, Calcutta, Advaita Ashrama, 1981, p 197.

14 Kapoor, Satish. K., Cultural contact and Fusion: Swami Vivekananda in the West (1893-96), Jalandhar: ABS Publications, 1987, p. 296.

15 C.W., Vol 8, pp. 79-80.

point You must end where you begin and as you began in God, you must go back to God."[16] It is this eternal relation which raises man to eternal life. Religion has made man what he is, and will make of this human animal a God.

His constructive genius can be appreciated by the perfect equilibrium and synthesis of his gospel of universal religion. Swami Vivekananda was like a dazzling comet who appeared on the spiritual horizon instinctively resolving the dissonances of life into a Mozartian harmony, as rich and sweet as the Music of the spheres. He asks of man, "why take a single instrument from the great orchestra of the earth ? Let the grand symphony go on......"[17] If mankind can discover this harmony, it would be the omega of all progress.

MOVING TOWARDS A RECONCEPTUALISATION OF GLOBAL SPIRITUAL UNITY :

The realisation that no nation could be an exclusive self sufficient island has led to a growing interdependence among nations. The shrinking of the world into a 'global village' reflects as intermingling of ideas, cultures, customs, traditions and aims of all peoples. Swami Vivekananda visualised the emergence of a new civilisation created by an integration of a variety of diverse elements, which would have the potential for the highest development in all spheres. But no civilisation could prosper to attain such a state unless the torture and terror unleashed in the name of religion would cease. The world was waiting for the grand idea of universal tolerance. Swami Vivekananda has taught man not mere tolerance but acceptance of all faiths. Says he: "The other idea the world wants from us today................. is the eternal grand idea of the spiritual oneness of the whole universe ....Behind that idea of the unity of the whole show, the real soul is one. There is but one soul throughout the universe, all is but one Existence......... It is the one great life-giving idea which the world wants from us today."[18] This was precisely his message to the world. In his numerous lectures, Swami Vivekananda brings humanity under a giant umbrella of a single family by emphasizing the divinity of the soul, the unity of existence, the non-duality of the Godhead, and the harmony of religions. Swami Vivekananda was indeed a spiritual bridge between the East and the West.

The ideas of universalism and brotherhood have been consciously or unconsciously or unconsciously exploited for individual gain.

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16 Swami Lokeswarananda (Ed.) Op.Cit., p. 87.

17 Burke, Marie Louise, Op.Cit., p. 584.

18 Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial Volume, Op,Cit., p. 122.

These words have become hollow shells with the real essence of its vitality being lost. At this critical moment Swami Vivekananda's gospel possesses the potential to restore these ideals to their former glory. Unity is no mean achievement as it is the test of truth. Hatred perpetrates falsehood and multiplicity leading to disintegration. But it is love that makes for one-ness and truth.

Spirituality exists in everybody, but it is more or less talent. In some it is suppressed while in others it finds free expression. But Swamiji who is "a fountain of it, is by his presence alone, by the very music of his gushing water, a call, an awakener of hidden springs, which did not know of their own existence or were afraid to avow it."[19] He was indeed a living communication of spirituality.

Swami Vivekananda's observation on global spiritual unity come from a practical and scientific analysis. He held that the language of the soul was one, though nations differed widely in their customs and languages. Spirituality finds expression through these varied channels. Thus the difference between world religions is one expression and not of substance. Their point of similarity is essentially the unity of the soul with its divine creator. This is the celestial song that echoes in the faith of all peoples. He illustrates this point very aptly : "You plant the seed in the ground and give it plenty of earth and air and water to feed upon; when the seed grows into a plant, does it become the air, or does it become the water ? It becomes the mighty plant, the mighty tree, after its own nature, having absorbed everything that was given to it."[20] The seed of spirituality in man nourished by all faiths should grow into the tree of global spiritual unity.

Swami Vivekananda opines that truth can be expressed in infinite ways and each of the ways are true as far as it goes. Human minds were like vessels trying to realise God who is the life giving water filling these different vessels. The vision of God assumes the shape of the vessel, but He is one and the same. Our recognition of global spiritual unity lies in this eternal truth. Mere acceptance of this truth is futile without practice, unshaken faith in Swamiji's ideal of the harmony of religions will lead humanity to understand and practise a Universal Religion.

"I belong to India just as much as to the world". It was this conviction that gave him the mental strength and moral courage to preach to man the essence of Unity. His conception of One-world shaped his mediations between the East and the West and "while bringing the message of the East to the West he unhesitatingly took his dip in the spring of western life and anointed the West with the East's life—giving water."[21]

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[19] Rolland, Romain, Op.Cit., p. 269.

[20] Swami Vivekananda Centenary Memorial Volume, Op.Cit., p. 186.

Swami Vivekananda delivered anew the message of global spiritual unity which forged an imperishable link between the East and the West. He cherished a dream when all scattered ideas could be brought together in a Parliament of Man to achieve the final triumph of the human spirit over the negative forces of life. This would restore the balance in the human situation which exists in both East and West.[22] The East and West should come together in a spirit of humility and pool their resources in an effort to solve global problems with the Vedantic philosophy of the solidarity of man and the unity of existance as their highest ideals.

Science and religion should work in harmony to bring out the spiritual potentialities of man. Nations should exchange their treasures for the welfare of all humanity and not make a hostile comparisions between the best of one and the worst of the other. "The ivory of one nation should make a fine setting for the gold of another nation. The spirituality of the East ought to be set in the practical reason of the west."[23]

The ultimate result of conjunction of the East and the West would be a regeneration of humanity marching jubiliantly with the progressive elements of the earth towards One World. The conquest of the external nature by the West and the harnessing of internal nature by the East was the ideal combination of "the energy of the lion with the gentleness of the lamb"[24] which would culminate in one humanity.

Swami Vivekanana conceives God as the Great Ancient Poet and the whole Universe as His poem set to heavenly harmony and written in infinite bliss. Man's appreciation of harmony in nature was to lead to a higher appreciation of God, who is the sum of all harmony. His philosophy and praxis of life signifies a new world order of global spiritual unity set in motion by a liberal, progressive and unified mankind.

CONCLUSION :

The modern world is like a fuming volcano threatening to erupt with the enormous rise in global tensions created by economic disparities, religious persecution, political conflicts and social imbalances.

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[21] Ibid., p. 243.

[22] Ibid , p. 196-97.

[23] Burke, Marie Lousie, Op.Cit., p. 227.

[24] C. W. Vol. 7, p. 289.

No amount of political or social manipulation of human conditions can ameliorate the misery of mankind. It is a change of the soul alone wrought by a life-giving philosophy, that can lift humanity from the depths of despair. The crumbling world is urgently in need of a new spiritual foundation.

His meditation at Kanyakumari, the southernmost tip of India gave him a profound picture of the degradation of not only India, but of the whole world. It was here that he 'hit upon a plan', as he said later, to reinstate mankind by giving a message of world civilisation based on Vedanta.

His message to the West was to integrate their scientific knowledge with the unity of mankind and nature to perceive the underlying universal spiritual unity. But Indians had a theoretical grounding in the Vedantic conception of the existence of one Universal Spirit. What we lacked and still lack is the ability to exhibit any enthusiasm or zeal for living. We have long forgotten to balance our material values and spiritual heritage. We must imbibe the spirit of enthusiasm and the desire to improve ourselves from the West.

Vedanta is a universal religion standing as a great equaliser of all people on Mother Earth. But it is India's ancient national ideal, and therefore we must set an example for the rest of the world to follow by practising it in its true spirit and demonstrate that it is possible in real life to practise a Universal Religion. This symolic con fluence between Eastern and Western ideals will ultimately lead to a global spiritual unification.

6

Can the Existence of God be Found Revealed By Way of the Common Capabilities Given Us, Those of Experience And Reason?

Paul Vjecsner

The preceding question has occupied religious thinkers and philosophers throughout history, in a pursuit belonging to what is known as natural theology. The great desire for an answer is of course understandable, with the question reaching into the deepest human concerns, ones for happiness that would be secured by the purposes of an overarching divine power.

So profound are these concerns that mankind has, unlike in other matters, relied in absence of knowledge so much on faith alone as to let it govern one's life, in accord with the teachings of the world's religions. There have indeed been many arguments proposing that belief should not have to be substantiated through knowledge, that it is self-sufficient in the search for truth. In the light of the difficulty of obtaining knowledge in these important matters, this attitude is again understandable. However, since varied convictions go well beyond basic notions that might be agreed on, the result is the pluralism much discussed today, with many conflicting truths advanced. And as we know, the conflicts have often been far more violent than is mere disagreement. Many convictions, further, are equally intense in denying the existence of a supreme being altogether. Can these differences be resolved ?

The title of this article speaks of the common capabilities of experience and reason given us, whether divinely or otherwise, and they serve to make knowledge of reality possible, in order to enable us to cope with it. The knowledge is not given beforehand. Yet we have the means to it, required to be used. The potential use of those means has moreover been almost always notoriously underestimated. The advancements in science have usually been held unimaginable before their occurrence. And the pronouncements of impossibilities continue to this day, in ironically the sciences and other spheres of thought themselves. They have to do with such technicalities as that certain mathematical truths cannot be demonstrated, but they expectably extend to what are regarded as metaphysical issues, as is the existence of God.

In attempts to discredit the last referred to possibilities, the focus has been mainly on dismissing reason, in opposition to experience, as a means to gaining knowledge of reality. The idea is obviously prompted by the acquaintance in practice with nature as reality, and by science's exclusive explanation of phenomena by natural laws. The deductive laws of for instance mathematical principles, used in learning of realities likewise, are said to be mere tautologies, true by definition. No matter what makes those laws true, however, of relevance is their just mentioned use in learning of realities. Realities are to a major extent known by inference. It is in fact by knowing the likes of natural laws that we infer in our daily lives what our actions and other events will lead to, so as to guide our decisions.

The everyday role of inference is nonetheless not fully recognized. with only fields like mathematics conceived of as somehow depending on thought for determinations. And even this recognition, as indicated, is not given its due. The first mathematicians must have had a hard time convincing others that magnitudes need not be observed only, but can be deduced.

The point, in other words, is that reason is beside experience a dominant part in us by which we acquire knowledge. The possibilities of knowledge, as explained, are continually found to extend beyond expectations, and the aim of this article is to demonstrate how in the concerned area reason as discussed can be applied to experience to achieve the results desired.

There is the saying that sometimes one cannot see the forest because of the trees. Said differently, one sometimes gets so lost in detail that one fails to see the whole picture. Details are often the province of science, in its search for the minutest constituents of things, for "what makes things tick". But in the process the larger picture can not only be overlooked, but actually denind. An extreme example is furnished by behaviorist psychology. Its intent to in studying the mind rely only on observed physical data, in the manner of other sciences, led to its denial of consciousness, although consciousness is the medium by which those observations are made.

Similarly, there are other large phenomena ie nature which are dismissed in the concentration on physical particulars. One of those phenomena is the characteristic in living things of acting toward the purpose of self-preservation. Considered here are not only conscious beings with their own purposes, but their bodies as well as live organisms like plants. Their behavior is studied by science primarily in terms of specific causes and effects, as in medicine, while the overall purposiveness of that behavior is rather ignored. It is in truth not admitted, because it conflicts with science's world-view of a purposeless udiverse.

However, as in the case of other large-scale occurrences, the activities of organism for the purpose of self preservation cannot be argued out of existence. Regardless of what the findings of the smallest causal chains may be, they cannot abolish the purpose-directed behavior of the whole, but only disclose how it is carried out. And the correspondingly needed adherence to the basic experience which are the foundations of all further learning also reveals that the answers we are seeking lie in those commonly known events.

How these answers can be found can be made clearer by considering how for example the law of universal gravitation was inferred from equally familiar occurrences. From the observations that all bodies near the earth gravitate toward it, and that bodies in motion continue in a straight line unless acted on by some force, Newton concluded that the revolving motions of heavenly bodies result from the like two factors in them, to wit that the force of gravity exists in all matter.

This conclusion consists in a proverbial "putting two and two together" out of ordinary observations, a conclusion that had escaped mankind before. There are other such conclusions, and bringing them to attention in the preceding may make the possibility of finding ones in the realms now explored more plausible. We can find, as a matter of fact, that in the present case there is no need to support common experience with more precise observations and related calculations, as is of aid elsewhere,

A hint of the comparative simplicity of the reasoning is supplied in the foregoing reference to the world-view in science that the universe does not contain purposes. The reason that suggestions of purpose in live organisms are tried to be explained away, as by Darwin's natural selection, is that the thought of any purpose in the universe immediately connotes a supreme being behind it. So close is the association. And its justification is the present intent to demonstrate.

It may be first of value to note why the idea of mentioned natural selection dose not dispose of purpose. As today widely known, the theory contends basically that the complex and functional structure of organisms did not develop by purpose, but is a consequence of their accidental adaptation to the environment through many generations. There have been with good reason numbers of objection raised as to the statistical probability of those adaptations. but it is needless to do so. The adaptations' heredity alone, of which the theory takes extensive account, signifies the organisms' long-recognized purpose of preservation of the species. The evidence of purpose goes far beyond that, however, in conformance with what was said above. Instead of speculation about the origin of the structure of bodily organs through eons of evolution, it is only required to depend on direct observation of the constant discussed behavior of every living thing. It is, once more, the purposive behavior of self-preservation.

Here then is why these purposive events are so readily associated with a supreme being. They are because the concept of a supreme being, in a most universal sense, is distinguished by the very attribute of large purpose, more specifically of purpose directed at the interests of the living as was seen to occur in them, in contrast to aimless forces of nature. that are indifferent to human or other aspirations.

Putting this reasoning very simply in a formal way, one which would be sought by logicians and is in the style of the famous syilogisms, it can be phrased as follows, the first line a definition.

1. God is the cause of purposive events as described.
2. Purposive events of that kind occur in nature. Therefore
3. God is the cause of these events in nature.

In keeping with the aforesaid, this demonstration may appear to almost everyone too simple for so momentous a subject. It may accordingly be worthwhile to be remindful that the most encompassing answers nsually take the simplest form. It is said that it is easier to elaborate than to innovate, which implies the comlexity of the first and not of the second. It is also easier to believe the elaboration than the innovation, because we are used to the first and skeptical of the second. The skepticism regarding the present possibility in addition exceeds any other. Therefore it should be helpful to return to the earlier observations on how we are endowed with capacities to learn.

There is no apparent limit to them and as more is known, the understanding of fundamental truths is simplified.

7

Ibn Sina's Contribntion to Philosophy

Mohammad Anwar Saleem

Ibn Sina or Avicenna as he was called in West was born in 370/980 in Afshana, his mother's place near Bukhara. His father was an official of the Samanid administration. He got his education at Bukhara which was a great seat of learning in those days. Though his father and brother were highly influenced by Ismaili doctrine and he got himself familiar with its principles but did not like it to follow.

Ibn Sina was a versatile genius. He dived deep into the ocean of knowledge and proved himsalf to be the father of many branches of traditional Sciences. He was one of the greatest philosopher of his time. His distinctive intelligence and wonderful memory contributed well to make him a leading philosopher and at the age of fourteen he surpassed his teachers.

He was a renowned physician as well as a systematic philosopher. He intensively went through the encyclopeadic conception of the traditional sciences alongwith the Philosophy which he found deeply related to the study of nature and thus, reached a perfect conclusion that the perfection of man is not achievable only through both knowledge and action and this observation can hardly be challanged.

The remarkable characteristic of Ibn Sina was that he independently achieved a remarkable success in the field of natural Science & Medicine and drew no knowledge from any teacher in this regard. He became so perfect a Physician at the age of sixteen that a number of notable physician worked under him and learnt a lot from him. On account of his peculiar judgement. he was able to overcome the serious disease of Amir of Khurasan who was taken by an incurable disease in those days. This great achievement led him to use the magnificent library of princes of Samanid which later proved a great soruce of knowledge to him.

Sharif, M. M., *A History of Philosophy*, p 480.

However, Aristotle's Metaphysics proved very difficult for him and in order to make it understable to him he was constrained to take the hel from al-Farabi's commentary. His extra-ordinary intelligence made him a master of all the then known sciences and all this was due to his personal judgement.

Ibn Sina had tremendous intellectual speculation which developed on account of his being an acute observer of pleasant and unpleasent realities of life and natural phenomena. His extraordinary brilliance led him to write a book at the age of twenty one which was his first book on Philosophy. He was, however, constrained to put his creative work on the side-track for a brief period.

After the death of his father. he was highly admired and given a rapturans applause. He was a great authority on medicinal matters. The princes of his time were so influenced by his intellect and intelligence that they liked to seek his unique opinion in political matters and his advice was always given a due weightage. He had influenced the ruling class to such an extent that he was honoured several times with ministerial berth. His name, fame and respect he earned for his deep knowledge in intellectual field made his contemporaries jealous of him and on accounts of their jealousy. he was several times put on trials and some times treated by princes harshly. He was treated so harshly that he had to go underground and faced financial hardships. He was put behind the bars from where he stipped away and spent fourteen years at the court of Isfahan and breathed his last in Hamadan.

One should try to understand his works in relation to his occupations with state affairs. His works are not only the works of a Philosopher alone but are crowned with the valuable contribution from a Physician and a politician embodied in one person, Ibn Sina. While undertaking the study of his works it should also be kept in view that he, throughout his life remained disturbed on account of his being a most out spoken politician. As he was a fearless bold and lion hearted person, he had to undergo the atrocities from the hands of the ruling party. So, he wrote under odd circumstances. He could hardly use any resource for reference in his writing and totally remained dependent on his own remarkable memory and genius thoughts.

His works present a striking factor that, though, he totally differs with Aristotle on his thoughts, he quotes him without restudying his works because he found Aristotle's works logically far from realities of life. Another main feature of his works is that he presents his own thoughts which carry novelty and originality and are least based on thoughts of any other thinker or Philosopher. This occured due to his facing numerous difficulties throughout his life and dealing with specific cases as Physician. His long experience of worldly affairs influenced his thoughts in his works and as a result he brought into existence a different kind of writings which, in different ways, have served the human beings and will continue to serve the human race.

Sine the trend in academic circles, for going through his works frequently, has recently emerged, a few controversies with regard to his life and achievements have come to the fore. In this regard one of the reasonable expression is re-produced below :

> "He is a scientific man who attempts to bring the Greek theories to the level of that which needs to be expressed by the study of the concrete when apprehended by a great "mind."

More revelation may, however, be made if we come across his ideas and thoughts which he expressed through his writings and his books :

(i) Impartial Indqment and (ii) Eastern Philosophy.

These books are not available in full forms. We only possess some extracts from these notable works.

WORKS :

The collection of Ibn Sina's works, that has reached us, though is in great amouut but incomplele. Thanks to Al-Duzadjami, who preserven several texts. A number of manuscripts including manuscript of 'Insaf' were lost in his life time. However, the main bibliography can be found in the biography of Al-Diuzadjami.

As mentioned above, he contributed a lot to the advancement of all the Sciences of his day i. e. natural history, Chemistry, Physics, Mathematic astronomy and Music. Apart from this, he enriched Political Science and Economics as a statesman. He also presented a new vision with relation to moral and religious matters including Quranic interpretation and Sufi doctrines.

His famous book 'Al-Shifa' Book of healing' not only encompasses his doctrine on the subject of medicine but his thoughts on natural history and Mathematics which are undoubtedly the parts of Philosophy. Similarly, his another notable works 'Kanun' Canon of medicine' is a valuable gift to the human race.

The 'Kanun' is said to have been formed more cohesively than any other of his Philosophical work. That is why it is still regarded exceptionally a monumental achievement of Ibn Sina. Its validity can be gauged from this fact that it remained a basis for seven centuries of medical teaching and practice and it is still a souce of useful information in the field of medicine. Not only this, the modern west of today too recognises the usefulness of this valuable treasure as various formulas as contained in it provide an effective cure to different dangerous diseases.

The 'Qanun' is not an ordinary book. It is a most comprehensive work divided into fine sub-books which systematically contain his very important and useful observation with regard to human body and its functioning process, sickness, herbs, different kind of diseases inclusing minor surgery, tumors wounds fractures, bites and poisonous diseases, etc and their diagnoses. Briefly, it can be said that 'kanun' encomposes a vide range of health and medicine matters and cure methods including surgical techniques. In this regard, the mention of his another poetic work 'Urdjuza' fi-t-tibb can not be avoided.

Ibn Sina's Philosophical works have reached the readers and critics in a very poor condition. Some have been found almost complete such as the Kitab al-Shifa and Kitab-e-Isharats wa tambihals ("Book of directives and remarks") On the other hand, some are in the form of small pieces i.e. Kitab-al-insaf ("Book of impartial judgement between the Easterns and Westerns") and the rests are lost ones.

Notwithstanding his various lost works, he caused an immense logical change correcting abstractions which were not touched by Aristotle and which could be seen and felt everywhere in the world of living beings. He analysed a matter clearly giving a specific explanation, classfying in terms of its meanings and visualising very clearly. As a Physician, he acts reasonably realising that each and every thing which comes into existence becomes a non-existant in a due course. This doctrine is a universal fact and is undeniable in medical diagnoses.

In Metaphysics, Ibn Sina presents an individual approach which is more or less based on his life experiences. Besides this, his doctrine, in this regard, appears to have been influenced by the thoughts of Aristotle and Al-Farabi whose concept were not only developed byhim but improved in one way or other substantially. In this respact, the name of Plotinus who was known by him under the name of Aristotle in the "Theology of Aristotle, should also be mentioned. He also influenced his doctrine as a third teacher.

As he was a born metaphysician, he was crowned with the title of "Philosopher of Being". But, he did not ignore the realities and always longed for knowing actualities of essence. That is why he is called Philosopher of essence too. His whole metaphysics revolves around the system of originality and its transformation into the essence but individually and factual state of essence. Here, it may be relevant to add that his theory of the forms creation emanated from the free interpretation of Aristotle and Plotinus. This is deeply related to the theory of origin and development of the Universe based on very old stories which may not be called genuine ones and seem to be attracted to some extent to the Aristotle's Views on the soul. Actually, his intelligence which occupies a prominent place in his thoughts makes his Contribution remarkable His gifts of being is connected with the light of intelligence Further, Ibn Sina, a firm believer of God and an ardent follower of Islam recognises God as a sole creater of whole Universe. He makes efforts to present his philosophical theory alongwith religious beliefs. But, he achieves a little success in doing so effectively. He, however, continue to work in this respect.

According to him, the first feeling of certainty, which the human brain convincigly accepted through sense of understanding, is that of his existence and this is so deeply rooted an idea that the man does not even feel himself unaware of it and it seems to be a natural phenomenon. According to him, the existence of man is a metaphysical occurance and the human soul maintains a separate identity and a spiritual existence in union with a body. It has a capacity of understanding itself independently. The second such a feeling according to him, is that the man, being apprehensive of his existences does not feel it as a being but his existence is a result of actuality. The essence of a man or another thing does not include the necessity of the existence of a particular non or a thing but actual beings. It does not mean that such an essences is without existence but its very existences is its essence. In this respect, the creater is a prime actor within such an existence. Though, this theory leads one to conclude that the existence of God from the point of view of Ibn Sina revolves around the Metaphysics only and does not touch Physics but it does not prove that God is not supreme and omnipotent as is widely and commonly believed.

No difference between created beings and the uncreated beings is clearly found in Ibn Sina's work. On the contrary, Thomas Aquines formulated a clear distinction between these beings, but the basis of his thoughts in this respect is Ibn Sina's doctrine, only being is in God, and not in animals and things etc. God, as conceived by Ibn Sina's "the first with respect to the being of the Universe, interior to that being, and also, consequently, outside it."

This specific and great perception is, however, disturbed by the ideas of Plotinus because they bring forth the originalist theory of creation. According to religious books, (the Quran like the old and New Testaments). Creation comes into being or existence by a free act of will on the part of God. To Ibn Sina (by way of plotinus) the unavoided Being is present in all its modes or forms and as creator too. Besides this, this originality does not happen without any cause and middle forces which are treated as creators too. Only one can emerge out of one. The Being, as taken for an essential phenomenon, gives birth to a single intelligence and this, having a basis, occupies with a duality of Being and Knowledge. Not only this, it offers multiplicity to the world which offers a source of another intelligence, a pious body with a pious soul.

Productive flow comes from the order of Plotinus method and this process comes down from range to range as a pure intelligence which rules not only any particular sphere but this populated planet which is a formation of impure matter. This results in a multiplicity leaving behind the human knowledge but is completely seized and overwhelmed by the sharp intellect, the tenth intelligence.

The emanation of this ready wit is a part of the passage of the De Amina in which Aristotle intensively discusses the active role of human soul. Ibn Sina makes it ineffective by having this active part derived from it with its important actions and functions. This intellectual virtue, which according to Aristotle, offers all specific explanations is now a distinct intelligence. It all leads one to conclude that human soul acts passively while receiving them and it, therefore, is not cable of thinking unless it is guided by intellect, comprehension and knowledge. Sciences have no role at all to play with regard its affairs. It can only offer a detailed description with the help and guidance which is extended to it.

It is in this way, Ibn Sina answers Plato's curious question that the definite being can help in producing an idea. The highly functional intellect has an ability which Plato stresses without any concrete reason.

The human soul is mainly concerned with degrees of abstraction, sensation, imagination and estimating action that keeps the individual off from non-sensible thoughts and ideas. Consequently, it rejects such ideas and is attracted to out side understandable matters.

The necessary Being throws out a comprehensive powes and intelligence abundantly which continue to come down to the created limits. There is also a fully emerged feeling which is caused by love and desire of creatures for their makers. This wounderful and loveable concept, which can only be a product of a soul, creates an inclination for religion and faith and which can be formed as a mystical feeling too·

The Epistle on love, however basically deals with a metaphysical matter of the common behaviour of every being towards it positive and physical explanation of the movement of stars in terms of materialistic and continuous action of the pure Act. Actually, these spheres re-produce the unending process of due and undue desires of the divinely souls which are similar to each of them. The sane soul of man exclusively behaves towards its good with a realised and cautious action with regard to love for the active intellect and necessary Being which is undoubtedly Good.

Idn Sina had a firm belief in the immortality of the Soul. He ruled out this speculation that the Soul can be corrupted and dirty nations can be assimilated and absorbed in it. He believed in it's immateriality as he found it capable of apprehending intelligible which are not materialistic in there nature. He is reluctant to favourably take up the question of resurrection of the body. Because he is not so firm in his belief that the resurrection of the body takes place after death.

In this regard, one of his strong expressions emphasize the love for God because He deserved it for his unique and different creations from heaven to earth and beneath its. He has illuminated his expressions with such strong beliefs.

There is another group of interpretaters who have their own observations with regard to his expressions of love for creator. They observe that Ibn Sinas Philosophy in this respect stresses only one aspect i. e. love for pleasure as a natural phenomenon that is why, according to these interpretaters, he narrowely escapes from being a hypocrite. In this connection, it may be concluded that though he faced a lot of seriousness in his life, he did not give much weightage to it in his writings particularly in 'ISHARAT', or he could not reconcile his thoughts with the realities one comes across in terms of natural pleasant and unpleasant occurences.

But this sort of interpretation is not generally accepted. Most of the critics are of the view that Ibn Sina's thoughts in this respect carry a balance otherwise he would not have taken a mystical approach to both principal factors in life i. e. happiness and sorrow. He had a true mysticat apprehension and a true love for God. One doubt, however, still enters in his general doctrine of apprenhension, and some of the terms that he uses, in fact, in texts on Sir, could be applied at least as well to a priviledged connection with the active intellect and not with God himself.

The two principal works of Ibn Sina, the 'Shifa' and the 'Kanun' brought to him name and fame both and helped him in becoming a renowned scholar and philosopher. These works made him a master in medicine, natural Sciences and Philosophy.

8

Ricoeur on Metaphor and Ideology

William C. Gay

> "Metaphor has the extraordinary power of redescribing reality".
> "Ideology is an unsurpassable phenomenon of social existence".
> Paul Ricoeur

I. INTRODUCTION

Language is one of the givens in our lives. In this regard, Paul Ricoeur note "the impossibility of reaching a social reality prior to symbolization."[1] Nevertheless, despite the ways in which our native language structures our initial ways of describing the world, linguists and philosophers of language have offered various accounts of how language changes and arguments concerning whether such changes are creative.[2] Less frequently addressed are questions about how to *assess* the *perceptual* implications of these linguistic innovations.[3]

Using insights of Ricoeur and, to a lesser extent, M. Merleau-Ponty and V. N. Volosinov, I will provide a model for evaluating a certain class of linguistic innovations, namely, new uses of language which rely npon distortion of typical perceptual associations. (Excluded from such new linguistic uses are, for example, analogical innovations, as presented by Saussure.) As may title suggests, I will relate two superficially dissimilar products of language, i. e., metaphor and ideology. I will argue that metaphor and ideology need to be considered jointly (comparatively) to understand linguistic creativity, because-despite their differences-they mutually rely (at their inception) on atypical, even excessive, distortion of the way words shape perception of and reflection on 'reality'.

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[1] Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed., trans. and intro. by John B. Thompson (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 237.

[2] Cf. my survey of trends in "Analogy and Metaphor : Two Models of Linguistic Creativity," *Philosophy aud Social Criticism* 7 (1980), pp. 299-317.

[3] For an interesting exception within analytic philosophy, see Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Indianapolis : Hackett Publishing Company, 1978).

My basic thesis is that, in language, the processes of creativity and distortion are interrelated. However, the conclusion I will reach is one which proposes a distinction between and criterion for 'positive' changes (which I term 'creative distortions') and 'negative changes (which I term 'distortive creations'). Nevertheless, I do not associeate 'creative distortion' exclusively with metaphors and 'distortive creations' exclusively with ideologies. For metaphor and ideology, I relate 'positive' and 'negative' to how practical activity is facilitated' using a criterion of expansion or enrichment versus contraction or impoverishment of the semiotic-perceptual field. Hence, throughout, even when I make distinctions, I will stress how metaphor and ideology are similar, not how they are different.

Textually, the model I will present results from my effort to relate Ricoeur's views on metaphor and ideology, epitomized in my opening quotations from him,[4] and to address the tension between metaphor and ideology that is implicit in his work. For this latter puspose, within continental approaches to the philosophy of language, I will utilize work done within both phenomenology and Marxism. In senses that I will clarify, much phenomenological literature endeavors to account for and *encourage* 'creative distortions' and much Marxist literature endeavors to account for and *eliminate* 'distortive creations.. I wish to address the hiatus between the stress by some phenomenologists on the autonomous subject and authentic speech and the stress by some Marxists on false consciousness and ideology critique. Generally, I will challenge overemphasis on either authentic or distorted communication. In order to avoid lengthy and tedious documentation for my model. I will provide an allegory.[5] My allegory is about metaphor and ideology in particular and language in general.

II. CORRIDOR OF GLASS

Imagine that people cannot go outdoors. At best, they pass from building to building through corridors lined with sections of highly, though obviously not perfectly, polished glass. (If such seems hard to conceive on Earth, project a space station on, say, Titan.) Lest this image suggest Kantian 'rose colored glasses', let me mention now that my glass corridor is not isomorphic with the forms of sensibility or the categories of understanding. Rather, in this thought experiment, stress will be on *exception*, not rule.

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[4] The former is from *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work*, ed. by Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart (Boston : Beacon Press, 1978), p. 132. The latter is from *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, p. 231.

[5] For Ricoeur, see, especially, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multidisciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, trens. by Robert Czerny *et al.* (Buffala : University of Toronto Press, 1975) and *The Conflict of Interpretations; Essays in Hermeneutics*, ed. by Don Ihde (Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1974).

Suppose the outside terrain remains constant but overnight one of the panels in one of the corridors is replaced by one which has a slight bulge at the eye-level of some inhabitants. Some will walk right by it and never notice the bulge. By chances some will. How can they ? Probably, detection will be a function, not of direct examination of the glass, but of indirect evidence arising from *altered perception* of the terrain. Almost anyone who looks at the landscape through the bulge in the panel of glass will discover that in passing from the preceding or to the succeeding panel a *change of focus* occurs such that the view through the anomalous panel likely will be designated, at least initially, as 'out of focus'. Nevertheless, beyond drawing attention to the odd panel of glass, the experience may have repercussions for *understanding the landscape* as well. One viewer may remark poignantly, though not necessarily truthfully, how she has never really paid much attention to say, the rock formation visible at that spot along the corridor. She might judge or present the 'distorted' (anomalous) view as more 'useful' (for some purpose) than the 'non-distorted' (typical) view of the formation. The social implications of a successful campaign to alter public designations of 'distortion' and 'non-distortion' are obvious, as well as the potential for scoffing, applauding, or fighting.

Some philosophers in the community might argue that uncertainty surrounds judgment concerning which glass panels afford the best view of the landscape precisely because in their community the inhabitants have no way to compare a view of the landscape itself with alternate views of the landscape through differently polished glass panels. However, although final 'resolution' may be precluded for subtle epistemological or, better, environmental reasons the inhabitants may require for practical purposes a workable method for demarcation. Even if some real and irresolvable disputes remain concerning the status of some 'gray area' panels, some real disputes concerning relatively 'transparent' and 'opaque' panels are soluble. Just as triangulation can establish a relatiuely accurate fix on an object's location, some perceptual criteria can be utilized to get a practical assessment on relative accentuation or attenuation of distortion. For example, if you cannot make out the object through a particular panel or if one panel offers inferior capacity for resolution of the object's details, then 'designation' of such panels as 'distorted' is appropriate.

For the philosophers, who prefer concession to the fact that noumena or, in this case, objects beyond the glass cannot be grasped, one could concede that *all* of the glass panels are *distorted* but that, demonstrably, *some* are *unacceptably so* for practical purposes. Moreover, since final resolution is precluded, experimentation with new panels always entails the empirical possibility that—given a new focus-a decision may be reached that certain innovative panels are not as distorted, for practical purposes, as other existing panels. Perhaps, one could propose that such perceptually expanding or refining panels are 'positive' distortions relative to the eclipsed ones. When some glass makers produce occasional, or even regularly, highly positive panels, the community may praise them for their creativity. However, when other glass makers (or the same glass makers, for that matter) produce on occasion, or even regularly, highly negative panels, the community may criticize them for their distortiveness. The philosophers, musing over the inaccuracy inherent to both designations, could perhaps conced that in that community the *distinction* between creative distortions and distortive creations is not bogus.

III DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE

Much philosophical effort has been evpended in making the rather obvious point that a one-to-one correspondence between words (signs) and things (reference) is neither actual nor practical.[6] Despite common rejection of even the possibility of such correspondence, theories of reference typically do not imply that because strict similitude of or correlation between words and things is absent that ineradicable incommensurability of or disproportionality between words and things is present. To affirm the latter is to abandon the quest for any instances of referenrially transparent and unambiguous discourse. Because at least this quest is necessary if any spheres for the application of linguistic positivism are to be prescribed, some look for instances of such discourse and assume that, otherwise, we would have a "distinction without a difference".[7] In other words, talk of distorted communication presumably makes sense only if non-distorted communication is also actual or, at least, possible. One point of my allegory is to call into question this philosophical view. In this section I will note how Ricoeur, like Merleau-Ponty and Volosinov, sees all language as distortive, but, unlike either, provides the foundation for a view which avoids making a vacuous contrast between distorted and non-distorted communication,

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[6] Cf. Ricoeur, *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, p. 125. Within the analytic tradition, Wittgenstein's later work, *Philosophical Investigations*, also makes this argument in a classic way.

[7] The methodological guard against this situation is often termed the "principle of nonvacuous contrast," i.e., the requirement that a genuine predicate can never refer to either everything or nothing within its universe of discourse.' On this principle, see William Dray, *Philosophy of History* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 29.

In the phenomenological tradition. Merleau-Ponty argued quite early that language is unalterably and ubiquitously allusive and implied that creative language is intentionally distortive. He even went so far as to correlate such linguistic creativity with authentic language. Hereby, he, along with Heidegger and others, initiated what I judge to be the over-emphasis within much phenomenology on creative speech as authentic. When taken in isolation, some of Ricoeur's work, especially his remarks on metaphor, can be viewed as falling victim to the same error

First, I need to sketch the phenomenologscal view of language as distortive and of creative speech as authentic. For Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, at any moment chosen, a given lexicon establishes set oppositions which function as a totality. Since "the learned parts of a language have an immediate value as a whole,"[8] a speaker moves from one 'whole' to another 'whole' (each a temporarily ,closed' totality) with the expression of new oppositions. Hence, acquisition is a process of internal *division* of a whole into further differences that are articulated in terms of more specific oppositions. This fact makes complete adequation between words and things unrealizable. Because internal division can in principle progress *ad infinitum*, Merleau-Ponty claims "the genesis of meaning is never completed."[9] Moreover, he maintains that "all language is indirect or allusive-that it's, if you wish, silence."[10] Conversely, complete expression (direct and fully adequate signification) would be possible only if a specific language at a particular synchronic moment 'captures' things themselves in its forms. If expression were transparent, we would see through the glass of language clearly rather then dimly.

In contradistinction to the positivist ideal, Merleau-Ponty contends that expression requires distortion because it is "an operation of language upon language which suddenly is thrown out of focus towards its meaning."[11] Herein lies the prospect for linguistic creativity in which Merleau-Poety is interested. If language *per se* allusive and if expression depends on using signs against signs, then no standards for transparency exist which preclude the possibility that experimentation with how signs are opposed might better convey the meaning one intends to express. To speak or to write places a panel of glass before one's audience providing an invitation to perceive in terms of its idiosyncratic focus. Sometimes, when previous perception is jolted rather strongly by new combinations of signs, creative distortions result; we see things in an altered light, from a different angle, in a 'new sense.' Implicitly realizing the inadequacy of words to things, we aften applaud the subtle nuance that even blatant distortions sometimes facilitate. We accept this practice in poetry; in fact, we employ metaphor across the board But theories of linguistic creativity too easily assume that such innovations are *in toto* authentic, enriching creations, albeit distortive like all the rest. In this regard Merleau-Ponty, in distinguishing language (*la langue*) from speaking (*la parole*),designates the former as "empirical language" and the latter as "creative language" or the "speech of authentic language."[12]

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[8] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, trans by Richard C. McCleary (Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp, 39-40.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Ricoeur's extensive writings on metaphor can be interpreted as an elaboration on Merleau-Ponty's view of language and creativity. Rejecting any exact knowledge of or adequate language for 'things in themselves' or 'reality,' Ricoeur still views metaphor as one of our best vehicles for enriching our expression and perception. Although he focuses on how metaphor redescribes reality, he stresses that its role is more hermeneutic than ontological, i.e., metaphor interprets, not makes, reality. The creative function of metaphor pertains to its impact on changing our perception. As Ricoeur says, the purpose of metaphor "is neither to improve communication nor to insure univocal argumentation, but to shatter and to increase our sense of reality by shattering and increasing our language."[13] A new metaphor is like a new, distortive panel of glass in the corridor of language which alters how we focus on the landscape that it frames. At various points, Ricoeur even hints at how metaphor can convey an entire *Weltanschauung*, viewing metaphor as a work in miniature.[14]

Like Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur sees indirect and polysemic language not only as 'always already there' for speakers but also as an ineluctable mediator of social reality. He states :

> If it is true that images which a social group forms of itself are interpretations which belong immediately to the constitution of the social bond, if. in other words, the social bond is itself

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[12] *Ibid*

[13] Ricoeur, *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, pp. 132-133.

[14] Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, pp. 166-171.

> symbolic, then it is absolutely futile to seek to derive the images from something prior which would be reality, real activity, the process of real life. of which there would be secondary reflections and echoes.[15]

Interestingly, Ricoeur makes this point while discussing *ideology*, not symbol or metaphor. Moreover, the preceding quote is followed by the statement (part of which I cited earlier) that, "A non-ideological discourse on ideology here comes up against the impossibility of reaching a social reality prior to symbolization."[16] Social reality, as 'always already' symbolized, is mediated not only by polysemic language but also through ideologically-charged discourse. It is the classic view of Marxisms's ideology critique that to the extent that class bias permeates language distorted communication results. Ricoeur, of course, concedes the link between the image a social group forms of itself and the class bias of that social group. This concession, along with the preceding quote, would seem to imply that not only is language allusive but also it is ideological. Moreover, while this view of the ideological character of language avoids a naive equation of creative speech with authentic speech, it throws the polysemic character of language into a different light and introduces a tension between what Ricoeur says about metaphor and ideology.

For Ricoeur, both metapor and ideology exploit polysemy, although (to my knowledge) he makes these points separately and does not pursue their joint effect for his theory of creativity. Elsewhere, I have addressed how Ricoeur presents metaphorical exploitation of polysemy as the heart of linguistic creativity.[17] Here, I wish to claim that a similar exploitation of polysemy occurs in ideology. A social group creates an image for itself (and of others); its perception is molded, in part, by this linguistic creation with its inherent distortions. Since all language is socially generated and because society is composed of social classes, creative speech may appear to take on the lamentable character of distorted communication rather than any iof y status of authenticity. Is linguistic change initiated for vested class interest ? In recognizing that identification of creative speech with authentic speech is wrong-headed are we led to view creative speech as so distorted and biased that authentic speech becomes a distinction without a difference ?

Ricoeur's view, unlike some Marxists, seems to deny that a non-ideological discourse-at least on social reality-is possible. Of course, one can experiment with ideologies and the various foci they facilitate. (In several places, Ricoeur seems to do so himself.[18]) Hence, it would seem that ideology, like metaphor, can be compared to distortive glass panels. Moreover, just as Ricoeur tends to view all sedimented language as a product of metaphorical expansion of polysemy, even so he tends to view it as a product of ideological expansion of polysemy as well. These considerations could lead one to ask whether metaphor and ideology (instead of authenticity) are to be equated.

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[19] *Ibid.*

[17] "Analogy and Metaphor," pp. 308-311.

At this point and in ordes to set the stage for resolving the tension in Ricoeur's view, I will introduce briefly the similar, but much more elaborated, view of ideology taken earlier this century by the Soviet philosopher, V. N. Volosinov.[19] Whereas Merleau-Ponty claims all language is allusive, Volosinov argues that semiology is ideology. Building on his claim that "the domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs,"[20] Volosinov proceeds to correlate the social generation of signs with class struggles. The creative and exploitative import of language at this level is obvious. For Volosinov:

> the word is she most sensitive *index of social changes*, and what is more, of changes still in the process of growth, still without definitive shape and not as yet accommodated into already regularized and fully defined ideological systems.[21]

Volosinov notes how, after social struggle, such new signs lose their force. Like dead metaphars, they no longer excite us as they did originally. (Ricoeur, speaking of ideology-in a passage that sounds like what he might say about metaphor-contends it continues "to be mobilizing only insofar as it is justificatory."[22])

The problem encountered with this view of ideology, as was encountered with the correlation of creative speech with authentic speech, is how distinctions are to be made within an apparently undifferentiated medium. One route is to abandon the equation of semiotic and ideological domains and to re-vitalize the quest for instances of non-distorted communication.

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[18] Beyond *The Conflict of Interpretations*, cf. his classic *The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. by Emerson Buchanan (Boston : Beacon Press. 1967).

[19] V. N. Volosinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (New York : Seminar Press, 1973). According to David Zilberman, V. N. Volosinov is a pseudonym for M. M. Bakhtin (Baxtin). Apparently, Volosinov let Bakhtin, who was being persecuted by the soviet state, use his name.

[20] Ibid., p. 10.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and The Human Sciences*, p. 225.

Implicitly, Pantelis Nicolacopoulos takes the route which searches for non-distorted communication when he insists, contra Volosinov, that ideology is only a subdivision of semiology.[23] Nevertheless, apart foom the shortcomings of such a response to Volosinov, Nicolacopoulos does introduce a notion (following Pierce) which can ground the type of response Ricoeur makes from within the equation of semiology and ideology. As Nicolacopoulos observes, Volosinov's method lacks the notion of an *interpretant*.[24] By including the role of an interpretant, one dose not confuse meaning and reference. Instead of hunting the object (physical, material) to which signs *refer* and assessing their correspondence to it, we can address what they *mean*. For example in an article which uses Merleau-Ponty to clarify Volosinov, Gerald Carruba observes, "Various classes will use one and the same set of signs... but each may well have its own interpretations of it."[25] Refining the Wittgenstein view that meaning pertains to use, one can specify and analyze how and with what result various classes use language.

Volosinov, in stressing the "social *multiaccentuality*" of words, notes:

> The ruling class strives to impart a supraclass,eternal character to the ideological sign, to extinguish or drive inward the struggle between social value judgments which occurs in it, to make the sign uniaccentual......In actual fact, each living ideological sign has two faces like Janus. Any current curse word can become a word of praise, any current truth must inevitably sound to many other people as the greatest lie. This *inner dialectic quality* of the sign comes out fully in the open only in times of social crises or revolutionary changes.[26]

Ricoeur, in order to approach interpretation of such signs, turns to Mannheim and claims, regarding detection of class bias in discourse, "What was a weapon of the proletariat becomes a method of research aiming to bring to light the social conditioning of all thought."[27] Within this framework it is possible to concede at the outset how any discourse is socially conditioned (i.e., has an ideological charge) and to proceed, after so interpreting and understanding it, to assess the implications of the focus it facilitates. While all language (semiology) may be biased (ideology), the distinction between creative distortions (authentic use of polysemic exploitation) and distortive creations (inauthentic abuse of polysemic exploitation) need not be a "distinction without a difference."

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[23] Panteleimon Demetriou Nicolacopoulos, *Towards a Theory of the Semiological Interpretation of Ideology : A Contribution to Historical Epistemology*, an unpublished doctoral dissertation (Brandeis University, May 1979), pp. 162-3.

[24] Ibid., p. 170.

[25] Gerald J. Carruba, "Some phenomenological Aspects of a Marxist Philosophy of Language," *Kinesis* 6 (Spring, 1974), pp. 95-111.

[26] Volosinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, p. 23.

[27] Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, p. 240

IV. CONCLUSION

Once one sees semiology as ideology, the temptation arises to equate ideology with domination. As Ricoeur notes when he considers the debate between Hermeneutics and Critical Theory, advocates of ideology critique often view tradition as "merely the systematically distorted expression of communication under unacknowledged conditions of violence."[28] Of course, Marxists from Volosinov to Habermas would agree; they could even be correct. (In this regard, some intriguing work has been done, especially by F. Rossi-Landi, to correlate linguistic and socio-economic domination.[28])

Ricoeur makes a similar point when, in a very different context, he addresses the relation of Science and Ideology. In trying to salvage a notion of the distinctiveness of scientific discourse, despite its concomitant distortiveness (i.e, its status as ideology), Ricoeor observes "If it is taken for granted that ideology is a function of domination, then it is assumed uncritically that ideology is an essentially negative phenomenon."[30] From an axiological perspective (albeit an ideological one as well), one could designate as 'negative' the ideology of the oppressors and as 'positive' the ideology of the oppressed.[31]

Ricoeur, however, admits the limit of any attempts at fully resolving the conflict of interpretations, the struggle of ideologies, the battle of myths. He presents the necessary, yet unrealizable, criterion for linguistic positivism : "to measure distortions against reality, it is necessary to know social reality in its entirety."[32] Because social reality is already symbolized, because polysemy cannot be eliminated, "it follows that the critique of ideology is a task which must always be begun, but which in principle can never be completed.[33] (The generation of neither meaning nor truth is ever completed). Nevertheless, at a practical level ideology critique can utilize a met-

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28 *Ibid.*, p. 64.

29 Cf., Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, *Linguistics and Economics* (The Hague: Mouton, 1977)

30 Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, p. 223.

31 Cf. the axiology of Paulo Friere, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York : Herder and Herder, 1972), pp. 27:28.

32 Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics aud the Human Sciences*, p. 242.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 245.

aphorical approach that provides perceptual, rather than strictly factual, criteria for assessing linguistic distortions. I will end by illustrating this point.

Phrases such as a "window of vulnerability," when used by U. S. officials, were often intended as a way of molding the public's *perception* of the former Soviet Union's strategic possibilities and, consequently, the public's reception of the government's response to these purported possibilities. Metaphor sets thinking in motion, but in non-'factual' ways. If one *perceives* a window of vulnerability, one tends, by analogical linguistic reflection, to think of closing the window, because, otherwise, we are exposed to surreptitious entry. A 'sneak attack' by the Soviets was thereby conceived like a potential thief in the night who could break and enter our home easily because we had not secured all the doors and windows : an open window is an open invitation to those who have been waiting for thair chance to sting. Very little factual information is required to support this perception. The image is clear. The metaphor works. It is very creative. Of course, it is also distortive. Nevertheless, is it a creative distortion, a vehicle for expanding/enriching our perceptual horizon, or is it a distortive creation, a vehicle for contracting/impoverishing our perceptal horizon ?

All along strategists and technicians have been able calculate the numbers, throwweight, accuracy and distribution of nuclear missiles across and-, sea-and air-based systems.[34] This approach, however, requires the presentation of many technical matters and is often greeted with skepticism, after all is said and done, concerning the reliability of the information. Other approaches are apen to one who wishes to challenge this image.[35] One can, in cases of this sort, juxtapose another metaphor and generate a different line of analogical linguistic reflection. One can ask, "Why should we be overly concerned about a 'window of vulnerability' when we live in a 'house without a roof ?" If no nation can adequately defend itself from incoming missiles, then to be overly concerned about sneak entry through an open window is to be insufficiently cognizant about our radical vulnerability, as 'roofless-whether ruthless-nations. This perception does not close any window, but it does put the metaphor and reality into a different perspective; it generates an alternate focus which, practically, prompts a different response.

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[34] have addressed these approaches elsewhere. Cf. William Gay id Michael Pearson. *The Nuclear Arms Race* (Chicago: The nerican Library Association, 1987).

[35] r two further approaches beyond the one sketched here, cf. my ays "Nuclear Discourse and Linguistic Alienation", *Journal of cial Philosophy* 18, n2 (Summer 1987), pp. 42-49 and "Star Wars The Language of Defense", in *Just War, Nonviolence and Nu- ur Deterrence*, ed. by Duane L. Cadv and Richard Werner ıkefield, NH: Longwood Academic, 1991), pp. 245-264.

To conclude, I will apply the distinctions I have been making to the contrasting phrases "window of vulnerability" and "house without a roof." First, both phrases are metaphors. Second, both phrases, at least in Ricoeur's sense, are ideological. Third, both are creative. Fourth, both are distortive, at least in the senses that they are selective and interpretive. I venture that these points can be made about metaphor and ideology generally. Hence, I caution against overstress on metaphor as creative *and*, thereby, authentic or on ideology as distortive *and*, thereby, negative. A theory of linguistic creativity which includes a comparative analysis of metaphor and ideology can avoid these pitfalls. Moreover, viewing a metaphor or an ideology as a 'panel of glass' allows, as well, for comparison of their impact on perception, i.e. on their differing affects on our focus. On practical grounds, I would affirm that language is like a corridor of glass panels but deny that the designation of creative distortions and distortive creations represents a "distinction without a difference".

9

Rawls' Conception of a Person

M. Muquim

Rawls declares that "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override".[1] This indicates: (1) that every single person in a society is significant and can't be ignored at any cost; (2) that Rawls stands against the utilitarian view which ensures maximum happiness for maximum persons. The utilitarian view undoubtly provides for precluding a person in the persuasion of happiness. But most significantly, it also indicates a direction of forth-coming discussion in *A theory of Justice* in which a person does the central role. In fact persons who constitute a society are the subject of justice. Rawls very rightly envisions a triangular relationship between persons, society and principles of Justice which regulates institutions of the society so that each and eneryone can be benefitted justly.[2] And therefore, he defines a society as "a more or less self.sufficient association of persons who, in their relations to one another, recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who, for the most part, act in accordance with them '[3] The conception of person seems one of the most crucial con-

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1 John Rawls : A Theory of Justice; Cambridge The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971. page. 3

2 It is interesting to note that 'A Theory of Justice' is divided into three main paris : Theory, institutions and ends. The scattered discussion on 'person' we find in may places, but most significant is one under the Section 40, on Kantian interpretation. However, a detailed account of person is given in the third part (Ends). The reason is that Rawls embodies Kant's moral principle that persons must always be treated as ends and never as means. There is another parallel between the structure of a theory of Justice and Kant's main notions, e.g. autonomy, kingdom of ends and treating persons as ends. These notions correspod to Theory (i. e. The principles of Justice), institutions (i. e. well-ordered society) and Ends respectively.

3 John Rawls : A Theory of Justice, p. 4.

cept in this theory of Justice but it does not come accross as a clear-cut concept of person. However, the notions of original position and well-ordered society seem to have dominated Rawls' early work (i.e. till A Theory of Justice). The notion of a moral person did develop in the *A Theory of Justice* but on weaker grounds compared to his latter phase *as having two moral powers pushed by two highest ordered interests.*

The paper precisely aims at illustrate the facts; how does the notion of person progress, get refinement and how has it been woven into the network of the theory.

(I)

Rawls' ideas of Justice as fairness obviously seem to be weded with Kantian's notions of autonomy,respect for rational persons and the view that rationality is inseparable from morality.[4]

Rawls, seems to argue at two different levels. At the first level, he traces the role of moral person[5] in the original position and at the second level, he explores the characteristics of original position.

Rawls believes that Kant's views about the nature of morality and its principles must be accepted as moral principles by every one. For instance, Kantian notion of autonomy, which is central to his moral system, states that a person is subject to the self made laws The law either made alone or with the help of several, free, rational, and equal persons. In *Grundlegung*. Kant seems to characterize that a moral person .is only bound to act in accordance with his own will.' This is one of the idea Rawls borrows frow Kantin order to characterize persons in the original position. The principle of justice rests on this assumption that autonomous persons are bound by their rationality to choose these principles as 'suitable object of choice'.[6] This ideal autonomous (free and rational) person is the member of a ociety who is ignorant about his personal contingencies.[7]

Another Kantian moral principle which has been embodied in Rawls' moral system is the principle that persons must always be treated *as ends* and never *as means*. A basic social structure if just i fit satisfies this Kantian principle. The proposed principle of justice, as Rawls argued, satisfactorily fulfills this requirement. The principle of equal liberty, eliminates all possibilities of using persons as means because one who subscribes to the first principle must treat everyone equally. Any attempt to treat persons as means will in all probability violate the first principle. Secondly, the second principle of justice requires complete restructuring of the society so that a situation may be obtained in which equal opportunities for all can be maximally guaranteed and moreover worst-off groups may be maximally benefited. The difference principle, of course, does allow inequalities but not at the expense of well-off group. Thus the question of using well-off persons as means for the betterment of the worst-off people does not arise at all. This principle maintains that there cannot be an alternative structure of the society which canensure the betterment of the least- advantaged persons as well as of the well-off groups. The difference principle does not infact require to take the property of the better-off people for its distribution among worst-off groops. The difference principle is totally compliance with the principles of equal liberty and equality of opportunity for all.

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[4] Ibid. p. 254.

[5] Ibid. p. 251.

[6] Rawls seems to use 'parties' in the original position as the abstract representation of 'persons'. The term moral should be understood in contrast of non moral, in the sense that persons are capable of having goals, plans conception of good and sense of justice. (Rex Martin's distinction). This idea of person is developed in full sense in Rawls' Dewey and Tanner lectures

[7] A Theory of Justice, p. 251.

It may further be argued in favour of the difference principle that takes into account the existing inequalities presumable caused by the violation of Kant's categorical imperative of not using persons as means. The principle of difference, perhaps, tends to make up the difference found in the basic structure of the society by allowing inequalities in order to remove inequalities. In other words, inequalalities are allowed only if they can systematically elevate the status of every one involved. Hence difference principles is justified because it does not intend to use person merely as means.[8]

The Kantian thesis maintains that a rational person obviously means a moral person who follows categorical imperative. Rationality necessarily entails moral responsibility. Hence, a moral evaluation of an action can't be possibly done without taking recourse to the concept of right. This is another Rawlsian idea which seems operative in the argument from the original position goes beyond the kantian conception of morality because Rawisian person expresses his identifiable nature when he acts.[9]

There are other aspects of original position that illustrate the nature of choice at original position; for instance, the notion of veil of ignorance presupposes an impartial perspective for principles of justice applicable to all persons. Rawls considers this idea a procedural interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy because he thinks that the principle of justice which are chosen at original position under the veil of ignorance are concerned with the kingdom of ends. This reflects that all persons are free, rational and possess equal power to participate in choice process. As Rawls spys that 'the procedural conception of the original position allows us to make these ties.[10]. Indeed, the notion of realm of end.says that the notion of autonomy should be connected with the Kant's imperative that have to treat others as ends because every person is equally rational. The *veil of ignorance* provides the perspective in which a person can act autonomously in choosing the principle. I understand, Kant would have accepted the veil because he himself seems to hold that the knowledge of particular end is a kind of abstraction.

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[8] Ibid. 252.

[9] Similar observations can be made about the principle of equality of opportunity. For example, it demands a structure of the society in which all persons can compete for equal footing.

Kant's free, rational person is Capable of controling his wants and desires. A person is identifiable by his capacity rather than desires. He can revise his plans and preferences if right activity demands so. Rawls's person, at original position, seems to cohere with this idea. Because his person can accept a thin theory of good' in order to pursue his rational plan of life which consists of primary goods. A person whose veil is still *unlifted will, at the same time, be able to cherish his end*. A person who advances the plan of his life does not, violate Kantian imperative because he is not treating others as well as himself as means for his end.

(II)

In the previous section, we have seen that persons are free, equal and rational beings. How do they arrive at the principles of justice ? Rawls supposes a hypothetical situation in which nobody knows his nature, abilities, social and political positions, or even his conception of good (in the moral sense). However, persons are capable of holding such notion of good as will enhance their capacity to exercise deliberative rationality in choosing principles of justice from an impartial perspective, applicable to all rational persons. Why does a person choose certain set of principles of justice ? The obvious season will be that these principles are good for carrying out his life plan. A good plan of life if one which consists of primary goods and is being chosen in accordance with principles of choice by deliberate rationality. This justifies persons in accepting a *thin* theory of good. It helps in identifying the primary good in the original position, and further, it leads to principles of justice.

A thin theory of good basically tells us what is the best for a person in view of his circumstances and abilities. It provides guidance in making rational preferences for primary good. and then principle of justice. For instance, the thin theory of good may tell us that

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10 Ibid. 255.

liberty and *self-respect* must be secured first because freedom provides a favourable situation in which the realization of one's desires and aims become possible. By the same token, the thin theory of good maintains, and moreover identifies which sense of justice is good for persons in an original pasition. Rawls holds that if the Thin theory of good is successful in identifying a certain sense of justice as good, independent of moral constrainsts, it stabilizes the well-ordered society.

A person is reasonably consistent with his aim (or plan of life), if he does whatever is necessary to achieve that objective. Thus, Rawls demonstrates that there are certain things, such as primary goods that every rational person must want if he counts anything at all in his life plan. Rawls argues that if persons are not capable to have those goods, such as liberties, rights, opportunities, wealth and income, self-respect, etc., in any measure at all, how would they realize their plans of life ? without *liberty* it will be impossible to carry out any plan of life. The list of primary goods, in fact, provides the content of Rawls's two principles of justice. The various liberties and rights (social, political, freedom of speeh, freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizer) are taken care of by the first principle of justice, and the remaining by the principles of fair equality of opportunity and by the difference principle.

A *full* theory of good follows the concept of right and the principles of justice in explicating the moral and the social concepts involving the notion of goodness. The *thin* theory of good does not assume the priority of right because it is not a moral theory at all. It is a mediating theory between persons and the principle of Justice.

So far, we have discussed the criterion of rational choice for primary good and for life plans. But we still do not know why the persons in the original position choose a certain set of things. It may be said that their choice process satisfies the rational criterions but a particular criterion is sufficient in charactersizing the desires and wants of persons is not clear. Rawls introdces another principle of motivation. He calls it *Aristotelian* principle which shows how persons in the origina. position exercise their realized capacities. It roughly says that (1) persons in the original position increase their amount of realized capacities when they exercise it in performing actions of greater complexity. It is a psychological fact that persons tend to refine and develop their capacities over time till they arrive at a point of saturation; (2) It is also a fact that persons in the original position enjoy more by involving themselves in doing complicated and *difficult* jobs instead of simple and easy ones. For instance, persons will like so play chess for their enjoyment and pleasure instead of checkers if they can play both games equally well. Why does it happen ? Because it is inherited in the human nature which generally tends towards novelty, originality and style.

Rawls claims that once the primary goods have been properly distributed in the society to raise the level of well-being of all, everyone will enjoy equal liberty. In the well-ordered society, persons can pursue their spiritual as well as cultural interests. And this persuasion would, in fact, be realizable in its fullest sense in the realm of social union where persons cooperate, complement and encourage with their respective excellences in order to achieve their ends. The notion of *social union* assumes the bonds of cooperation and participation through exercising equal liberty and with sense of trust, friendship and affection. The notion of *well-ordered society* as a social union of social unions involves the public recognition of institutions which justly determine the status of persons by offering the distribution of fundamental rights and liberties. The Rawlsian condition of *publicity* expresses that each and every member of the society must have a sense of justice.

In *The Basic Equality*, Rawls attributes two basic features :

(a) Persons are capable of holding a conception of good which is to be exhibited in their plans of life; and

(b) They are capable of having a sense of Justice which is exhibited in acting according to certain principles of right. Therefore, a person expresses his nature as a free and equal rational being when he carries out his plan of life and acts in accordance with his self-chosen principle of justice and only this way he achieves the unity of his self.[11]

(III)

Rawls sketches a relation between the notion of social cooperation and that of a person. He indicates that the notion of social cooperation is more than that was previously described as a coordinated social activity regulated by some publicly recognized set of rules directed towards a certain goal. The social cooperation under question is always for the mutual benefit and it must be carried out by the two specific elements.

First, each person acknowledges reasonably enough to accept terms of cooperations based on mutual and reciprocal cooperation. It means each of us accents these terms and also expects that the same terms will be accepted by the others. It implies each of us will be benefited out of this scheme of cooperation. This aspect of social cooperation is named as ***reasonable.***

The second element of social cooperation refers to each person's rational advantage, i. e., the personal benefits, a person keeps in his mind when he involves himself in the social cooperation. This aspect appears to be *rational*. The scheme of social cooperation runs over the whole period of one's life. Hence, persons are capable to carry out these schemes of cooperation in a normal and as fully cooperating participants of the well-ordered society.[12]

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[11] Ibid. 256.

Assuming that the persons are capable to carry on the terms of social cooperation being a normal and full active member of the society indicates that the basic structure of the society can be restructured in accordance with the principle of justice This restructuring of the society will eventually specify the content of social and political justice.

The fact that persons are active participants of social cooperation indicates that they have been attributed by two powers of moral personality. The first power is to be exemplified by their reasonable social cooperation under the sense of justice and right. The second power is to be reflected in their personal fulfillment of their life plan under the conception of good. Hence, they enjoy simultaneously two parallel capacities. The capacity of holding a sense of justice related to the capacity of understanding the principle of justice and then capacity to implement those principles as the fair terms of cooperation. The second capacity includes the capacity of forming the conceptions of good and revising them if needed.

The rationality of the second power lies in the fact that persons may have different loyalities to other persons, objects, associations and philosophies. According to the capacity, persons are allowed to hold contradictory view points about their religions, philosophies and personal good ends. Rawls seems to visualize a democratic society in which persons agree upon some social cooperative norms and at the same time they are allowed to keep distinct goals at their personal levels; and these are the people who are regarded as equal citizens. Rawls does not handle the question of the goals of two persons directly collide to each other. Or the goal of one person conflicts with the general terms of social cooperation; for instance, Rawls allows persons to keep religious faith in their personal capacity. However a problem arises when some participants come to believe at any juncture of their life that their religion or their philosophy are not a personal matter. The society as a whole should be regulated by religious instructions. Does it mean that they would not remain as the participants anymore or they would be allowed to propagate their philosophies under the accepted terms of social cooperation?[13] Rawls seems to tie the equal citizenship with accepting these two powers. Does it mean to say that those who are not convinced to keep religious matters at personal level would loose their citizenship or equal citizenship ? Rawls allows that persons may have different natural, social backgrounds, different loyalties and affiliations to the associations and organizations, even they can enjoy equal citizenships. This is a kind of liberalism he endorses, assuming that equal citizens may have incommensurable conceptions of the good.[14] However, Rawls does address these questions; one can infer that if someone does not accept the plurality of the conceptions of goods, means he is not accepting the foundation of social cooperation; i.e. the basic liberties.

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[12] Ibid, 501.

[13] John Rawls : "The Basic Liberties and Their priority" in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values III, 1982, edited by Sterling M. McMurrin, University of Utah Press, P. 14.

In order to push two moral powers, Rawls introduces two highest order interests :

(a) The interest of realization of moral power of having a sense of justice and right.

(b) The interest of exercising the moral power of having a the conception of the good.[15]

What is meant by realizing the first moral power. naming, 'the capacity of an effective sensre of justice' in the original position or in the original position or in the well-ordered society ? In the context the context of the original position, we do'nt have any sense of justice, instead, persons are required to agree on two principles of Justice by involving appropriate rational deliberation. If Rawls insists to see this power operative at the original position, in that case, we can't go to far except preparing ground for an agreement on two principles of Justice.

Considering (b) it seems to me that the original position is not the place for exercising determinate and personalize~~d conce~~ption of he good; otherwise, whole concepts of the original position as impartial situation would be jeopardized.

In the section III of Tanner lectures, Rawls seems to confirm this interpretation when he talks about these two moral powers in the context of the society.[16] But in Dewey lecture I, he states "So in original position we may describe the parties as the representative of persons with certain interests or as moved by these interests."[17] And, again, in Tanner lectures, he introduces a novel idea of two parts of the original position corresponding to the two parts of moral powers. Here he again makes the distinction between reasonable and rational corresponding to the first and second powers. Notice that in Section

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14 For instance, abortion issue, many believe that abortion should be declared illegal. What about those who don't recognize separation between church and state

15 The Basic liberties and Their Priority. P 17

16 John Rawls : 2 ·"Kantian Constructivism : Moral Theory". The 198·John Dewey Lectures at Columbia University; The Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980) : P. 25

17 Using two words, 'realize' and 'exercise' seems unnecesxary because both moral powers should be realized first.

III of Tanner lectures, he made the same distinction in the context of society in which persons ase cooperating on some fair term. He called reasonable and referred 'participant's rational advantage' as rational.[18] Even though distinction between 'reasonable' and 'rational' is shaky, it may make some sense if moral powers are being considered in the well-ordered society.

From another point of view, if we consider that second power of having a conception of the good should be moved by highest order interest of exercising that power in the original position. In that case, we need to know the content of the concept of the good. But we know that we can't know the content because of veil of ignorance. There is only one way of interpreting this paradoxical situation by claiming that in the original position (b) indicates only the general capacity of having a conception of good. In that case, it raises further three problems. (1) Then any talk of highest-order interest would be meaningless because we can't exercise and revise the conception of the good unless we know in advance what the conception of the good is? (2) In order to know what is good in the original position, Rawls had already introduced a thin theory of good which basically identifies what is good for persons in the original position, particularly primary goods including basic liberties. (3) If the above interpretation is correct, then why did Rawls talk about the plurality and the incommensurable conceptions of the good in Tanner lectures?[19] Even if the above analysis is correct that the moral powers of persons as well as highest-order interests are functionally operatable in the well-ordered society, there is no mechanism by which one canhceck the domination of second power over the first one.

Rawls introduces another subordinate interest of higher order, that is :

(a) The interest of advancing and protecting the conceptions of the good.

Again, the determinate conception of the good cannot be advanced, protected in the original position, so it is senseless to talk hour and if (c) is subordinate of (b then what is the need of a separate.

Rawls realizes the problems of pursuing a determinate conception of the good[20] and tries to resolve it by saying that persons having definite concept of the good only represent in the artificial situation and introducing the concept of primary goods. Rawls visualizing an artificial original position in which real persons are being represented by artificial parties who don't know what they are representing and what is the determinate conception of the good of their counterpart persons? But mysteriously, these parties can know how their counterpart persons in the actual society can exercise, advance and protect their definite conceptions of the good. How do they (parties) know that? Only way of interpreting the role of artificial parties in the original position is to consider the whole business as general knowledge or as abstract. In that case too, whatever selection would be made by these parties in terms of choosing suitable primary goods may or may not be suitable in advancing the definite conceptions of the persons. If we claim that the social conditions, requirements and 'the normal circumstances of human life in a democratic society' have been imported by us then it would not be an argument from the original position.

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[18] The basic liberties and Their Priority P. 15-18.

[19] Kantian Constructivism moral Theory P. 524-525.

[20] The Basic Liberties and Their Priority. P. 14.

If we concede what Rawls is saying, in that case, in fact, he is making a strong claim, a leap from his early position in *A Theory of Justice*. Now he is claiming that how the moral persons in the original position can exercise, advance and realize their moral powers choosing the best set of primary goods. The idea of two interests, in that case, would push the two powers of moral personality because the conceptions of person basically invokes which primary goods are more basic for the persuasion of life plans.[21]

Rawls considers the basic liberty as the necessary and sufficient condition for the development and full and informal exercise of two moral powers. Without the freedom of thought and freedom of conscience, the moral power as the capacity of realising the sense of justice as well as a particular conception of good, would be impossible. Being moral persons, we want to exercise our freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, as the highest order interests.

CONCLUSION :

From a Kantian perspective, persons are free, equal and rational beings. However, being a free person does not entail that persons have arrived at a principle of liberty. For this reason, Rawls invents the idea of an original position where persons can participate in rational deliberations. The idea of thin theory of good explains what is good for persons in the original position so that they can select primary goods. This establishes a relation between persons and basic liberties, and finally to two principles of Justice.

In later writings, Rawls seems to substitute a thin theory of good by attributing two moral powers to persons. In new perspective; persons are more active because they are moved by two highest-order interests. The role of second power and corresponding second interest is problematic at the original position. Once it is consistantly explained, it world produce wonderful results. The idels of moral powers and interests would relate basic liberties and social primary good (such as opportunities and wealth)to the plan of life of persons. The liberty of conscience and speech, etc; can be captured more easily in the frame of highest ordered interest if the first power is charged. For these reasons, it is plausible to hold that later account of basic liberties and primary goods in terms of moral person is definitely an improvement in Rawlsian systms.

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21 Ibid. P. 16 17.

22 Ibid. P. 21.

23 Ibid. P. 22.

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Freedom and Faith in Kierkegaard's Philosophy

Dipti Shukla

Subjectivity is the core of Kierkegaard's philosophy. For Kierkegaard subjectivity—freedom. For him as it is according to Indian thinkers, freedom is the basic nature of human being. The difference between a man and an animal is because of this nature. That is why Kierkegaard raises an important question ;

'What it is to be a man ?'

For Kierkegaard it is not enough for a man that he is born as a man. His definite physical posture can not make him a man. But he can only be a man when he behoves like a man. Kierkegaard is of the view that a man is free if he has authentic existence, that he is able to choose. He acts according to his own norms. He is neither governed by and external Laws nor is he guided by any Universal Command:

In the history of Western philosophy, Kierkegaard revolts against those who condemn the essentially free nature of human being. He not only opposes the philosophy of Hegel but traditional Christianity also. He is even against tbe socialistic and humanistic approach for human life. For him, these trends of thinking are against freedom of man. They consider man either as a concept or as a group where the individuality of man is completely lost.

The increasing impact of science influenced not only the ways of man's life-style but also the ways of thinking, So is with the philosophers. They are tempted towards the accuracy and objectivity of Science. Therefore, for them, the aim of Philosophy is to draw definite results. This made man stranger to himself. He has no identity of his own. A man man is bound by social and political conditions. He seems to be a small point in this huge world. Mac acts as a parts of a group or as a cog in a machine. His indidividuality is submerged under majority on the one hand and the society on the other.

Kierkegaard accepts the uuiqueness of an individuality which lies in his freedom. Freedom is the existential value which determines the worth of one's action. Freedom is not a measure of the value of one course of action as opposed to another: For Kierkegaard freedom means the appropriation of the truth by one's own choice. Freedom indeed is the freedom of choice to him.

In Indian thinking freedom is accepted as an essential nature of human being. Only by being free he actualises his potenlial. To be free does not mean to gain or attain something which is beyond his capacity. But basically a man is free because he is a spiritual being. He loses his freedom due to bondage which is the result of ignorance. At this point Kierkegaard holds the same opinion. He supports freedom as man's essential nature.

For Kierkegaard "so by turning inwardly he discovers freedom.... Freedom is his bliss, not freedom to do this or that in the world, to become king or emperor, or the exponent of popular opinion but freedom to know himself. That he is freedom. I not only determine what I am to do; I also determine what I am to be."[1]

Freedom makes a man what he really is: Like Indian thinkers, Kierkegaard also accepts that freedom is not an out-side disposition, but because the man is submerged in this objectivity world to such an extent that he himself considers as a third person.[2] He becomes an object for himself. This leads him towards bondage in Indian terminology. As soon as he recognises his essential nature he attains his subjectivity. A man can only be free if he overcomes his weakness, that is, of becoming an object,

Freedom is not an intellectual category. It is inner honesty and openness. Freedom is not something we have, it is something we are. For Kierkegaard, "human freedom does not mean a freedom from the Laws of Nature; it is also a freedom from definition, from limitation, from definiteness. In choosing I not only determine what I am to do; I also determine what I am to be."[3]

Freedom gives the power to decide. If a man has the power of decision, he has to own the responsibility. He can decide his own ways. Whatever the result may be, he has to shoulder the responsi-

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1 The Concept Of Dread; by Walter Lowrie. 1973 p-96-97
2 The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard : W. H. Auden. 1974p-127
3 The Sources Of Existentialism As Philosophy ; F. R. Molina (edit) p-6

bility. Thus fear is second aspect of freedom. "If he is to recover his freedom, it can only be through an intensified, 'fear and trembling' brought forth by the thought of having lost it.[4] "Thus the freeom is accompanied by fear. "In the degree that he discovers freedom, in that same degree does the dread of guilt in the condition of possibility impend over him. Guilt only does fear, for that is the one and the only thing that can deprive him of freedom."[5]

To become subjectivity means to be free. Though freedom is essential nature of human being. yet one cannot actualise it without faith. Faith can never be explained in rational terms. It is not the result of scientific inquiry. "Faith is passion" according to kierkegaard. For him if passion is eliminated. faith no longer exists and certainity and passion donot go together.

According to Kierkegaard. like Ramanuja. man is essentially free but freedom cannot be attained without the mercy of God. So knowing the truth is an intellectual effort which can be an initial stage in pursuit of truth. But to realise the truth one has to surrender himself completely to God and this he can do only through faith. Kierkegaard accepts unconditional faith in the pursuit of truth. Truth in Kierkegaard's view is paradoxical in nature and to realise that truth one has to believe. For Kierkegaard, "faith has in fact two tasks: to care in every moment to discover the improbable, the paradox: and then to hold it fast with the passion of inwardness."

Without passionate acceptance of faith one cannot realise the truth. Faith never leads us to objective certainity because "faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual's inwardness and the uncertainity......This uncertainity is an expression for the passionate inwardness and this passion is precisely the truth."[7]

Faith is not a whimsical attitude of man. For him faith is a far higher category of human life by which one can attain one's aim of life. "Faith, therefore, is not an aesthetic emotion but something far higher, precisely because it has resignation as it's presupposition; it is not an immediate instinct of the heart, but is the paradox of life and existence."[8]

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4 The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard : W.H. Auden, p. 132.
5 The Concept of Dread : S. A. Kierkegaard, p-97
6 Concluding Unscientific Postscript ; S. A. Kiergaard p-209
7 ibid; p-182-183
8 Kierkegaards S.A. Anthology ; R. Byetall; 1973 p-126

Thus freedom is essential for human being to be. To be means to be subjective, that is to realise the truth. One can realise his subjectivity by being free from the objective world but freedom has fear as its counterpart, Freedom is not anything material or getting freedom from bondage but freedom means to have an I-Thou relationship with God which is only possible if one can leap with full faith.

"Freedom means that we have a hand in making ourselves what we are to become, but it also means that we can negate as well as affirm, we can destory as well as construct. Freedom means that man can have a kinship with Nothingness as well as with God."

"Knowledge and faith, for Kierkegaard are polar opposite. Knowledge is objectively certain but it deals only with "the possible", i.e. the hypothetical (cause and effect, condition and conditioned, premise and conclusion); faith is highly uncertain but by taking the leap and exercising it does one come into contact with actuality-the actuality of one's own being."[10]

Kierkegaard in his famous work "Fear And Trembling" tries to explain it that no selfish interest should be implied in faith. Faith is the humble courage of Abraham who ulters never questions God but obeys God. He is ready to sacrifice his dearest son Issac to show the depth of his faith. For Kierkegaard faith is never conditioned by thing. It is faith in God only. It cannot be the faith of Agamamnon who too was ready to sacrifice his daughter but only if the winds blew favourable. It is the faith of Abraham by which one can attain freedom.

To sum up : Freedom is man's disposition but he cannot realise it without the help of God. God helps only those who have firm faith in Him. Thus he is oble to surrender himself unconditionally.

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9 Existentialism and Religious Belief D. E. Roberts. p-73

10 Kierkegaard's Anthology—Introduction.

Book-Review :

Paul Arthur Schilpp (Editor) : *The Philosophy of Srvepalli Radhakishnan*, p. 883, Publishers Motilal Banarsidass Pvt. Ltd., 41 U.A. Bangalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, New Delhi-310007.

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975) is regarded as one of the greatest thinkers of the East, an eminent representative of the rich philosophical and a leading advocate to the reconcilliation of the Eastern and Spiritual values. He was Vice Chancellor of the Andhra University (1931-36) and Banaras Hindu University (1938-1948). He also taught in several of the universities including Oxford University. He occupied the Spalding Chair for sometime. He taught in the Calcutta University as George V Professor of Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University.

Earlier Dr. Radhakrishnan served as a President All India Education Conference in 1930 as President Executive Board University Grants Commission, Govt. of India 1948-49; Member Indian Constituent assembly 1947-49; Indian Ambassador to U.S.S.R. 1949; Vice President of India 1949; President of India 1952.

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Editorial :

Buddhism : Gotamavada Versus Theravada

Archie J. Bahm

Publication of my *philosophy of the Buddha*, 1958,[1] a research report of my studies as a Fulbright Research Scholar in Buddhist Philosophy in the Department of Pali and Abhidhamma, University of Rangoon, Burma, 1955-1956, announced a controversial thesis, namely, that the philosophy of Gotama, the Buddha, centered about a single psychological principle and involved explicit rejection of doctrines attributed to him by Theravadins.

GOTAMAVADA

Gotama's philosophy, as I have discovered it, is that desire for what will not be attained ends in frustration; therefore, to avoid frustration, avoid desiring what will not be attained." (Second and third "ariyan truths.") Since "it is natural to want more—at least a little more—than on gets,......the frustration entailed in this unattained more is ever-present,...'all is suffering.'" (First "ariyan truth.") If one desires to stop desiring more than will be attained more than he can, this desire also begets suffering. "In seeking to avoid frustration, one finds that he must be willing to be frustrated as much as he will be frustrated; and also be willing to be frustrated relative to his desire to stop desiring as it will be frustrated. This double willingness is the middle way. (Fourth "ariyan truth.") "The middle way turns out to be the way things are (i.e., to all tenses of 'are'), for it is the way between wanting things (including desires) to be more than they are or less than they are with respect to any way that they are. So long as one considers 'seek the middle way' and 'accept things as they are' as two different principles, he has not yet found the middle way..... Only when one is willing to be as unhappy as he is can be be as happy as he can be."[2]

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[1] Archie J. Bahm, Philosophy of the Buddha, Harper and Brothers, New York, and Rider and Company, London, 1955. Republished by Collier Books, New York, 1962, by Putnam's Capricorn Book, New York, 1969, by Vikas, Delhi, 1982, and in a Second Edition by Asian Humanities Press Freemont, California, 1991.

"The goal of life is neither more favorable rebirth nor extinction of self or of desire, as some have maintained, but 'dwelling, here and now, beyond appetites, consummate. unfevered, in bliss, in (wholesomeness).'[3] Then '...to whatever place you go, you shall go in comfort; wherever you stand, you shall stand in comfort; and wherever you make your bed, you shall lie down in comfort.'[4]"[5]

THERAVADA

Theravada, philosophy of the Theras, regarded as "orthodox" by most Buddhist and Indian scholars, differs from Gotamavada in several ways. It retains the traditional Indian tendency to regard desire, i.e., all desire, as evil (even though distinguishing between *chanda* (intending to act and acting as intended) and *tanha* (desiring with some anxiety, often emotion, and intentional intensity). It rejects traditional tendencies to regard ultimate reality as eternal, or permanent, and adopts two doctrines, *anicca* (impermanence) and *anatta* (no-soul). It accepts a rigorus doctrine of an "Eight-fold Path" as the way to achieving the purpose of life.

It reformulates the "four ariyan truths" accordingly :

1. "'All is suffering, because all is impermanent. A really non-existent self, in mistaking itself as a soul or permanent existent, clings to its belief in and desire for its permanent existence, thereby wanting what it cannot have. Its attachment to itself leads to attachment to other things; it believes that it has an enduring body, lives in an enduring world of other persons and things, and can acquire and own enduring possessions, of wealth, honor and children. Desire for their attainability and greed for acquiring them grow out of this mistaken belief in their permanence."

"Need for explaining the doctrine, "All is suffering because all is impermanent," occurs at two levels, one popular and one technical. Popular :......'Birth is suffering, decay is suffering, death is suffering; grief, sorrow, lamentation, pain and despaire are suffering; to be connected with things we dislike is suffering; to be separated from what we like is suffering; not getting what we want is suffering; in short all existence and attachment to existence is suffering.' Technical explanation is summed up in 'five aggregates,' temporary, even if persisting associations of phenomenal elements mistakenly accepted as substantial."[6]

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[2] Ibid., pp. 15, 18-19.

[3] Further Dialogues of the Buddha, Vol. I, p. 247. Tr. Lord Chalmers, Oxford University Press, London, 1926

[4] The Book of the Gradual Sayings, Vol. IV, p. 200. Tr. E. M. Hare, Luzac and Co., London, 1955.

[5] Philosophy of the Buddha, p. 17.

2. " 'The cause of suffering is desire.'......How can desire arise in a non-existent self or soul ?......'twelve links' have been distinguished in analyzing stages in the emergence and development of desires : (1) ignorance of the truly impermanent nature of beings exists (2) volition emerges from ignorance as will to endure; (3) awareness emerges from volition; (4) consciousness of objects and processes emerge to provide qualities of objects and thoughts about objects; (5) the five senses and mental processes emerge to provide qualities of objects and thoughts about objects; (6) the seeming reality of sense qualities and objects of thought emerges from sensing and thinking; (7) feeling about such qualities and objects as pleasant or unpleasant, good or bad, arises from their seeming reality; (8) desire (craving) for pleasure and avoidance of pain emerges from such feelings about objects; (9) clinging results from craving; (10) endurance results from clinging; (11) rebirth results from endurance; (12) suffering (birth, aging, dying, brief, lamentation, and despair) results from rebirth."[7]

3. "'To remove suffering, remove desire,' At the popular level, this means to stop desiring, or at least to stop being greedy, lustful, avaricious, demanding, fearful, hateful, or ambitious. ......At the technical level, the 'twelve links' must be reversed. One must first remove ignorance by realizing the truth of the doctrine of impermanence, including impermanence of the self. Removal of belief in permanence will remove willing the endurance of what does not endure." Etc.[8]

4. " 'The way to remove desire is the Eight-fold Path, consisting of right belief, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mind-fulness, and right concentration.' Although accounts may mention that this is called 'the middle way,' they assert that it consists in 'The Eight-fold Path' or in a path with eight steps. .. ...This eighth step becomes transformed into a ladder of four more steps, each more difficult, the last of which may involve

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[6] Archie J. Bahm. The World's Living Religions, Dell Publishing Co . New York, 1964. Republished by Southern Illionis University Press, Carbondale, 1971, Arnold-Heinemann, New Delhi, 1977, and Asian Humanities Press, Freemont, California, 1991, pp. 113-114.

[7] Ibid , pp. 114-115.

[8] Ibid., p. 115.

four still more subtle stages. ......Attribution of supernormal powers of vision and action at these stages appeals to the imaginations of some, but seems to be discouraged generally.[9]

DIFEERENCES

The most basic difference between Gotamavada and Theravada, one underlying all or most all of the other differences, is whether to idealize avoidance of all desires or avoidance of only those desires that will not be satisfied.

A tendency to regard all desire as a source of evil has prevailed thoughout much of the history of Indian Philososophies, even though desiring is necessary for living and Indian culture has customarily approved four kinds of desires (*kama. arth*, *dharma*, *moksha*). Theravada, although rejecting traditional Indian views about eternal beings (Brahman and Atman),retains its tendency to regard desire as a major source of evil. Gotama, in finally refusing to accept all desires as sources of evil and in refusing to assert either the eternality or impermanence of beings, is one of the must, if not the most, radical reformer in the history of Indian philosophy.

Other differences, which will be explored further below, include Gotama's refusal to assert his assurance of the truth of the following doctrines approved by Theravada : *paticcasumuppada. anicca* (impermanence), *anatta* (no soul), *kamma* and *samsara*, the Eight-fold Path, his originating an Order of Monks and authoritatively asserting rules and doctrines for them, and supernormal powers and omniscience.

PERERA'S CHALLENGE

A. D. T. E. Perera[10] arrived in Albuquerque on June 20, 1991, as Research Professor in Buddhist Studies and Comparative Religions in the Department of Philosophy af the University of New Mexico, to begin a two-years research project

He presented me with some articles and copies of *World Buddhism* which I read with interest. Then I referred him to my books, *Philosophy of the Buddha* and *The World's Living Religions*, Chapter 5, the former being my research report as a Fulbright Research Scholar in Buddhist Philosophy in the Department of Pali and Abhidhamma, University of Rangoon, Burma, 1955-1956, and the latter summarizing both Gotamavada and Theravada with comparisons.

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[9] Ibid., pp. 115-117.

[10] Perera is Editor-in-Chief of World Buddhism (Sri Lanka Cultural Research Publications, Gauri-14, Sarikkamulla, Moratuwa, Sri Lanka), Associate Editor of Encyclopaedia of Buddhism (Ministry of Cultural Affairs, Government of Sri Lanka).

After becoming aware of my controversial thesis about the philosophy of Gotama, Perera referred me to some pages in Warder's *Indian Buddhism*,[11] p. 49, citing the view that Gotama did indeed accept and assert *paticcasamuppada*. This act constituted a challenge to my view, and thus called upon me to respond appropriately.[12]

MY RESPONSE

My response included withdrawing thirty-four volumes of English translations of the Vinaya and Sutta Pittakas and some other books about Indian philsophies from the University of New Mexico Library, rereading much of the material read in the University of Rangoon while preparing my research report originally, and searching for further evidences that may support, or refute, my conclusions.

After finding much material that seemed suitably supportive, I outlined the issues that I claim are involved in the differences between Gotamavada and Theravada for further detailed examination.

My view, which I name "Gotamavada," is that Gotama was a person, immersed in the cultural traditions of his time, who became a "Brahma-farer," i.e. truth seeker in customary ways, practiced diligently for six years, and the obtained an intelligent, comman sense, self-evident insight into human nature and its way of desiring and being satisfied and frustrated. It is a view that, once understood, is obvious. Every person practices this view even though he is unaware of doing so. I believe that the obviousness of this view was a cause of his winning agreement from so many listeners.

THE ISSUES

1. *Paticcasamupapda*. The principle of "dependent origination," consisting of a causal process involving "twelve links," beginning with "ignorance" and ending with "There is nothing that really is,"[13] originated, according to Theravada, by Gotama, as an historical person, when experiencing enlightenment while recovering from an extemely exhausting yogic effort. It had no other originator, at least in human history during the persent yuga or aeon of time The enlightening experience occured by a banyan tree and the doctrine,

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[11] A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1970; Second Revised Edition, 1980.

[12] During the more than thirty years since my book was first published, no one has presented me with a challenge, so I am deeply endebted to Perera for his challenge. I very much appreciate an opportunity for responding by citing supporting evidence which seems sufficiently conclusive, for me at least.

[13] Dialogues of the Buddha I, p. 250 Tr. by T. W. Rhys Davids, Henry Frowde, London 1899.

referred to as "the supreme Wheel of the Doctrine"[14] and was announced during his "First Sermon" in a deer park near Banares. It includes a formulation of "The Four Noble Truths" and affirmed views about *annica* and *anatta*.

These ideas, with numerous variations, can be found restated in many places in the *Pitakas*, intermingled with many other ideas, practices and accounts of personal encounter between many different people. They seem to be foundational to Theravada as a doctrinal system.

I claim that Gotama was not the author of *paticcasamupadda*. Several kinds of evidence may be presented is support of this claim :

a. **His view is his own.** "The recluse Gotama teaches *dhamma* on (a system) of his own devising beaten out by reasoning and based on investigation; and says that *dhamma*, taught for the sake of something specific, leads the doer of it onwards to the complete destruction of anguish."[15]

b. **His view a first in the Pitakas.** The Pitakas open (the first ten pages of *The Books of the Discipline* I) with a conversation in which "a brahmin of Veranja quizzed Gotama about nine negative charactristics reportedly attributed to him; It does not begin by announcing the *paticcasamupadda* or any of the "twelve links." After responding to each claim as "true in some sense', but also as "surely you do not mean that-" and after his comments on his efforts to achieve understanding, Gotama concluded ; "Then with mind collected, clarified, purified,...and come to utter peace, I directed my mind toward the knowledge of the destruction of (frustration).[16] I knew as it really is : This is frustration, this is the arising of frustration, this is the stopping of frustration, this is the (way) to the stopping of frustration."[17]

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[14] Further Dialogues of the Buddha II, p. 296. Tr. by Lord Chalmers, London, 1927.

[15] Middle Length Sayings I, p. 91. Tr. by I. B. Horner, Luzac and Company, London, 1954.

[16] The problem of translating the Pali word "dukha" has given interpreters much trouble. Although the word has a wider range of meanings, its use in the Pitakas to account for unhappiness in life tends to keep it relevant to evils of desires. It has been translated into English in many ways : "suffering," "pain," "ill," "evil", "unpleasantness,.' "unhappiness," "sorrow," "discomfort," "misery," "anguish," and "cankers" (obstacles preventing satisfaction causing anguishing frustration). Although I am not aware of its use previously, I choose the word "frustration" as most adequate. Why. Because the central problem of life, as dealt with in Indian Philosophy, in Theravada and in Gotamavada. pertains to desires: There are only two general kinds of consequences of desires: satisfaction and frustration. So any translation of dukkha should be directly relevant to desires, and thus to involve frustration. Although describing feelings of frustration as "suffering," "pain,"

c. **Stated in the First Sermon.** "It was here in this very deer park at Banares that the Truth-finder...set a-rolling the supreme Wheel of the Doctrine, which shall not be turned back from its onward course by recluse or brahmin, good or Maya or Brahma or by anyone in the universe : the announcement of the Four Noble Truths, the teaching, declaration and establishment of those Four Truths, with their unfolding, exposition and manifestation. What are these four ?...the Noble Truth of frustration, of the origin of frustration, of the cessation of frustration, and of the path that leads to the cessation of frustration. '[18]

d. **Restated many time.** These "four certainties" about what "really is" are repeated in thc Pitakas more than a hundred and twenty-five times.[19]

e. **His view is convincing.** This view, that persons experience frustrations, that when they do not get what they want they are frustrated that when they want what the get they are not frustrated, and that frustration can be avoided (by becoming willing to accept what they get), is so obvious that everyone who understands it believes it. "The recluse Gotama teaches *dhamma* that is convincing, not unconnincing.[20] I regard the obviousness and convincingness of his actual doctrine as a major contribution to why "he won all his arguments" and won agreement with so many listeners (many of whom are reported to have expressed interest being his follower).

"ill," etc,. may serve the purposes of translaters unsure of its precise meaning, understanding that the meaning involves relation to desire should make evident that desire is at least implicit in such descriptions. Perera informs me that currently many intepreters use the term "unsatisfactoriness" This word has a very similar, if not quite the same, meaning as "frustration." It's connotation is somewhat less negative.

[17] The Book of the Discipline I, pp. 1-10. Tr. by I. B. Horner, Oxford University Press, London, 1938.

[18] Further Dialogues of the Buddha II, p. 296. Tr. by Lord Chalmers, London, 1927.

[19] The Book of the Discipline I, p. 10 The Book of the Gradual Sayings IV, 39. The Book of the Kindred Sayings V, 113 times between pp 355 and 399, Dialogues of the Buddha I, 93, 113, 255. Dialogues of the Buddha III, 128. Further Dialogues of the Buddha I. 207, 272, 296, 307. Further Dialogues of the Buddha II, 6 The Middle Length Sayings II. 221, 235, 235. 295. 296.

[20] The Middle Length Sayings II, p. 210. Tr. by I. B. Horner, Luzac and Company, London, 1957.

"There is a way in which one speaking truly of me could say; "The recluse Gotama is confident, he teaches a doctrine of confidence, and in this he trains his disciples."[21] Not only was Gotama convinced of his own view but he believed that onyone willing to use common sense in making observations about their own experiences would recognize its truth Even when about to die he advised self-observation. I prefer to render the early English "Be ye lamps unto yourselves" as "Figure it out for yourselves, boys (that's what I did; i.e. observes that when you want what your do not get you are frustrated and that when you want what you get your are not frustrated.)"

f. **His refusal to decide questions.** Complaints that he refused to commit himself to deciding issues recur many times in the Pitakas. Why did he refuse ? Claiming to know more than one can know about speculative doctrines "in sixty-two ways" involves "the worry and writhing consequent thereon, of those...who...are subject to all kinds of craving",[22] Implicit, when not explicit, is repudiation of claims included in *paticcasumupadda.* The entire Brahma-Gala Sutta (fifty-five pages) is devoted to asserting "That too is a matter on which I have expressed no opinion". "Some things I have laid down as certain, other things I have declared uncertain. The latter are those ten questions that you raised, and for the reasons given I hold them matters of uncertainty. The former are the Four Truths I expounded, and for the reasons given I hold them to be matters fo certainty".[23] Several other examples have been assembled in my chapter on "Greed for Views".[24]

g. **Complaints aboul misunderstanding.** "There are some recluses and brahmins who misrepresent me untruly, vainly, falsely, not in accordance with fact, saying: 'The recluse Gotama is a nihilist, he lays down the cutting off, the destruction, the disappearance of the existent entity'. But this is just what I am not...I lay down simply anguish and the stopping of anguish".[25] When listeners interpreted him as supporting or as denouncing kinds of views included in *paticasamupada*, he was quick to complain and restate his own views briefly I have summarized several types of misunderstanding in pp. 26 32 of *Philosophy of the Buddha*.

h. **Expressed previously.** Many parts of the doctrtnes included in *paiiccasamupadda* appeared much earlier in the *Brahmanas* and

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[21] The Book of the Discipline IV, p. 320. Tr. I. B Horner, Luzac and Company, London, 1951.

[22] Dialogues of the Budvha I, pp. 52, 53.

[23] Dialogues of the Buddha I, pp. 254, 256-257.

[24] Philosophy of the Buddha, Chapter 9.

[25] Middle Length Sayings I, p. 180.

Upanishads. "By knowledge man ascend to that condition in which desires have passed away."[26] "All action is ignorance, aad its opposite is knowledge. A creature is bound by action and libreated by knowledge."[27] "On account of attachment to unreal objects the mind pursues such objects. (But it comes back to its pure state) when it attains non-attachment, realizing their unreality."[28]

Jain doctrine includes some ideas present in *paticcasmupadda* : Bondage is due to ignorance of one's original, infinite nature...However, this ignorance of the original state has to be removed, and it can be removed naturally by knowing the ultimate truth about the *atman* .....when all action is got rid of, man obtains liberation."[29] "By the teaching of true knowledge, by the voidance of ignorance and delusion, and by the destruction of love and hatred, one arrives at final deliverance which is nothing but bliss." "Misery ceases on the absence of delusion, delusion ceases on the absence of desire, desire ceases on the absence of greed, and greed ceases on the absence of property.[30]

i. **Formalized later.** "The concept of Dependent Origination (*patiecasamupadda*) has been discussed by many scholars. Although various formulas of Dependent Origination are set forth in the scriptures of early Buddhism, the best known is that of the Twelve Links......However, the Twelve Link Theory must have been formalized later......Although there must have existed a complicated process in formulating the Twelve Link formula, it is undeniable that it is analogues in its ways of forumulation to the formulas set forth by other philosophical systems of India, such as Samkhya-Yoga. The original prototype of the theory is found in the older portions of the *Suttanipata*; and some similar sayings can be found in Jain works."[31]

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[26] Satapatha Brahmana, X. 5. 4. 15.

[27] Swetasvatrata Upanishad, Vishnu-Dharma, quoted by Sankaracharya in his Introduction. Reproduced in The Upanishads : A New Translation, Vol. II, p. 58, by Swami Nikhilananda, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1952.

[28] Mandukya Upanishad, Gaudapada Karika, reproduced in ibid., p. 355.

[29] P. T. Raju, The Philosophical Traditions of Irdia, p. 110 George Allen and Unwin, London, 1971.

[30] Gaina Sutras, Part II The Uttaradhyana Sutra. tr. by Hermann Jacobi. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1895.

[31] Hajime Nakamura, Indian Buddhism, A Survey with Bibliographical Notes, pp. 67-69. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, New Delhi, (1980) 1987.

"The title, "*Paticcasamupadda*,"......is almost certainly a name given by the compliers of the *Sutta-Pitaka* at a later date."[32]

j. Kassapas' influences. Evidences that the Kassapa brothers and their monastic followers, especially Mahakassapa, Gotama's favorite disciple, played important roles in formulating and promoting *paticcasamupadda* : The *Mahavamsa* account of the Third Council credits Mahakassapa and others with responsibilities for establishing the doctrine. "That redaction of the true *dhamma*, which was arranged at the beginning by the great theras, Mahakassapa and others, is called that of the theras."[33] When Gotama died, "The thera Mahakassapa was the *samghatthera* (organizer)" of an assembly. When he had performed all of the rites due ......the Master,...... thinking of the evil words of the aged Subhadda and also thinking that the Master had given him his garment, and had (thereby) made him equal with himself,......appointed (to make a compilation of the holy *dhamma*) five hundred eminent, bhikkhus......repeaters of the ninefold doctrine and versed in all its separate parts."[34]

k. Pre-enlightenment claims. Some accounts imply that Gotama knew in advance that he would achieve enlightenment and in what his enlightenment would consist. If so, then he did not discover *paticcasamupadda* under the banyan tree. "Before I became enlightened, while I was yet unenlightened and Bodhisat, there came this thought..... let there be becoming, then birth comes to be......let there be grasping, then becoming comes to be......let there be craving, then grasping comes to be......let there be feeling, then craving comes to be......let there be contact, then feeling comes to be...... let there be sense, then contact comes to be......let there be name-and-shape, then contact comes to be......let there be consciousness, then name-and-shape comes to be......let there be activities, then consciousness comes to be......let there be ignorance, the activities come to be, activities are conditioned by ignorance."[35] "Before my Self-awakening while I was still a *bodhisatta*, not fully awakened, it occured to me.[36] "Our Conqueror resolved to become a Buddha, that he might release the world from evil.[37]

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[32] Mrs. Rhys Davids, The Book of the Kindred Sayings II, p. v. Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., London, 1922,

[33] The Mahavamsa, p. 26. Tr. by William Geiger, Information Department of the Ceylon Government, Colombo 1912.

[34] Ibid , pp. 14-15.

[35] The Book of the Kindred Sayings II. p. 6. Tr. by Mrs. Rhys Davids, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1922.

[36] The Middle Length Sayings II, pp. 400-401.

[37] The Mahavamsa, p. 1.

1. **Previous Buddhas.** That the enlightenment of Gotama, the Buddha, under a banyan tree was a unique event of great historical importance seems to be agreed upon by Buddhists of all kinds. Although Theravda doctrine accepts this view, and that his enlightenment consisted primarily in *paticcasamupadda*, it seemingly contradicts this view by also claiming that at least twenty-four other Buddhas experienced the same enlightenment and also that the *dhamma* known by each was really universal and eternal.

The names, height, household lifespan, yuga lifespan, the mode of departure, and periods of austerities (ranging from 7 days to 6 years) of twenty-five Buddhas (including Kassapa and Gotama) are listed (pp. xxxii and xxxvi) and discussed (pp. xli-xlvi) in *Buddhavamsa) Chronicle of the Buddhas*), tr. by I. B Horner.[38] Acceptance of fantastic conceptions of omniscient, seemingly omnipotent, Buddhas presiding during different Yugas (cosmic aeons), seems to warrant believers and interpreters unlimited liberties to provide their own conceptions. If *paticcasamupadda* is an eternal cosmic truth, then Gotama's enlightenment is not unique, except as occurring in a current yuga.

Dialogues of the Buddha II opens with a chapter devoted to an account of Vipassi, the twenty-first Buddha, explaining how he "arose in the world, into what rank and family he was born, how long he lived, where be became a Buddha; the names of his leading disciples, the name of his father, his mother, and their place of residence."[39] Vipassi, even as a Bodhisat (pre-enlightened) expounded details of *paticcasamuadda* [40]

This extravagant doctrine of Buddhas in many yugas prospered in the minds of Mahayanists. Gotama is made to call "to mind many a *kalpa* of the world's evolution, many a *kulpa* of its dissolution, and many a *kalpa* of both evolution and dissolution."[41] Even Mahayanists interpret Gotama as "awakened to......enlightenment by insight gained in a momentary flash of thought: That is to say : this is frustration; this is the origin of frustration; this is the cessation of frustration; this is the way that leads to the cessation of frustration."[42]

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[38] The Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon III, tr. by I. B. Horner, Routledge & Regan Paul, London, 1975.

[39] Dialogues of the Buddha II, p. 8.

[40] Ibid. pp. 22-28.

[41] The Mahavastu II, p. 128. Tr. by J. J. Jones, Luzac and Company, London, 1952.

[42] Ibid.' p. 267.

The Jatakamala, p. xv, tr. by J. S. Speyer, Henry Frowde, London, 1895.

m. Editorial revisions. The final forms of the texts of the Pitakas have resulted from omissions, additions, modifications, rearrangements' and misinterpretations by memorizers, organizers and interpreters, and also translaters and commentators. Conflicting opinions of monks participating in a first council caused some to leave.

"It was at that Council (of Vesali, about 377 B. C) that the great schism took place, and that the ancient Canon was rearranged or disarranged.[43] "The Bhikkus of the Great Council settled a doctrine contrary (to the true faith). Altering the original text they made another text. They transposed Suttas which belonged to one place (of the collection) to another place; they destroyed the true meaning of the Faith, in the Vinaya and in the five collections (of the Suttas) ——Rejecting single passages of the Suttas of the proposed Vinaya, they composed other Suttas and another Vinaya which had (only) the appearance (of genuine ones)."[44]

In the Katha Vatthu we find "A refutation by Tissa of 250 erroneous opinions held by Buddhist belonging to schools different from his own."[45]

That two major systems of explanation should remain is itself remarkable in light of such diversity of opinions and revisions by so many people. "Hence in trying to account adequately for......the Paticcasamuppada, we need to keep in view this dual aspect of it." "Thus in A.I., 177, the formula of the Paticcasamupadda is rehearsed to explain the Aryan Truth of the uprising of Ill frustration), In M. I., 190,......an exhortation by Sariputta on the primary importance of a right attitude towards .....the nature and causes of ill so that the brethren may meet persecutions.. ills not due to their own ill deeds–with fortitude and serenity. In the Nidana Samyutta ....,all of the contexts of the formula......are grouped together. Of the ninety-three brief Suttas of which this division consists, only one-sixth—have Dukkha (or its opposite) for their object. A slightly larger proportion of the Suttas (16) are so many statements upholding the truth of the evolution of phenomena by way of natural causation."[46]

The idea of causation is involved in Gotama's four certainties (desire for what will not be obtained ends in frustration) and in *paticcasamupadda* (twelve links of dependent origination). Although these

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43 The Jatakamala, p. xv, tr. by J. S. Speyer, Henry Frowde London, 1895.

44 Ibid.

45 Dialogues of the Buddha I, p. xi.

46 Dialogues of the Buddha II, pp. 42-43.

two distinguishable systems intermingle at times and in various ways an understanding of each as "a philosophy," with its own systemic integrity, should be helpful in explaining the differences between Gotamavada and Theravada.

2. **Eight-fold Path.** Gotama did not advocate The Fight-fold Path. He advocated a middle way between wanting too much and wanting to stop wanting too much. His four certainties applied to all kinds of desires. "When one regards anything, no matter what, with *samyaksmirti*, attention to it with equanimity, a middle way between hankering and dejection, then he 'is aware of it as it really is.' "[47]

For further evidences regarding Gotama's intentions regarding the middle way, see my *Philosophy of the Buddha*, Chapter 6. Also, I have tried to show how each of the eight steps in the Path should be interpreted,when understood in terms of Gotama's ideas the middle way, in Chapter 10.

Adoption of the Eight-fold Path by Theravada editors doubtless involved many revisions. Lord Chalmers remarks that "Of these (right outlook, right aims, speech, action, mode of livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and right concentration) the second, third, forth and fifth were borrowed from the Wanderers *en bloc*."[48]

3. **Anicca and anatta.** Gotama did not advocate either that in ultimate reality things are impermanent or that no (permanent) soul exists, because he refused to take sides regarding such issues. Vacchagotta asked : " 'Now, good Gotama, is there a self ? When he had spoken thus, the lord became silent. 'What, then, good Gotama, is there not a self ?' And a second time the lord became silent. Then Vacchagotta departed. Then......Ananda spoke thus to lord : 'why, lord, did the lord not answer Vacchagotta's question ?' If I......answered that there is a self, this would have been siding-in with those recluses and brahmins who are Eternalists. If I......answered that there is not a self, this would be a siding in with those recluses and brahmins who are Annhihilationists-'."[49]

Although I have interpreted Gotama's views in advocating avoiding only those desires that will be frustrated rather than all desire as a most radical departure from traditional Indian philosophy, the Theravadins were also involved in a most radical departure from traditional Indian emphases on eternality and on soul, Individual and cosmic. Theravadins retained traditional conceptions of *karma* and

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[47] Dialogues of the Buddha II, p. 337.
[48] Further Dialogues of the Buddha I, p. xxiii.
[49] The Book of the Kindred Sayings IV, pp. 281-282.

samsara, regarding both of which Gotama refused to affirm conclusions. For more details, see my *Philosophy of the Buddha*, Chapter 10, "Soul or No-Soul ?"

4. **Order of monks.** Gotama did not intentionally establish an order of monks, or authorize and rules for monks. To do so would have been inconsistent with his views about refusing to decide debated issues. When Gotama was about to die, Ananda expressed hope that Gotama " 'would not pass away until at least he had left instructions as touching the Order.' 'What does the Order expect of me ?' ......'Now the Tathagata thinks not that it is he who should lead the brotherhood, or that the Order should be dependent upon him. Why then should he leave instructions in any matter concerring the Order ?' "[50] For more evidence; see Chapter 11, "Sangha;" in *Philosophy of the Buddha*.

5. **Claims about omniscience.** "Most schools of Buddhism have held that the Buudha was omiscient, that he was literally aware of everything that has ever taken place; was at present happening, or would happen in the future......However, the *Tripitaka* preserves explicit repuditation of such a claim by the Buddha."[51] "I have heard it said that the recluse Gotama is all-knowing and all-seeing, with nothing outside his ken and vision......The witness, Vaccha, is not true; it imputes to me what is false and untrue."[52] By repudiating claims to omniscience, Gotama rejected any theravada doctrines asserting or implying omniscience, including those associating him with previous Buddhas.

GOTAMAVADA MORE REALISTIC

The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate by quotations from the Pitakas that Gotama advocated four certainties which involve a necessity for refusing to advocate some of the doctrines considered "orthodox" by Theravadins and others. A second purpose has developed as a result of my becoming convinced that Gotama's four certainties are genuinely certain and that they constitute a major achievement in mankind's quest for wisdom.

That is, in addition to claiming that Gotamavada differs fundamentally from Theravada, I now claim that Gotamavada is true...... true in the sense that it consists of certainties that everyone can observe for himself and which he actually practices even when not aware of any statement of its principles.

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[50] Dialogues of the Buddha II, p. 107.

[51] A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, p. 136-137.

[52] Further Dialogues of the Buddha I, p. 340.

I regard the philosophy of Gotama as more realistic than Theravada in many ways :

Gotma is reported as behaving in accordance with his doctrine : "The revered Gotama eats food experiencing its flavor but not experiencing greed for the flavor."[53] "The recluse Gotama is content with any kind of almsfood,... with any kind of lodging".[51]

Theravadins, or at least the compilers of the first two Pitakas, regarded his doctrine as sufficntly important to record it at least one hundred and thirty times.

Anyone concerned with testing its truth can do so easily. Simply observe your own desires and which are desires for what you attain and which are desines for what you do not attain, and which are frustrated. Then observe a desire for something that you believe is not attainable, and cease desiring it. When you have no desire, it cannot be frustrated.

Scientific evidence supporting Gotama's view can be obtained by anyone wishing to take the trouble. Question ten or ten thousand persons (i. e., as many as you regard needed for a conclusive test) and tabulate their answers. Unless persons questioned have been conditioned, culturally or socially, to hold a conflicting view, answers seem likely to be entirely favorable. But a person who has already made such tests seems unlikely to believe that additional testing is necessary.

However appropriately Theravada doctrines and practices were suited to the cultural system in which Gotama lived, their appropriateness for today seems questionable. When becoming a monk was not only an acceptable but honored way of both living and learning, acquaintance with historically-debated issues, whether by brahmins, jains or theras, and arguments favoring each side of traditional issues, led naturally to interest in them and debates about them. But today, when knowledge explosions provide information not only about so many other traditional philosophies of life and so much increased understanding of the nature of things, supported by scientific investigations providing conclusions based on demonstrable evidence, the idea of understanding one's life in accordance with the "twelve links," ending in "nothing really is,"[55] is no longer unable for most people. Today, when more and more people are faced with megalopolitan and global realities, the belabored and unconvincing promotion of

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53 The Middle Length Sayings II, p. 324.
54 The Middle Length Sayings II, p. 208.
55 Dialogues of the Buddha I, p. 250.

ancient doctrines seems unrealistic. But Gotama's four certainties, which are universally relevent for all peoples and at all times, is quite realistic, and more realistic than the Theravada doctrines which he rejected.

IMPLICATIONS

Although Gotama's four certainties are so obvious, when attended to and understood, that they must have been stated by many people in many different ways, his statement of them was so impressive and convincing and so influential in human history that it deserves recognition as a unique expression of this wisdom.

In attributing this wisdom to Gotama, I do not attribute its discovery to myself. My study of Buddhist texts and doctrines caused me to become aware of his certainties as true universal generalizations about human nature.

If Theravada doctrine claims that Gotama is author of *paticca-samupadda* and the Eight-fold Path, and thus not the author of the view that only the four certainties are certain, then, since I have stated this view, in attributing it to Gotama, actually I am author of this view so stated.

If Theravadins find it necessary to attribute such authorship to me, then do they not in effect regard me as the author of the view? Ought they not be willing to call this view "Archivada" ? And if, or since, it is more realistic than Theravada, then ought they not regard me as an author either equal to, or even greater than, Gotama and other Theravadins in wisdom ?

Ought they not expect me to issue an invitation to potential followers : "follow me"? Or, in the language attributed to Gotama, "I allow, I permit," meaning, "you may"[56] or "I approve." If I regarded myself as anthor of Gotamavada, I would be willing to invite others to become fellow way-farers even as Gotama did. But Since I regard Gotama as author of Gotamavada, I advocate that truth seekers follow him.

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[56] The Book of the Discipline IV, p. xxiii.

I

Personal Identity : In Buddhist and Whiteheadian Thought

(An Exercise with an Intercultural Experience)

Anil K. Sarkar

Though the topic seems interesting, it is a complex consciousness in intercultural philosophy.

Going back to modern European thought of the Old World process—it has been found that Descartes, a French Philosopher, brings in a problem by a triadic process of 'doubting', implying 'thinking' and that leads one to posit one's 'self-existence'. Does it imply a 'personal identity' ?

Hume, a British thinker; an empiricist, doubts whether it is possible at all to establish the reality of one's self, or permanent experiential process, if all experience rests on 'discrete' and 'abstract impressions' ?

Kant, a German thinker, still later refers to a unifying judging process operative behind all sensible phenomenal forms, but doubts the 'existential process' behind the phenomenal synthesis of any judgment.

Hegel, another German thinker, interprets thought, as an 'idea'--a process of assertion, when followed by a contrasting 'opposite'-darts towards as 'synthesis', or 'unity', and that again leads to further unities, terminating finally with an 'Ultimate' or 'Absolute' Idea. That psychic ideal process, when transferred to the cosmic process of Nature, is operative as a dialectic process. These processes in transcendence-symbolizing a transcendent unifying process-have a claim of an Absolute Spirit: But can this abstract dialectic process account for a 'personal identity' ?

'Personal identity', if understood in some depths, implies a passage to one's depth-process-from that depth-conscious process, one may still be doubtful about one's personal identity, and any claim of finding a basis for a 'feeling process' in one's 'abstract idea' may always be doubted. There is a gulf between an 'abstract idea', which roams about on the suface of one's psychic experience and the basic directly experienced feeling-process. The 'abstract idea'-cannot touch the inner 'psychic processes'.

Moreover Hegel can never relate one's 'abstract idea'-to the transcendent 'Universal Spirit'' which is in a different dimension, if there is no continuous 'personal process' running through, one's personal subjective life, along with the confronted Natural processes. unless the two processes are foundationally connected with one another, and for the same reason, there is a 'dimensional lift' beyond these basic orders, to a completely distinct order, we symbolically indicate through 'spiritual process' which runs through and also beyond each of the separate basic orders of one's psyche and Nature. All apparently distinguishable processes-Psyche, Nature and Spirit are interconnected processes, if 'personal identity' is sought.

In post-Hegelian thought-a German thinker, Husserl for example-is said to revolutionize the entire European thought by suggesting that there is a transcendent subjectivist process-as prior, confronting simultaneously two other orders, as one's ego with other egoes, and the vast order of objective realities-but here also-one has sufficient reason to doubt the reality of one's 'subjectivity or 'personality, if one is not conscious of an inner transcendent experience, which is at once conscious of a basic transcendent experience with a 'confronted' experience but totally comprehended in the 'integral transcendent experience.

Husserl mentions about a 'transcendent subjectivity' and the confronted dual orders of one's own 'ego' and also of other's ego and self-but not very clearly indicating that the "transcendent subjectivity' runs from the transcendent basis to the confronted processes, distinguishing one from the other, without splitting itself with the observant processes, by some kind of a continuous pursuit of 'one's identity'. But this claim, if any, is, not admitted with a direct insightful 'clarity', hence that 'claim' is also 'doubtful', when one is not sure of an 'existential process' beyond one's phenomenological postulation of a prior and a posterior order. How can one know the 'sequence', or 'one as the ground for the other' ?

Husserl's trans-psychic and trans-cosmic order, as prior was doubted by another German thinker, who claimed the 'existential priority' over one's psychic priority'.

What was necessary in both of these trends-was a simultaneity of these claims with a 'togetherness'-which in India's Upanisadic thinking was taken as a 'double consciousness'. This is indicated clearly in Kena Upanisad, suggesting that 'experience' is not complete, if any confronted sense-experience, is not at the same time grounded upon the transcendent consciousness, which is not merely a sensible experience, but as well something more being 'consciousness of consciousness'-transcending the confronted sensible experience, by a supersensuous' experience with a continuity.

Here also one is at a loss to determine, what really is one's' person' or 'one's identity', or even one's 'existentiality'. The two orders of consciousness, is a continuous reciprocily, one is deficient without the other. The 'efficiency' lies in 'relativity' and also the transcendence of the one by the other-a 'double consciousness'-self-consciously.

The post Husserlian and post-Kierkegaadian process was followed by a series of mixed 'phenomenological-existential' processes, making the simplicist process of what really is one's 'personality', or one's identity', or 'existentiality' when there was no dsscovery of the two distinct processes-one's 'psyche' and 'one's existentiatity'.

They were not placed within a common milieu. All in a way-suggest some kind of dealing with 'abstract ideas', and there-fore some 'abstract claims'-providing grounds for some kind of 'egoistic claims', and nothing more.

The varied naturalist/realist Euro-American trends that followed these-remained occupied with a 'same linear 'platform'-'re-interpreting'-the 'emergent ideas' in one's consciousness-as belonging to a living organismic process-with a background and foreground-with no specific beginning or end-but 'possible' orders of 'ground-consequent' processes-in any specific scientific or philosophic orders of experiential processes. But how can the linear processes continue an infinitum, unless there is an inspiring transcendent process, as a 'witness' supervising the confronted, to give direction to the varied confronted processes, with ever-fresh novelties ?

Without going into further details—this paper—with some abruptness—concentrates on the philosophical deliberations of A. N. Whitehead—who chose to re-interpret 'emergent ideas'—as apparently 'abstractions', of the human organismic living process—separating one's 'consciously oriented process' as entertaining all sorts of specific abstract phenomenological or existentialist thinking, and also all modes of specific realistic theories, or again interpreting the 'emergent ideas' as 'pragmatic', 'instrumentalist processes' with a currency value, or tracing them back to socio-vocal 'gestures' later raised to a symbolical linguistic level in human situation. This complex process in a series-was differently entertained by Peirce, James, Dewey and and Mead. Viewed from this lengthy past history of the 'emergent ideas' as 'abstracts'-one can safely entertain the view, that an 'emergent idea' in an occasion of human experiential situation in a 'contrast', in the background of its past, and has a further prospect beyond this level.

In all of these philosophical-psychological and scientific thinkers-from Bergson, Russell to Boodin and Santayana-there was a stress on some kind of specific exclusive theories, or in a 'general sense'-a series of 'abstractions' as upholding some 'absolutes', without acknowledging their basis in some possible processes, without any element of 'categorical features'.

The 'confronted situation'-takes shape as a 'form' of 'contrast'-to perish with a possibility of emergence, with no 'inheritance', and with any fixed conceivable basis.

The universe is 'fluid through and through', with only a general suggestion, of continuous, emergence' inextricably bound with a general character of 'perishing'.

The words used are 'symbolical' in the general sense, of a 'may be'.

Whitehead's different books, as 'The Concept of Nature'-removes all 'bifurcation' between different orders of experiential processes. This process of various orders, in terms of several experintial processes-as 'contrasts'-from the confronted World or Nature-are considered in different dimensional orders-from a basic non-sensuous processes-from 'spatiotemporal' orders, in one dimension, as continuously perishing, and as 'persisting' in a different dimension, of 'eternal objects'-Whitehead's specific term, or 'contrast'-to symbolize the possible permanent characters, but not absolutely permanent, just as the spatio-temporal process is not absolutely perishing'. Whitehead's these two basic principles, are not 'abstract', 'categorically oriented ideas'-one excluding the other, but one leading to the other', with a further possibility.

The permanent characters-the 'eternal objects,' in one aspect, combine themselves in various forms, as expressed in 'Whitehead's propositional orders'.

But these 'propositional orders' are still placed in the non-sensuous orders, with emergent possibilities, in conscious intellectual orders, as basic 'contrasts'.

Besides these complex possibilities, from the 'eternal objects'—there is a further possibility of all of these possibilities—in an epochal Occasion, which is both primordial and non-conscious or pre-conscious or but as well 'conscious' and 'post-conscious'.

Such a transcendent process and possibility—involving a series of 'contrasts'—is Whitehead's 'God'—it is a togetherness of all eternal objects, with an 'epochal vision'; it is also a post-intellectual process beyond all 'intellectual abstractions and restlessness'.

Hence this 'God' does not stand for the exclusive religious experience of a particular 'religious experience', but it stands for all religious experience, in togetherness, with a transcendence to all orders of experiential processes, in inter-relatedness.

All these many sided or many-dimensional ideas, as many-dimensional 'contrasts'—are described in Whitehead's books—'Religion in the Making' and 'Process and Relativity'.

Here the relations between 'God' and the 'World'—are expressed in different dimensions, by contrasting 'poles'—' physical' and 'conceptual'—one directing the other— 'permanence with fluency'—to make up one's deficiency by the other.

They describe both 'relativity' and 'transcendence' in togetherness—pointing to another prospective process, which is Whitehead's 'Creativity'—a process beyond all 'forms'—even transcending Whitehead's God, in its transcendent-superject aspect.

All these complex ideas are made further clear in Witehead's 'Adventures of Ideas'. Here Whitehead's 'ideas' are progressively considered as 'contrasts' in many dimensional orders, comprehending all major civilizations of the world, in a final direction, which is a pursuit towards, a symbolical term—'Peace'.

The details of Whitehead's major principles, as developed in Whitehead's different books to the stage of his 'Adventures of Ideas–have been indicated specially with Buddhist pursuit towards 'Peace' with some difference—in my book, Whitehead's Four Principles From West-East Perspectives' (Bharati Bhawan, Patna, 1974, Second Enlarged Edition to come out soon from South Asian Publishers Ltd., New Delhi. Publication references to Whitehead's books will be found also in my above books).

Whitehead abandoned all these various specific Naturalist and Psychic scientific and Philosophic processes—by interpreting the 'ideas' as 'emerging' in human consciousness, transcending the preceding cosmic-naturalist processes in non-sensuous relational psychic processes or 'prehensions', or symbolically—'concerns' or 'connected-ness—at once 'perishing' and 'emergent'—'spatio-temporal' and possible permanent characters (eternal objects)—separately or in interconnection (propositional processes).

But all these 'pre' and 'non-sensuous cosmic-psychic processes' will emerge in a ground-consequent way in 'conscious' intellectual way, which by themselves are 'abstractions', splitting the continuity of the possible confronted processes and possiblities, if not lifted to a transcendent cosmic-psychic process—in an 'if then' form, beyond—which Whitehead calls the 'Wisdom Order'—in a 'symbolical 'if then' sense.

Hence the process is not 'intellectually, abstractly or categorically oriented. It is a process of a continuous'if-then' possibility—but not separated. It is an integral process, hence meditatively oriented.

Beyond this 'epochal wisdom order of God' which is an all sided possibility, not religious alone, there is an over-all—cosmic-psychic possibility beyond all 'forms' to a continuously 'transcendent process—the formless' beyond all confronted 'forms'.

Whitehead—gives a specific name to this process—'Creativity', without making it an abstraction', it is not an 'idea', but 'symbolically oriented'—a 'wisdom'—a complex 'meditative contrast', with a further possibility.

Here the pursuit is deeply 'meditative', in the order of continuous 'detachment' from all intellectual abstractions, or restlessness'; way of contrast, it is balanced condition, or 'Peace' or a meditative continuum' of infinite possibilities, akin to the Buddha s experience of 'Meditative Possihility' beyond all intellectual forms—an infinitude of 'contrasts'.

Here there is no more any claim for an 'abstract ideas, it is a cosmic-psychic continuous-integral vision, with no end It is not personality, it is not a claim of identity, it is a loss of all identities, a 'process, of continuous 'if-then'.

Therefore this paper. brings in a possible comparison with India's Buddhist thought in development through the different Asian countries, and now placed on par with several Whiteheadian thinkers, who are also conversant with the afore-mentioned Buddhist thought, with continuous developments—beyond all 'intellectual forms'—'is', is not', both 'is and is-not'—dialectically denying a 'choice', symbolized by Nagarjuna of the second century A.D. offering no choice for selection, so that an individual pursuing this path has to remain with 'no choice' i. e., a 'choice'—for instance—is an 'intellectual restlessness for jumping into choosing', but 'no choice' by a contrast—is remaining'—'balanced and placid'—in a Peaceful Condition.

If Nagarjuna's confronted 'neither nor,—or 'no-choice sitution' is presented—it might be symbolized as below : 'There nothing disappears, Nor anything appears. Nothing has an end, Nor is there anyeternal, Nothing is identical, nor is there anything differentiated, Nothing moves, Neither hither nor thither.'

In all these alternatives—any 'choice' is excluded.

The puzzle is more : 'if one confrontes such a situation as—the non-existence of 'self-existence', nor even 'relational existence'—for both are deficient'.

Whitehead like Nagarjuna—in their progressive post-intellectual meditative exercises—confronts—similar situations.

Hence, cutting out the details of both Whiteheadian and Buddhist thoughts—this paper summarises the interconnected aspects as below, following the trends of his published works both on Whitehead and Buddha and their 'process-philosophy'—in an inter-cultural context.

In this connection—one my refer to my book, Buddhism And Whitehead's Proces Philosophy (South Asian Publishers Ltd , New Delhi, 1991, where I have closely pursued the nine papers of nine American specialists on Whitehead's process-philosophy, and Buddhism, in its developed 'Mahayana' form of Buddhism.

But, in contrast to their clarification of Buddhist thought in development—I have developed Buddhist thought—pursuing the Buddha—in different stages of his life—before and after—his attainment of 'Nirvana' or the 'transcendent enlightened condition, and after that stage, in his confrontation of later experiences, with his confrontation with different personalities—so that there were basis of emergence of different froms of Buddhism—Theravada, Mahayana and Tantra—so that one could find the basis for the Buddha's discovery of 'no-personality' process, in the life of the Buddha, with a development of the direct meditative experience of 'No-Buddha' finally: There is no final 'personality' for the Buddha, the Buddha dwells in an abode of un-restricted continuity.

If that were the Buduha's experience, then, the title of the paper—'Personal Identity' in Buddhist and Whiteheadian Thought'—ends up with a possible suggestion—that if there is no such thing as an 'ultimate Personality', then obviously the pursuit—has its merit in a superior type of 'meditative understanding'—in which both Whitehead and the Buddha agreed—though in this pursuit of the study of the Buddha or of Whitehead—they will differ from me. But undoubtedly they both advocated a meditative experiential situation of 'no personality , and hence 'no identity'. Both in different ways revolutionized their respective cultural process, and headed towards a comprehensive 'humanist movement'.

For a detailed clarification of my position, in this connection, I will also refer to my book, 'Changing Phases of Buddhist Thought' (in three editions, the final third edition, published by South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1983), and my another recent work on Buddhism, entitled, 'The Mysteries of Vajrayana Buddhism'—From Atisha To Dalai Lama. (South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1993).

2

Religious Belief and Philosophical Inquiry

M. Prasad

The object of the present paper is to show the relevance of philosophical inquiry for religious belief. Religion and religious beliefs are generally considered to be based on faith and as such they are not amenable to reason. The present study will also try to clear the mist behind such a view. To show the relevance of philosophical inquiry for religious beliefs, we must have a clear notion of what philosophical inquiry is and what exactly is signified by religious belief.

I

What does Philosophical inquiry mean ?

"To inquire" is "to seek knowledge of (a thing) by putting a question" : "to make investigation", "to seek information by questioning". When I make inquiry about an absentee student in the class, I simply intend getting information about him which will explain his absence. When a scientist inquires about a physical phenomenon, he tries to find out the cause of the phenomenon by carrying on several experiments and observation which will explain the phenomenon. The aim of inquiry is to explain a thing or event based on facts and not on imagination. It must however, be admitted that a good imagination does help in inquiry.

A philosophical inquiry is also an attempt at explanation. A philosphical inquiry, must be different and distinct from a non-philosophical inquiry. The inquiry made by a police officer or a scientist cannot be strictly said to be philosophical, unless philosophy-making characteristic are presest in their inquiry. But what are philosophy-making characteristics ? There characteristics can be known best if we study what the philosophers are exactly doing when they say that they are doing philosophy. William P. Alston has fruitfully summa-

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[1] *Religious Belief and Philosophical Thaught* : see Introduction.

rized philosophical activity under the heads of '*formulation, clarification, integration* and *evalution*'. Formulation and clarification are really inseparable aspects of the same enter-prise. The philosopher seeks to clarify the basic concepts, assumptions, and modes of reasoning of whatever area he is dealing with and in so doing he gives a clear and precise formulation as far as possible. In this endeavour, the philosopher seeks to remove confusions and ambiguities with which the area is infected. Clarification of concepts means doing all these.

It is generally found that in the various areas of our study, a tension is generated by coflicting beliefs and theories. When this sort of tension develops, it is for philosophy to find out some kind of unification. Integration, thus is an important philosophical activity. With the help of reflective activity, philosophy tries to remove the tension *either* by giving judgment in favour of one or other belief or theory; *or* by showing that the conflict is only apparent and not real; *or* by affecting some sort of compromise between the conflicting theories. Philosophers have been found to be always questioning the worth, validity of whatever they have been investigating. Analytical philosophers, however, donot accept evaluation to be the business of philosophy. For them philosophy ought to limit itself to the first three tasks only. Although analysis for the sake of clarifying a concept is very important activity, yet reflective men will always feel a need to raise questions regarding justification and validity. Having thus understood the implications of philosophical inquiry, let us now turn to explain the meaning of 'religious belief'.

II

Religious belief : its nature :

Belief is mental assent to or acceptance of a proposition, statement or fact, as true, on the ground of authority or evidence. Belief need not be confused with knowledge. Knowledge is unerring and free from doubt. I may have strong belief about the innocence of my friend, but I cannot on that account claim to have knowledge of the innocence of my friend. It is also true that all knowledge results into belief, but all beliefs need not lead to knowledge.

By religious beliefs are meant those beliefs because of which a man does activities which are designated as religious activity. In other words, religious beliefs are the causes of religious activity. With regard to the nature and status of religious belief, it would be fruitful to begin with the views of Alsadaire MacIntyre. According to MacIntyre religious beliefs are not established by reason or arguments. They are based on the authority of the scriptures, religious teachers or prophets, and as such they have a distinct status from ordinary beliefs. He offers *two* grounds for holding such a view *viz.* (i) the criterion of testing the validity of religious belief is different from that of ordinary beliefs and (ii) that the nature of religious belief is also different from ordinary historical belief.

(i) Ordinary beliefs are based on the experience of the believer or on the strength of cogent arguments or on the authority of some person who has experienced the veracity of belief himself. But religious beliefs are based on the authority of scriptures or prophets or religious teachers esteemed with reverence. As MacIntyre says, "If religious belief was the kind of thing that could be presented as the conclusion of an argument, we should either have too much certitude or too little for the belief in question to be religious belief. For if we could produce logically cogent arguments we should produe the kind of certitude that leaves no room for decision; where proof is in place, decision is not; we donot decide to accept Euclid's conclusion; we merely look to the rigour of his arguments."[2] Religious beliefs are not accepted on the strength of arguments. They are tested to be valid or invalid according as they conform or not with some scripture or the authority of prophet or religious teacher.

(ii) The nature of religious belief is also different. "Since a belief in a historical event is always a factual belief it is always provisional in the sense that new evidences as to the facts could always turn up. But religious faith ..is never provisional."[3] We donot find for example, a Christian believer accepting *Resurrection* conditionally or provisionally. Religious believers donot take their beliefs to be provisional waiting to be confirmed. Religious beliefs are unshakable in nature. MacIntyre assumes that there exists a characteristic religious attitude in man which commits the believer to the practice of worship on the one hand and to the belief that God acts in this universe, on the other hand.

R. M. Hare like MacIntyre, believes in the Conviction theory of religious belief. He also holds that religious beliefs have a status which does not require empirical testability. Hare upholds the theory of "*blik*". A "*blik*" is a pervasive attitude of mind which underlies his assertions. It is a confirmed and habitual way of looking at things. It is brought to the facts, not elicited from facts. It cannot be described as true or false. For him religion is just such a *blik* and does not, therefore, enter into the empirical circle of truth or falsehood.

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[2] *The Logical Status of Religious Beliefs* in Metaphysical Beliefs (ed; Alsadaire MacIntyre) pp. 196-97

[3] *Ibid.;* p. 198.

R. B. Braithwaite also agrees that religious beliefs are not of the type of scientific beliefs. Braithwaite highlights on the emotional and intellectual side of religion but The "Religious assertions are primarily declarations of adherence to a policy of action, declarations of the commitment to a way of life".[4] Religious beliefs are moral in nature and are concerned with human actions alone. Braithwaite upholds action theory of religious belief.

Without entering into discussion of the merits and demerits of such views, it can be maintained that each of the above mentioned views is onesided and does not take into consideration the situation involved in religious belief in entirety. Religious belief does not concern the feelings and emotions alone or actions alone; The entire personality of the religious believer is involved in his religious beliefs. W. P. Alston has very correctly remarked," A belief in a Divine Mind and Will ruling the universe might be held purely as a speculative hypothesis; it will not be a *religious belief* unless it makes contact with the believer's feeling, attitudes, and action in a characteristically religious way."[5] Religion is most adequately understood as an exercise of our *whole* nature. It is a complex function in which thought, felling and will are inextricably interwoven as constituent elements. Religious beliefs are expressions of a man's total reaction upon life. They are very dear to the believer. He cannot give them up so easily. The believer orients his life according to his religious beliefs. It is not a fact that a religious believer does not exercise his reasoning faculty. He must have reasons for his beliefs, although he may not be able to convince others, But he is satisfied with the interpretation of his experience and he derives great emotional satisfaction from his beliefs. His prayers, acts of worship and adoration—all can be explained in terms of his beliefs. Religious beliefs are what a believer after due deliberation resolves to accept and models his life accordingly. Religious beliefs are not due to lack of critical faculty on the part of the believer. When he finds his empirical knowledge leading him *nowhere* and leaving him in a vacuum, he feels inclined to accept the words of a scripture, or *Guru* (religious teacher) even when his words refer to things *not knowable*. And so, when one is disillusioned by worldly life, he takes to religious beliefs. His pinning of faith in the words of *Guru* is not blind but only when he is convinced that the teacher has personal experience of what he preaches; And because of such experience, the teacher is able to inspire confidence in the disciple.

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[4] See his *An Empiricist View of the Nature of Religious Belief*

[5] W. P. Alston, *Religious Belief aad Philosophical Thought*, p. 3

To sum up then : religious beliefs are conscious commitments. When a child is told stories about ghosts, he believes them in an unconscious way because his critical faculty has not developed. Religious beliefs are accepted with full knowledge that the entities they refer cannot be verified as true or false. They are accepted as true on authority in which the believer has unflinching faith. The believer is attached to his religious beliefs, internally and emotionally. These beliefs are the main springs of his life. He does not even for a moment think these beliefs to be false He feels the life and blood of his life in these beliefs. They control and guide his life.

III

Are religious beliefs independent of philosophical inquiry ?

Some religious mystics are of the views that religious beliefs are essentially a matter of faith and philosophical inquiry has no place therein. Faith is opposed to reason and philosophical inquiry is essentially critical. Religious beliefs are based on the words of scriptures and words of religious teachers. We cannot approach them with a skeptical attitude because that will count as loss of faith in them. If we approach them critically, we can never be religious. The famous philosopher Kant also found in his Critique of Pure Reason the incompetence of reason to comprehend the truths of God, immortality etc. Faith, Revelation and mystical union with the Supreme Being are the sources of religious beliefs. They do not need to be justified by any critical or evaluative inquiry. W T. Stace holds mysticism to be the essence of religion and believes that there is a mystical side of human nature just as there is a rational side. Deep down in us, far below the threshold of our ordinary consciousness, there lies the non-discriminating, intuitive mentality in us, which in the great mystics exists in the full light of conscious recognition. The religious beliefs have justification in the ecstatic vision of the great mystics. They need no other justification. They have their foundations in the religious nature of man. They have an independent status.

Heidegger also believes that philosophical inquiry has no competence to inquire into religious beliefs. Heidegger takes religion to be dealing with divine human relationship which cannot have a place in philosophy. For him faith and reason are two different activities. and any attempt to synthesize them is bound to fail. He takes religious faith to be unconditional in character and philosophical inquiry to be problematic in nature. Religious beliefs are concerned with a way of life which is quite distinct from the object of philosophical inquiry Philosophy for Heidegger, deals with Being as such. God of religion cannot be identified with Being of philosophy. Christian faith according to him is an event of participation of the believer in what is believed—Christ. Religious belief is a way of life and so is entirely beyond the scope of philosophy.

Heidegger's separation of faith from reason and his insistence on their contradictory character would deprive religion to have any objectivity. His distinction between faith and reason on the basis of absoluteness of faith and religious belief and conditional character of reason and philosophy is also misconceived. Recent studies into Christianity and its historicity disclose the conditional character of Christian faith also. A number of Christian thinkers like Hartshorne and Ogden take God to be relative rather than absolute. Ogden holds that God is "a reality which is genuinely related to our life in the world."[6]

Are religious beliefs and philosophical inquiry intimately related

If we look into the early history of philosophical thought in the West, we find that no attempt has been made to demarcate the field of philosophy from religion. Knowledge of the ultimate reality was considered to be the object of philosophical inquiry. The goal of religion was to realize the ultimate reality. Religion was an integral part of philosophy till the eighteenth century. The nineteenth century also witnessed the continued popularity of religion as a philosophical topic. Spinoza did not distinguish between Substance and God. Almost all philosophers including Kant, Hegel and Hume found the religious topic like belief in God to deserve an important consideration in their thinking. They considered religious beliefs to be intimately connected with philosophical thinking. Most of them felt that the task of philosophy was to present a comprehensive interpretation of universe which includes beliefs like God, Soul, etc.

The approach of the Indian thinkers in early days was different. They believed that knowledge of the reality dawns upon those who approach the qualified teacher with reverence and unflinching faith in their words. The Indian Seers and Saints have first realized the truth by undergoing rigorous discipline called *Sadhana*. These truths were then communicated through philosophical thinking. In other words religious truths are realized truths and they become the foundation of philosophical inquiry.

John Macquarrie also favours the view that religious beliefs are indistinguishable from philosophy. Giving an existential interpretation, he says that to believe in God is to believe that human existence is set within a wider context of meaning. In another place, he equates the belief in God with "faith in Being' which is practically equivalent to "confidence in the final worth of our existence".[7] Religious beliefs are for him firm belief in the worth of human existence.

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[6] Ogden, Schubert m., *The Reality of God* (Harper & Row, N. Y) p. 47.

Leslie Dewart is also of the view that philosophy and religion are intimately connected. His contention is that the traditional theology of Christianity is inadequat today because it has failed so develop in step with the general evolution of human consciousness: He defines religious experience simply as "that aspect of ordinary everyday experience which is the origin of religious belief"[8] One basic fact of ordinary experience is that we realize that our existence is contingent. We might never have existed. This makes the meaning of our existence problematic. We donot determine our destiny. "What religious experience really reveals is that the meaning of existence is not to be found within existence itself, but beyond. And when human experience reveals this, human experience has become religious belief."[9] Religious beliefs, on this interpretation are, as it were, the real, ultimate meaning of human existence. We, thus find contemporary thinkers with an existential bias, construing religious beliefs as giving meaning to human existence. Religious beliefs are not opposed to ordinary experience but grow out of it. Philosophical inquiry is a reflective activity which gives meaning to religious beliefs.

IV

After having discussed the issue in the context of what philosophers have to say on the problem, let us find out if the fourfold activity of philosophical inquiry can be applied to religious beliefs. In view of wide divergence of views about what religious beliefs mean and the nature of religious belief, it is necessary to make explicit the basic concepts, assumptions involved in religious belief. The misconceptions, confusions with regard to religious belief and its nature have to be removed by philosophical inquiry. Religious beliefs of one religion often come in conflict with those of other religions. The tension generated by such conflicts demands the integerating activity of philosophical inquiry. The question of the worth, and validity of religious beliefs to general and of some specific religious beliefs has become very important these days because the progress of science has put a question mark on these beliefs. Philosophical inquiry must perform its evaluative function.

It must be admitted that the interest of religion can best be served by critical inquiry which is the aim of philosophy. If religions belifes are not to get fossilized and must issue in living faith, it is proper that they get themselves and formulated by philosophical inquiry.

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[7] Macquarrie, John, *God and Secularity*, p. 150

[8] Dewart, Leslie, *The Foundations of Belief* (Herder and Herder, New York 1969) p. 426.

[9] *ibid*, p. 126.

3

Plato and the Scientifie Spirit

B. Mollenhauer

It is one of the paradoxe‸ of our atomic age that representative scientists are reading the Vedas and other ancient classics of India, and that the emerging insights of new religious insterest look not to science but to mysticism and to the ancient sources of Western Culture, to Creece that morning land of Western philosophy. It becomes increasingly apparent science is no new Messiah, and has not only no real panacea for our social illness but is the growing menace when diverced from spiritual values. Almost too late we are learning what sages of the Orient have always known-the peril of intellectual development apart from inner corresponding spiritual growth.

Historically speaking the parting of ways between Orient and Occident is owing to a growing difference in the dominent modes of thought since Plato whose comprehensive genius would have sympathized with much in a work like the Bhagavad Gita. From Greece of his time we have inherited an inquiring empirical attitude of thought, the ever questioning spirit of Socrates, the inventive spirit of an Archimedes, the empirical outlook o| a Democritus, who saw in atoms the building blocks of the universe.

There is wide spread notion that Plato's Idealism is a development of Socratic thought that eclipses science and discourages experimental work. It is sometimes claimed Plato considered Natural phenomena unworthy of serious observation since ,the only real things are the eternal Ideas. The famous allegory of the dwellers in the Cave who know only a shadow world encouraged the interpretation. And of course there is a higher philosophical sense in which all the world is Maya, the great illusion. But Plato was not devoid of an appreciation of nature; there is too much of the Greek in him to ignore the outer aspect of things. We know he madc acute observations of geological formations in his native Attica. Far from ignoring experience he is one the careful student returns to again for his keen commentaries on men and events. It should be noted also that the Doctrine of Ideas as popularly understood is not the final Platonic teaching as pointed out in the elaborate Greek studies of the eminent Platonist Prof. Wincenty Lutoslawski.

In a later phase of his thought Plato drew closer to the position of Aristotle. That Greek science flourished under his most famous pupil indicates that Platonic influence did not exert a baneful influence upon its later growth. Research was carried on in the Academy where mathematics was eagerly cultivated by Plato's followers, the very language of science.

"If we took away the numbering and measuring and weighing from all the arts, what was left in each case would be called a poor thing," says Plato, "what was left would be guess work and training of the senses empirically by practise."

It would be vain at this late date to repeat Voltaire's scornful criticism of Plato's views on science sometimes echoed by our contemporaries. The Academy was not a clinic and Plato's knowledge was limited by his time as seen in his dependence on Hippocrates. Yet he was aware of much we think of as peculiar to modern thought, such as the basic principle of psychoanalysis, the influence of emotions on condition of the blood and the shape of the earth. Perhaps his philosophy provides a sounder basis for research in psychotherapy than what we have in "behaviorist psychology" with is purely and quite dogmatic materialist assumptions.

It is true Plato insists that spiritual knowledge is much more important than any knowledge of sensible phenomena which he assign to the lesser realm of "opinion." In claiming true knowledge of the philosopher involves a higher level of consciousness he brings to mind that there must be higher degrees of insight. As sun is higher than any light on earth so is the Idea of The Good higher than nature and a science of nature. For in it is the fulfillment of man's ultimate being and destiny.

4

The Existential Perspective of Language and Meaning

Santosh Kumar Pal

The problem of language and meaning is generally understood from the logico-linguistic point of view. Most philosophers of language, particularly those who take a formalistic approach, think that grammatical rules and logical syntax are the only determinant of the meaning of an expression, and so they focus only upon the syntactical aspect of language. But it seems that this approach to language, though not incorrect, is nevertheless insufficient. Language has an existential root add as such to grasp the meaning of an expression or of a sentence we have also to illumine our lived experiences. In what follows we would throw light on this neglected aspect of language. We would do this by considering relevant views of different thinkers, particularly of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.

It seems worthwhile at the beginning of our discussion to take note on the difference between the existentialists' approach to language and that of the analysts. As we see, the analytic philosophers are interested in the way language relates to the world, how words 'signify' or 'refer', how propositions acquire meaning, under what conditions they get true, and so forth. They fail to take note of the fact that meaning has a more primitive level of origin. The existentialists, on the otherhand, show their interest in this aspect and so they focus their attention to the existential level of human experiences. They hold that meaning springs from the depth of living relations of man to the world. And so they stress upon the selection of words, upon individual's dialogue with others, his mode of uttering, his tone of voice, his silent movements, etc. These are characteristics that are of no value, or of less value, to the logical analysts. But the fact is that these modalities contribute to the meaning. If this be so, the problem of meaning is to be taken up at the deeper level of our living relations to language.

In our discussion we shall understand meaning in two senses, in a *broad sense* and in a *narrow sense*. In the broad sense, meaning could be the sense of anything for some other thing which the human being understands in the course of his encounter with the thing-world. Such meaning need not always be conveyed by linguistic signs alone. It may also be expressed in non-linguistic signs, gestures, movements of body, as well as by the uses of natural objects. The meaning as conveyed by linguistic signs is the meaning in the narrow sense. While meaning may express itself also in the pre-reflective, natural way through non-linguistic signs, meaning in the narrow sense is meaning as conveyed by the linguistic expressions alone. In this latter sense, language is a system of artificial signs, although such signs have their origin in natural human expressions. We may trace the origin of emotion-words to the natural expressions of them in human beings. In a situation of fear, e. g., when a man shivers, the shivering in the natural expression which communicates that the man is in fear. But when the man expresses the same fear in the form of the sentence 'I am in fear', he communicates the same emotion, but it is deprived of the natural concrete expression. It is possible that the man starts shivering first and then in the course of the shivering he shouts that he is in danger, that he is to be saved, etc. In some other situations, however, the behaviour-expressions are not so marking, and the relevant linguistic expressions are the only means of communication. These linguistic expressions are a system of sounds codified by public rules. Obviously, these linguistic sings are abstract, and so may fail to represent the depth of natural expressions.

Needless to repeat that language has the principal role of communication. When a man utters a word or writes a groups of words, he wants to communicate something. This intention of communication is the most important aspect of language and so this aspect is to be properly taken into account to grasp the meaning As words are uttered in a speaker-hearer situation, understanding of what is intended to be communicated is thus as important aspect of meaning. Meaning becomes possible when the speaker and hearer share the same communicability and carry on the same type of socio-cultural activities. Other-wise the intention of communication will be frustrated, and meaning will remain unrealized.

The elements of language, i. e., words, sentences, etc., are supposed to have certain specific uses, although the uses may be of various kinds. It is sometimes held that words, as the units of language, have meaning first, and the sentence acquires meaning only when the word-meanings are combined. The existentialists, however, do not accept this associationstic account of meaning. We may speak of Merleau-

Ponty, for example, who holds that words acquire meaning only as being used in a concrete speech-situation in a sentence. In other words, meaning develops, accordingly, in the concrete course of dialogues with others. Thus conceived, the meaning of a sentence is more fundamental than the meaning of words.

According to existentialism, the human being exists in the world; he exists alongwith other fellow beings and objects of the world which have significance for him. The world is for the sake of which he exists. Understanding reveals to him the significance of the world. The revelation of the world means the disclosure of the significance of the objects. It is human beings that exploit their significance. The attempt to understand his own being equiprimordially with the objects of the world produces meaning. But this understanding which is the source of meaning, according to Heidegger, may be *authentic* or *inauthentic*[1]. In the authentic mode of understanding human being wants to grasp the world in a genuine way· If the understanding is inauthentic, the world may be disclosed, but the true significance of the world would not be revealed. Only in authentic understanding does the human being come to be aware of himself alongwith his awareness of the meaning of objects, of the world. But when the human being fails to realize his potentiality for being, the, language in his project for possibilities, meaning lapses into inauthenticity.

According to Heidegger, human being exists in and through such projects which are based upon his possibilities. When the possibilities are considered in their real situation, with reference to a state of realization, they must be made articulate. when we consider a thing" we consider it for a specific purpose. Things have a certain specific use, they are equipments or instruments. An object is looked upon to be something in terms of its use. and so it is a table, or a door, or a hammer, something which has a use for me. It is not the case that first a bare object is seen and then it is interpreted as something having a particular use. Rather the object is taken pre-predicatively. The predicative interpretation which comes on later is based on this pre-predicative understanding. Things, according to the existentialists, are use-things and, the use are their meaning. This meaning is determined in terms of our possibilities. If we think of them as mere things without any relation to the human project, we will fail to understand. Heidegger says that in interpreting we do not, so to speak, throw a 'significance' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand. we do not stick a value on it; but when something with-in-the-world is encountered, the thing in question has a preinvolvement. This is disclosed in our understanding of the world and this involvement gets laid out by interpretation.[2] Although meaning becomes articulate by the predicative interpretation of understanding, it lies pre-figured in the involvement of the human being with the world which gives it this earlier shape, even without language. This type of involvement may be called the having of things in advance, in Heidegger's language, *fore-having*. Heidegger says that entities derive their meaning through man's *involvement* with them and his *concern* for them. They are disclosed as having meaning through the project of possibilities of which human being is concerned. Meaning thus is not a property attached to entities, for entities become meaningful or meaning-less in the context of human beings' project of potentiality for being. It might be said that only *Dasein* (Heidegger's word for human reality) has meaning. Heidegger writes, "*Dasein* can be meaningful or meaningless. That is to say, its own Being and the entities disclosed with its Being can be appropriated in understanding, or can remain relegated to an non-understanding"[3].

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[1] Martin Heidegger : *Being and Time* (trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1178, pp. 95-125.

According to Heidegger, before man can speak, he is addressed by Being. Language may be man's creation. But actually it is man's response to Being which possesses language. He says that man is in an essential sense attuned to the silent voice of Being. In his words, "Authentically language speaks, not man. Man speaks only insofar as he at all times responds to language"[4]. If he speaks, it is because he has first heard and paid heed to the voice of Being. Thus Heidegger wants to say that language has its source in our primitive experience of Being. It is, as if, Being speaks and man simply responds to Being. Fundamentally, hearing is *Dasein's* belonging to Being, its obedience to the call of Being. Language is, accordingly, the 'house of Being'. This is, however, not a metaphor formed by applying the familiar image of a house to Being, for it is far from thinking the essence of Being that we may finally think what 'house' and 'dwelling' are. It is in this house that man lives. This means that man has his abode in language in which he lives. Language and meaning develop through constant dialogues between *Dasein* and Being. According to him, language is not merely a tool which man also possess among many others, but rather that which makes it possible for him to stand in the openness of Being"[6] In order to show that language is not simply something at *Dasein's* disposal, Heidegger uses the enigmatic expression, *die Sprache spricht*. It is language that speaks, not man.

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[2] *Ibid*., pp. 190-91.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

[4] Martin Heidegger : *Hebel-der Hausfreund*, 2nd Edition, pfullingen : Neske, 1958, p. 26 (as cited by Tomas A. Fay in his *Heidegger : The Critique of Logic*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977, p. 96).

[5] Martin Heidegger : *Uber den Humanism*, Frankfurt, 1949, pp 10, 21, 43.

Although in *Being and Time* Heidegger has disavowed a 'word mysticism', it can hardly be denied that he moves in some such direction in his later writings. Language is not only the house of Being but increasingly it takes over the character and function once assigned to Being itself. One obvious way in which Heidegger's *Wortmystik* shows itself is in this facination with etymologies and the primordial meanings of words. A large number of Greek words is studied by him in the belief that the articulation of Being evinces itself in there words. His belief is that "along with German, the Greek language is at once the most powerful and most spiritual of all languages".

According to the existentialists, language and meaning thus have their origin in 'discourse' in 'dialoque'. Human being wishes to communicate what he in his interpretive search understands. The efforts to understand give rise to the articulation of what is understood or interpreted. That which is understood or thought to be intelligible becomes expressed in words. Meaning becomes articulate in words, and a discourse conveys the totality of significance. The main task of discouse is to disclose the being of the individual. In this context of Buber has introduced the, primary words', 'I-Thou and 'I-It'. The primary words are not isolated words, but combined words which Imply a discourse of our 'being-with-others'. This dialogical character reveals a personal dimension of language and meaning Buber says, "primary words do not describe some-thing that might exist independently of them, but being spoken, they bring about existence"[7]. But Sartre claims that "lanauage is not a phenomenon added on to being for others; it is originally being-for-others, that is, is the fact that a subjective experience itself for another"[8] Sartre's discussion of language is found in the context of his remarks on seduction. He acknowledges that the primitive language is not necessarily seductive and that there are other forms of it. But language can be revealed entirely and at one stroke by seduction as a primitive mode of being of expression'[9]. His tendency to dwell on inauthentic relations with other forms is a corrective to that which is somewhat idealized in 'I-Thou' relation stressed upon by Buber, though the latter was well aware of the fragility of the relation to deteriorate.

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[6] Martin Heidegger : *Erlauterungen Zu Holderlins Dichtung*, 2nd Edition, Frankfrut am Main : Kiostermann, 1951, p. 35.

[7] Martin Buber : *I and Thou* (trans. by R. G. Smith), 2nd Edition E. B. Ashton, New York, 1267, p, 125.

[8] J. P. Sartre ; *Being and Nothingness* (trans. by Hegel Barnes), Philosophical Library, New York, 1956, p. 372.

[9] Ibid., p. 373.

Lanauage, accordingly, is not a picture of reality which is to be judged true if there is one-to-one correspondence between the picture and the fact it represents. The locus of meaning and truth is not in the proposition, but rather in the reality itself. Language lets what is talked about stand out and be seen for what it is. Language successfully communicates when it lights up for two or more people their being-in-the-world and lets each see what the other sees. It is obvious that such an account of language lays stress on the personal integrity of the users of language as on the logical structures of language itself. But, as Kierkegaard observes, such language does not achieve this lightning up and communication. He writes, 'How ironical that by speech man can degrade himself below dumb creation he becomes a Chatterbox'[10]. 'Idle talk' is Heidegger's expression for the kind of discourse that does not really communicate or disclose entities as they are. We do not so much understand the entities whin are talked about; we already are listening only to what is said in-the-talk as such. The idle talk, far from opening things up for us, really closes them off. For Heidegger, the quest for the meaning of Being in terms of its truth as unconcealment (aletheia) or unveiling should situate itself within the realm of discourse, where the communication for our existential possibilities of one's being can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosure of existence. But all the possibilities of *Dasein* are not realised in this disclosing, and for this, Heidegger goes forward to the 'poetics of silence'.

The question of the relation of language to the ultimate mystery of Being is also discussed bv Jaspers. He seems to recognize three levels of thought and language : "Appearance is described and thought in concepts. Signs convey what I am and can be myself. Transcendent reality, to be experienced by existence alone, is manifested in cipher"[11] Jaspers prefers the word 'cipher' to the word 'symbol', and explains that a cipher denotes 'the language of reality that can be heard and addressed only thus and in no other way'. In this language Transcendence is thought of in terms of some intelligible entity, but if we take the language at all literally, we fall into superstition. As example of cipher, Jaspers speaks of the personal God, the one God and the incarnate God. These all relate to Transcendence, but none of them can conceptualize Transcendence, or gives us a literal idea of it. The ciphers cannot conceptualize, or objectify, but they evoke some notion of it.

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[10] Soren Kierkegaard : *The Last Fears* : *Journals 1953-55* (ed. by R. Gregor Smith), New York, 1965, p 262.

[11] Karl Jaspers : *Philosophical Faith and Revelation* E. B. Aston New York, 1967, p. 125.

In this way we in the long run proceed to the idea of the unthinkable, or the unsayable. Ordinary language is incapable of disclosing the unsayable. In this connection, the existentialists preach the doctrine of mysticism, and say that language cannot completely capture the reality, and put forward the 'poetics of silence.' As Bindeman observes, for Heidegger, this poetics of silence serves to locate the typology of Being as phenomenological poetics of silence as found in the presencing of a work of art and in that which is worthy of thought. This mysticism of silence, however, finds affinity with the early Wittgenstein's theory of language. He writes in the *Tractatus*, "what we cannot speak about we must consign to silence"[12], and, elsewhere in the same text, 'There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make *themselves manifest*. They are what is mystical"[13] But this mysticism of Wittgenstein is not to be exaggerated, since the positivist gives up mysticism long before the mystic does. Their mysticism only means that what we cannot speak of, we must be silent, and nothing else.

Let us finally turn our attention to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of language· According to Merleau-Ponty, language which expresses our thought is no different from our ideas through a music or painting. A piece of music cannot be separated from the rhythm, truth and harmony in which it is expressed. Likewise, thought can never be separated from language, or the meaning from words or sentences. Meaning presents itself in utterances in a concrete form and it is understood in the cluster of sounds expressing words. Hence it is said that a little hesitation in utterance, a little change of voice or the choice of a particular string of words, changes the meaing[14]. Merleau-ponty has compared words with a kind of pure bodily signs and he thinks that words carry meaning in the same way as bodily expressions. The bodily signs have an inseparable relation with signification, and so also language. Language, according to Merleau-Ponty, has two fundamental forms. He distinguishes between *la-parole* and *la langue*, between 'speaking word' and 'spoken word'[15]. He considers the speaking word as the pure or basic speech, and speaks of the spoken word as the speech of the second stage. The spoken words are those words which have become the common property of a language group due to constant uses after coming in existence. In this sense language is an institution which has acquired a well organised fixed body due to the repeated uses by the different members of a linguistic community. But it is to be noticed that this speech in the second level has its source in the primitive first level. These words must have been used at first by a speaking word is that primitive speech through which meaning is born, and thus makes possible the expression of any matter of discussion[16]. He refers to the first sound of a child, an expression of the feeling of a lover to the beloved. He speaks also of the first words of man on the earth, or of the enunciation of an ultimate principle by a philosopher. In all these cases there is the primitive speaking. These speaking word reveal the true and original nature of language. These words are thus the true source of meaning.

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[12] Ludwig Wittgenstein : *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*(trans. by D-E. Pears and B. G. MuGuinness), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961, Proposition No. 7 (in short, T. 7)-

[13] *Ibid* : T 6. 522.

[14] Maurice Merleau-Ponty : *Signs* (Trans by Telhard C McCleary) North western University Press, Evanston, 1964, p. 89.

[15] Maurice Merleau-Ponty : *Phenomenology of Perception* (trans. by Colin Smith) Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979, p. 197.

But the close relation of language with meaning, Merleau Ponty says, becomes obliterated through the frequent use of words, and the meaning appears to be more important than the speaking through which it comes into being. He invites us to go back to what the original sources which explain the articulate thinking. The source itself may be silent, but that silence is broken up by man's first speaking which brings into reality what we call language[17]. This speaking is the expression of man's first encounter with Being with all its multiplicity and sensuousness. As man lives in Being, he cannot separate himself completely from his intimate bond with Being. The reduction of that lived world in which man is pre-reflectively existent in a sort of union with the multifarious aspects of life is impossible. In that experience the distinct parts have not yet emerged, but are, perhaps, lying in a sort of non-distinctive whole. The process of reflective awareness chisells the inarticulate experience into articulate tools of communication through expressions, words, and so on.

It is noticeable here that there are differences among the theoretical frameworks of the existentialists; but all of them agree on the point that meaning is to be understood in relation to man's primordial, aesthetic and mystic experience with Being, where man is an active

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16 Mrinal Kanti Bhadra : *A critical Survey of Phenomenology and Existentialism*, ICPR-Allied, New Delhi, 1690, p. 489.

17 Maurice Merleau-Ponty : *Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit.*, p. 183.

purposive being in his project of possibilities in the attempt to realize his authentic being.

In concluding the discussion we may consider the logical positivists' objection against an existential theory of meaning. Carnap, in his essay "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis', argues that the so called language of the existentialists is vitiated with the violation of logical rules of language, and so an existential theory of meaning is non-sense. He particularly refers to Heidegger's theory of Nothingness, and contends that his expression 'The Nothing nothings' (*Das Nichts nichtet*) is a clear violation of logical rules, which is essential for a possible meaningful language. But Tomas A. Fay, in his work *Heidegger : The Critique of Logic*, strongly opposes Carnap's contention that logic is the ultimate foundation of everything. He reiterates that mechanical logic need not be the only approach to reality. He writes : "What if logic and its principle of contradiction is not the highest court of appeal in this case ?... What if there is a thinking which is even more original than the thinking of science and logic, and what if this thinking can grasp The Nothing and speak meaningfully about it ?"[18] All these amount to saying that the analysis of language and meaning by logico-grammatical rules is not the whole story. We have to lead our search to that existential level where meaning takes its origin in the lived experience of human individual.

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[18] A. J. Ayer (ed) : *Logical Positivism*, The Free Press, New York, 1959, p. 69.

[19] Tomas A. Fay : *Heidegger : The Critique of Logic, Op. cit.*, pp. 42-43. *Also consulted :*

Steven L. Bindeman : *Heidegger and Wittgenstein : The Poetics of Silence*, University Press of America, New York, 1981,

John Macquarrie : *Existentialism*, Penguine Books, 1973

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5

From the Chariot : The Katha and the Phaedrus

Lawrence E. Johnson

The chariot can offer a superb vehicle for spiritual instruction. Arjuna, as we all know from the *Bhagavad-Gita*, learned a great deal while riding in a chariot. Other examples will spring to mind, very striking ones occurring in the *Katha* Upanishad and in Plato's *Phaedrus*, each of which uses the chariot as a simile for teaching about the soul and its spiritual progress. I shall by no means attempt a systematic exploration of the use of the chariot as a literary simile. Rather, I shall explore certain aspects of the teachings of the *Katha* and the *Phaedrus* as they concern the nature of the self. It is not my endeavour to explicate the full meaning of either of those seminal works. That I believe would be impossible, and certainly it would be beyond my own powers. I do hope to illuminate important aspects of those two works and their teachings. Like the jewels in Indra's crown, each of which reflects the others, each of these works can, I believe, be better seen in the light of the other

Plato's Chariot

Plato's *Phaedrus* presents an account of the self, and its ascent to the truest and highest knowledge, an account which is strikingly different from that which is presented in the *Republic* and in other of Plato's earlier dialogues[1]. In the *Republic* (Book iv) we are told of a soul divided into appetitive, emotional, and rational elements. It is the latter element which is true soul,according to that dialogue,and it the alone can attain immortality through attaining the highest knowledge. To do so it must suppress the other, baser, elements of the soul. For this reason, poetry, the arts, and personal affection must all give way to philosophy. At the beginning of the *Phaedrus* Socrates starts to express a similar view but, as Plato dramatically presents it, he is stopped by his familiar *daimonion* which, as it has done on previous occasions, lets him know that he is in error. Plato then, through Socrates, unfolds another account, one which I believe to be more highly evolved. In this account he moves significantly in the direction of the *Kath*—and not merely in his choice of simile. There are important points of difference, as well. Through considering both similarities and difference we can, to our benefit, improve our understanding of both the *Phaedrus* and the *Katha*.

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[1] That the *Phaedrus* is later than the *Republic* (and the *Symposium* and certain other dialogues) is still controversial, though critical opinion seems to be progressively coming ever more into agreement that this is so. See the discussion in M. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, Cambridge, 1986, L. Robin, *La Theorie Platonicienne de l'Amour*, Paris, 1933, and R Hackforth, *Platos Phaedrus*, Cambridge, 1952.

In the *Phaedrus* Plato recognises, as he did not in the *Repubic*, that the emotive and appetitive elements are intrinsic parts of the soul and are intrinsically valuable. All three elements, of course, must be properly channeled. The emotive and appetitive elements provide power to the soul and so can be used to carry it upwards. Here we come to Plato's simile wherein we are told (246a-247b) that the soul is to

> be likened to the union of powers in a team of winged steeds and their winged charioteer.. ...a pair of steeds......one of them is noble and good, and of good stock, while the other has the opposite character, and his stock is opposite. Hence the task of our charioteer is difficult and troublesome......All soul has the care of all that is inanimate, and traverses the whole universe, though in ever-changing forms. Thus when it is perfect and winged it journeys on high and controls the whole world; but one that has shed its wings sinks down......what we must understand is the reason why the soul's wings fall from it, and are lost. It is on this wise......by reason of the heaviness of the steed of wickedness, which pulls down his driver with his weight, except that driver have schooled him well.[2]

The horse of inferior breeding, the appetitive element, is the one which draws the soul down through its attachments to worldly, and therefore illusory, objects of desire. The way to prevent the fall of the soul is not to try to get rid of the unruly horse (which could not be done even were it desirable to do so) but to guide it in the right direction—a matter of getting our desires properly in order. This the charioteer, the mind, does with the aid of the well bred horse, the emotive or spirited element. Properly directed, the spirited element of the soul is a powerful agent for controlling and redirecting our appetites. Improperly directed, it is a powerful agent in helping them destroy us. I am reminded here of C. S. Lewis's observation that great saints and great sinners are cut from the same cloth alike having great spiritual power and passionate dedication to what they value. What is critical is how this spirited element is directed. Certainly it is a matter of direction. Unlike Hume, Plato does not take the view that reason is the slave of the passions. Neither is it independent of the passions. They are partners in the soul's ascent—or descent...with the rational element in our soul having the critical role in guidance.

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[2] I use the translation of the *Phaedrus* by R. Hackforth, *op. cit.*.

Guidance, however, is not solely a matter for our reason That is because *we* are not solely a matter of reason. All three elements of the soul are aspects of the *whole* self, and the well-being of the self must span the well-being of all of its aspects and in all of its depth. We are according to this view, complex beings with complex ways of participating in reality, and there are diverse channels through which perceptions of reality may enter the soul. Not all reality is comprehended by reason alone. Certain types of beauty and moral significance—which are quite throughly real–are arational (as distinguished from irrational),and must be experienced by us in our wholeness Here the passions can offer a certain amount of guidance, as well as motive power. In isolation the rational mind becomes stale and arid for lack of nourishment. We must not lose contact with our broader and more complete self. Given input from our whole being our rational mind can then fulfil its role at the reins.guiding us—all of our being – properly in the right direction. Our soul is a whole and it must be well integrated and well directed,and accordingly as it is or is not well integrated and well directed as a whole it will rise or fall as a whole.

On the strength of these considerations, the *Phaedrus* goes on to make a further point of immense significance concerning the nature and importance of the emotive and appetitive elements of the soul. Not only do they provide motive power for the soul and even play a certain role in guidance, they are essential and intrinsically valuable elements in the good life—that which leads us to communion with the highest truth. This is because the highest truth is not a purely intellectual matter. It involves value. As we are told in the *Republic* (vi, 508). truth and knowledge have their source in the Form of the Good. Goodness, the supreme value, is the source of all value, of *all*. It follows that finding our way to the highest is a matter not just of getting our knowledge in order but of getting our values in order The whole of our being, in *all* of its aspects, must be put in order. To concentrate on only one aspect of the self would be to take a superficial approach which is inadequate to deal with deep reality. On this point there is agreement with the Upanishadic view that the way of true knowledge and the way of true value are ultimately the same way.[3]

Socrate's *daimonion* warned him that he would fall into error if he neglected this aspect of truth. The consequences would not be good. Nether are the consequences good for theorists in their theories or people in their lives if they neglect it. It is an under-statement to say that much subsequent history has born this out in practice.[4]

The Chariot of the Katha

The *Katha*, like the *Phaedrus*, uses the imagery of the chariot to explain the self as a whole, the soul, and what is necessary for its salvation. The imagery is used differently, with different points of emphasis Some of the differences are superficial, while others are matters of fundamental importance. As the *Katha* puts it (i, 3, 3-11),

> Know the Self to be sitting in the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect (buddhi) the charioteer, and the mind the reins.
>
> The senses they call the horses, the objects of sense their roads.
>
> When he (the Highest Self) is in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer.
>
> He who has no understanding and whose mind (the reins) is never fimly held, his senses horses) are unmanageable, like vicious horses of a charioteer.
>
> But he who has understanding and whose mind is always firmly held, his senses are under control, like good horses of a charioteer

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3 For instance, the *Chandogya* stresses the way of true knowledge, while the *Brihadaranyaka* stresses the way of true value. Yet, to have true knowledge one must have one's values in order. Having true values is a matter of having an undistorted grasp of reality, which is to say, of having true knowledge. These therefore, as the Upanishads teach us, are not two ways to the same end, but are fundamentally the *same* way to the same end. For a further discussion, see my "On the Self : The *Chandogya*," *Darshana International* 99 (1987), and "Self and Salvation : The *Brihadaranyaka*", *Darshana International* 114 (1989).

4 To discuss that in any detail would take us too far afield. However, I would like to mention the currently important work of Francis Fukuyama in his "The End of History ?", *The National Interest* 16 (1989), and in his *The End of History and the Last Man*, Penguin, 1992. There he gives instances of how things have gone radically wrong when we did not make proper provision for that arational element. Societies which try to organize themselves rationally for rational humans tend to develop in ways which are neither rational or humane. Man lives not by reason alone. It turns to stone in our mouth. We must make provision for the passionate element, and we must do so in such a way that our passions work *with* reason in the service of the good.

> He who has no understanding, who is unmindful and always impure, never reaches that place, but enters into the round of births.
>
> But he who has understanding, who is mindful and always pure, reaches indeed that place, from whence he is not born again.
>
> But he who has understanding for his charioteer, and who holds the reins of the mind, he reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place Vishnu.
>
> Beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, the Great Self is beyond the intellect.
>
> Beyond the Great there is the undeveloped, beyond the undeveloped there is the Person (purusha). Beyond the Person there is nothing—this is the goal, the highest road.[5]

Perhaps the most immediately striking difference between the *Katha* and the *Phaedrus* lies in their different conceptions of the role of the charioteer. In each case the rational mind or intellect is represented as the charioteer, but for the *Phaedrus* it is alone in the chariot. For the *Katha* the soul is the lord riding in the chariot while the intellect acts in a subsidiary role, as something of a chauffeur. To be sure, the *Phaedrus*, if not the *Republic* or the *Phaedo*, grants that the other elements of the soul have considerable importance, but for Plato the rational mind is still preeminent. In this Plato expresses what has been, from before his time to the present the predominant western point of view, that whatever else we might be, however much or however little, we are in essence *rational* beings.[6] The *Katha*, in contrast, while assigning the intellect a leading role in the affairs of the body.assigns it a much lesser role in our over all scheme of things. It is only one aspect of a much wider whole.

The other differences are of varying degrees of importance, both in the imagery and in the underlying content. The horses, for example, in the *Katha* represent the senses and are of indeterminate number. Plato's two horses represent the two elements of the soul, the senses being taken for granted. There is agreement that the object of sense, worldly things, are illusory and misleading, though only in the *Katha* are they assigned a specific analogue (the roads). These differences are more literary than substantive. Much more important, though it may not appear to be so at first, is that in the *Katha* the charioteer must control those unruly horses, the senses. The Platonic charioteer must also control unruly horses, but those horses are the elements of the soul. Sensory input is presupposed, and is not thought to be problematic. For Plato, as for much of early Western philosophy, the senses were regarded as something like windows onto the outside world. We ought not to become too attached to what we see out there, and we should not repose undue faith in the veracity of what enters in that way, but the senses themselves were taken to be more or less passive channels. They were not conceived of as dynamic elements in need of control. For the *Katha* they were potentially rebellious horses, to be kept under firm control—all the more so as they are part of our phenomenal self.

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[5] Upanishadic quotations are taken from the translation by F. Max Muller. that being perhaps the most widely distributed.

[6] In the west, accordingly; much more than in the east, the thought that an animal might have a soul is widely considered to be absurd. Similarly, that a god might take an incarnation as an animal usually seems absurd in western eyes, much more so than that the god might incarnate as a human. Plato himself does grant (*Phaedrus* 249a-b) that a human soul can be incarnated as an animal. However, this can only be as a result of its having fallen away from the philosophic life and as a consequence deteriorating badly to the point of losing its essential humanity.

The *Katha* has that right, of course. Our senses are not just facilities we happen to have. Nor are they passive. They are manifestations of our manner of being in the phenomenal world and in significant measure they are under our control, whether or not consciously. Nonetheless, in significant measure they actively *shape* the world of our awareness—that which is *our* world. We shape that which shapes are awareness. How we perceive the world around us is in significant part an expression of our needs, attitudes, values, and, in general, orientation of our being. To start with, and what is most trivially obvious,our perceptual space is a human one, primarily a visual one—a perceptual space which must be very unlike, for instance, those of echo-locating bats or sharks with their electro-magnetic sensations. Even among humans the nature of our perceptual space will vary somewhat from one person to another, as we differ somewhat in our make-up. How we fill our perceptual spaces will also vary considerably and significantly, reflecting what we are. Our perceptions reflect our expectations, our values, and our past history, drawing distinctions and forming associations along lines which we feel are useful or which have been positively reinforced in the past. Our sensory awareness thereby comes to incorporate and presuppose values which are characteristically ours, yet of which we may be conscious only dimly or not at all.

Perceiving the world is something we *learn* to do. A seasoned sailor, for example, may come to see a very striking features of the sea or sky that landsmen never notice and may be unable to discern even when they are pointed out to them. Even in our perception of colours, happenstance or our social environment may lead us to distinguish between colours in some one of varying possible ways. An intermediate shade may come to seem like a green to some and a yellow to others, and habituation may lead us to see it as resembling the one range of colours very strongly and the other very little. Differences in the way in which we see colours and clouds, to be sure, do not themselves have a high degree of moral importance. These examples do serve to illustrate that our awareness of the world even in our fundamental perceptions, is formed in way which suit our passions and appetites, and our perception of what is important. That we do so preconsciously makes it all the more pervasive in our thinking. Perceiving things, however we perceive them, tends to reinforce some values and to exclude others.

Our perceptions of the world can, together with the other elements of our scheme of awareness, lead to a downward or an upward spiral. It can possibly lead to a downward spiral wherein one may come to distinguish things only in terms of that which is relevant to one's basest and most self-centred desires. Oblivious to all else, one may see only opportunity in war, only flesh in a woman, only gold on the altar. Yet we may learn to ascend, Starting with our senses, improving our awareness of things is an aid in improving our awareness of value—and vice versa—and doing so will move us closer to the realisation of our true Self.

This flies in the face of the recently conventional view, now in well-deserved decline, according to which our sensations are one thing, with how we interpret and react to them being quite another. Evaluation is held to be a subjective reaction of some sort. On such a view we would need to impose selfguidance not on our sensing *per se*, but only on our interpretation of sensory experience and in our reaction to it. Views of this stripe not only presuppose a rigid fact-value di tinction, they ignore the facts of how we actually do form our perceptual and conceptual schemes. The Upanishads quite rightly reject such views—going beyond even Plato who, though he did not trust sensation, seems to have been unaware of its systematic distortion by our assumed values. The charioteer does well, then, to recognise the more than merely passive nature of the senses, and to guide them in the paths of righteousness. They, too, are parts of the phenomenal self, dynamic parts which affect us and are affected, and which can and must be controlled for the sake of one's well-being.

In the service of the soul, the charioteer must control the reins as well as the horses. Indeed, it is through the reins that the horses are controlled. Our intellect, that is, must control our mind as well as the senses—our mind being as essential to controlling our career in the world as the reins are to controlling horses. Not only our perceptions but our conceptions presuppose and incorporate values.

We thereby run grave risks. With our mind we draw conceptual lines across the undivided fact of reality, again reflecting our history. anticipations, and values. Through our perceptions and conceptions together we fabricate an appearance of reality which emphasises some values, obscures others, and reflects our own distorted being. It is, as it were, up to the charioteer to wield the reins and guide the horses so as to carry us in the right direction and away from the wrong: to carry us away from error and toward truth and true value.

Self and Rationality

The *Katha* calls upon us to transcend the worldly manner of thinking about things, to do so as a means of achieving our salvation through the realisation of our true nature. So also in his own way does Plato. Neither calls upon us to become irrational, to be sure, but to find a communion with Truth which is more fundamental than that offered by the mode of thought which, with its inherent limitations and distortions, arises through our commerce with phenomenality. Only by going beyond superficial knowledge can we realise our true self and find our way to its fulfilment. Plato and the *Katha* offer us somewhat different views of self, reason, and salvation, but their views nevertheless have important points in common. Their similarities as well as their differences are significant. To start with, it is a matter of fundamental importance that each tells us that to find the highest truth we must go beyond any of the descriptions and categories appropriate to phenomenality. According to Plato, the reason we must go beyond is that such conceptual mechanisms separate us from the true being, the essence, of what we are thinking of. Between our own essence and that of which we would know is interposed distorted and misleading conceptualisations which obscure the truth. The supposed knowledge developed thereby may be of a certain utility in dealing with worldly affairs, in the chaotic flux of particulars and changing appearances, but worldly knowledge is a poor thing and not really worthy of being deemed knowledge at all. It merely concerns that which, compounded only of appearance and particularity, is but a reflection of reality, has no inner necessity, and is inherently *different* and so at a remove from our own being. True knowledge is a direct communion of the soul with the Forms--the universal and eternal True Being Unlike phenomenal knowledge, this is knowledge of the *real* world.

We share in the reality of the truly real world. As Plato (*Phaedo* 80b) tells us,

> on the one hand we have that which is divine, immortal, indestructible, of a single form, accessible to thought, ever constant and abiding true of itself; and the soul is very like it : on the

> other hand we have that which is human mortal destructible, of many forms, inaccessible to thought, never constant nor abiding true to itself: and the body is very like that.[7]

The soul, with its rational principle, is like the Forms, and being like them can know them—once it turns away from the unrealities of the phenomenal world (*Republic* vi, 508) :

> When its gaze is fixed upon an object irrapiated by truth and reality, the soul gains understanding and knowledge and is manifestly in possession of intelligence. But when it looks towards the twilight world of things that come into existence and pass away, its sight is dim and it has only opinions and beliefs which shift to and fro, and now it seems like a thing that has no intelligence.[8]

The *Phaedrus* (247 c-d) tells us that

> beyond the heavens...true Being dwells,...reason alone, the soul's pilot, can behold it, and all true knowledge is knowledge thereof. Now even as the mind of a god is nourished by reason and knowledge, so also is it with every soul that has a care to receive her proper food; wherefore when at last she has beheld Being she is well content, and contemplating truth she is nourished and prospers.

Understanding requires insight. To have right opinion, no matter now right that opinion might be, is not to have knowledge. We have knowledge. only when our soul grasps the Form of what we are knowing and knows it for what it is—for what it is in itself, apart from any distorting entanglements with changing appearances. True knowledge, in sum, is a matter of soul and Forms, of like knowing like.

It is, thereby, a matter of sloughing off our entanglements with what is phenomenal, illusory, particular, unreal. Yet *all* of our being must find Being. In the *Phaedrus*, Plato, for the first time, recognises the convergence of the various aspects of the soul in acquiring true knowledge. Socrates' *daimonion* had given him useful advice.

The Upanishads quite agree with Plato that soul and ultimate reality are of the same nature, and that true knowledge is a matter of like knowing like. However, in their call for us to go beyond the limitations and distortions of modes of thought appropriate to the phenomenal world, the Upanishads, including the *Katha*, take a line somewhat different from that of Plato. As the *Katha* tells us.

> The wise who knows the Self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing things, as great and omnipresent, does never grieve. That Self canot be gained by the Veda, nor

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[7] I use the translation of the *Phaedo* by R. Hackforth, Cambridge University Press, 1952.

[8] I use the translation by Francis M. Cornforth, as *The Republic of Plato*, Oxford University Press, 1941.

> by understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained. The Self choose him as his own. But he who has not turned away from his wickedness, who is not tranquil...can never obtain the Self (even) by knowledge. (i, 2, 22-24)
>
> That Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but is seen by subtle thinkers through their sharp and subtle intellect. A wise man should keep down speech and mind; he should keep them within......the Self which is the Quiet. (i, 3, 12-13)
>
> He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without from, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the Great, and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death (i, 3, 15).

The Self is beyond any of the categories of worldly thought, and we must turn from all the things of phenomenality in order to find it. It cannot be obtained by thought alone, but through subtle intellect as Self knowing itself for its own.

We gain the Self by realising ourself as being it, without divergence or distorting intermediation : Thou art that *Tat tvam asi* (*Chandogya* vi, stated there in six distinct verses). Plato, for his part, calls upon us to know the Forms in themselves, without being misled by the confusing and obscuring intermediation of particulars. *A fortiori*, we must not seek them in phenomenality, for in that there is nothing but particularity. As the soul is of the same nature as the Forms, it too must be sought beyond phenomena. Not in fragmentation and particularity but in the universal and fundamental must we seek our self—and therein lies our challenge. The Delphic imperative, *Know thyself*, was never regarded as easy.

However, Plato does not call upon us to know the soul by *identifying* it as being (one of) the Forms. This poses the question of how the soul is related to the Forms, and the further question of how Plato's account relates to the *Katha's* doctrine, with which it here seems to have an important disanalogy.

Self and Reality

Granted that the true Self is of the same nature as true Reality, and that to have the highest knowledge we must transcend phenomenal modes of thought—points on which we have seen that Plato and the *Katha* agree—we now ask concerning the relationship of the true Self to this Reality with which it has a common nature. Is it merely *like* it ? Part of it ? To be identified as it ? Or what ? As well, we must also ask about the relationship between the true Self and the phenomenal self. More fundamentally, we must ask whether ultimate

Reality according to Plato's account is the same as that indicated by the *Katha* and the other Upanishads. On these points we come to find significant divergence between Plato and the *Katha*.

Let us start with the *Katha*, where we were told (i, 3, 10.11) that

> the Great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the Great there is the undeveloped, beyond the undeveloped there is the Person (purusha). Beyond the Person there is nothing—this is the goal, the highest road.

This is subject to multiple interpretation. The monistic interpretation—which is the standard one—is that at the level of ultimate truth and reality, we all share a common Self, the Atman/Brahman. It is not that there are Selves which are *like* one another, there is *one* Self. *Tat tvam asi.* Even in India, attempts have been made to deny that conclusion, but that is the evident thrust of the Upanishads, and certainly of the *Katha*. Beyond that, there is divergence of opinion within orthodox thought as to whether the One is an undifferentiated unity, or a differentiated unity within which each of us has a limited but real identity as an aspect of reality. This is not the place to pursue that complex inquiry. Whichever way we take it—and I believe we may take it either way consistently with the *Kath* and the other Upanishads—this characteristically Indian doctrine is not that of the *Phaedrus*. In one of his proofs for the immortality of the soul Plato (*Rep. x*, 610) tell us

> since the soul is not destroyed by any evil, either its own or another's, clearly it must be a thing that exists for ever, and is consequently immortal......And if this is so, there must always be the same number of souls in existence.

Plato clearly took that number to be greater than one, and this passage strongly indicates that the soul is understood to retain its identity in eternity. In this, it fits with the evident thrust of the *Phaedo*, *Gorgias*, and other dialogues.

Perhaps, however, there is more to the story than that. If not Plato himself, some who regarded themselves as heirs to Plato developed his ideas in a monistic direction. It is a principle of Plato's that when two things are similar they are so by virtue of participating in the same Form, which is a reality they have in common. If the soul is *like* the Forms, as Plato repeatedly tells us it is, then the same logic would seem to indicate that it must have some reality in common with them. Indeed. and evident implication of the *Republic* is that the several Forms converge (Allegory of the Line, *Rep.* vi, 509-511; Allegory of the Cave, *Rep.* vii, 514-521). [illegible] plausible following step—which Plato did *not* make—would be to [illegible] the Forms to converge to unity. The several souls, being of the [illegible] nature, might also converge to that unity. Plotinus and other neo-Platonists took up this line of reasoning and concluded that souls are manifestations of a fundamental One. On such an account we would have what, though in some way differentiated, was an integrated whole. While this arguably may be the logical conclusion from Plato's doctrine—though that is by no means undisputed—it in any case goes beyond anything which Plato himself made explicit.

In India, many thinkers also come to conclude that unity must, of necessity, underlie all diversity—which Shankara took to indicate that the Brahman must be an undifferentiated unity. Other Vedantins, from Ramanuja and Madhva on to Sri Aurobindo, have recognised diversity within unity, as have many non-vedantins. The text of the *Katha* itself is consistent with *all* of the leading orthodoxies (which is hardly surprising since to be orthodox they muss, under some interpretation, be consistent with the Upanishads). The *Katha* would also be fundamentally compatible, at least in that regard, with the neo-Platonic interpretation of Platonism. Whether or not it is compatible with Plato's own interpretaion—or whether he rested with fundamental differenc and an absolute plurality of souls—is more than can be determined with certainty.

From and Brahman

There is a further relevant point about the relation of the Platonic and Upanishadic accounts of reality. As we have already noted, the Forms, as explained by Plato, bear more than passing similarity to the Brahman. After all, the Forms are ultimate reality and—as the Republic especially makes clear—they from a unity. It is, moreover, not just any unity but one wherein all diversity and particularity are reconciled. All the things of phenomenal particularity, only have reality, however much they do have it, to the extent that they participate in the Forms. This fundamental source, like that of the Upanishads, cannot be described, being rather the ground of all description and all describability. As the *Katha* tells us (ii, 5, 14-15) :[9]

> They perceive the highest indescribable pleasure, saying...How then can I understand it ? Has it its own light, or does it reflect light ?
>
> The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, and much less this fire. When he shines everything shines after him; by his light all this is lighted.

It is tempting to equate the Brahman with the unity of the Forms. Still, there might perhaps be reason for caution here. I have doubts, centring on the the difficult question of the One and the many. Indeed, one problem has already been noted in connection with Plato's apparently taking the souls to be many. Another aspect to the difficulty is that it hardly seems right to equate the Brahman with a *universal*, which is what Forms are often taken to be. A universal spans a multiplicity of elements. Yet the Upanishads tell us that there is no multiplicity. There is only misapprehended unity. Instead of as a universal, the Brahman would better be understood as a particular. The reality of all apparent multiplicity is that one particular.

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[9] This central doctrine is also stated in the *Mundaka* Upanishad (ii, 2, 10), in the *Svetasvatara* Upanishad vi, 14, and in the *Bhagavad Gita*, *xv*, 6;

Perhaps we are being unfair to Plato here, for it is far from clear that Platonic Forms are universals, however widely they are taken to be so. Plato, and Socrates before him, approached the matter by asking what different things—different instances of courage, or virtne, or whatever—had in common. While he started by looking for universals spanning multiplicity, though, Plato progressively developed his thought in such a way as to attribute less and less reality to the multiplicity and ever more to to underlying unity. The particulars of phenomenality become only the ephemeral phantoms of an increasingly unitary. In the later dialogues, as I would interpret them, instead of as universals, we ought to think of Forms as *essential reality*—a reality which is more and more presented as unity. This essential being is the fundamental reality at the root of phenomenality. The essential is to be contrasted with what is accidental, contingent, incidental, etc., the flickering shadows on the wall of the cave. Are these shadows to be equated with *maya*? Maya is ignorance, only the misapprehension of reality. The phenomena of maya are therefore seemingly between total falsity, or nullity, and the truth and reality of the Brahman. According to Shankara, phenomena are therefore partially real and our awareness of them is partially true.

One can give Plato a similar interpretation. While the earlier dialogues do not support such an interpretation, the later ones do suggest that phenomenality is merely our own confused misapprehension of underlying reality. For Plato, phenomenality is associated with ignorance. To imagine that the phenomenal thing is real is to mistake shadow for substance. To imagine that our awareness of it is knowledge is the deepest of ignorance. One might plausibly take it that our awareness of phenomenality is, for Plato, our misapprehension of the underlying Forms.

The problem then is to account for apparent differentia and change. The vision of the problem of the One and the many—that of the relation between Form and phenomena—is perhaps the most daunting poser troubling Platonism. This was a difficulty experienced by Plato himself, as evidenced by the perplexing second part of the

Parmenides, which draws, yet shrinks from, the conclusion that differentia and change are illusory Later, in the *Timeous*, we are presented with the myth of the demiurge who intermediates between the timeless perfection of the Forms and the imperfection of fleeting phenomena. Here we are given what is almost literally a *deus ex machina* as a mythical solution to a problem which Plato has perhaps found to be otherwise insoluble.

Self. Reality, and Value

What has been said of fundamental reality must apply to the self for, *tat tvam asi*, our true self is real, the Atman is the Brahman. That is as true in Plato's conception as it is in that of the *Katha*. for as Plato tells us, from the *Phaedo* on, the soul is of the nature of the Forms. That nature—for which any term is at least somewhat misleading—encompasses truth, reality and self, and just as much it also encompasses beauty and goodness. It encompasses *all* value. It is not just that value is inseparable from the rest. Rather, in what I am taking to be the mature Plato, each is an aspect of one fundamental identity.

Let us take a closer look at this matter of self, reality, and value, doing so first in connection with Plato, and then with reference to the Upanishads. In the *Philebus*, Plato asks what role, if any, pleasure has in the good life. It does seem to have some role. While the good life centres on reason and knowledge, the best life is the one wherein reason, knowledge, and pleasure are combined (*Philebus* 21). Some pleasure can be quite misleading, to be sure, enticing us into wrong paths. Pleasures, Plato tell us, can be *false*. False pleasures, like false beliefs, are those which do not correspond to reality. True pleasures are those which do correspond to reality, which are *of* reality. Which pleasures arc true pleasures ? As in the *Republic* (ix,581), we are told by the *Philebus* (40) that the most desirable pleasures are the pleasures of knowledge—and knowledge, of course, is a kind of being, of participation in reality. These are the truest of pleasures. Unlike the case with other pleasures, in these we are experiencing value in accordance with reality. We are valuing insight into true reality, the Forms.

Our pleasures and all of our valuing can be a powerful motivation toward or away from true being, according to what we value. We do well then, to pursue true pleasures, to have true values. In Plato's *Symposium* (207-208), the wise Diotima tells her pupil, Socrates, that in our loves, from the highest to the lowest, our mortal nature seeks immortality. We find it only if what we seek is knowledge, which alone partakes of the immortal. Rightly loving is thus a powerful aid in the assent (or fall) of the soul—which of course is much of the point of the *Phaedrus* as well as the *Symposium.*

> The *Republic* (vi. 508) tells of a Form of the Good which is
> something beyond truth and knowledge and, precious as these both are, of still higher worth.
>
> ...objects of knowledge...derive from the Good not only their power of being known, but their very being and reality; and Goodness is not the same thing as being, but even beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power.

The Good is thus conceived of as something which is transcendent to all being and which serves to draw incipient things toward higher levels of being. This conception of the Good has had its echoes in neo-Platonic notions of God, and in Aristotelian and Christian ideas of a God who is a final as well as a first cause. In more recent years this conception has taken a new form in the process theology of Alfred North Whitehead.

When we value insight into true reality, the Forms, we are valuing participation in that which is of the nature of our very soul. This invites the conjecture that our soul participates in the Form of the Good and draws our own being after it. While we might so conjecture. Plato does not explicitly address this question. However, the idea would not be incompatible with his major doctrines. Nor would it be inconsistent with vedic thought to suggest that our true self has a character which transcends being and serves to constitute it.

* * * *

The Indian tradition does affirm that the ultimate transcends truth and being. Truth, being, and all that we experience as value spring from that transcendent source. As expressed by the *Purusha Hymn* (*Rig Veda*, 10.90):

> All creatures are a quarter of him; three quarters are what is immortal in heaven.
>
> With three quarters the man rose upwards, and one quarter of him still remains here.[10]

This cosmogonic *purusha*, to use the term of the Veda, is not only what is but all that was and will be, and yet more. It is both transcendent and immanent. As the source of all it gives what has being its being—it is that being—yet is much more than that. It is the source of what comes to be and the end of what ceases to be—and yet is more. Moreover, the Indian tradition affirms that the Self is of that nature.

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[10] I use Wendy O'Flaherty's translation, *The Rig Veda*, Penguin, 1981,

Our knowledge and our values, to be knowledge and values, converge in the Brahman, which is the Atman. Of this we are reminded by, *inter alia* the *Chandogya* and the *Brihadaranyaka*. Yet they also remind us that, like Plato's sun which is not illuminated but illuminates all else, the Brahman lies beyond the truths, and values, and beings of phenomenality :

> Beyond the senses is the mind, beyond the mind is the highest (created) Being, higher than that Being is the Great Self, higher than the Great, the highest Undeveloped. Beyond the Undeveloped is the Person, the all-pervading and entirely imperceptible. (*Katha* ii, 6, 7-8)
>
> When he shines, everything shines after him : by his light all this is lighted. (*Katha* ii, 5, 15)

Our self, our true Self, is indeed the lord riding in the chariot. It is not a thing of the phenomenal world, nor does it depend on it. The chariot, the driver, the horses, the reins, the roads—the lord in the chariot does not depend on these things, nor can they move him the least distance. Rather, they and all phenomenality are but partial and dependent appearances of the Self. As the *Brihadaranyaka* tells (iv, 3, 10) :

> There are no (real) chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself sends forth (creates) chariots, horses, and roads. There are no blessings there, no happiness, no joys, but he himself sends forth (creates) blessings, happiness, and joys.

6

Rajneesh : The Rebel

A. P. Sharma

EARLY IMPRESSIONS

A well-fed physique, big rounded bulging eyes, medium stature, fairish complexion, half bald and probably an easy going man—Rajneesh was one of the rare persons in the history of the world, who like any literary old masters, created immense written and spoken material which contain his unique genious, unparalled wisdom dauntlessly analytic discourses which proves and disproves what has been reckoned right or wrong since long.

I met Rajneesh around twenty five years back at Udaipur, Rajasthan, when he was delivering a talk to a large number of people. He was talking on some theme relating to truth, giving examples from day today life exposing the worn-out, static religious befiefs. His simple language with occasional faulty pronunciation but a style of his own with which he expressed his views, captivated me for more than an hour although I had not intented to stay there even for ten minutes. It was a strange experience which thrilled my mind with uncanny thoughts, which later on did not allow me to sleep for a long time that night. What was Rajneesh talking about disturbed my sleep that night. Perhaps his style, his illustrations, his simple language or his analysis of the age old beliefs that had been harbouring my mind for more than thirty years were responsible for it. I never thought to look into the validity of those old beliefs as I feared to invade the realm of religion which I must not, as I had been brought up that way from my childhood. Probably it was the beginning of some kind of awakening. I slept the remaining hours of the night with a quiet mind later on.

THE THEME OF HIS DISCOURSE

What did Rajneesh often talk about ? A widely travelled man who had read a lot, probably reached that stage of life when he could unveil the truth from the face of the traditionally propagated beliefs mostly carried forward by religion. He, therefore, talked on transmigration, the law of Karma, heaven and hell, Buddha, Mahaveer, Jesus and other religious leaders and dauntlessly condemned all of them as they had been prescribing the ways for redemption. He thought that redemption lyed within the self and it could not be donned upon from outside. Rajneesh criticized even Sankaracharya and the Geeta for he thought that they too prescribed something which led to conditioning. He explained it with examples.

He said that when the priests defined the 'law of Karma', they promised to lead the man to salvation or *moksha* through following a prescribed path. Was that not conditioning ? He reflected :

> The Law of Karma, in the first place, is not a law. That word gives it an aroma as if it is something scientific, like the law of gravitation. It is merely a hope, not a law at all[1].

He, therefore, condemned the very thought which upheld the law of Karma. For he thought that a law had to be universal if it was a scientific law. Then what kind of law it was ? Was that simply a hope ? When a man wandered in a quandary or in darkness, he often clinged to any thing which gave him some hope and what we observed in life was totally different from the law of Karma. He explained it further with examples. 'The priest has found a way to hoodwink people : The law of Karma. As the priest cannot explain it here now, so he transforms the whole scene. He makes death come in between our actions and their results. The results will be after death, in the next life. But why ? Why not in this life ?/ Why not now ? If one puts one's hand in the fire then will it be burned in the next life ? Why so much distance between sowing seeds and reaping the fruits ? Does it always happen that in one life one does good or bad and its result comes in another life ? "To me there seems to be some conspiracy in it. It is not a law, it is conspiracy, because the priest cannot manage to explain......"[2]

Thus, his discourses are full of candid reflections in which old religious taboos and prescriptions which have been invading human psychology for centuries, are rejected. It is entirely an original approach by an authentic and original man—Rajneesh, whose penetrating eyes go deeper into the hidden realms of dark ages which though overtly lighted by religious sermons of Christ, Buddha and Adi San kara, but are dark according to Rajneesh as in them truth is veiled by dogmatic religious beliefs.

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[1] Rajneesh. The Bible Vol. III, Discourse 9, "The Law of Karma : a Conspiracy of the Priest to manipulate your mind, "Rajneeshpuram, January 7th, 1985 P. 274.

[2] The Bible Vol. III, Discourse 9, Jan. 7th, 1985, P. 274.

IN SEARCH OF AUTHENTICITY

I was at Washington D. C. 1984 when one day I watched something about Rajneesh on television. The U. S. Government had declared the entire Rajneesh estate unlawful. But he was still there fighting agaist the decree. Was it possible for an ordinary person to stay in the States for such a long time against the desire of the most powerful Government in the world when he was constantly criticizing Jesus as well as the most powerful Senators ? Perhaps it was his rebellious nature and the deep rooted authenticity in him with which he faced fearlessly all those odd situations. Rajneesh remained quite undisturbed even though there was a great turmoil outside Rajneeshpuram. Rather his candid attacks against the Government increased in intensity and his fury contained in his daily discourse went on uninterrupted. In fact people loved him for his candid and convincing arguments and clear thinking. More than that his language was quite attractive. He had attained the maturity of a Massiah who was spiritually awake and possessed unmitigated courage. It was because of all that that he showed least concern towards the consequences which might follow on account of his discourses. Even those who refused to judge him as an original philosopher—contributor, cannot deny to view him as a great orator, or as a critic of culture and religion, or even as a supurb master of language which he spoke with unbelievable lucidity and effortlessness.[3]

In most of his discourses his search for the original man continues all the time. The state of original man, according to Rajneesh, is an ultimate state in which there remains neither desire nor any need. One is sufficient unto himself. That blessed state, he remarks, 'is the state of nothingness, which implies a few fundamentals'. The first is to be a rebel. He strongly feels that all the religions delebrately destroy the potential of rebellion in man so that he may not rebel against tradition, convention and religion. When the spirit of rebellion dies in him, he lives just like a dead man. Religions go on forcing knowledge, doctrines and dogmas on man. Therefore, his main concern is to develop the spirit of rebellion which implies doubt, skepticism and enquary. But it needs tremendous courage with which the man could go against all those who are in power.[4] The politician, the priest, the rich and the educated elite working in the higher institution of learning—are all in powerful positions. And the truth is that all these vested interests are against man: against his individuality, his nature and potentiality. These powerful men have their own ideas and want to fulfil them. The more man behaves like their puppets, the more respectable he becomes. This is how they programme man and kill the rebellious spirit in him by day to day programming and conditioning. Rajneesh, therefore, is in search of an authentic man and wants to take away every thing from man which has programmed him, leaving him to himself to seek and search. He states :

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[3] Swami Vitaraga Anand, Lifting the Veil, Delhi : Motilal Banarsidas Indological Publishers, 1971, Introduction (xiv)

[4] Bible III, Discourse 15, Truth Said Truth Dead, Jan. 13, 1985, P. 472, 474

> So the first thing is : regain the rebellious spirit you were born with —which is not a programme, which is your very being.[5]

In the process of keeping the spirit of rebellion intact Rajneesh reflects that the meaning of individuality and personality should be clearly understood by each individual and in no case individuality should be sacrificed for the sake of personality. He explains :

> The society tries to make you a person. never an individual. A person is one who has a personality' and a personality is a mask. Society teaches you how to sit, how to stand, how to behave, how to act in certain situations.[6]

In different ways the society prepare man so that he may fit with the status quo. It forces man to develop a personality which is a mask to hide his original face. Personality is created by the society according to its own needs. But individuality is natural, it is original and wild. Rajneesh, therefore, wants man to be an authentic person, an individual. He comments :

> The moment your original face if discovered you are on the way towards freedom, authenticity, totality, fearlessness.[7]

THE CATASTROPHE

I came back home after staying in the States for little less than a year. By then Rajneesh's discourses had become pointedly critical towards the American Senators who were in power. His repatriation or expulsion was imminent, After some-time the decree was passed. His estate was confiscated and he was expelled out of the States. Fearing his rebellious disposition no Western Government was happy to accept him. Rajneesh had no place to go but his own mother land. But all that did not change him. His friends started deserting him Huge riches which were accumulated due to the generousity of his followers, became instrumental for law suits. All was gradually disintegrating except his own authentic, critical, rebellious and agnostic spirit with which he had been invoking man to rebel against the social and religious powers which had been corrupting and converting him (man) to become a typical brand chiselled out of the religious dogmas and tradition. Rajneesh would never accept this kind of person. And he never did until he died.

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[5] The Bible III Discourse 15, P. 490.

[6] The Bible III, Discourse 15, P. 490.

[7] The Bible III, Discourse 15, P. 498.

7

Syllogistic Reasoning Pattern in Turkish Adolescent

Nermin Celen

The purpose of this study is to compare the reasoning pattern of Turkish University Students accustomed to abstract syllogistic processes and the reasoning pattern of young industrial workers unaccustomed to abstract syllogistic processes.

The subjects were 50 adolescents with an age range 18-22 years from low economic status. They were asked to solve twenty syllogistic problems (from simple to complex). The data are interpreted as follows : Formal training influence is more effective on syllogistic reasoning pattern.

A considerable amount of contemporary research has demonstrated that ability to reason deductively undergoes a well defined developmental progression between the ages 11 and 20 years. These support the position that prior to adolescence, formal deductive reasoning competence is unavailable whereas by late adolescence individuals demonstrate a high level of competence in solving deductive reasoning problems (Ward, Overton, 1990).

The findings aforementioned above support Piaget's "power of logic theory" in describing the adolescents thought process. Piaget use INRC (Identity, Negation,'reciprocity, correlavity) as his logical model to describe formal operations. This model attempt to describe and explain the mechanisms involved in adolescent's thought processes. In other words, the adolescent solves a particular problem in a particular way because has thought processes are capable of particular logical operations. In turn the concrete operational child may not function this way because his thought processes are not capable of dealing with the particular logical operations necessary to solve problem. Adolescents are capable of dealing with possibilities as well as realities. In fact, the real is only one particular instance of possible (Dussek, 1987). In this theory intellectual development has an ultimate destiny. Cognitive structures are driven towards a specific, structural end point, a state of ultimate stability and equilibrium which involves the achievement of sense of logical necessity.

If one decides that Piaget's account of the nature, of mature logical thinking is unacceptable, then we must be prepared to reject both his account of children's thinking and constraints imposed by the proposed stage of intelligence upon the nature of learning and understanding, teachings and explaining (Wood, 1990). But not all findings support this view; some findings suggest that deductive reasoning competence is not available in all context. The findings of research have been done by Cole and Scribner, 1974; Cole 1985; Luria, 1676 manifest that the groups who were unaccustomed to abstract syllogistic reasoning patterns can't manifest competence in deductive reasoning (Solso, 1991). From this point of view it can be assumed that learning awakens a variety of internal developmental processes such as deduction and understanding, evolution's of notions about the world, interpretation of physical causality, mastery of logical forms of thought and abstract logic (Valsiner and Van Deer Veer, 1991; Vygotsky, 1978).

As it can be seen above, there are contradictory results about the interaction between learning and mental development. So the question can be raised : "Does every adult or adolescent think logically ?" Syllogistic reasoning was taken as a from of logical thought.

Underlying hypothesis of present study which was based on this question had planned to put forward the effect of formal training on abstract syllogistic reasoning patterns.

METHOD

Subject

There are two independent groups :

Group I; 25 young man between ages. 18-22 yrs. (late teens) were selected randomly from among young industrial workers who had graduated from elementary school

Group II : 25 young men between ages 18-22 yrs. 18 22 (late teens) were selected randomly among social science university students, who came from lower-middle class families (not including philosophical science students).

TASK AND PROCEDURE

The problems set (20 syllogistic problems from simple to complex) were given to the each member of the I. group individually by the experimenter. Experimenter explained how each problem would be solved and the words which were unfamiliar to the young workers such as "Arsenic". The problems set were given to the II. group in the classroom. Experimenter explained the example and the group finished the problems set without asking any further questions,

Some syllogistic problem (statements) examples in the problem set :

All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore Socrates is a mortal.

……

All men are moral
A Serbian is a man
Therefore Serbians are moral.

……

All poisonous things are bitter
Arsenic is not bitter
Therefore, arsenic is not poisonous.

……

Sam is not the best cook in the world
The best cook in the world lives in Toronto
Sam does not live in Toronto.

……

X and Y always eat together
X is eating
What is Y doing.

……

Five of the problems were selected as key problems to test the effects of content of judged validity.

SCORING CRITERIA

Each syllogistic reasoning problem was scored independently. The following scoring criteria were adopted : A score "O" of a was assigned to each correct syllogistic reasoning.

RESULTS

Of the syllogistic reasoning problem set, the university students scored total 358 correct points, the young workers scored total 173 correct points. Mean differences of correct responses of the group were evaluated by t test (Table I). The differences in performance between the two group are statistically sianificant $P<0.001$. That shows that the university student have been trained in abstract thinking in lycee years and were more successful in solving syllogistic reasoning problems. Chi square test was used to compare the way of solving the key problems and the others. The university students showed consistency in the way of solving the problems p0 > .05 but the other group did not show. Consistency, p < 0.001 that means sample data depart significantly from the shape of normal distribution.

Table I

The Comparison of Average Score Differences Between Group I and Group II on The Basis of t Test

Groups	t	deg. freedom	p
nx=25 ny=25	8. 824	48	p<0. 001

Table II

(For Group I) The Consistency of Answers to Different Set of Statements is Valued on The Basts of Chi Square

	Grp of Statements	(+)validity	(–)validity	Total
n = 25	15 Statements	113	262	375
	5 Statements	60	65	125
	Total	173	325	500

p<0. 001

Table III

(For Group II) The Consisteney of Answers to Different Set of Statements is Valued on The Basis of Chi Square

	Grp. of Statements	(+) validity	(–) validity	Total
n = 25	15 Statements	264	111	375
	5 Statements	94	31	125
	Total	358	142	500

p>0. 05

DISCUSSION

In this study, it was attempted to indicate whether everybody can reason syllogistically or not (syllogistic reasoning was taken as a form of logical thought). The result showed that : the students who underwent abstract reasoning training manifest distinct (high) performance on solving syllogistic problems compared to the young workers. These results do not support Piaget's findings about formal operational stage of development, because in Piaget's cognitive developmental theory; mentally developed structure reaches end point and at that point mental stability and adolescent's reasoning system is hypnotised as logical. Piaget suggests that most of the adults reach Aristotelian formal logic in formal operational stage (Wood, 1988). But again there is not a clear cut cue that indicates the adults' typical reasoning is logical.

Most of the researchers found that adults prefer intuitive and practical reasoning in daily use instead of formal logical reasoning. The psychologists such as Luria, Leontiev, Wood put forward that the persons who were highly educated, even logically trained ones, found it difficult to think in formal logical way in daily use (Wood, 1988).

Besides these findings; Vygotsky accepts learning as a prerequisite of cognitive development, because learning provokes the internal developmental processes. This kind of learning is acquired when the child is interacting with adults. Once these processes are internalised, they become the child's independent developmental achievement. So properly organised learning results in mental development, The processes such as deduction and understanding, evaluations of physical causality and mastery of logical forms of thought and abstract logic are intellectual processes awakened by school learning. Unlike Piaget, he suggests school based learning as being an important source of cognitive development (Vygotsky, 1978; Donaldson, 1978; Bruner, 1964, Kozulin, 1992).

But Piaget assumed that these processes all occur themselves without any influence from school. Piaget's epistemic subject is obstructed individual experience. "The self exist because......the being of structures exist in their coming to be" (Piaget, 1970, s. 140). With these words Piaget did not analyse the structure of real world, nor did he clearly articulate its role in cognition (Van Deer Veer; Valsiner, 1987; Oleren, 1977; Tenzer, 199o; Broughton, 1981; Schoenberg, 199I).

Stueesy, like Piaget, accepts that reasoning capacity increases with age and the is the most important signifier of scientific reasoning. Experience and social interaction seems to be a statistically significant signifier but not as powerful as age (Stueesy, 1988).

M. Cole, a pioneer of sociohistorical approach in the United States contributes on the transferability of cognition developed in the school setting into other spheres of life and adds that, "some forms of reasoning corresponding to Piaget's concrete operations, apparently do not require school-based learning for their development. Alternatively such a thing as syllogistic reasoning would not develop outside school, but it is hardly transferable to everyday situations (Moll, 1990).

The findings of this study do not support Piaget's and Stueesy's arguments but support Cole's. If abstract logical processes occur by themselves young workers would have performed equally as well as the university students on solving syllogistic problems.

On the othar hand, the studies held on scientific reasoning chose the subjects from among students. They followed up the development of mental reasoning of adolescents and pointed out that the 17-18 age group adolescents logical performances are better than the younger groups. Most of the studies did not consider the adolescents who did not take abstract reasoning training (Body, 1979; Bucci, 1978, Moshman, 1979; Ward-Overton, 1990).

School learning enhances specifies way of reasoning, also it helps to increase the level of scientific reasoning capacity, therefore learned associations can be generalised into other areas, sometimes everyday situations. The familiarity of the content affects the solving of logical problem. This suggestion has been supported in several studies (Griggs, 1983; Cheng-Halyoak, 1985; Ward-Overton, 1990).

It seems that there is a correlation between education and hypothetical logical reasoning ability. It has been suggested that the least educated societies can not reach formal operational stage. Literacy helps the person to achieve deduction logic (Bruner, 1964; Olson, 1977).

As it has been seen above there are contradictory opinions about achieving logical reasoning. But this study indicates that the age is not a significant variable for thinking logically. One needs to have accumulation of experience with abstract reasoning. If some one has representations of the rules in his long term memory about to solve logical problems, he can recall them. These kinds of structures can be acquired by the help of formal school learning.

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8

Aggressiveness, Competition and Human Unity

Amitava Chatterjee

Among the highly stable phenomena that we can count on in our rapidly changing society is that unplanned, random violence is increasing. Any casual observer of the day's events cannot help but struck by the crime on the streets, the senseless murders and beatings of innocent prople, and other similar events. The question is why. The answer to this question can, possibly, be sought in the problem of wanton aggressive behaviour of human species.

Aggression, or starting a quarrel or fight, at times without a just cause, is one of the primary characteristics of all living beings. But human, possibly, is the only species-other than ants-that engages in acts of collective violence against his own kind. Thus aggression seems to be inherent in human nature yet to be done a way with further mental evolution. "Realising perfectly Sachchidananda, they can convert themselves, Mind into the nature of the Truth, *Vijnana*, Life into the nature of *Caitanya*, Body into the nature of *Sat*, that is into the pure essence. A progressively perfect realisation in the body is the aim of human evolution."[1] Emotions and impulses under cognitive control are more likely to be expressed when the input conditions minimize self-observation and evaluation as well as concern over evaluation by others. "The result is that their neighbour is to them not only a possible helper or sexual object, but also a temptation to them to gratify their aggressiveness......to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture aud to kill him......"[2].

In view of the long chain of violence since the pre-historic days to claimed-to-be most civilized society of today, it is not surprising that aggressiveness, as an inharent part of human nature, is perceived as a phenomenan, which at best can be held in check but never eliminated completely. It is concluded that the biological mechanisms of aggressiveness are in born and helps in the maintenance of cerebral homeostatis.

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[1] Sri Aurobindo. *The Upanishads*, Part one, Pondicherry : Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1986.

[2] Frend, S. *Civilization and its discontents*. London : Hogarth, 1930.

Homeostatis is a physico-chemical mechanisms of organisms to maintain an optimum equilibrium level of bodily functioning. This process helps the brain in maintaining a dynamic state of balance between the information flow from the external world and human's internal environment. The unceasing flow of information occurs through the organs of sense perception: The five sense-organs have as their objects, sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell. In order to maintain equilibrium in the cerebral system all incoming information must be integrated with the systems or refused (through behavioural responses that in most cases are evidently in contrast). The refusal immediately triggers the defence mechanism of the central nervous system insofar as it resists the imposition of the information. Should the power of external information exceeds the defensive mechanisms of the cerebral system, it compels the latter to accept the alien information giving rise to disequilibria that leads to various anomalous behaviour.

It is *Svabhava* or a law of nature that conscionsness is a function of the body. Each living being must be different from others, because of *shaja*, that which is born with us, whatever is natural, inborn, innate; its equivalent is *svabhavaja* or *svabhava*. It is an indisputable fact that sensations and perceptions can arise only in so far as they are conditioned by a bodily mechanism. Those spring out of the vibrations of the molecules of the brain. The traces left by previous experiences are capable of beings transmitted from the material cause to its direct product. And thus everything happens through the influence of *svabhava*[3].

We must then posit a "universal need" to shatter all formal controls albeit temporarily, as occurs in every person through dreamings. "It is a rival state as real as working; and owing to the indeterminable discrepancy between the two in the time flow, added to the unconscious and time-less interval between, they must be adjudged of equal independence, as different realms of reality of which they are expressions"[4]. This fact is the basis of society's institutionalization of revelons behaviour—harvest festivals in agarian societies and carnivals in religious ones-where an "unproductive waste of energy" is encouraged. Functionally, much festivals serve to siphon off destructive energy, prevent unpredictable individually initiated release of impulses, and enable the deindividuated reveler to experience both the pleasure of his revels and the satisfaction of becoming reindividuated followings their termination.[5]

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[3] Shastri, Dakshina Ranjan. Materialists, sceptics and agnostics, in Haridas Bhattacharya (Ed.) *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. III. Calcutta : The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1983. See also : Sri Aurobindo. *Essays on the Gita*. Pondicherry : Aurobindo Ashram, 1983.

[4] Krishaswami Iyer, K. Philosophy of the Advaita, in Haridas Bhattacharya (Ed.) *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. III, Calcutta : Ramakrishna Mission, Institute of Culture, 1983.

According to yoga psychology, as beings in the course of evolution have assumed many shapes, so also have left deposits of impressions of those different lives in the *citta* of posterity as *vasanas*. These vasanas are eternal in the sense that they are not habits, memories and dispositions acquired during the life time of the individual, nor do they disappear like these with the disappearance of the individual.[6] Asecret Delight is Such a vasana, is the base of existence "In the Aitareya Upanishad Soma, as the lunar deity, is born from the sense-mind in the universal Parusha and, when man is produced, ex presses him-self again as sense-mentality in the human being. For delight is the *raison d'etre* of sensation, or, we may say, sensation is an attempt to translate the secret delight of existences into the terms of physical consciousness".[7]

Aggression, thus seekes to be an instinctual part of human nature. Man has not only inherited it from infrahuman species, but possibly has lost instinctual control as well over aggression during the course of evolution. The individual, for his earthly existence had and have to struggle against or compromise with many adverse or threatening situations. In his coping behaviour man learned through observation and imitation that aggression, many a times, pays. And so it is reinforced and maintained by a variety of rewarding conditions. On the other hand, aggression is a logical and expected consequence of frustration, its purpose being to remove or destroy the interference with a specific goal directed response of the organism. If external situations provide a target for release of aggressive behaviour, the motivation to aggress (as result of frustration) operate with an added intensity.

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[5] Zimbrdo. P. G. The human choice : Individuations, reasbn and order versus deindividuation, impulse and chaos, in *Nabraska Symposium on Motivation*. Nebrasha : University of Nebraska Press, 1969.

[6] Sri Aurobindo. *Bases of Yoga*, Pondichery : Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1985.

[7] Sri Aurobindo, *The Upanishads*, Pondichery : Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1986.

It would not be surprising to suggest[8] that since aggressive habits are acquired largely through imitation or through the directed rewarding of aggressive responses learning plays a key role not only in what aggresisive responses are used but whether it is made at all. Thus through learning aggressive vis-a-vis frustration may be channelised to any of a variety of responses, including constructive and peaceful ones. This re-direction, in fact, regulates the overall equilibrium of human behaviour by manipulating the vast range of (political, economic, social etc.) interactions related to aggressive behaviour in its manifold intensity levels and these we have codified in terms of competition when it is contained within the values we hold to be normal.

Competition is, therefore, a more civilized mechanism of aggressiveness that may have either positive or negative values. Competition is positive when it promotes a Seheme interaction and not at ricky means aiming at prevaricating the ideas (*adhikara*) of others. Indian ethics suggest that every individual has his sacred *svadharm* and has equal opportunity with everyone are alse to realize or internalise it. The highest *adhikarin* should feel it a previlege to join in the worship (duties) of the humblest [9] At the social level, this instinctive competition has forced the different classes of society at different times to search for the Truth in life. In the process, in physical and material levels at least, it has endowed mankind with tremendous progress in science, literature, art and culture. On the contrary, competition produces negative outcomes when it is used to gain supremacy over others. Violence or other expedient means are used in order to impose one's ideas and models without integrating those of others. In such a state of competition the individual creates chaos by denying that part of the self that integrates while enshrining the parts that fragment exerience.

From the above analysis it emerges that aggressiveness and more so its off-shoot competition, that developed in man as a means in the search of joy and truth, later degenerated as rationalized philosophy for control. It clarifies the intensification of the Western propensity to exploit and destroy the Nature towards the end of a greater material standard and glory for the ruling hierarchy. Consequently this

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8 Rosenthal, M. Where rumor raged. *Trans-action*, 8 (4), 1971.

9 Bhattacharya, Haridas. Indian Ethics in Haridas Bhattacharya (Ed), *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. III. Calcutta : The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1983.

view of life has prompted them to degrade and exploit 'inferior' races and the 'primitive' cultures with whom they clashed in the process of expanding empires. They placed themselves firmly in the centre of the Universe.

The internal dynamics of the materialistic premise of competition produce some well known features of recorded history. It also explains the gradual degradation of Indian institutional system from its initial emphasis on spirituality, role of the individual in the attainment of spiritual advancement and the unmistakable technique of expandind the self and Increasing the dimensions of personality, to a caste and class ridden society of domination and exploitation. The later ideologues of socio-religion convention rivalled the secular, idealistically expanding and utterly humane self in venality, internecine debate and superficial rituals.

What precisely in the defect from which the competitive human spirit, which could be the driving force towards perfection, suffers at the degenrating level ? At the present juncture of his continuing history, man, evolved out of animal nature and simultaneously struggling forward for further humane development, seems to be of a double nature. So also are all his inherent characteristics including competition. As a vestige of animal aggressive instinct competition in man works towards the gratification of lower order needs and impulses, dominance over others by inhuman or brutal means, orientation and method for the satisfaction of only the physical being. The other aspect of this characteristic manifests in man as a"...half-divine nature of the self conscious intellectual, ethical aesthetic, intelligently emotional, intelligently dynamic being who is capable of finding and under-standing the law of his own action and consciously using and bettering it, a reflecting mind that understands Nature, a will that uses, elevates perfects Nature, a sense that intelligently enjoys Nature".[10]

Society is at present characterized by a bad, vicious life-destroying competitive struggle at all behavioural levels of social life......the philosophy put forward in the name of progress. The supremacy of competitive spirit as we know it today, with its emphasis on objective reality and rationality, will possibly create a monoster that may anhiliate and destroy the whole social fabric. It will harm man, turn him into a miserable, unfriendly, self-righteous mechanism without charm and humor. How can we achieve human integration so long different segments of the society are dominated by different social.

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[10] Sri Aurobindo. The necessity of the spiritual transformation, in *The Human Cycle*, Pondicherry ; Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1985.

religious political and other specific models ? How can they come together so long their interaction is subject to the principles of competition at the material level, which in turn is controlled by the mechanism of animal though evolving instinct of aggressiveness.

The underlying principle of competition is development of the human beings regarded as the only species in nature with evolving mental consciousness. It is to be taken as a means to develop oneself and fulfil his life, to excel even himself as a subjective being by rising above the mere vital tendencies. The subjective view of competition implies the obligation to respect the same competitive spirit in all other individuals.

The growth of modern science has meanwhile created new ideas which have mostly been wrongly put because of the practice of technocratic rationality. Aggressive self-affirmation have become surrogate for self-developmental competition. The maxim, 'survival of the fittest' is understood in its derogatory superficial form. It is regarded as a struggle to take the best advantage of the environment and people for self-preservation and self-aggrandisement. This view of life inevitably imposes that there is always a loser in any competition and he has to go out of the interaction. Consequently each negotiation is an indirectly coercive compromise more than a wish for better understanding and mutual growth.

However, flight or attack is never an aware choice of the human individual for he realises that Man s dignity must be respected wherever he is "The man is not, when we look closely, himself alone, a rigidly seperate self-existent individual, but humanity in a mind and body of itself; and humanity too is no rigidly seperate species or genus, it is the All-existence, the universal Godhead figuring itself in the type of humanity;......"[11].

It follows then that mankind today has been over whelmed and dazed by the glare of his material achievements : as a consequence it is yet to have a conscience of what life really is. The apparent progresses in all aspects of life are aids to it, for its guidance and betterment, for its embellishments, but they are not part of its very substance. Standing between the actual and the possible man is in a conflict. He tends to mistake the present as the utmost possibility—the eternal ideal. But in reality, only that is eternal which is constant through all changes and our ideal can be no more than a progressive expression of it. Life, itself is the only object of living—a serach for the eternal ideal.

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[11] Sri Aurobindo. *Essays in the Gita.* Pondicherry : Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1983.

This endeavour will be a supreme and difficult task even for the individual, but much more for the total mankind. It may well be that once started, it may not progress rapidly or may the progress be even halted at a point of time. It may be that it will take long centuries of effort to come into some kind of permanency. But that is not altogether inevitable. The key does, I believe, lie in the nature of human affects or emotions and particularly that of joy or Delight.

Yastu Sarvapi Bhutani Atmanyevanpashati
Sarvabhutesu Atmanam Tata Na vijuguptase
—Isha Upanishad

"Being one with all beings, we possess, in their enjoyment, in ours and in the Cosmic Being's, delight of universal self-expression. It is only by this Ananda at once transcendent and universal that man can be free in his soul and yet live in the world with the full active Life of the Lord in His universe of movement".[12]

The first step for realising the Delight is the growth of absolute ideals in the human plane. If we take the individualistic and social life of man we find hints of them in several forms. The ideals of life, humanity and beauty appear to be those which are inherently related to maximization of love. What we call love is a manifestation of the 'sharing' trend in the relationships among people, and in a more general sense the whole concept of sharing could be equated with love. But sharing is an ideal and no ideal can be pursued single mindedly without sacrifice of the others. Therefore, it comes to that to concentrate exclusively in the search for love would be to exclude the nature of the process of seeking ideals as a set. This argument may be logical, but with huma n behaviour is not wholly true. People intuitively know that their perception of ideal-seeking as an intrinsically desirable mode will also be similarly perceived by all other humans because its desirability inheres in itself. The human civilization with its two powers of competition and cooperation is stumbling blindly forward in two divine directions towards some realisation of power and unity.

Let us now look at the inherent and evolving dynamism of competition is its true being and not only as a means for ethical or spiritual development and see to what extent it really goes against the realisation of the supreme Delight. We can see at once that the most crude, uninhibited manifestation of this vital urge is aggressiveness. Evidently it is in this natural form, a still-unevolved characteristic of man that results in hideous ugliness and jarring discords. It is true that it resists, with an obstinately enormous strength, the elevation of conscience to sharing with people, love for beautitude and joy of living. But competifion still has its rich elements in pursuit of knowledge, aesthetics, beauty, sacrifice, nobility and when it is shorn of its basal impulse of aggressiveness.

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[12] Sri Aurobindo. *The Upanishads*. Pondicherry : Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1986.

We see that competitive spirit, like many of his characteristics exists in man in double form. Modern society, whatever may be the splendour of its achievements, acknowledges only the animal nature of competition. And the result is widening differences and discords between man and man. Human. unity, is no doubt attempted, but solely through mechanical means. through social and political adjustments. The ideal of human unity is nevertheless vaguely making its way in our consciousness; but no long the ideal does not penetrate its root in the heart and mind-especially the heart of minkind-failure may be predicted, unless indeed inner changes in men usher in the external radjustment. As long as mankind does not accept, with total conviction, a religion of humanity, it will be very difficult that life can be respected in its various forms.

Man has the implicit force that can transform the earthy competition, used merely for vital existence and growth to a self-fulfilling joy of competition. The secret of the transformation lies in the transference of our centre of living to a higher consciousness and in a change of our main power of living. The insufficiency of formal unity then will be made up by a great psychological advance in the spiritual evolution of the human race. We need to aim at a synthesis of the two paradigms (competition in basal from and cooperation in divinine form) to arrive at an interaction model of internal processes and external intrusions between human units, their neignbours and their environment. Human unity can be achieved only through a fundamental change in attitude of competition; a 'renunciation' from doing to allowing, from grasping the world to allowing the world to enter us.

'Let him raise the self by the self and not the self become depressed; for verily is the SELF the friend of the self and also the SELF is the self's enemy'. Competition be practiced, not for mutually assured destruction, but for human unity and peace :

Sarve bhavantu sukhina,
Sarve santu niramaya
Sarve bhadrani pasianti;
Ma kascid dukhsabhag bhavet.

Which says,

Let all should be happy,
Let all should be healthy,
Let all should be well,
Let no one should have sufferings.

9

Our Enemy and Gandhi's Legacy

John Somerville

Though no one individual alone is really deserving of such an honor as the Gandhi Peace Award—it is always a whole group who did the necessary work—there is a special reason for me to feel doubly grateful on this occasion. Forty years ago, in 1947, I had the cherished privilege of taking part, with Mahatma Gandhi, in the first project of UNESCO, which was on the subject of human rights. The aim of the project was to put into print an international symposium volume for the benefit of the United Nations delegates who would shortly be discussing and debating the first formulation of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and which would be of educational value to the world community. Thirty-two scholars and specialists from different countries and cultures around the world were invited to take part, and each of us wrote a separate chapter for this first UNESCO volume. Characteristically, Gandhi's was quite brief, but deeply meaningful. One sentence from his contribution expresses the essence of what I want to say on this occasion. He wrote, "The very right to live accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship of the world"[1]. Citizenship of the world. Let me tell you how I came to understand that.

Some time ago I made a strange discovery. It was after I had been active for quite a few years in the peace movement. I began to realize there was a mistake, a clear error, a pervasive misconception at the very basis of our work. This misconduct was in fact making the victory of the movement—the victory of peace over war as we conceived of it-much more difficult than we realized. And the worst of it was that this final victory of peace over war seemed, by every undeniable fact of contemporary history, to be more necessary now for humanity as a whole than it had ever been before.

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[1] Human Rights : A symposium Prepared by UNESCO, London, Wingate, 1949, p. 18.

More necessary now, of course, because of the new kind of weapon, the nuclear weapon, that had been created in the closing stages of World War II. This weapon of previously unimaginable destructive power—witness Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with only its first small, crude models—was speedily "improved" and multiplied hundreds of thousands of times in destructive power and numbers. It soon reached a point where its stockpiled arsenals of overkill models could annihilate, in one relatively brief conflict, every human being on earth, and to it a senseless number of times over. This would be the nuclear "war", as we called it, that would indeed end all human history forever.

So it seemed perfectly clear that, although humankind had never been able to get rid of war, had never really wanted to get rid of war, which in one form or another had characterized its entire history, humankind must now get rid of it, once and for all, on pain of universal extinction. As President Kennedy once expressed it, "Either man must put an end to war or war will put an end to man". He did not understand that any form of conflict capable of putting an end to man could not be a war, and should not be thought of as a war because to think of it as a war could mislead all our judgments about it.

As if to demonstrate what can happend in practice when nuclear conflict is thought of as war, President Kennedy himself, when he was faced with Soviet missiles in Cuba, deliberately decided to risk what he called nuclear "war" by sending his ultimatum to the Soviet government: You must remove your nuclear missiles from Cuba, even though we have our nuclear missiles in Turkey, closer to you than Cuba is to us, or else we will bomb and destroy your missile bases in Cuba, even though we realize that this will start World War III as a world nuclear war.

All this is fully documented in the play I wrote on the basis of what Robert Kennedy, the President's brother, had revealed in his completely candid memoir about the crisis, in which he had been a central figure.[2] His memoir, entitled *Thirteen Days ; The Story about How the World Almost Ended*, was not published until after his death and indeed, might well be regarded as a death bed confession. It was Robert who delivered the ultimatum to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, and he reports the conversation he had with the President immediately afterwards, in these words :

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[2] *The Crisis : True Story about How the World Almost Ended.* San Diegy. 1976, Author Press, 1426 Merritt Drive, El Cajon, CA 92020.

[3] First published in *McCall's* Magazine, November 1968. In book form as *Thirteen Days . A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, by Robert Kennedy. New York, New Americans Library, 1969[1]

"I returned to the White House. The President was not optimistic, nor was I. He ordered twent-four troop-carrier squadrons of the Air Force Reserve to active duty. They would be necessary for an invasion. He had not abandoned hope, but what hope there was now rested with Khruschev's changing his course within the next twenty-four hours. It was a hope, not an expectation. The expectation was a military confrontation by Tuesday, and possibly tomorrow".[4]

Note how carefully Robert Kenneny distinguishes the fond hope from the actual expectaion. They "hoped" Khruschev would obey the ultiuatum, but they "expected" he would not. The "expectation was that they would have to use military action against the Soviets, which would be war between the US and the USSR, and between the respective allies of these two superpowers around the world.

What they expected from such a confilict was acknowledged by Robert Kennedy in a sentence that surely must be the most poignant ever to appear in a government memoir. Referring to the Presidant he wrote, "The thought that disturbed him the most, and that made the prospect of war much more fearful than it would otherwise have been, was the spectre of the death of the children of this country and and all the world-the young people who had no role, who had no say, who knew nothing even of the confrontation but whose lives would be snuffed out like everyone elses "[5] Thus, everyone would be dead, but the death of all the children would be the most regretable. Nevertheless, the President and his chief advisers still felt that they had to send the ultimatum, and it was sent. Even on the first page of his memoir, Kennedy acknowledged the full extend of what was at stake when he descibed the Cuban missile crisis as one that "brought the world to the abyss of nuclear destruction and the end of mankind[6].

The end of mankind, nothing less. But if that was what they expected from war between the US and the USSR, and they expected that the ultimaium would precipitate that very war, while it was likewise acknowledged that the Soviets had the same legal right to place their missiles in Cuba, that we had to place ours in Turkey, why was the ultimatum sent ? Why didn't they accept the Soviet proposal that the matter be settled peacefully by both sides removing their respective missiles, ours from Turkey and theirs from Cuba ? Perhaps the answer, or part of the answer, is found in another conversation in which Robert Kennedy recounts what he said to the President: "If you hadn't acted, you would have been impeached", and adds that "The President thought for a moment and said, That's what I think—I would have been impeached".[7]

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[4] Ibid., New American edition, p. 109.

[5] Ibid., p. 106.

[6] Ibid., p. 23.

There we witness the political psychology of war. One must always have the courage to go to war, even the nuclear "war" which however bad, is still thought of as war, which is the supreme form of patriotism. And there was something more—the consciousness that the President was president of the most powerful nation on earth, and by the constitution Commander-in-Chief of the strongest military forces in the world. As such, he must not grant equal rights to an adversary or competitor. He must be willing to threaten to use the weapons of "war" in order to make clear that his country is indeed the strongest, and intends to remain so. If he lacked the will and the courage to do that, he would and should be removed. This is accepted as the binding mandate, the clear message of all past history. Thigs is the logic of war, the logic that has always ruled the minds of the rulers of the world, and not only the rulers, but most of the ruled as well,

Moreover, we must admit that some of the reasons why war, throughout history, has been accepted by practically all governments and most people, are powerfully convincing. Otherwise, how could so many respected thinkers and true patriots, true lovers of their country, of their people, and of all humanity, have spoken of a just war, a war of liberation, a war of self-defense ? It is difficult indeed to argue that no wars were ever justified. But in any case, the key to the understanding of today's worldwide, unprecedented unclear danger lies in the answer to one specific question : Could any of the possible justifications for war that have been advanced in the course of history apply to nuclear conflict, the conflict that would "end mankind", the conflict that the Kennedy brothers and everyone else called "nuclear war" ? Is there, in fact, any such thing as nuclear "war'; ?

The answer is completely in the negative. The fortunate truth is that not a single one of the justifications that have ever been offered for a war—patriotism, self-defense, liberation, justice, freedom, or even the clearly illegal or immoral "justifications" such as denial of equal rights to a fellow sovereign country, imperial conquest of foreign lands. Forcible enslavement of weaker peoples—not a single one of these justifications could apply to a conflict fought out with the nuclear weapons that now exist. The reason why they cannot apply is almost self-evident. That is, every justification offered for war depends completely on the precondition that after the war is over there will still be human beings left who might acquire or gain something from it—justice, libertion, freedom, security, money, land, slaves, revenge—something. That necessary precondition is what always gave war its whole purpose as a human activity and its whole meaning as a word in a language. Never in all the history of war did that precondition cease to exist and to operate. In light of these central facts it is clear that when a new type of armed conflict emerges which can eliminate all human beings, that kind of conflict cannot rightly be called a war for it in fact eliminates everything that gives war its purpose and meaning. It makes war impossible.

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[7] Ibid. p. 67.

But it, in spite of these facts, you go on calling this new from of conflict a war, you will seriously, even fatally, mislead your-self and others. You need a new world for this new kind of conflict because there is a qualitative difference, not merely a quantitative difference between it and a war. Nuclear conflict can and did grow out of a war, but that does not make nuclear conflict a bigger or more severe form of war. Death can and does grow out of illness, but that does not make death a more severe from of illness. From any illness you might possibly recover, but not from death. Just so, from war humankind can and does recover, but from muclear conflict with the present weapons it could not recover, since nuclear conflict with the present weapons means the killing of all humans including themselves. I therefore created the new word "omnicide" as the right word for this kind of conflict since our language already has a series of nouns denoting the killing of different sets of humans—suicide for killing oneself, infanticide for killing infants, genocide for killing ethnic groups, and so on. Since "omni', signifies all, omnicide is the terminal extension of the series of killings—literally, the end of the human line.

It is said of Confucius that when he was asked what is the secret of good government, he replied, "To call things by their right names." I would think this applies also to a peace movement. When we call nuclear conflict by its right name, some of the main questions answer themselves in a wonderfully clear and convincing fashion. For example even if it is possible to have a just war, sparing the innocent and promoting a just cause, is it possible to have a just omnicide, sparing the innocent and promoting a just cause ? Even if it is possible to have a war of liberation, is it possible to have an omnicide of liberation ? Even if it is possible to have a war of self-defense, is it possible to have an omnicide of self-defense ? Even if it is possible to have a profitable war, good for business, is it possible to have a profitable omnicide, good for business ? History is full of imperialist wars, fought for the conquest of lands and the enslavement of peoples. but is it possible to have an imperialist omnicide for the conquest of lands and the enslavement of peoples ? Even if it is possible for superiority in the weapons of war to lead to the victory of one side over the other, is it possible for superiority in the weapons of omnicide to lead to the victory of one side over the other ? Even if it is sane to say our government must be prepared to wage war, is it sane to say our government must be prepared to wage omnicide ? Even if a president could be impeached for refusing to begin a war, would he ever be impeached for refusing to begin omnicide ? If President Kennedy had understood the difference between war and omnicide, would he have sent his ultimatum ?

To put all this into what might be called a working perspective, I think it would be well in our contemporary peace movement to distinguish between two enemies. One is war and the other is omnicide. These two enemies are not at all identical, nor do they represent equal degrees of threat, danger, crime, or sin. Certainly there can be no greater threat, danger, crime or sin than omnicide. It is self-evident that, in order to be able to deal at all with the evils of war which, however great, are clearly of smaller scale than those of omnicide, we must first prevent the infinite, all-inclusive evil of omnicide.

It is all the more possible for us to do this as a necessary first step because omnicide is obviously not something that has been practised by human beings from the beginning of history; it is obviously not rooted in human nature. Neither could it be argued that omnicide is something beyond our rational human control. It is in fact wholly within our rational human control because the problem of omnicide, the very possibility of omnicide arises only and entirely from the omnicidal weapons we humans ourselves have but recently created, and what we ourselves have but recently created we can certainly, by mutual agreement, refrain from using. For example, poison gas was created in World War I but by mutual agreement was not used in World war II on the ground that it was too horrible. Are not the present nuclear weapons even more horrible ?

In regard to these present nuclear weapons, our presumed adversary and its allies—the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries—have on three separate occasion in recent years, proposed to our country and our NATO allies a mutual treaty of no-first-use of nuclear weapons [8] But our government, or to speak more accurately, the executive branch of our government, the President and his cabinet, have quietly rejected each proposal without even calling for debate or discussion in the Congress, and what is worse, without making any report of its decisions to the public, to the people whose lives are all at stake.

During this same time the General Assembly of the United Nations on ten separate occasions passed measures by large majority votes confirming that the first use of nuclear weapons would now be "a violation of the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity."[9] But on each occasion our government and its NATO allies have been in the small minority that opposed the judgement of the great majority and brushed aside international law.

Ironically, during this very period a national poll conducted in our country by the Public Agenda Foundation in New York, and specialists from Brown University, in 1984 found that 81% of our eligible voters were happily convinced that it is already the delared policy of our government not to use nuclear weapons first. Undoubtedly, the reason why 81% of eligible voters had this profoundly mistaken impression was that President Reagan, along with Defense Secretary Wein berger, a year or so before the presidential election of 1984, suddenly began repeating in their speeches here and abroad, the same statement over and over : "Nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought." Since this strongly suggested that they had decided never to be first to use nuclear weapons, our national campaign for the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons (which was already endorsed by five hundred members of the National Academy of Science forty Nobel Laureates, and fifty members of Congress) actually thought at first that the Reagan administration had changed its mind, and had finally accepted this policy. But in order to make sure, we asked six members of Congress to write a collective letter to the President requesting a clarification of his position on the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Their letter was sent on April 19, 1984, and the reply came back May 15 : "We cannot pledge no-first-use of nuclear weapons; our policy is to retain the option of first use of nuclear weapons. This means retaining the option of *beginning* the very kind of "war" that "cannot be won and must never be fought" !

So it remains clear who is willing to use the omnicidal weapons first, and who is not. Let us therefore take heart, and do what we must obviously do, what is clearly the duty of world citizenship, as Mahatma Gandhi put it, remembering that it is we the people who put governments in office, and who have the power to change and remove governments which are bound by oath to enact the will of the people and to protect their "right to live." Let us call things by their right names, and recognize omnicide for what it is. It is not war. It is a crime so enormous it could be committed only once, a sin so unspeakable it never even had a name. Let me close with a brief philosophic characterization I tried to make of the utterly stran-

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8 Announced to the world press from the meetings of the Warsaw Pact countries is Budapest, Bucharest and Moscow.

[9] See Fact Sheet No. 34 from the series, Disarmament Fact Sheets, published by and available from the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations. Address : United Nations, New York, Ny 10017.

ge, insane, historically new and unique inner nature of our nuclear enemy. It was published in our oldest religious journal. *The Churchman.*

For the first time in all history
All history has a common enemy
Against which everything human must now unite.
The good and the bad,
Those who belive in reason and those who do not believe in reason.
Those who believe in freedom and those who do not believe in freedom.
The exploited and the exploiter,
The poor and the rich.
The radical and the conservative,
The atheist and the believer,
The humanist and the anti-humanist,
The unselfish and the selfish,
The saint and the sinner,
Joy and pain,
Happiness and misery'
Health and sickness,
God and the devil,
Life and death;
But how can life and death have a common enemy ?
Is not death itself the worst of all common enemies ?
What have we found that is worse than death,
Against which both death and life must now unite ?
Is it that which can kill the living thing in such a way
That the passage from death to further life is blocked.
What we before called death released the elements of life
In forms that could produce further life.
The dance of life had a silent partner called death.
And thus the dance could go on.
Our nuclear enemy can remove the silent partner, and stop the dance.
It can kill the cell of life. kill life-renewing death.
Transform this green and fertile plant into a thing forever sterile
Our nuclear enemy is not only a reactor that creates plutonium.
It is an economic system that seeks profit from reactors.
It is a political system that makes nuclear omnicide possible
It is an arms race that multiplies nuclear weapons.
It is a foreign policy that threatens to use them first.
It is education that does not teach the truth about the common enemy.
It is religion that does not denounce the common enemy by name.
It is ignorance that can be overcome.
We can overcome it.

Obituary Note— Professor Krushna Prasad Mishra

Krushna Prasad Mishra was born in Berhampur in Ganjam District the home-town of his maternal uncle, on 19th. April, 1933. He was the eldest son of late Ananta Prasad Mishra who hailed from Banapur in Puri District, the founder-propietor of one of the frontline publishing houses of Orissa, Cuttack Students' Store.

He did his B. A. Honours degree in Philosophy from Ravenshaw College, Cuttack in 1954. He secured the first position in the first class in M. A. Philosophy in 1956 and secured first class in LL.B. in 1957, both from Banaras Hindu University. He appeared at the Civil Services Examination and was selected for the Allied cadre. But he did neither opt for the civil services, nor for the legal profession, but accepted an appointment as Lecturer in Philosophy in the Orissa Education Service. He taught in B. J. B. Bollege, Bhubaneswar from 1959 to 1962 and in S. C. S. College from 1962 to 1963. He was awarded a Commonwealth Fellowship and went to Toronto University, Canada in 1963. He worked there for his Ph. D. degree with Prof J. F. M. Hunter on the moral Philosophies of Hare, Baier and Singer. He was an illustrious student of illustrious teachers like late Prof. Ganeswar Misra, Dr. Srinivas Sahu, Late Prof. T. R. V. Murty, Dr. Prof B. L. Atreya, etc.

He was appointed as a Reader in Philosophy in the Post-Graduate Department of Philosophy, Utkal University in November, 1968 and was elevated to the post of Professor of Philosophy in July, 1984 He visited U. S. A. as a Fullbright Research Scholar in 1988. He succeeded Prof. G. C. Nayak as Head of the Department in 1989 and continued as such till 1991. He was the first Co-ordinator of the Department of Special Assistance Programme for the whole of its first phase for five years.

He was a thorough-going scholar in Meta-ethics and the philosophy of Wittgenstein of all-India renown. His Ph. D. dissertation was published under the litle, *Principle in Contemporary Moral Philosophy* in 1977. It is prescribed in the M. A. and M. Phil courses in many Universities in India as a reference book. It went into the second edition in 1991. A collection of his essays on the philosophy of Wittgenstein was published under the title, Wittgenstein in 1978. Apart from these, he published a book on deductive logic meant for Higher Secondary Students and more than forty papers in prestigious philosophical journals. Many students prepared their M. Phil discretations and five candidates were successfully completed their Ph. D.

dissertation under his supervision. *Darshana International* dedicated its 118th Issue to Professor K. P. Mishra in recognition of his Philosophic eminence. He was also in the Advisory Editorial Board of the National Philosophical Journal : Review of Darshana.

Professor Mishra was connected with many associations and institutions in the capacity of a philosopher and a litteratuer. He was a life-member of All India Philosophical Congress, Utkal Sahitya Samaj and P. E. N. He was the founder-General Secretary and a life member of All Orissa Philosophy Association as well as founder-President of Rastravadi Sikshak Parishad. He was, for some time, the President of Orissa Lekhaka Sammukhya (Writers' Front). He was a sitting member of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, a member of the Philosophy panel of the U G. C. and a member of Orissa Sahitya Academi.

He edited a premier intellectual Oriya monthly magazine, *Manasa* for a decade. This magazine was able to produce a number of writers and poets and shot many others into prominence. He was the Chief Editor of the Utkal University annual magazine, *Vani Vikash* for a couple of years and was the General Editor of the Utkal Studies in Philosophy series published under the D. S. A. Programme in Philosophy. He was Chief of the editorial Board of the Proceeding of the All Orissa Philosophy Association.

He is the celebrated author of 3 fictions, 14 collections of short stories, 3 collections of essays and a famous travelogue. Besides the Vishuva award in 1972, he was crowned with Orissa Sahitya Academi award for his remarkable literary output.

His literary creations pertain to the turmoil resulting out of the tossing and crossing of cultures. He was of the view that his opinions in this regard cannot be communicated through philosophical writings as the concern of philosophy is more intellectual and its appeal is more restricted than that of literature. Ms. Jayashree Nanda, A Lecturer in Oriya in an affilated college of Utkal University has done her Ph. D. research on the literary works of Prof. Mishra and has been awarded the degree by Utkal University. A collection of articles of appreciation and appraisal of his early literary works was published under the title, *Kathakara Krushna Prasad*.

Prof Mishra breathed his last at about 2. 00 P. M. on 13 2. 94 at his Vanivihar residence. He is survived by his widow mother, widow wife, five brothers, married sisters, three married daughters and two sons, one being an army doctor and married and the other being in the college in the under-graduate classes.

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Paper proposals should be received by December 31, 1994. Accepted and invited papers will be published in Conference Volume.

Those interested in the conference are kindly requested to fill in the registration from and return it before 1 September, 1994.

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Announcement & Call for Papers

for

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Rationale: This conference will form part of the celebration to mark the bicentenary of *St Patrick's College, Maynooth*, which was fouuded in 1795 as a Catholic seminary to prepare priests for ministry in Ireland. It became a Pontifical University in 1896, and a recognized college of the National University of Ireland in 1910. It now has about 4.000 students in 5 separate faculties.

Sponsorship : The conference is being organized by the *Stephen Mc Kenna Society* with primary financial support from St Patrick's College supplementary contributions from Trinity College and University College Dublin.

Location: The conference will be held on the beautiful rustic campus of St Patrick's College about 25 kilometres west of Dublin. Room and board at very reasonable rates will be available on campus for all participants who come from outside the Dublin area. A normal conference fee will be charged and participants will be expected to pay their own travel expenses.

Application: Persons wishing to participate in this conference should send a brief curriculum vitae, along with an abstract (1 page) of their proposed paper before *September 1, 1994* to Dr. John J. Cleary or Dr. Kieran McGroarty at St Patrick's College, Maynooth, Co Kildare, Ireland.

Publication: A selection from papers given at the conference will be published as part of the new series instituted by the Stephen Mc Kenna Society for the promotion of neoplatonic studies. The first volume in this series (in press) contains papers that were presented at the conference hosted by Trinity College in 1992.

Conference Committee:

Dr. John J. Cleary, Faculty of Philosophy, St Patrick's College, Maynooth.

Prof. John Dillon, Dept. of Classics, Trinity College, Dublin.

Prof Andrew Smith, Dept. of Classics, University College, Dublin.

Dr Kieran McGroarty, Dept. of Classics, Lt Patrick's College, Maynooth.

apply is almost self-evident. That is, every justification offered for war depends completely on the precondition that after the war is over there will still be human beings left who might acquire or gain something from it—justice, libertion, freedom, security, money, land, slaves, revenge—something. That necessary precondition is what always gave war its whole purpose as a human activity and its whole meaning as a word in a language. Never in all the history of war did that precondition cease to exist and to operate. In light of these central facts it is clear that when a new type of armed conflict emerges which can eliminate all human beings, that kind of conflict cannot rightly be called a war for it in fact eliminates everything that gives war its purpose and meaning. It makes war impossible.

But it, in spite of these facts, you go on calling this new from of conflict a war, you will seriously, even fatally, mislead your-self and others. You need a new world for this new kind of conflict because there is a qualitative difference, not merely a quantitative difference between it and a war. Nuclear conflict can and did grow out of a war, but that does not make nuclear conflict a bigger or more severe form of war. Death can and does grow out of illness, but that does not make death a more severe from of illness. From any illness you might possibly recover, but not from death. Just so, from war humankind can and does recover, but from muclear conflict with the present weapons it could not recover, since nuclear conflict with the present weapons means the killing of all humans including themselves. I therefore created the new word “omnicide” as the right word for this kind of conflict since our language already has a series of nouns denoting the killing of different sets of humans—suicide for killing oneself, infanticide for killing infants, genocide for killing ethnic groups, and so on. Since “omni’, signifies all, omnicide is the terminal extension of the series of killings—literally, the end of the human line.

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In regard to these present nuclear weapons, our presumed adversary and its allies—the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries—have on three separate occasion in recent years, proposed to our country and our NATO allies a mutual treaty of no-first-use of nuclear weapons [8] But our government, or to speak more accurately, the executive branch of our government, the President and his cabinet, have quietly rejected each proposal without even calling for debate or discussion in the Congress, and what is worse, without making any report of its decisions to the public, to the people whose lives are all at stake.

During this same time the General Assembly of the United Nations on ten separate occasions passed measures by large majority votes confirming that the first use of nuclear weapons would now be "a violation of the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity."[9] But on each occasion our government and its NATO allies have been in the small minority that opposed the judgement of the great majority and brushed aside international law.

Ironically, during this very period a national poll conducted in our country by the Public Agenda Foundation in New York, and specialists from Brown University, in 1984 found that 81% of our eligible voters were happily convinced that it is already the delared policy of our government not to use nuclear weapons first. Undoubtedly, the reason why 81% of eligible voters had this profoundly mistaken impression was that President Reagan, along with Defense Secretary Wein berger, a year or so before the presidential election of 1984, suddenly began repeating in their speeches here and abroad, the same statement over and over : "Nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought." Since this strongly suggested that they had decided never to be first to use nuclear weapons, our national campaign for the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons (which was already endorsed by five hundred members of the National Academy of Science forty Nobel Laureates, and fifty members of Congress) actually thought at first that the Reagan administration had changed its mind, and had finally accepted this policy. But in order to make sure, we asked six members of Congress to write a collective letter to the President requesting a clarification of his position on the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Their letter was sent on April 19, 1984, and the reply came back May 15 : "We cannot pledge no-first-use of nuclear weapons; our policy is to retain the option of first use of nuclear weapons. This means retaining the option of *beginning* the very kind of "war" that "cannot be won and must never be fought" !

So it remains clear who is willing to use the omnicidal weapons first, and who is not. Let us therefore take heart, and do what we must obviously do, what is clearly the duty of world citizenship, as Mahatma Gandhi put it, remembering that it is we the people who put governments in office, and who have the power to change and remove governments which are bound by oath to enact the will of the people and to protect their "right to live." Let us call things by their right names, and recognize omnicide for what it is. It is not war. It is a crime so enormous it could be committed only once, a sin so unspeakable it never even had a name. Let me close with a brief philosophic characterization I tried to make of the utterly stran-

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[8] Announced to the world press from the meetings of the Warsaw Pact countries is Budapest, Bucharest and Moscow.

[9] See Fact Sheet No. 34 from the series, Disarmament Fact Sheets, published by and available from the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations. Address : United Nations, New York, Ny 10017.

ge, insane, historically new and unique inner nature of our nuclear enemy. It was published in our oldest religious journal, *The Churchman.*

For the first time in all history
All history has a common enemy
Against which everything human must now unite.
The good and the bad,
Those who belive in reason and those who do not believe in reason,
Those who believe in freedom and those who do not believe in freedom.
The exploited and the exploiter,
The poor and the rich.
The radical and the conservative,
The atheist and the believer,
The humanist and the anti-humanist,
The unselfish and the selfish,
The saint and the sinner,
Joy and pain,
Happiness and misery'
Health and sickness,
God and the devil,
Life and death;
But how can life and death have a common enemy ?
Is not death itself the worst of all common enemies ?
What have we found that is worse than death,
Against which both death and life must now unite ?
Is it that which can kill the living thing in such a way
That the passage from death to further life is blocked.
What we before called death released the elements of life
In forms that could produce further life.
The dance of life had a silent partner called death.
And thus the dance could go on.
Our nuclear enemy can remove the silent partner, and stop the dance.
It can kill the cell of life. kill life-renewing death.
Transform this green and fertile plant into a thing forever sterile
Our nuclear enemy is not only a reactor that creates plutonium.
It is an economic system that seeks profit from reactors.
It is a political system that makes nuclear omnicide possible
It is an arms race that multiplies nuclear weapons.
It is a foreign policy that threatens to use them first.
It is education that does not teach the truth about the common enemy.
It is religion that does not denounce the common enemy by name.
It is ignorance that can be overcome.
We can overcome it.

Obituary Note—
Professor Krushna Prasad Mishra

Krushna Prasad Mishra was born in Berhampur in Ganjam District the home-town of his maternal uncle, on 19th. April, 1933. He was the eldest son of late Ananta Prasad Mishra who hailed from Banapur in Puri District, the founder-propietor of one of the frontline publishing houses of Orissa, Cuttack Students' Store.

He did his B. A. Honours degree in Philosophy from Ravenshaw College, Cuttack in 1954. He secured the first position in the first class in M. A. Philosophy in 1956 and secured first class in LL.B. in 1957, both from Banaras Hindu University. He appeared at the Civil Services Examination and was selected for the Allied cadre. But he did neither opt for the civil services, nor for the legal profession, but accepted an appointment as Lecturer in Philosophy in the Orissa Education Service. He taught in B. J. B. Bollege, Bhubaneswar from 1959 to 1962 and in S. C. S. College from 1962 to 1963. He was awarded a Commonwealth Fellowship and went to Toronto University, Canada in 1963. He worked there for his Ph. D. degree with Prof J. F. M. Hunter on the moral Philosophies of Hare, Baier and Singer. He was an illustrious student of illustrious teachers like late Prof. Ganeswar Misra, Dr. Srinivas Sahu, Late Prof. T. R. V. Murty, Dr. Prof B. L. Atreya, etc.

He was appointed as a Reader in Philosophy in the Post-Graduate Department of Philosophy, Utkal University in November, 1968 and was elevated to the post of Professor of Philosophy in July, 1984 He visited U. S. A. as a Fullbright Research Scholar in 1988. He succeeded Prof. G. C. Nayak as Head of the Department in 1989 and continued as such till 1991. He was the first Co-ordinator of the Department of Special Assistance Programme for the whole of its first phase for five years.

He was a thorough-going scholar in Meta-ethics and the philosophy of Wittgenstein of all-India renown. His Ph. D. dissertation was published under the litle, *Principle in Contemporary Moral Philosophy* in 1977. It is prescribed in the M. A. and M. Phil courses in many Universities in India as a reference book. It went into the second edition in 1991. A collection of his essays on the philosophy of Wittgenstein was published under the title, Wittgenstein in 1978. Apart from these, he published a book on deductive logic meant for Higher Secondary Students and more than forty papers in prestigious philosophical journals. Many students prepared their M. Phil discretations and five candidates were successfully completed their Ph. D.

dissertation under his supervision. *Darshana International* dedicated its 118th Issue to Professor K. P. Mishra in recognition of his Philosophic eminence. He was also in the Advisory Editorial Board of the National Philosophical Journal : Review of Darshana.

Professor Mishra was connected with many associations and institutions in the capacity of a philosopher and a litteratuer. He was a life-member of All India Philosophical Congress, Utkal Sahitya Samaj and P. E. N. He was the founder-General Secretary and a life member of All Orissa Philosophy Association as well as founder-President of Rastravadi Sikshak Parishad. He was, for some time, the President of Orissa Lekhaka Sammukhya (Writers' Front). He was a sitting member of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, a member of the Philosophy panel of the U G. C. and a member of Orissa Sahitya Academi.

He edited a premier intellectual Oriya monthly magazine, *Manasa* for a decade. This magazine was able to produce a number of writers and poets and shot many others into prominence. He was the Chief Editor of the Utkal University annual magazine. *Vani Vikash* for a couple of years and was the General Editor of the Utkal Studies in Philosophy series published under the D. S. A. Programme in Philosophy. He was Chief of the editorial Board of the Proceeding of the All Orissa Philosophy Association.

He is the celebrated author of 3 fictions, 14 collections of short stories, 3 collections of essays and a famous travelogue. Besides the Vishuva award in 1972, he was crowned with Orissa Sahitya Academi award for his remarkable literary output.

His literary creations pertain to the turmoil resulting out of the tossing and crossing of cultures. He was of the view that his opinions in this regard cannot be communicated through philosophical writings as the concern of philosophy is more intellectual and its appeal is more restricted than that of literature. Ms. Jayashree Nanda, A Lecturer in Oriya in an affilated college of Utkal University has done her Ph. D. research on the literary works of Prof. Mishra and has been awarded the degree by Utkal University. A collection of articles of appreciation and appraisal of his early literary works was published under the title, *Kathakara Krushna Prasad.*

Prof Mishra breathed his last at about 2. 00 P. M. on 13 2. 94 at his Vanivihar residence. He is survived by his widow mother, widow wife, five brothers, married sisters, three married daughters and two sons, one being an army doctor and married and the other being in the college in the under-graduate classes.

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Announcement & Call for Papers

for

Neoplatonism Conference in Maynooth (Ireland) *July 9-16, 1995*
Topic : *Mysticism Rationalism & Empirieism in the Neoplatonic Tradition*
Official Languages : *English, French and German*

Rationale: This conference will form part of the celebration to mark the bicentenary of *St Patrick's College, Maynooth*, which was fouuded in 1795 as a Catholic seminary to prepare priests for ministry in Ireland. It became a Pontifical University in 1896, and a recognized college of the National University of Ireland in 1910. It now has about 4.000 students in 5 separate faculties.

Sponsorship : The conference is being organized by the *Stephen Mc Kenna Society* with primary financial support from St Patrick's College supplementary contributions from Trinity College and University College Dublin.

Location: The conference will be held on the beautiful rustic campus of St Patrick's College about 25 kilometres west of Dublin. Room and board at very reasonable rates will be available on campus for all participants who come from outside the Dublin area. A normal conference fee will be charged and participants will be expected to pay their own travel expenses.

Application: Persons wishing to participate in this conference should send a brief curriculum vitae, along with an abstract (1 page) of their proposed paper before *September 1, 1994* to Dr. John J. Cleary or Dr. Kieran McGroarty at St Patrick's College, Maynooth, Co Kildare, Ireland.

Publication: A selection from papers given at the conference will be published as part of the new series instituted by the Stephen Mc Kenna Society for the promotion of neoplatonic studies. The first volume in this series (in press) contains papers that were presented at the conference hosted by Trinity College in 1992.

Conference Committee:

Dr. John J. Cleary, Faculty of Philosophy, St Patrick's College, Maynooth.
Prof. John Dillon, Dept. of Classics, Trinity College, Dublin.
Prof Andrew Smith, Dept. of Classics, University College, Dublin.
Dr Kieran McGroarty, Dept. of Classics, Lt Patrick's College, Maynooth.

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Bell'S Tin-Teen-Nabulation

Panos D. Bardis
The University of Toledo, Ohio, USA

Daniel Bell's intellectual myopia, intensified by the fact that he viewed my critique (Contemporary Sociology, November 1984, pp. 665-666) from the Olympian heights of his inimitable self-importance, has improved my point, namely, that writing and reasoning in Sociology are often deficient.

After all, unlike Mr. Bell, any objective reader could easily realize that I merely presented two simple, justified, and constructive criticisms : a grammatical guilty of such offenses) and one pertaining to the dismal state of sociology (I did present some documentation -- moreover, countless objective sociologists have frequently agreed with me.

But Mr. Bell, intoxicated as he is with the wine of his infallibility, would never admit that he has made an error. Accordingly he arrogantly ignores my statement and pathetically hurls ad hominem missiles, desperately supercilious shenanigans. He obviously does not know that true wisdom and arrogance never coexist, that true erudition never generates immodesty.

His absolute inability, or refusal, to understand something extremely simple mystifies me. I was only talking about the necessity and importance of some agreement concerning basic issues. After all, the thinker was Burke, not a Bell-like author. The issue was the American Revolution, not a political donnybrook among sociologists at "Hahvad." Why can he not realize that this is almost as if two mathematicians were howling at each other: "The value of pi is ?.' "No, it's 5 !" If sociology is a social science , then some agreement is possible and we should pursue it -- humbly, diligently, methodically . If it is not, and thus anything goes, what kind of "reasoning" convinces bell that his pronouncements are scientific, whereas whatever other scholars state is charlantic?

How much faith am I expected to have in Bell's sociological work when I know that what he natively assumes about me is so nonsensical that I am infinitely amused ? So much for the Formidable Intellect's scientific generalizations ! As for his "bourgeois formalist" non sequitur, shall I assume, with equal puerility, that Bell is a "proletarian anarchist" ? It is no wonder that the public and academic usually refuse to take sociology seriously.

As is characteristic of him, Bell, in his debate with William McCord whose reasoning and objectively I find superior to Bell's), did exactly what I have always suspected: he sedulously searched for a highly obscure and esoteric point which up to that moment he totally ignored, and which he still does not quite comprehend, and pompously incorporated it into one of his paragraphs, thus hoping to convince and impress his readers-- since he lacks sound arguments , which a true scholar prefers. He obviously knows nothing about the philosophical origin of the term esoteric; for if he did, such knowledge would make him humble-- if such a cataclysmic metamorphosis is possible in his case ! Moreover, he often seems to believe that he has monopolized all esoteric knowledge. Thus, when suddenly and unexpectedly someone calls his bluff, he becomes so discombobulated (oh, how it hurts !) that he ignores the entire issue and quite irrelevantly and impertinently, adds some more esoteric nonsense in a desperate attempt to camouflage his malapropisms and solecisms.

Bell's "reply" also proves that he needs a lecture on the history of English lexicography. I could easily attempt to give him a very long one, but I am certain that even Dr. Johnson and Webster would be unable to lecture "Hahvad's" Intellectual Giant! Remember that obtuse medieval King, whose Latin was atrocious? When a clergyman dared correct him, His Majesty merely exclaimed--quite irrelevantly and impertinently: "Eqo sum Rex Romanus et super grammaticam!"

Mr. Bell's "explanation" of "Kristol, et al." is much more amusing. He just cannot realize that, if the idiosyncrasies of his cronies justify grammatical offenses A, B, and C, then somebody else's idiosyncrasies also justify grammatical offenses D, E, and F, and so on ad infinitum. This means that language ultimately becomes so chaotic and anarchical that, for instance, when I wish to say "Bell," I have the right to say "Nixon"; when I wish to say "Kristol," I am permitted to say "Hitler"; and when I wish to say "sociology," I am allowed to say "arachnology ." And vice versa. You see, like a linguistic Nazi, Bell is essentially telling us: "Achtung! I will determine what grammatical rules will be violated and the extent to which they will be violated. Bellus [not quite!] locutus est, causa finita est!" Perhaps such attitudes partly explain why the typical Kristol-Bell contribution merely constitutes subjective journalism--even Time is more scientific and elegant, although, as I have always maintained, Time is for those who cannot think and Life for those who cannot read. More Importantly, even my grandmother gave me, much more eloquently, less trite generalizations about society--and without Bell's unbearable gobbledygook, Linguistic acrobatics, and terminological gymnastics! and his cliquish academic politics--what a puerile argumentum ad verecundiam! I am only reminded of Voltaire's devastating argument: "Le sot trouve toujours un plus sot qui l'admire."

His sarcastic and inane "historical" nonreference perhaps suggests that Bell is also ethnocentric and temporocentric (Mr. Bell, you, "or any other unenlightened gentlemen may find out" the meaning of temporocentrism "by sending a self-addressed stamped envelope to' Dr. R. Bierstedt, a true scholar). Of course, I must admit that sociology was actually born in 1919, when Bell himself was born. I also know that the demise of sociology will occur when Bell enters Elysium--if he is not immortal! Needless to add, at that time, Elysium will acquire its first sociology department.

And now, the climax: Bell "explains" my critique in terms of the fact that I am "a stranger in a strange land"! How revealing! Below are my reactions:

1. Obviously. Archie Bunker could learn a great deal from Mr. Bell.
2. Bell is not alone. I have often met sociologists who howl against prejudice (what hypocrisy, what tartuffism!), while at the same time engaging in Nixonian politics, cliquish shenanigans, and diabolical conspiracies generated by despicable bigotry and medieval fanaticism.
3. I am infinitely proud of both my Hellenic descent and my American citizenship.
4. I am an American by choice. Bell is an American by chance. (What else could he be by chance ? I wonder!)
5. It would be fascinating to speculate about what Bell's attitude would be if he had been born in Nazi Germany, in the USSR, or in Communist China.

Finally, I challenge Bell to a verbal duel at the next conference of the American Sociological Association. I will speak in his mother tongue and he in mine. Poor, poor Mr. Bell! Please descend from the Himalayan heights of your arrogance and self-importance. Too many of us are awed neither by you and your clique nor by your "Hahvad" connection.

In brief, except for Bell's sublime contributions, which have attained utopian perfection, sociology is plagued by the problems mentioned in my critique. Are we going to attempt to solve them -- humbly, methodically, diligently -- or, like Mr. Bell. Continue to be pathetically irrelevant ?

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Philosophy and the Self-Determination of Nations and Persons Today

Prof Dr Dejan Pavlov
Belgrad - Kovin,

Member of the Internationale Institute for Peace in Vienna. The past years has been major new developments in our understanding of the road for humahity. In his proposal for a new structures for social progress prof A. Mansueto / Albuquerque, New Mexico/ pointed out that the present period is characterized by ever deepening contradictions between the development of human social capacities, and social structures which hold back that development. We have seen the emergence an emerging ethic of respect for the earth and of devotion to the common good, and a spirituality founded on recognition of the community and interrelationship of all things. We are rapidly creating conditions for the emergence of a synergistic mode of social organization, in which the recources of society are allocated in such a manner as to best promote the complexity of the eco-system, the development of human social capacities and the self-organizing activity of the cosmos generally. That means it's high time for creation of new values for persons and nations by all religious and philosophical mode of thinking. The time has come for philosophy to change its emphasis from method and criticism to composition and creation, and so to make its unique contribution to society by suggesting alternative possibilities to those which it is confronted. What is needed is a serious and sustained analysis of our conventional wisdom and the construction of alternatives to our accepted ideas of what is important, what is real, what is Worth of Persons and Nations? The equality of human beings is their identical worth as persons and nations. But what is the exact worth of a persons? Persons are worth more than anything. No price can be set on a persons, though a person has incalculable value, as Kant understood / Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der sitten, Section II/. To recognize the equality of human beings is to recognize the preeminence of persons in a world of things; it is to draw the line between the human and the non-human. To insist on the equality of man is to affirm humanity. All men are equal is another way of saying all men are men. "Men" should be understood in this context to apply to the human community, regardless of nation, race, age. What good is equality if it is reducible to humanity and results in a tautology? The significance is that equality does not exclude anybody. No one is left out of the valuable status of persons. Equality is membership. To be equally members of the human race is to have all the rights and Privileges that appertain thereto. The members differ individually, they lack uniformity, and there is little observable exterior similarity among them. Since equality is a non-excluding principle, the it follows that the right to recognition as a human is not subject to forget. Equality is the inalnability and undeniability of being human. In drawing its line between the human and the non-human, equality draws us all within its circle, and this draws our attention to one another. As we examine one another we make different values judgments, for people are different. No person is the same as another person. Indeed, that is one of the things to be insisted upon in the proper sense of person: individual uniqueness. Moreover, we are likely to judge our own character or accomplishments more favorably than others even if these were to be identical, for the simple reason that we have a more intimate knowledge of ourselves. Hobbes analyzes this as the problem of diffidence in the condition of equality that marks the State of Nature and that leads to conflict/The. Hobbes: Leviathan. Pt. I. ch. XIII/. It now appears that if all men are human, then to be human is to differ in fact and in judgment from everyone else. Equality perforce would be impossible among human persons. Yet each is valuable as different and the final value of each cannot be fixed. Equality, then, is a status of value without limit. One may have more wealth than another but that doesn't change one's worth as a person. It is impossible to rove that philosophy must do something other than what it is doing. But it is possible to point out that as a result philosophy has become increasingly methodological and critical, and philosophers divided from themselves while at the same time more and more politicized - as Prof. Richardson pointed out: "Neither philosophy nor society can be healthy and strong in such isolation from each other. No society can be strong as long as the philosophical questions of relation, priority and reality go unanswered. No philosophy can be healthy as long as it isolates itself from such basic question about the society which supports it. And, when we ask whether the relation between philosophical and social questions is historical or perennial the mutual interdependence of such questions becomes evident". X X X The Self-determination as a value and as a concept has become closely lined with the nature and scope of the international community itself. Its central focus is the sovereignty of a people as a nation, concerning the status of national Units within the international system and the style of international relations. The problem is now extremely important especially in connection with the historical events by the so called transition from the totalitarian to the democratic system. Nobody knows the right answer on the new and complicated questions of that historical processes. After reading the essay by the well-known American author Charles Krauthammer "The Doves Are Right About Bosnia" / "Time"; February 8,1993, p. 60/. I understood better that many peoples forget the place of the civil and ethnic war in Bosnia-Hercegovina in the contradictory process of the formation an interdependent World. I support the general Intention of Mr. Krauthammers inquires the set's of theses and contratheses in the Discussion - he is looking for the insides Logic/if such exists / in various interpretations of the events in Bosnia-Hercegovina. I full agree with his considerations about that "the Bosnian egg cannot be unscrambled". Unfortunately, most politicians, it seems to me, will make the "Bosnian egg unscrambled". That's surely is impossible and give an irrational Meaning of the larger part of the political efforts, incl.. These made in the year 1993. Where is the Exit? Only in the Logic of the "Doves", which is consequently for a political Solution of the Bosnian crisis. Here exists a important connection with the Interdependent World. If Europe is going to be more and more Interdependent then must be recognized for all nations the right of Self-determination. Its relating also to the Serbian people. It's true that Interdependence develops parallel to the process of strengthening of national Independence. Moreover Independence itself is a pre-requisitie for the development of Interdependence - and from a historical point of view - for the advancement of the global community. And my question. further, is: Why not recognize also the Self-determination of the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina as well as in Croatia? In which way is permit that only the Serbs does not has in whole former Yugoslavia-Right of Self-determination NHI,:'De Broglie got this theory not from any laboratory or directly from any other theories of physics, but from logical assumptions. Let us take his first proof. Since nature is manifested in two fundamental forms, matter and radiation, he assumed that they must exhibit similar characteristic. After studying particular and general characteristics of matter and radiation, he inferred that matter must have some characteristics which radiation possesses. From Lenin's explanation of Dialectics we can see that De Brogile studied how matter and radiation can be and how they happen to be indentical - under what conditions they are indentical becoming transformed into one another.

When we considered 'law of gravitation', we found that one adical deformation of the social essence of science itself, or neo-utopianism - a renunciation of the social value of cognition. And my conclusion is: value is a philosophical category, denoting those things, properties and relationships of reality which, created, discovered or designed by man, are used for the promotion of universal human development, for the possible evolution of the human personality and human goodness. Hier is also they very important role of Philosophy in the crisis in the 1990's and the crucial questions of Self-determination of Persons and Nations. It's the same problem in Europe and Asia, America and Africa everywhere around the world. Without Self-determination of the human Being is impossible to have any other rights, incl. Right of Religion, Philosophy and scientific thinking, even as to practice any kind of Mysticism or other Traditions in concrete man's situations.

3

The Confederation Of Religion And Society

Dr. S. Sreerama murthy
Department of Andhra University, Vishakapatnam (A.P.)

In this paper I made an attempt to expose the real implications and close contact between religion and society which are inseparable from each other in their general and philosophical approach. The need for religion in society and vice-versa has been focussed upon. Here religion is reflected in society where the highest rate of morality can be practicalized and religion has been estimated as a necessary element in reforming society.

`Everything has its own relation and unanimity' both in theory and practice; but we may not find that due to the failure of proper understanding and close interaction. In the contemporary world we are realizing the same in all aspects. In practical sense we have to acquire rational thinking and critical analysis which is supposed to exhibit the real identity. In the same way religion and society are closely related. Even thought they are two different and independent concepts, they do necessarily reflect the close relation.

Religtion is a view of life whereas society is a way of life binding with some commitment, but having got its own relation in between them. Cicero declares it as a power of unification and opined that `religion is together up again'[1] which reflects the sense of social unification.

In reality, religion cannot be seen like society but has the moral support in all times. Religion can be defined as a binding factor which gives moral support to the individuals. Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa disclosed that any religion cannot be realised but reflected through behaviour and conduct. So, it develops a sense of commitment for the particular cause and pours the aim of service and sacrifice. But all these things can be practicalised in society through its subjects as it is the combination of unified members of the same idea.

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[1] K. Satchidananda Murthy, Hinduism & its development, Sundara Ram & Sons, Tenali, 1947, P. 13

Religion and society have the intimate relation of practicalising the true principles of religion. Both get support from people for its existence. So, society is the centre where the concepts are being formulated in a systematic way. It develops morality and commitment along with devotion in the mind of people. Durkheim visualised the prominence of religion in society and their relationship as "The religious beliefs are always common to a determined group, which makes profession of adhering the them and practising the rites connected with them"[2] He affirmed religion as a factor of unification.

By any means, we cannot separate religion and society as they are having the roots and indelible orientation which has been playing an active role in shapping man as a man of values. Religion develops all sorts of highest qualities to polish and make him fit for society. On one occasion Basava declared that "Compassion is the root cause of religion"[3]. Really, society needs compassion but not passions and commitment out of confrontation. So as a link in between them, will be reflected through the behaviour of human beings in society. In general, to say religion can establish good social relations and social values which are the root cause of social relations.

Religion is part and parcel of man which has close relation in the lines of running society in a better manner. Dr. Ambedkar said that religion maintains ethical norms on the basis of social principles. These principles protect man internally and externally of one's own requirement. So according to him, "religion was a sort of one's own social inheritance"[4]. Really it will lead to social consciousness and commitment which are the real interaction to interact man in the social evaluation. Masih opined as "Religion is a system of lived experiences. This, therefore, includes the first order language in which we communicate our feelings, thoughts and acts in relation to an objects of devotion and commitment".[5] In fact, to say any religion cannot live out of society and man.

Religion proposes the sense of quality and uniformity in living and unanimity in the action of people. .Buddha, Christ and Mohammad also gave more importance to social relations and the process of commitment. As Mathew Arnold declared that "Religion is nothing but morality touched with emotion"[6] In the broad sense religion gets its own orientation with the affiliation of society. Dr. Ambedkar asserted that the foundation of religion to be essential to life and practices of society. Whereas Dr. Ambedkar profounded its reality in relevance in society as "The Religious sanetion is the highest sanction which an institution or a belief can have to support and sustain it is beyond question"[7] Society needs some basic values to control man for his general improvement. In the same context, religion imposes certain rules, regulations, values and moral attitude. In this way religion has a close contact with society.

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[2] Vasant Moon (ed) Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar writing and speeches, Maharashtra Government, Bombay, 1989, P. 179.

[3] Sri Jaya Chamaraja Wadiyar, Religion and Society, orient Longmans, Madras, 1965, P. 29.

[4] W. N. Kuber, Builders of Modern India, B.R. Ambedkar Govt. of India, New Delhi, 1987, P. 80

[5] Y. Masih, Introduction to Religious Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1971, P. 18

Religion and society cannot be established far away from man and his cooperation. Religion in the view of Dr. Ambedkar, is not limited or restricted, not eliminated and not parties but is an an unlimited view of universality.

A polished man can reflect or realise reality of religion for his interaction with social intercourse. Due to the religious values, broad mentality and reai tolerence will be exhibited. Dr. Ambedkar said that "Religion must be judged by social standards, based on social ethics"[8] Religion gets its own support from people even though it is the guiding principle and formation of good habits and norms for the total improvement of man. The group can be seen with the help of religion. Here group in general, people having the same process or attracted for the implementation of religion. Masih asserted it as, "Religion too in its turn is indebted to morality for its progressive and gradual purification"[9]

Religion will help man to lead a happy life in society by acquiring the moral and ethical values which are the basis for humanistic approach as morality is supposed to consist with behaviour to carry out an action in accordance with a general plan of life.

As a matter of fact, religion can establish right relation on the basis of ethical principles which are the strong roots for the way to systematise society and social order. It develops strong determination if we follow its real principles. In fact Pandyan clarified that religion is a social institution having a set of principles, doctrines, beliefs and practices which aim at furthering human happiness"[10] Whereas Dharma Theertha described the role of religion

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A. R. Mohapatra, Philosophy of Religion, Sterling Pub. Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, 1985, P.22

Vasant Moon (ed) Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and speeches Vol. 5, P. 179.

D. R. Jatava, the Political Philosophy of B. R. Ambedkar, Phoenix Publishing Agency, Agra 1965, P. 31

Y. Masih, Introduction to Religious Philosophy, P. 26

in society as "Religious and social customs, laws and institutions have a stronger hold and exercise greater authority over them than the political considerations"[11].

So, the social life of man is purely connected with the religious principles which are the domains of extending social relations. According to Wadiyar, the purpose of religion.... is to provide us a store-house of power whatever is good for the world"[12] In this way, religion and society has a close relation for the smooth running of society with humanistic outlook, ethical attitude and moral conduct. Jesus Christ always emphasised the need of service for establishing the right relations in society which can prove the nature of human-beings. In the same way every religion will generally propose the sense of proper understanding and commitment in society for its real stability and ability in existence.

In order to establish a stable and progressive, society needs right relationship which will be obtained from religion and its true principles as they can would individuals and make them as the custodians of social values. It will reform re-integrate the federal outlook in man and make him accountable to society along with self-culture and sacrifice.

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[10] Manubai C Pandyan, An Intellectual Man's guide to Indian Philosophy, D. B. Tarapore vala & Co. Bombay, 1985, P. 16

[11] Swami Dharma Theertha, History of Hindu Imperialism 5th (ed) Dalit Educational Literature Centre, Madras 1992, P. 204

[12] 12. Sri Jaya Chamaraja Wadiyar, Religion and society, P. 28

4

Knowledge of One-self and Other-self

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Ever since the beginning of the world, man has been a puzzle for himself! The more one seems to know about man in general the lesser he knows himself. The more one endeavours to understand the individual- person the lesser he understands the whole in terms of the individual parts. But one needs to know Oneself in order to be an afficient self-administ-rator. Each individual-person is unique. As a part of the social system, a social institution or for that matter a member of them can dictate norms and codes to an individual-person. But at the psychological level every man desires to be left alone; in fact is left alone! This loneness of man indicates that no external force can authoritatively dictate rules for his or her personal-isolated-psychological life. At this level every thing is value neutral. This could have been the reason behind Socretic dictum KNOW THYSELF and Freudian prescription BE YOURSELF. Today behavioural scientists are in the pursuit of more complicated mechanical understanding of human mind. However, what is the I of an experience or a particular state or an egotic assertation has been a subject of great deal, not only among western thinkers but also Indian thinkers. For Plato it could be a pure soul, so also for Aristotle; and to Descartes the mind or consciousness which is different from body, but for Sankara it is neither an entity nor a substance which has qualities nor one that can be property of any thing else. It is the pure consciousness. so-be-it, one is far sure thatone has mental states-feelings, sensations and different sort of experiences. In other words, to put it short, one has mental states because of mental activities on certain phenomenon-may it be external or internal. This leads one to say that to have mental activity of a particular sort is to have a particular perspective of the person concerned. Hence, any discussion about mental states can not afford to over look the concept of what exactly is a person.

A person is an agent with a sense of oneself of oneself as an agent, a being which makes plans for himself or herself as a free agent to do so, one who also holds values by virtue of which different such plans are seen as better or worse, and she/he is also on ewho is capable of choosing between them. In contemporary philosophy, it was P. F. Strawson, the champion of the concept oconcept of a person as something presupposed of both physical properties and properties of consciousness; it is in this sense logically primitive i.e. person cannot be reduced either to something mental or something physical, because it is presupposed by both.

It was, perhpas, Descartes' mind-body distinction with its different properties and characteristics, that has been a turning point. There are physical properties which are the properties of body (these properties are those those predicates which can be ascribed to both person and material objects - 'is heavy', 'is tall' etc.). There are also mental properties (these properties are those predicates ascribable only to persons, and to animals in some sense - 'is thinking', is in pain, 'is watching a foot ball match' etc.). Physical properties are those properties of a thing which has its being in spatio-temporal world. Mental properties are essentially conscious. Mental properties cannot be extended in space; although indirectly thoughts can be manifested concretely in diverse forms. Consciousness is not mere capacity to make rational decision. It is rather a state of being conscious. This state of being conscious separates man from the rest of creatures. Indubitably, a sophisticated chess-robot or a pilot-robot may adopt an appropriate movement, which the situation demands. But this is not what is not what is meant by consciousness. By consciousness we mean an individual's capacity to make reference to things and an ability to distinguish oneself from rest of the universe. In otherwords a person, then, must have physical properties, which one can objectively rectify, and mental properties. However, apart from physical properties and mental properties there are a third set, (category), of properties which can be predicated of both body and mind, e.g. maturity. We can talk of an individuals's physical maturity as well as emotional maturity. This fact further shows that a person is not sum total of an individual's parts alone, but an aggregate of sum total of individual parts: value of which is more than sum total of different parts. the aggregate-sum-total can be called as consciousness. It is quid of beings as well as consciousness of. It is the quid because it alone helps man to have a trans-observation-a capacity of man to stand outside himself and look into himself. A person, hence, is a self-conscious being. This aggregrateness renders uniqueness to the individual person. This then is responsible for the controversial aspect of human mind-the privacy. Because consciousness is unextentable in space.

The question of privacy of mental states, therefore, pre-suposes individual uniqueness and, perhaps, controversies have been intensified since the inception of cartesian dualism or interactionism. Descartes reduced a person into nothing other than mind; as he puts it in his Meditation II, 'to speak accurately I am not more than anything which thinks, that is to say a mind or soul'. He has pointed out that although mind and body are two separate substances, both are connected through pineal gland for inter-action. One is not only lodged in the body as a pilot but also so closely linked with it. Nonetheless, mental properties have no xtension. It has no outside representative. therefore, cannot be explained in terms of anything outside itself. This leads to:

1. There are mental states,
2. Mental states are inner states - such as feelings, emotions, sensibility etc.,
3. Each of the mental states are private to the individual who experiences them and none other than the possesser has an immediate acess to them.
4. One has direct access to one's own mental states much more than one has to anything else.
5. Therefore, one knows one-self even if one does not know anything else.

This, again, implicitly suposes that knowledge of other mind is highly skeptical. However, one got to be critical with the use of the term 'KNOW'. 'X' means that:

'X' is an object of knowledge (outside the knower).

'X' possesses an independent identity of its own, and 'X' radiates a class, of which X' is a member.

This pre-supposition, needless to say, enhance us, at the crucial point, to fall back upon it for residentification of 'X'as 'X' as 'X' and not 'Y'. If this holds good in the case of knowledge of external objects, why not internal too? In cartesion account mental states are private to the individual-person. Hence, one is both the object of knowledge and subject of knowledge. This certainly, has its own problems. One may identify, for instance, a particular sort of felling (pain) to be 'P'. While there is no gurantee that one would be able to re-identify it to be so, when a similar sort of pain occur at some other time. In order to re-identify 'P' to be 'P', one needs to depend on memory, which could be falliable. And the problem lies in the fact that no external criterion can be depended on to verify 'P' to be 'P' alone because of 'Privacy' nature of mental states.

This fact further suggests that mental phenomenon are diverse in nature; even an apparently similar kind of phenomena may have difference in intensity of its being. Therefore, each mental states and phenomenon are in flux without a permanent identity of its own. Hence, the difficulty in classification and re-identification is followed by impossibility of self-knowledge. Neverthless, the question of knowledge of oneself is not much warranted as that of others'. One has direct access to one's mental phenomena and states. One is aware of them explicity, being the owner of them. In this case there is no active participation of the knower is at force, yet she/he is a passive experiencer of different mental states. This conspicuous from our day-to-day discourses. For instance one doesn't tell oneself "I know I am in pain" or "I know I am in love". The term 'know' is an indicative of a careful clarification of a doubt about a particualr state of affair; such as one may say, 'You know I am in pain' or 'you know she/he is in love' etc. Hence, the term 'know' is suggestive of the potential know-ability of the second and third person; but misnomer if applied to the first person. However, in order to arrive at this conclusion the knower will have to go through an introspective analogy and move in the line of behaviourism.

Both psychological behaviourism and philosophical behaviourism, insist on the observation of behaviours; of course philosophical behaviourism, of G. Ryle's sort, talks of dispositional behaviour i.e. 'A' is disposed to behave in a particular manner at a particular circumstances or over a particular mental state. Thus behaviourist would insist on verbal testimony and over to behaviour of the first person as a source of knowledge about his or her mental states. Behaviourism, again is use less a theory as far as the first person is concerned. But, even in second and third person they are not completely free from committing defective judgement. For e.g. 'A' may pretend that she/he is in pain, whereas in reality not. How do we come about this problem? Behaviourism has its own solution; a constant observation will unveil those pretentions. Yet, this is an untenable solution, because a constant and unblinking observation is utterly difficult, if not impossible, a task. Behaviourists talk of dispositional behaviour viz. if 'A' has a pain 'X' she/he must behave or is, atleast, disposed to behave in a way indicative of 'X'. However, this proposition of dispositional behaviour is not free from that of the identity trouble that we have dealt with in the case of dualism. For the first time, in this case 'A' may be able to identify 'X' and classify it as 'X'. But how could that be possible for a second time? For 'A' to identify the second pain (say X) to be as the pain 'X', 'A' has to depend solely on his memory, because pain is an internal state, and memories are falliable. Surely, holding on to behaviourism, we may talk of knowledge of other minds or mental states of other-selves with an introspective analogy or one might put it differently as extrapolations. But, how that be possible if the feelings, emotions, or say, mental states of the person cannot be re-identified by the person himself with the same accuracy as he did for the first time? This, in other words, shows that

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there is nothing that which can be ascribed as a (fixed) dispositional (or deterministic) behaviour for our particular sort of mental state-the behaviour of different persons, let alone the same person, on similar circumstance which may produce the same mental state, may be different; stoic, for example, would behave indifferent to pain. This, them, shows that behaviourism, too, is untenable in knowing the mental states as exactly as they are. The main defect of philosophical behaviourism is that it moves with dispositional behaviour. This in other words can be said as deterministic behaviourism like given X-> Y, (where X is the mental state that cause Y). Nothing of that sort can be applied to human kind, effectively, due to the situational-adoptability of each person.

To understand the mental states of a person is to understand it from his or her perspective. But one's perspective is known to one alone, because each person is different and has different socio-culturally determined mental set up. However, in the mental arena, one may say that words are referents of thoughts. A word has a meaning because corresponding to it there lies a thought. So to understand a word is to understand a mental state because each mental states - such as feelings, sensation etc. has an appropriately fabricated thoughts. But that is a mistake. One should not entertain the misleading thought that all mental states are thoughts. For eg. Ecstasy of mystics is a mental state. It is an experience of the first person, how can one put it in accurate words so as to make the other person understand with the same intensity and exactness as it occured to the person himself? It will be an irreparable mistake to think that for each mental state there must be a corresponding thought which can be explained with words. Because no thought is possible unless one has words with which one can think and no words is possible unless there is a concept for which it is simply a currogate. It is not necessary that to have mental states of all sorts, specially of the above mentioned sort, one need to have words with which one approximate thoughts, to explain them in turn, in words; because there may not be an appropriate concept, although there are personal experiences of that sort, with which an approximate word can be fabricated, in a way as to be understood universally. This is what perhaps, Thomas Nagel put forth in his own way in 'what is it like to be a bat' i.e. to understand one's mental states as it were to that person is to be that person himself (the other-self); which of course, is empirically impossible. Therefore, the point of emphasis, then, here is that one can have only partial knowledge of the other-self, depending on the richness of concepts and ability to communicate them effectively on the part of the knowee on the one hand and the knower's richness of concepts, as similative and decipherment ability to decode messages from those socio-culturally- programmed- individual-experience-concepts of the other-self.

5

The Hypergame Paradox: Smullyan's Version

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In Fragment 61 of 5000 B. C. and Other Philosophical Fantasies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), Raymond Smullyan gives the following version of william Zwicker's amazing paradox known as Hypergame.

> A game is called normal if it has to terminate in a finite number of moves. An obvious example of a normal game is tic-tac-toe. Chess is also a normal game, assuming tournament regulations. Now, the first move of hypergame is to state which game is to be played. For example, if you and I were playing hypergame and I had the first move, I might say, "Let's play chess." Then you make the first move in chess, and we continue playing chess until the termination of the game. Another possibility is that on my first move in hypergame, I might say, "Let's play tic-tac-toe," or "Let's play casino," or any other normal game I like. But the game I choose must be normal; I am not allowed to choose a game that is not normal.
>
> The problem is, Is hypergame itself normal or not? Suppose it is normal. Since on the first move of hypergame I can choose any normal game, I can say, "Let's play hypergame." We are then in the state of hypergame, and it is your move. You can respond, "Let's play hypergame." I can repeat, "Let's play hypergame," and the process can go on indefinitely, contrary to the assumption that hypergame is normal. Therefore, hypergame is not normal game. But since hypergame is not normal, on my first move in hypergame I cannot choose hypergame; I must choose a normal game. But having chosen a normal game, the game must finally terminate, contrary to the proven fact that hypergame is not normal. (pp. 40-41)

Below I shall develop a solution to this paradox and answer possible objections to my solution. But first, let me clear "hypergame" of its technical associations. In the game-theoretic literature, "hypergame" is defined not as a structure of a single game, but as a set of "perceived" games where there are situations in which the various parties are not well informed of each other's preferences and strategies. (See, e.g., Peter G. Bennett, "Bidders and Dispenser: Manipulative Hypergames in a Multinational Context," European Journal of Operations Research, vol. IV, no. 5 (1980), pp. 293-306.) There ambivalent situations are not present in Hypergame, at least in Smullyan's version of it. Professor Zwicker has recently published his rendition under the title "playing Games with Games: The Hypergame Paradox," American Mathematical Monthly, vol. 94, no. 6 (June-July 1987), pp. 507-514. I hope to discuss Zwicker's important paper at another time.

It should be observed at the outset that hypergame belongs historically within the class of games known as "games to start a game"; see Games of the words, edited by Frederic V. Grunfeld (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975), pp. 16-17 usually these games are ways of deciding who has the privilege of the first move, but here it is the choice of what specific game is to be played, all of them dependent on chance or luck, but here again these elements are absent, and hence it is not equally fair. So hypergame does not fit the class characteristics of games to start a game. Be that as it may, let us look at our text.

My focus is on the circle or the loop Professor Smullyan develops in the second paragraph. The two players, it is claimed, can say "Let's play hypergame" to each other ad infinitum, and hence the game they are playing--hypergame-- is not normal which is contrary to the supposition that is normal. The result, of course, is that hypergame is both normal and not normal, which cannot be. Nevertheless, we have a paradox that is ingeniously generated. But its generation cannot be; therefore, no paradox emerges from these paragraphs. The remainder of the paper is an attempt to substantiate this conclusion.

When the first player says "Let's play hypergame," and the other player responds "Let's play hypergame," the process terminates at this point. The game does not continue. Let me explain. Since the first move in hypergame is to state which normal game is to be played (and assuming that this move is the only move the initiate hypergame):

Player (1) can state: "Let's play hypergame." player (2) can then state: "Let's play hypergame."

The game should stop there because hypergame involves only one move (stating a normal game--in this case hypergame) and player (2) satisfied the requirement of the game. Therefore, the process need not, and cannot, go on indefinitely. After player (2)'s response, the game is finished, so it turns out to be normal after all.

Now, what is it in Smullyan's version of Zwicker's paradox which suggests the above interpretation? Two foci within hypergame give us our clues: (a) by studying the unstated conventions given in the examples of permissible games and how the game proceeds under "normal conditions" in the first paragraph; plus, (b) by the conditions set down by Smullyan in his argument which is outlined in the second paragraph.

Let us return to our brief conversation:

Player (1) says: "Let's play hypergame."

(Here (1)'s remark is an invitation to play a normal game--the only requirement or rule for hypergame. This opening remark initiates the game process.)

Player (2) then says: "Let's play hypergame."

(Here (2)'s remark is in response to (1)'s and expresses an agreement to play a normal game -- "normality" is implied because of (2)'s response. So the use of "hypergame" in (2)'s sentence functions like "chess," "tic-tac-toe," or "casino," in an expression, "Let's play X," where any normal game may be substituted for the X.)

Since this second move in the conversation defines the normal game--which turns out to be hypergame--this is the first and last move; hence, the game is over. Why? Because this is the one and only move in hypergame. The game cannot continue after the second use of "hypergame" has been used or selected, since that use designates a specific game to be played which has started and finished at the same time due to its solitary rule. The only way the game could continue is if the senses of "hypergame" remain the same and, of course, they do not, so the process cannot go on indefinitely as is described in paragraph two.

However the game could be extended for a greater length of time by changing hypergame from a two-player game to an n-player game where n represents an unusually large number, say into the billions. One player initiates hypergame by saying "Let's play hypergame, and the next player, who wishes to pass the game choice along to some other participant, also says "Let's play hypergame" to do the same for another. And given that this large group of players are likewise disposed, continue passing the game selection to another who hasn't been asked, but sooner or later we shall arrive at the last player whose utterance, "Let's play hypergame," will terminate hypergame. So even in an n-player situation we still have a terminating game because this process cannot go on ad infinitum.

A potential problem with my solution is that in chess, after having selected it as the game, then (1) would have to make the first move (like pawn to queen four) and then play would continue until the game terminates. So, by analogy, hypergame would have to continue beyond player (2)'s remark in order to initiate hypergame which was just selected as the normal game to play. However, this overlooks the fact that the second utterance of the sentence does constitute a move--by selecting hypergame one does make a game move, the first (and last) in hypergame. This analysis points out a subtle equivocation which occurs in the second paragraph of the paradox. The first use of "hypergame" denotes a class of games, whereas the second use designates a game. But does it, except in a highly artificial sense? The only way that hypergame gets away with being a game is because it trades on the word game, so naturally we (the readers) go along with the idea that it is a game since it is called one. But this is a temptation which should be resisted, given what I have argued above.

Another possible response along the same lines would be where after the first player says "Let's play hypergame," and the second says "Let's play a ball game" (and "ball game" is normal because it's a finite class), then the first has the choice of the game to be played, and player (1) will say something like, "Let's play basketball." Likewise, the second player who utters "Let's play hypergame" is placing the choice back into the hands of player (1), who selects hypergame, and consequently, the game does go on indefinitely. But this just puts the problem back one step further than before. There is not an intermediate use (like "ball game") because there is only the class designation (as in use (1)) and the game designation (as in use (2)). The technical sense of "hypergame" may have a subset or species designation, but that use is not applicable here. Otherwise we have an instance of Russell's Paradox, where "hypergame" is both a class and a member of that class.

Even if there is a response permitted which would let the initiator of hypergame to select the specific game to be played, it would throw the sequence out of the loop and the cycle would eventually terminate. Moreover, the second player in hypergame does not have as an option to say, "Let's play hypergame." The only move he or she has is to select a specific game (like chess or dominoes)., So, given the description of activities which took place in the first paragraph, hypergame is not a game in the sense that it is a specific game to be selected and then played. Consequently, the paradox cannot be generated in the fashion that Smullyan hás stated it.

One ordinary assumption about the nature of games is that they must have a winner and a loser. Who won the game, hypergame? It appears no one, so no game? Perhaps. But if there is truly only one move in hypergame and that is to initiate the game, and in the game mode that move also terminates it, then the first player is the winner. Or, is (1) the loser? (Maybe this game doesn't have enough rules to decide such matters. We need rules for scoring, etc.) Hypergame may be one of those "winless games." Not all games need to have a winner and a loser--the later Wittgen- stein showed us that in his discussion of "games" and meaning in the Philosophical Investigations (Part I); some games can end in ties. But, then, winless games are not normal games, under ordinary circumstances, so this state of affairs seems contrary to the initial supposition, i.e. hypergame is normal. Alternatively, maybe hypergame is not a game (in the strict sense), but play.

6

The concept of Rasa according to Abhinavagupta

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The main objective of the paper is to consider the nature of aesthetic experience from Indian standpoint with special referencet to Abhinavagupta. An effort has been made to evaluate the view of Abhinavagupta and to show how far this view is applicable to other forms of art like dance, music etc. The view of other thinkers in this field have also been put forth in favour of may conclusions.

All of us are well acquinted with the phenomenon of aesthetic experience, in our everyday life. It is the philosophers business to trace the source and discover the nature of this type of experience. Abhinavagupta has confined himself in giving an account of aesthetic experience arising from literary art.

In any piece literary art i.e. Kayvo aesthetic enjoyment (resa) is the corner stone. It is the aesthetic pleasure which controls the story, characterisation, style etc. According to some rhetoricians, the poetic beauty depends on the sounds and their meanings. The sounds associated with the rhetorics are able to create poetic beauty. The beauty in meaning is produced out of the rhetorics like Vakrokti etc.

The merit, rhetoric or figure etc cannot be taken as vital factors of Kavya due to their inadequacy in the field of the creation of proetic beauty. When the poetic language is completely differentiated from the ordernary language, the beauty of the former can be easily realised. Though the merit, rhetorics etc are also found in the language in our day to day behaviour, it is not taken as a Kavya. All persons are able to follow the ordernary language, but not the poetic language. In enquiring the cause of this Anandavardhana has discovered the theory of Dhvani which can give the reasonable explanation of the creation of the poetic beauty. The nature of Dhvani is given in the following way. "Arthah sahrdayaslaghyah kavyatma yo vyavasthitah"[1]. The aesthetic pleasure arising from literary art cannot be understood by all, but only the appreciators (Sahrdaya). In other words, a Kavya is always appreciated by the Sahrdayas alone. The protion which is specifically apprehended by the appreciators and which is taken as a vital factor of Kavya is called Dhvani. The aesthetic pleasure (rasa) is originated if there is supremacy of Dhvani, otherwise it is rasavadalamkara (i.e. rhetorics mixed with rasa).

The aesthetic experience from a Kavya, as Abhinavagupta has observed, is different from the experience from other sources (i.e. non-art objects). Those who enjoy a Kavya (either in the form of poetry or drama) become happy or unhappy after sharing the happiness or misery of the hero or heroine. Behind this happiness or misery of the audience there is no argument by which a logical mind can be convinced. As for example, Rama, a character of a Kavya might be happy or unhappy, but there is no reason of being involved emotionally with the dramatic character and being happy or unhappy. Though it is true, it is found in each and every case. From this particular effect of audience it is quite rational to search for a cause of it. As this cause is not found through ordinary sense-organs and reasoning, it can be taken as mysterious.

That the aesthetic pleasure is mystic can again be known from the fact that the emotional mood involved in grief also gives rise to the realisation of joy. How is joy realised from the painfulsituations ? In this situation our mind is absorbed in the performances and this absorption depends on the equilibrium of mind. When our mind is disturbed, the pain follows. If our mind remains in the state of aesthetic experience, there is something which forcibly snatches our mind and keeps it in a state of complete rest.It is the aesthetic pleasure which only can do this thing. This joy is endowed with such type of mystic power by which audience can enjoy this bliss even out of painful situation, but in our practical life human nature is found averse to experience of pain. Hence, Visvanatha, the celebrated rhetorician, has said poetry is a peculiarly unwordly phenomenon, an extraordinary creation of supernatural supernormal genius and hence it cannot be governed by the rules of ordinary human intellect. In ordinary life sorrow comes from sorrow, fear follows fear,but in the world of poetry we find pleasure deriving from the painful, horrible and terrible situations[2].

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[1] Dhvanyaloka, Karika no. 2.

[2] "Hetutvam sokaharsadergatebhyo lokasamsrayat sokharsadayo loke jayantam nama laukikah. Alaukikabhavatvam praptebhyah kavyasamsrayat sukham sanjayate tebhyah sarvebhyo piti ksatih." Sshityadarpana, 3/6-7.

In these cases there is some sort of indentity between the audience and the object of perception. This notion of identity emerges from having self involvement (Ekatmata) with it. As for example, when an individual is perceiving a scene in which Dusyanta enjoys happiness in company of Sakuntala, he is realising bliss just as Dusyanta. For the time being he is identified himself with the character of the drama. Due to this indentification (with the hero) the spectator loses individuality and forgets his personal this-worldly matters. This shows the mystic power of the aesthetic plessure.

The real appreciator of a Kavya is Sahrdaya. The property of being a Sahrdaya lies in the fact of being identified with the feeling of the poet. The poet creates a Kavya, the appreciator realises it and being Sahrdaya he re-creates the Kavya in his own self. Just as fire overs the dry wood, the aesthetic pleasure arising in one's heart covers his whole body. This aesthetic pleasure is produced if the object is appreciated by heart (hrdayasamvadi).

(*"yo 'rtho hrdayasamvadi tasya bhavo rasodbhavh Sariram vyapyate tena seskam kasthamivagnina"*[3]).

It may be argued why this-wordly pleasure is not aesthetic. In reply, it can be said that this is not aesthetic pleasure because aesthetic pleasure must be impersonal, disinterested and universal in character. When an individual becomes happy at the happiness of the dramatic character, this pleasure is not of his own (i.e. arising from his personal life) and hence it is impersonal. as this pleasure is not due to the fulfilment of his self-interest and hence it is disinterested. Such type of feeling does not occure in the case of only one individual. It happens so in the case of all individuals. That is why, it is universal[4]. It has been stated earlier that due to complete absorption in the aesthetic pleasure a man forgets his individual love, fear etc. At that time there prevails a universal love which is aesthetic pleasure. When a terrific scene is represented, there is enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure called Bhayanaka. In this case also we generally forget that this fear realised by us belongs to the dramatic character and enjoy the universl character of fear which is free from other barriers like individualistic elements. The generalisation is the process of idealisation through which an individual may go from his personal emotion to the serenity of contemplation of a poetic sentiment. The poet and audience must have capacity of idealisation. For this reason a poet can present personal emotion as an impersonal aesthetic pleasure which is enjoyed by others[5]. As this pleasure transcends the limitations of personal interest, it is disinterested universal pleasure. A pleasure which transcends this-wordly interest is surely transcendental and hence, mystic. As this-worldly pleasure arising out of this worldly affairs like tha birth of a son, attainment of property etc. is not impersonal, disinterested and universal, it cannot be described as aesthetic[6]. Aesthetic pleasure is the emotional mood revealed in a blissful knowledge free from all barriers.

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[3] Locana on Dhvanyaloka (ed. by Kappusvami Sastri). Madras, 1964, pp. 77-78.

[4] Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy : Dhvanyaloka of Anandavardhana, Motilal, Delhi 1982, P. xxxI.

[5] Dr. S.K. De : Sanskrit Poetics as a study of Aesthetic,Oxford, pp. 12-13.

According to Abhinavagupta, an objects becomes beautiful when our self is reflected there. When someone realises the misery of some character in a Ḳavya, he thinks it as own due to the reflection of his own self there. This view is more firmfooted if the Upanisadic view is reviewed in this context. It has been stated in the Brhadaranyakopanisad that husband seems to be beloved to some-one because she loves her husband but because she love her own Self etc. ("...na va are patyuh kamaya patih priyo bhavati, atmanastu kamaya patih priyo bhavati" etc[7]. One can realise the nature of Rasa with the help of bliss arising from the realisation of Brahman as accepted by the Advaitins. When an individual's personal desire is transformed into the impersonal aesthetic sentiment, the realisation of aesthetic pleasure which is of universl character is possible. Hence, Abhinavagupta has accepted 'generalisation' (Sadharanikarana) as one of the characteristic features of aesthetic pleasure. Though there is reflection of Brahman in an individual's mind which is free due to the prominence of Sattvaguna, this pleasure is quantitative by different from the pleasure of Brahman. Hence it is described as dwarf image of the taste of Brahman (Brahmasyadasahodara)[8].

The aesthetic pleasure leads a man to the world of creativity. After perceiving the the separation of the curlew couple Valmiki became very much moved and out of his grief he created a sloka. He had intense feeling of pathos in which he had lost himself. Due to the complete loss of personality he had a sense of joy out of grief. This joyous experience of pathos provided him with the power of creating a sloka spontaneously. Valmiki's grief was not this-worldly. If it were so, he would have some sympathy with the bird from which the creation of Kavya would not be possible. This-worldly grief makes a man ikle. When a poet's vision becomes very deep and clear, he will surely get an inspiration from within. Then the materials for writing a Kavya (like characterisation, plot etc.) follow automatically just as water overflows automatically from the far already filled in water. So, poet's genius depends on the absorption of the aesthetic enjoyment and this absorption is endowed with capacity of creating Kavya spontaneously. If a poet's heart is filled with emotion, it (emotion) finds a spontaneous qutlet. In the case of a poet, this feeling, if stirred up by an emotion, will find and outlet in the metrical form spontaneouly. This spontaneity comes when there are no barriers (like personal interest etc.) for the realisation of aesthetic plessure. The spontaneous outlet of poetry from a man who was idle before having aesthetic absorption proves again the mystic character of aesthetic pleasure.

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[6] "Ripuste martah putraste jatah ityadi vakyarthe ... na lokottaratvamiti na tatra kavyaprasaktih." Kavyadarsa Commentary on verse no. 10, Ch. I, Edited by K. Roy.

[7] Brdaharanyakopanisad, 4/5/321/6.

[8] "Bhavite te rase tasya bhogo yo 'nubhavasmaranapratipattibhyo vilaksana eva...
rajastamorvaicityanubidhasattvamavanijacitsvabhavanivrtivisrantilaksanah parabrahmasyadasayidhah." Locana, P.193 Chowkhamaba.

The theory of Dhvani and Rasa, though invented in connection with the literary form of art, can be extended to other forms of art also. It has been stated by Anandavardhana that an individual, though conversant in respect of word, meaning and their relation, cannot understand Kavya untill and unless his heart is saturated with aesthetic sentiment. This phenomenon is explained by himwith the help of an example taken from the world of music. He adds that an individual, though expert in the science of music, cannot understand melody and pleasure arising from it untill and unless his heart is saturated with rasa[9]. Thesame theory can be applicable to the pictorial form of art also. In the phrase of Abhinavagupta, any type of the production of creative art presupposes rasavesa[10] (involment in aesthetic sentiment) in an individual. Various experiences of our daily life are represented in the ar-objects like literature, picture etc. In order to represent the reality one should need deep concentration which is supported in the Gita - 'Na cayuktasya bhavana'[11]. This abiding emotion or sentiment must exist in artist, dramatic characters and spectators (in the case of literary art). In the case of pictorial art also, there must exist the same sentiment among artist, pictorial presentation, and the critic. Hence, the property of being Sahrdaya is not essential in the case of Kavya only, but other forms of arts.

The mystic element can be traced in dance, music etc. also. A man is found to forget his grief in his personal life at the time of the enjoyment of the performance of music or dance. That the spontaneity is, as already pointed out, one of the vital characteristics of aesthetic experience from Kavya can be applied to music and dance etc. How far the performance of dance and music is artistic can be known from the spontaneity of them along with other qualities. If the performance of dance or music is not spontaneous, they will seem to be artificial. As the spontaneity comes from within, it belongs to an artist whose heart is absorbed in aesthetic pleasure. If a musician or dancer is absorbed in this enjoyment in heart (which is usually called 'mood' in ordinary language), he cannot dancing or singing. In this stage only spontaneity comes. Music and dance forms begin and end in aesthetic pleasure. The dance like other arts also has, as Ananda Coomar Swami observed, spiritual significance, independent of its theme or charm. As music and dance clearly express the aesthetic pleasure and enable men to taste it they give them the wisdom of Brahman[12]. This again leads us to the world of mysticism.

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[9] "atha ca vacya-vacaka-laksanamatrakrtasrmanam kavyatattvartha bhavanavimukhanam svarasrutyadilaksanamivapragitanam gandharvalaksanavidamagocara evasavarthah."
Prose-portion of Karika no. 1/7 of Dhvanyaloka.

[10] Dr. K. Krishnamurthy : Dhvanyaloka, P. XL, Motilal, Delhi, 1982.

[11] Srimadhbagavadgita, 2/66.

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[12] Dr. K. Krishnamurthy : Studies in Indian Aesthetic and Criticism, Mysore, 1979, p. 257.

7

The concept of Morality

Ija Lazari-Pawlowsk

I. AXIOLOGICALLY NEUTRAL CONCEPT OF MORALITY.

In the present article I will deal with the axiologically neutral concept of morality. It provides for a distinction between moral and non-moral phenomena i.e. between those that belong and those that do not belong to the sphere of morality. But it does not classify the phenomena into moral and immoral ones, that means into morally good and morally bad.

For the sake of simplicity I will limit my remarks mainly to the concept of a moral norm (directive, principle).

It is not always the custom to oppose the axiologically neutral concept of morality to the evaluative one; sometimes the distinction is even consciously rejected. The problem is whether any system of norms can be called "morality" only because it meets certain formal criteria, and independently of the contents of its constituent norms, just as any system of norms fulfilling certain formal criteria is usually called law. After all, the lawyers themselves do not agree on that point. For example, Gustaw Radbruch, in the period following the Nazi era, held that if any bills are extremely unjust, socially pernicious, incompatible with the spirit of humanism, then, even if they meet the formal conditions of legal norms, they cannot be called law. Is it then the case of Unrecht and not of Recht, of "lawlessness" and not of "law"[1].

The tendencies of that kind, found among theoreticians of law, occur fairly frequently in the field of ethics. Here are some examples. H. Feigl considers whether one could speak of the ethics of Nazism or fascism; he himself is of the opinion that this is possible, thus declares for a neutral concept of morality. He asserts that whoever denies the name of ethics to those systems, whoever proclaims that the very concept of "fascist ethics" is a contradiction in terms, makes thereby a recourse to persuasive definition of morality - one which refers only to systems based on principles of benevolence and impartiality[2].

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[1] G. Radbruch, *Der Mensch im Recht,* Gottingen, 1957, p.1506

In 1960 a conference was held in New York devoted to the problems of ethics of power; one of the lectures there delivered dealt with the political and ethical systems in a certain European country. In the discussion that followed the author was criticised for calling the presented system by the name of ethics; the system which, according to the participant in the discussion, was so "unethical"[3]. On the other hand a Soviet author, W.P. Tugarinow, employs the word "amoralism" when speaking about systems which he condemns : "Marxism points out that (...) the fascist "morality" and the bourgeois amoralism are hostile to man"[4]. When the word is employed neutrally there should be nothing improper in the formula "Marxism points out that fascist morality and bourgeois morality are hostile to man".

Still, it is a fact that with the term "morality" certain positive emotions are associated which some authors would like not only to preserve but also employ for the persuasive purposes. Yet I think that if, to divide ourselves off from emotional associations, we introduced some totally neutral word in place of the word morality, which would designate both the normative systems recognized as good and those acknowledged as bad, then a situation foreseen for such cases by G. Myrdal[5] would occur, namely this word too would in the course of time acquire an evaluative flavour, since it would refer to the phenomena perceived as good or bad.

Despite occasional moral resistance towards the neutral concept of morality, which I pointed at, it seems dispute that for research purposes in such descriptive sciences as psychology of morals sociology of morals and history of morals, the neutral concept is indispensable.

II THE DIFFERENTIATION OF MORAL NORMS

1. The search for a unique definition of morality

It has been considered obvious that not every norm is a moral one. Which norms do fall within the scope of morality ?

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[2] H. Feigl, "Validation and Vindication", in *Readings in Ethical Theory*, New York, 1952, p. 679

[3] The Ethic of Power, New York, 1944, p. 1059.

[4] W. D. Tugarinow, *O wartosciach zycia i kultury* (On the Values of Life and Culture), Warszawa, 1964, p. 180

[5] G. Myrdal, An American Dilemna, New York, 1944, p. 1059

Maria Ossowska pointed out that to find specific features common to all norms generally considered as moral is an impossible task. "The construction of an analytic definition may amplify our knowledge of what people mean when they speak of morality, but to attempt to weld these opinions into some coherent entity is chimerical"[6].

I will try to formulate the problem in a somewhat different way although I shall make use of Maria Ossowska's analyses and considerations. I will try to show that the concept of morality is in a better methodological situation than one could infer from the results of Maria Ossowska's inquiries. What is commonly called morality is actually a complex of so many aspects, and so incoherent, that the attempts at constructing one analytic definition which would take into account all its aspects, are indeed, doomed to failure. If we wish to comprise in the concept of morality all semantic intuitions attached to it, then we get an incoherent whole. I think, however, that we can delineate from that whole several coherent parts. Hence, we may construct several concept of morality. We not only can do this, we actually do this since, both in theoretical work and in everyday life, we apply several criteria to distinguish moral norms. Thus we have at our disposal several concepts of moral norm and, in my opinion, each of them happens to be helpful for particular research purpose; and even in a single discipline various concepts may prove helpful for various research e projects.

This is how the situation looks presently. It is, however, possible that with further development of the social sciences there will arise a single theory to describe and explain all "moral phenomena". Then it would be possible to define one concept of morality applicable to all those phenomena. Usefulness of this concept in the formulation of that theory would constitute its criterion of validity.

2. *The criteria applied*

In general we distinguish moral norms on the basis of some intuitively applied criteria. Here are, in my opinion, some more important of them.

a) The psychological criterion

Sometimes we apply a psychological criterion which connects the concept of moral norm with a certain state of consciousness, e.g. remorse in case of disobedience to the norm, a specific sense of duty, etc. I would like to stress that by indicating this criterion I do not mean to construct a definition of moral norm in its psychological variant; I only characterized the general type of the definiens. Attempt at a particular definition would have to specify the definiens in detail. The same applies to other concepts of moral norms which I am going to talk about in the present article.

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[6] M. Ossowska, *Socjologia moralnosci* (Sociology of Morals), Warszawa, 1963 p.178.

(b) *The sociological criterion*

Morality has not only its psychological aspect but the sociological one as well. Hence when we are interested in the social aspect of moral phenomena we apply some sociological criterion to link the concept of moral norm with somehow or other characterized social sanctions or social functions. That is the line followed usually be the sociologists and cultural anthropologists. Thus, for example, an author maintains : "It is not the content of the norm but the type of sanction with which it is endowed that decides about ascribing a given norm into one of the four (...) normative systems" (here the author mentions religion, morality, custom and law)[7].

Maria Ossowska takes into consideration two means of distinguishing moral phenomena in alien cultures, and it is into the second of them that a sociological criterion of morality is markedly involved. The researchers of morality in alien cultures may follow two ways. They can, namely, set themselves as an assignment to ascertain how the natives react to the behaviour approved or disapproved of in the society native to the researcher. That was the case with, for example, E. Wester Marck who accumulated in his work information on how various societies reacted to manslaughter committed in various circumstances, to theft, deceit, premarital sexual intercourse, adultery, etc. In this case a ready network of concepts is brought along with the researcher and the way in which the examined society fits into it is investigated. That type of research, however, may leave out such behaviour which is neither approved of nor condemned in the culture to which the researcher belongs. To prevent this one can follow another way, leaving aside one's own sphere of moral phenomena, and observing reactions of censure or approbation recurring in the given group, and describing the stimuli which elicit those reactions. In that case the researcher has a chance to come upon attitudes unknown in his society[8]. Y would like to note that in the first case described above we dealt with the application of a certain criterion which I will later describe as substantial whereas in the second we dealt with the application of a formal one (the above discussed sociological criterion).

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[7] J. J. Wiatr, *Spolczenstwo* (Society), Warszawa, 1964, p. 57.

[8] Cf. M. Ossowska, op. cit., p. 127

c) The systemic criterion

When we apply a criterion which I intend to call systemic, we treat as undoubtedly moral all norms expressed within a certain complex called an ethical system or ethical theory, e.g. Catholic or Buddhist ethics, of Kant or Bentham. Obviously, there is something in the content of a given complex of norms which determines that the name of "Ethics" is given to it, yet when we apply the criterion under descussion we simply consider as moral any norm which belongs to a system of directives called ethics.

If, when quoting the famous cathegorical imperative of Kant, some one wold ask whether this is a moral principle, he would have certainly received an affirmative answer; this norm as he would have been told, is the foremost postulate of Kant's ethics.

In the field of ethics the systemic criterion is applied first of all by the historians of ethical ideas. In the field of law it is the most frequently applied criterion.

All the criteria indicated above serve mostly to define a relativised notion of moral norm. According to the relativistic conception a certain norm is moral or not only with regard to a relativising factor, e.g. a person, a group or an ethical system.

Here is an example of a psychological concept of a relativised moral norm. It is a conceptual suggestion considered by M. Ossowska : "A moral rule concerning a given X would be (...) a rule in regard of which X has experienced in the past, is experiencing at present or may experience, as he asserts on the grounds of mental experiment, a specific sense of duty. The same rule might not be a moral rule concerning Y"[9]. M. Ossowska considers also the possibility of employing a relativised definition in which a moral norm would have been associated with the experience of remorse.

In a similar way one could proceed with construction of relativised depritious which take into consideration other example, Durkheim distinguishes moral norms not on the grounds of their content but on the grounds of certain reactions of the group. If someone's absence from the Sunday service in church offends members of a certain group to a sufficiently universal extent then, in consideration of that group, a rule requiring observation of a holiday by presence at the church service is a moral rule[10]. Thus one and the same rule may be a moral or a non-moral one, depending on the situation.

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[9] M. Ossowska, *Podstawy nauki o Moralnosci* (Foundations of the Scince of morality), Warszawa, 1947, s. 150

An opinion is encountered that the relativised concepts are somewhat "inferior". If "inferior" means less operative, then the opinion is groundless. Let us consider what a non-relativised concept of morality would be like, e.g. a non-relativised sociological one. One could define a norm as moral if there existed at least one group in which a transgression of norm is met with condemnation. In my opinion such a definition would be less operative then the relativised one since its application would require an immense stock of factual knowledge.

If we assume the relativised concept of moral norm we cannot simply qualify as a moral norm an expression of the form "One should do X". We always have to point to the conditions under which the expression in question becomes a moral, a legal, a customary or other type of norm[11].

The reluctance with which the relativised concept of moral norm is met stems seemingly from the fact that in some situations a need is felt of norms which could be called moral - simply, without the necessity of relativisation. This need is met by the criterion which I am going to expound now.

d) The substantial criterion

The criteria presented so far had formal character. They allowed to count a norm as moral without investigation of its substance. There are, however, cases when the substantial criterion is considered useful. It seems to be applied in two variants; with no relativisation and with partial relativisation.

In the first some norms are treated as undoubtedly moral ones. Such are for example the norms demanding respect for life or property, telling the truth or sparing suffering. They recommend a certain type of actions which we have already associated with morality.

We apply that criterion without relativisation. According to that criterion the norms "One should tell the truth". "One should not steal", "One should not kill" have always moral character; of course this does not exclude the possibility that some of them may also function as e.g. legal ones.

The content criterion is also used in a different form. For it happens that we take into account a broader context into which a given norm is involved; we try to find out by which more general principle is the norm implied, and accordingly, recognize it as moral or non-moral. We recognize it as moral if we

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[10] Ibid. p. 241.

[11] Cf. Z. Ziembinski, *Normy moralne a normy prawne* (Moral Norms and Legal Norms), Poznan, 1963, p. 46

ascertain that it is a consequence of a principle which we have already axiomatically recognized as moral.

In connection with the application of that criterion, a very important in my opinion, there arise some difficulties with qualifying as moral norms which on the ground of the first content criterion are undoubtedly moral. For example, as is known, the moral character of the norms existing among the Navaho Indians which regulate the interpersonal behaviour and which are treated as moral in our culture is denied by some authors because they are supported by reasons which the authors do not regard as moral. For instance, according to J. Ladd each norm existing in that community turns out be an individual case of the following two principles: "Do all those necessary to promote your own welfare", and "Do not do any actions leading to your own misfortune"[12]. Return the borrowed money because if you do not return it no one will ever lend you again and you will suffer a loss. Do not tell a lie because if a lie is made known you will be disgraced. Do not steal because when you are caught you will go to jail, etc. Ladd states that with all the "altruism" of these recommendations their motivation is purely "egoistic". Even bringing help to others is recommended as a safeguard against one's own loss: if you do help others they will help you. The recommendation of striving for one's own interest is usually not considered as moral. That is why some authors consider the norms "Do not tell a lie" and "Do not steal", so far as they are intended to serve as safeguards against one's own loss, not as moral norms despite their content but as prudential ones, as recommendations indicating the means of protection of one's own interests.

However, when the first content criterion is applied these norms, what I have already stressed, have always moral character. Therefore, as Maria Ossowska puts it, "for many the directive 'do not tell a lie' does not case to be a moral norm even though it is propagated by addition of "because no one will believe you or because you will go to hell"[13]. I will add myself that it does not cease to be a moral directive only on the assumption of the first content criterion.

Maria Ossowska writes as follows: "During the Month of Courtesy we have on our buses slogans like 'Courtesy adorns you better than a pretty dress' or The courteous one lives longer. I thin that the requirement of courtesy does not turn into a cosmetic rule or a recipe for longevity despite the way it was formulated"[14]. However, is it not so that if these jocular slogans continue to be for us moral slogans, it is only because we do not take them literally and that

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Cf. J. Ladd, *The structure of Moral Code,* Cambridge, 1957 s. 278

M. Ossowska, *Socjologia moralnosci*, op. cit., p.176

they have also a justification treated as purely moral ? I think that if we f ourselves in a situation in which - in regard to some assumed causal relati we would have been seriously recommended to treat others exclusivel means of preserving our health or prolonging our life, it would raise doub to the moral character of these recommendations.

In a manual of good manners an author propagates courtesy and o virtues included in the etiquette; she supports them, first of all, with reca the duty of benevolence. "What are good manners ? What is their essence; w constitutes their basis ? Simply - consideration for others." She writes furt on: "We have headache, yet we see that, for example, our wife or our mothe fatigued with work. So we neither complain nor go to bed but help her in t household to soften her toil. We feel like damning the whole world a relieving our bad temper. Yet we do not do that to distress others with o behaviour"[15].

With the application of the second content criterion various so ca etiquette rules concerning even such matters as the way people should sh their hands or the manner of making one's way between the rows in the cin - in so far as they are supported with moral reasons - become moral rules, e though they appear in the manual of good manners and not in the moral treatise. For, according to the criterion now discussed a norm is moral if a only if it is a principle assumed axiomatically as moral or is supported by s a principal.

With that formulation of the problem - when we accept axiomatically t talking care of one's own interest does not have moral character - we have acknowledge that the recommendation of honesty in the form of a well-know slogan "Honesty is the best policy" and the recommendation of justi supported with the argument that justice is a surer way of getting rich than or robbery, both turn into non-moral recommendations.

As I already said, when we apply the content criterion now un discussion, we assume axiomatically that some definite aims, ide motivations which find their expression in principles, have an undoubted moral character; subsequently we ascribe moral character to all norms wh may be considered as consequences of those principles, while non-mo character to others. Thus we have at our disposal yet another basis f

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[14] Ibid.

[15] I. Gumowska, *ABC dobrego wychowania* (ABC of Good Manne Warszawa 1962, p. 12.

inguishing moral norms from all others - legal, aesthetic or cusomary ones. se basic principles, one axiomatically assumed as moral, become for us al for all situations, while the remaining norms are subject to relativisation: have or do not have moral character depending on whether they follow these basic principles or not.

Among hitherto presented problems the most controversial seems the one istinguishing basic principles considered as undoubtedly moral. I remind the distinguishing must not be done in reference to our own moral feelings to the relatively common semantic usage.

In modern ethical literature prudence is often opposed to morality. Thus, example, K.W. Frankena asserts : "Morality must be contrasted with dence. It may be that prudence and morality dictate some conduct, for mple, honesty. It may also be that prudence is a moral virtue; however, it is characteristic of the moral point of view to determine what is right or ous wholly in terms of what the individual desires or of what is to his rest "[16]. Kurt Baier takes similar view. He holds the opinion that slogans "Honesty is the best policy", "Treat your servants kindly and they will work you like slaves", "Never be arrogant to anyone - you may need his services day" dictate behaviour which we usually associate with morality. ertheless, the justification inherent in them determines that they cannot be owledged as moral, as demands originated in the moral point of view. ose who adopt consistent egoism cannot make moral judgements"[17]. erous examples of such a conviction can be found in contemporary ethical atises. According to this stand the taking care of other's interest falls within range of morality, while prudence is associated with taking care of one's interest. To assume norms safeguarding one's own interest are moral while se safeguarding other people's interest are non-moral would seem to be ngly against the existing usage of the term "moral norm". Such a definition ld be wholly arbitrary, and although everybody is entitled to formulate it, this kind of definition of "moral norm" is intended in the present sideration. The concern for other people's interest is, as it seems to me, the ner-stone of the contemporary concept of morality in the Western culture. I ployed the phrase "concern for other people's interest" pleased with its ense generality - since it has to contain very numerous moral theories.

Beyond the presently indicated type of norms recognized with relatively mon consent as undoubtedly moral, there exists a certain margin of

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K. W. Frankena, *Ethics*, New York, 1965, p. 6

K. Baeir, *The Moral Point of View*, New York, 1965, p. 93 passim.

vagueness which makes the borders of the concept "morality" controversial. For example, everything connected with self-respect may be axiomatically included in the concept of morality, but it may be excluded as well. Perfectionism as the striving for one's own excellence can be included but also excluded. There is here no firmly established usage which could be referred to. It seems to me that a given author's decision as to which phenomena from the margin of vagueness should be subsumed under moral principles and which should be excluded is determined by his individual moral sense, by his own system of values.

Maria Ossowska in her article "On certain changes in the ethics of fight" indicated several factors which exert mitigating influence upon military clashes[18]. She recognized some of them as undoubtedly moral, others as non-moral. She recognized as moral the concern for other people's interests, namely the motivation of compassion and respect for the adversary; as non-moral on the other hand, the desire of fun and the fear of retaliation. Thus in spite of all difficulties connected with the distinguishing of moral phenomena, which M. Ossowska so convincingly presented in her work devoted to these problems, in that particular paper of hers she uses a definite concept of morality, as, after all, everybody does. It is worth while to add that in the paper discussed M. Ossowska included in the moral motivation also the concern for one's won honour, that is the self-respecting motivation. If anybody doubts whether such inclusion is justified, he shows thereby, in my opinion, that concern for one's own honour plays in his system of values a different role.

If my remarks are right, than any moral scientist who in his search for the essence of moral norms leaves the purely formal criteria takes the stand not much different from that of a moralist. A moralist defines what is moral meaning what is "morally good"; the moral scientist characterizes the scope of moral phenomena as opposed to non-moral ones, and if in doing this he uses the content criteria he, like the moralist, is also guided by his system of values. This becomes manifest with extraordinary clarity in the quoted book of K. Baier, in which the author ends his analysis of the definition of moral rule with the statement: "Moral rules are universal rules designed to override those of self-interest when following the latter is harmful to others"[19].

3. *The problem of non-moral norms*

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[18] M. Ossowska, *O pewnych przemianach etyki walki* (On Certain Changes in the Ethics of Fight), Warszawa, 1957.

[19] K. Baeir, op. cit. p. 149

So far my remarks seem to support the opinion that all efforts at indication of such norms of human behaviour which certainly do not have moral character in regard to any of the actually applied criteria must end with a failure.

Still many authors attempt at finding instances of some non-moral norms. For example Johan Hospers holds that, "Whether I put my right foot or my left foot down first when I get out of bed in the morning, is a non-moral matter which is no concern of ethics"[20]. However, it is possible that in some culture even this behaviour is subject to moral regulation with respect to some beliefs in the causal relations between the phenomena. Many examples of that type are to be found in the autobiography of a Hopi Indian "Sun Chief". The author reports how accurately he complied with various forms of ritual behaviour, such as specific movements of hand or food which according to our standard are pure magic. He believed that compliance with such ritual behaviour prevents the whole community against starvation which shows the undoubtedly moral character of his motivation.[21]

The case is similar with other instances of norms which detached from the situational context seem to be non-moral; such as the duty of reporting to the police within so and so many days, the rules how to board a streetcar, etc. It is not difficult to indicate situations in which those norms would have to be recognized as moral. According to Koran before a man goes on pilgrimage he should achieve the state of ritual sanctification. A pilgrim to Mecca has no right to hunt, cut his hair and nails, use scent, cover his head.[22] With the sociological criterion, whicn in fact is applied, all these commandments should be recognized as moral.

III ON THE OF THE DEFINITION OF MORALITY

When does the definition of morality become a matter of theoretical significance ?

Maria Ossowska in her Sociology of morals sets the problem whether it is possible to proceed with one's research without prior defining precisely what is the subject of research. She indicates a certain type of research problems which can be pursued without the concept of morality being defined. She has, namely, in mind the investigation of interdependence between some two factors of which one has moral and the other non-moral character e.g. the investigation of interdependence between respect for human life and the births rate. In the case when, contrary to supposition, the dependent variable proved to be of a non-moral character the author's only fault would consist in going over into someone else's domain of research[23].

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[20] J. Hospers, *Human Conduct*, New York, 1961, p. 8.

[21] *Wodz Slonca* (Sun Chief). The Autobiography of D. C. Talayesvy, Warszawa, 1964, p. 215.

[22] H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism.* An Historical Survey. Toronto.1961

I share this conviction of M. Ossowska. I also do not think it indispensable to have at one's disposal a definition of morality in case of writing a monography on "moral beliefs" of an author or of a social group. In cases like that it is a general practice which brings good results to understand the concept of morality so broadly that it coincides with the concept of "the way life" "the ethos"[24].

The situation is, however, different in case of research the aim of which is to formulate and verify statements about morality understood as a total whole of phenomena. I have in mind statements like "The function of morality consists in...", "Morality changes together with...", "Morality is conditioned by..." etc. With this type of research the definition of morality is necessary. When one employs an obviously vague concept, then one formulates, as is widely known, undecidable statements. Therefore, if someone formulated general statements concerning morality as a whole, which is often the case, he should indicate the set of phenomena to which that statement refers. Otherwise misunderstandings will ensue: e.g. an relatively narrow domain of "moral" phenomena by quoting counter-examples taken from a more broadly comprehended "morality".

In such cases the problem is not to give a definition of morality which would be binding for the given author in all his works, but to differentiate clearly the scope of phenomena which form the subject matter of his analysis in a given research project.

The question arises whether it is of any importance what particular label will be given to name that scope of phenomena. The selection of label seems to be essential.

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[23] M. Ossowska, *Socjologia moralnosci*, op. cit., p. 130

[24] Cf. M. Ossowska, *Moralnosc miesczanska* (Bourgeois Morality), Lodz, 1956, p. 24.

8

Gandhian Conception of Brahmacharya.

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The term 'Brahmacharya' is eymologically meant by the way of dedicated n, r practice of Brahman, or living in Brahman. Brahman means both God and Vedas. So Brahmacharya is way of knowing God, or learning Vedas.

But the term "Brahmacharya" is popularly meant by a life of celibacy i.e. abstinence from sexual relations, or at least physical control over the organs of generation. It is essential for a student of the Vedas as well as for a man who wants to have the realisation of God and, therefore, Brahmacharya is basically all kinds of self-restraint including sex-urge. It is not only sex-control but also a check and restraint over all the senses and the mind. In other words, the capacity of sexual control is dependent upon genera self-control, the general power of inhibition. Therefore, Brahmacharya, in Gandhi's view, is a kind of self-control in every aspect of life-in thought, in action and even in speech.

Self-control in thought, action and speech altogether yields a union with God. N.K. Bose, therefore, terms Brahmacharya as a conduct that puts one in touch with God. This conduct consists in the fullest control over all the senses. Bose further remarks that Brahmacharya is popularly meant by the mere physical control over the organs of generation. This is a narrow meaning of Brahmacharya which has debased it and made its practice all but impossible. Control over the organs of generation is impossible without proper control over all the senses. They are all interdependent. Mind on the plane is included in the senses. Without control over the mind mere physical control, even if it can be attained for a time, is of little or no use. The mind is even more difficult to curb than the wind. Nevertheless, the existence of God within makes even the control of the mind possible. Let no one think, that it is impossible because it is difficult.

This remark of Bose, in an actual sense, represents the Gandhian view on Brahmacharya. It shows that the control of 'palate' is most important and necessary for the control of sexual appetite. To Gandhi, the palate is responsible for our taking delicious and rich food which in its turn causes the sexual urge to arise. This is one of the chief reasons that led Gandhi to carry on lifelong experiments on diet to observe the effect of food on sex-impluse. The effect of food on mind is an ancient Indian belief that Gandhi tries to verify in his life with the help of some modern ideas about the basic constituents of food necessary for the human life. Thus Brahmacharya, in Gandhi view, is also the control of taste in meal. It is the absence of all kinds of craving and clinging. It is not the life of an ascetic. Gandhi himself said. "It is wrong to call me an ascetic. The ideals that regulate my life are presented for acceptance by mankind in general."

From the meaning of Brahmacharya, I can drive tow aspect of the term. Firstly, the positive aspect which is self-restraint. Secondly, the negative aspect which is the lack of temptation and craving. Self-restraint is nothing but control of all kinds of senses including sex-restrait. According to Gandhi, there must be the effect of sight, taste, touch; etc. on the human sex. Without the activities of external senses, sex cannot be stimulated. Not only external senses like eyes, nose etc; but even the internal sense i.e. mind is a stimulating factor behind sex. It we are not able to control our minds and external senses, we cannot afford to control sex. It is a fact that sex-urge is essential for the human life. But this should not be unrestrained. The unrestrained sex is the source of bad human character. As a result, the society composed of bad characters is an evil society. An evil society is full of corruptions in the society, Gandhi had to emphasise the control of all the senses. The control of all the senses is not a negative approach but a positive one, as it makes both the society and the individual good.

It is a fact that Gandhi always tried to make the Indian society a good one, but what is the experience of ours forces us to thinks that the positive meaning of the Gandhian concept of Brahmacharya has affected the modern society negatively.

Though Gandhi disregards Brahmacharya as ascetic, his (so-called) followers in the modern times use it as such. The followers of Gandhi in our times are used to preach the common people to apply the concept of Brahmacharya given by Gandhi in their lives. They want that each of the Indian people (I hereby mean that the Indian people are no one but the poor masses composed of more than the ninety percent population of India.) must apply Brahmacharya in the Gandhi's sense of the term. It means that everyone should necessarily control over all of his senses. If they have to restrain their natural urge fully, the preacher (less than ten percent of the Indian population composed of politicians and capitalists) is free to exploit them at every shed of their blood. These preachers themselves disregard Gandhi's meaning of Brahmacharya, because they are always alert and they attempt to manage how they can be rich and richer at the earliest. Not only they become rich and richer but also they want to satisfy their unlimited sex-impulse. The speaker of Goa Assembly is a sample of it who attempted to molest a nineteen year's old girl, Sunita.

In the true sense, it is very herd to restrain all the senses. A common man cannot afford it. Psychologically, it is quite impossible sense has its own subjects and all the senses must be satisfied with their subjects. The satisfaction of all senses including that of sex is natural and it is the human nature. To suppress the human nature is a king of unjust act. Moreover, it is a violent act. An unjust or violent act contradicts the principle of Ahimsa. This kind of act gives birth to chaos and disorder in society. And what we are visualising in our society today is nothing but a horror sea of chaos and disorder. Brahmacharya as self-restraint is responsible for it. It is one of the responsible factors.

It Brahmacharya is want of temptation and craving, it is a good thing. Temptation and craving are really the sources of making the human character bad. All kinds of corruption have been brought forth by temptation and craving. Hence if a man is beyond temptation and craving, he must have a good character. He is satisfied with what he has. He does not want to have more and more. He never wants to take bribery. He cannot manage to take other's things away. In short, a man without temptation and craving is responsible for making society lawful and unchaotic. A pious society is built up by such a kind of men. But it is impractical to give away temptation and craving. Psychologically, it is quite unnatural.

Nobody even a saint can get rid of temptation and craving. Everyone requires the essential and other commodities to meet their daily needs. The daily needs provoke them to earn more and more. The desire for earning more and more is nothing but a kind of temptation. More and more earning forces a man to craving. So Brahmacharya as its negative aspect too cannot be applied to the human life. Iife. It is absolutely unnatural and impractical to negate temptation and craving in the human beings.. Temptation and craving are the human natural urge. These natural urges can merely be restricted.

Thus, the restriction of temptation and craving as well as that of all the senses can be called Brahmacharya. Perhaps Gandhi uses his term of Brahmacharya in this light. But his followers have misunderstood it, or they misinterpret the concept of Gandhi's Brahmacharya. That is why the impact of

Brahmacharya on the society of ours rebuts the thought of Gandhi on Brahmacharya.

Brahmacharya, in the real sense, is to know the Brahman (God). The Brahman or God is nothing but truth. So Brahmacharya is 'knowing truth'. The person who Knows turth is 'Mahatma', i.e., the great soul. Gandhi himself applies Brahmacharya all his life. So he is called Mahatma. But it is never possible for all men to become, Mahatmas.

Knowing truth or God is also impossible. Through senses it cannot be known. Reason is also unable to prove or disprove the existence of God. So reason cannot gives us the knowledge of God. Intuition is only the source of knowing truth or God. Intuition is nothing but the inner consciousness of a human being. Inner consciousness varies from man to man. It is not necessary that the inner conscious of all men is development. So all men cannot know the truth. Thus knowing truth or God is subjective. Herein lies the fallacy of subjectivism.

Subjectivism leads to solipsism. Solipsism is a kind of egotism. So, the concept of Brahmacharya propounded by Gandhi is solipsism or egotism. Solipsism or egotism is not a satisfactory theory. Therefore, the concept of Brahmacharya as Gandhian moral virtue is quite unsatisfactory.

An unsatisfactory theory cannot affect the society in a good way. Gandhian Brahmacharya, thus affect the society of our time badly. The slogans of self-restraint and lack of temptation and craving are used by the upper class (less than ten percent of the Indian population) to suppress or oppress the common people (more than ninety percent of the Indian population). The upper class always teaches the common people to follow Brahmacharya in Gandhian words. But this class itself does not bother to follow it. Instead, this class authorises itself to have the unlimited temptations and cravings as well as to have unrestricted sex-act. The members of upper class must have to satisfy their unlimited and unrestricted sexual urge, temptation and craving though the members of middles and lower classes. Ninety percent members of our society - even more -comprise the middle and lower classes. Thus, in the name of Gandhian Brahmacharya, less than ten percent members of society are used to exploit the rest more than ninety percent members of society. It is the negative implication of the Gandhian concept of Brahmacharya on our society today.

[from my unpublished book "The Paradox in Gandhian moral values."]

9

For a better understanding of Philosophy, For a better Philosophical Method

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Evolution of Philosophy

History bears witness to times when the son and the moon were worshipped as Gods. Fire, wind and rain had corresponding deities. In the flow of history, in the flow of time all of them lost their position and had to be planned in less attractive posts like Star and Plasma. In India, the Jains taught us about atoms. In ancient Greece, Democritus and Lueippus had also taught about atoms. Aneximander reflected upon the Facts of organic life[1], while Aristarous first called attention to the problem, whether the Sun revolves round the earth or vice versa, and gave an answer, which was ratified after one thousand and five hundred years. D.P. Chattopadhyaya rightly observes, 'There was a time when science was hardly distinguishable from philosophy. Almost all philosophers were scientists of a sort[2]. Pythagorous was the first who classified, explained philosophers as the third class, spurring both Fame and Profit, and seeking to arrive at the truth by contemplation.

The world, today, considers these thinkers with respect and also appreciates their immortal contributions. But this in only one side of the coin. On the other side, the problem of atoms, the problem of the movements of earth and the sun and the problem from where life emerged can be is seen no longer as a philosophical issue. Much of the philosophical rubbish heaped upon knowledge by 'intuitive insights', are to be removed and kept in to the archaeological museum of the history of thoughts. In other words what happened is that various branches of thoughts have parted away from 'love of wisdom', and abstract speculations. The divine intuitions are no longer a method of enquiry of the truth. That is why Negel said " Philosophy on the other hand has to do, not with unessential determinations, but with a determination in so far as it is essential it's element and content is not the abstract or non actual, but that which posits itself and the essential is always within itself-existence within it's own notion"[3].

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[1] W. Windelband, History of Ancient Philosophy, (New York : Dower Publications, Inc. 1956), pp. 38-42.

[2] D.P. Chattopadhyaya. "Science, history and Philosophy". **Darsana** International, Vol. XXIX (1989(, No. 4, p.2.

What is philosophy - A New Understanding

Patrick says, "Philosophy has been defined as an attempt to use of scientific methods to understand the world in which live"[4]. The main defect of this definition is that it can be replaced by any branch of science. Physics and Chemistry are also scientific methods to understand the world in which we live. However it do not acquires a status of philosophy.

Patrick is more clear when he said "Philosophy is critical analysis of concepts, and discovery of relation between them. It thus hopes to integrate our knowledge, to unify and interpret it, so it comes about that, logic is perhaps, the most essential part of the philosopher's equipment".[5]

Critical analysis of concepts are also done by other branches of knowledge. The mythical concepts which surrounds sun and moon were exploded by Astronomy. After Aristarcus of BC, Galileo who was a scientist rather than a philosopher, was the first to prove that it is not the sun, but the earth which is moving. Unification, interpretation and integration are the concerns, of philosophers, rather than that of the scientists or sociologists. Logic is surely an essential part of the philosopher's equipment. Logic is a subject matter of philosophy, but not of any other branches of knowledge. Frederick Engels correctly maintains that for Philosophy, which has been expelled from nature and history, there remains only the realm of pure thought, so far as it is left; the theory of laws of the thought process itself, Logic and dialectics[6]. But this does not mean that philosophy has no more role. But there is a defect; This position can be counted as a subjective interpretation of logic since here logic is that concerns with realm of pure thought. Engels never conceived thinking process as having no connections with real existing world; but quite contrary he thinking is the process by which man understands external worlds and himself.

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[3] G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1977), p.27.

[4] G.T.W. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy. (Delhi : Surjeet Publications, 1978), p.5.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected works. (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1970), 3, p.375.

Logic

What is Logic ? Popularly it is defined as the science which deals with the operations of human mind in its search for truth. Aristotelian Logic and Modern formal Logic are studied under this title. But many philosophers are unsatisfied with the formal nature of this approach. V.I. Lenin in is "Conspectus of Hegel's science of Logic"[7] remarks that Logic, is not a science of external forms of thought. Syllogism and symbolic logic treat logic in that manner. Those who tried to construct a perfect language are also treat it in the same manner. But Lenin thinks that Logic is the science of the laws of all material, natural and spiritual things, i.e. the sum total the definition is enough to deal, whole reality with all it's complexities. In this way, logic and philosophy become indential. Since it is the conclusion (theory) of the history of knowledge, it is nothing other than Theory of Knowledge itself.[8]

Logic and Dialectics

Dialectics is the logic which admits Universality of contradictions. Lenin further elaborates dialectics :

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) indentical, under what conditions they are indentical becoming transformed into one another - why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another" (Lenin, 1961). Thus for Marxism Dialectics itself is philosophy. If we consider, this objectively, then Dialectics is their philosophy.

Philosophy and Science

"Scientific knowledge .... is certain, exact and fully organised real knowledge. Well organised is scientific knowledge".

Person and many other scholars defined science in this way "Science is the complete, and consistent description of the facts of experience in the simplest".

V.I. Lenin, Collected works (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1961), 38, p. 92.

Zhong Wanzian, Ed. by Mao Ze Dong : Biography, Assessment. Reminiscences (Beijing : Foreign Language Press, 1986), p.209 quoting Zhou Peiyuan.

We have to analyse three problems. First, whether scientific knowledge is 'complete', 'exact', 'fully organised' and 'consistent description'. Let us take a scientific proposition. "Acceleration due to gravity g = 9.8m/sec2'. This is a *proposition in Physics. At first glance we may attribute all of the above mentioned qualities to this proposition.

First let us admit, for the sake of science, there are objective truths, objective in the sense of being independent of us, human beings.' If so, can human ideas, which give express it all at one time, as a whole, unconditionally, and absolutely, or only approximately, and relatively ?"[9]. The authors of the book 'Empirio-monism' answer that we can know objective truths only relatively and approximately.

Apart from Emperio monists, Nietzsche criticises science from a different angle. to him "Physics too is an interpretation of Universe an arrangement of it (to suit us, if I may be so bold:), rather than a clarification"[10].

Secondly, for philosophers like David Hume, there is no question of even causality. 'We only find that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other......There is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection".[11] If this position is admitted then there is no question of law of gravitation.

Thirdly, this law itself is liable to many objective conditions. For example, "g" is slightly different in different places in earth.

The conclusion is that the nature of scientific truth is not complete, certain and exact as G.T.W. Patrick or Pearson claimed.

Secondly let us examine, whether science depends upon philosophy. Let us examine the French Physicist Louis de Broglie's matter wave principle. This principle suggests that matter, like ratiation, has dual nature; that is material particles like electrons, protons, atoms and the like might exhibit wave like (undulatory) characteristics in addition to corpuscular characteristics. Three considerations led De Broglie to introduce the concept of matter wave. They are: 1. Nature manifests herself in two fundamental forms, matter and radiation. De Broglie argued that these two forms must exhibit similar characteristics, that is, they must be mutually symmetrical. Since radiation has a dual nature - wave and particle nature - matter also might possess the same dual nature. (2) There is a close similarity between laws of Mechanics and Laws of optics. Maupertion principle of least action in mechanics and Fermat's principle of least time in optics prove this. Hence De Broglie argued that matter also might exhibit dual nature. (3) In Bohr's atom model, stationary orbits of the electrons are governed by integer rules. In physics integers arise only in cases where wave motion is involved. Hence electrons must possess some wave characteristics.

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[9] V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1962), 14, p.123.

[10] W.T. Jones, kant and the Nineteenth Century :A History of Western Philosophy (New York : Har Court Brace Jovanovich. Inc.), p. 242.

[11] W.T. Jones, Hobbes to Hume. A History of Western Philosophy (New York : Har Court Brace Jovanovich, Inc), p.242.

I thus arrived the following of overall concept which guided my studies; for both matter and radiations, light in particular, it is necessary to introduce the corpuscle concept and the wave concept at the same time. In other words the existence of corpuscles accompanied by waves has to be assumed in all cases"[12].

De Broglie got this theory not from any laboratory or directly from any other theories of physics, but from logical assumptions. Let us take his first proof. Since nature is manifested in two fundamental forms, matter and radiation, he assumed that they must exhibit similar characteristic. After studying particular and general characteristics of matter and radiation, he inferred that matter must have some characteristics which radiation possesses. From Lenin's explanation of Dialectics we can see that De Brogile studied how matter and radiation can be and how they happen to be indentical - under what conditions they are indentical becoming transformed into one another.

When we considered 'law of gravitation', we found that one can admit the law of gravitation only if he maintains three philosophical positions - consciously or unconsciously; firstly he must admit the objectivity of truth or he must be an antiemperio-monist; Secondly he must he an anti-sceptic, thirdly he must admit conditional, temporary, transitory and relative nature of objective truths. A simple law in physics made a man three times philosophical. But in the case of 'g' everything was indirect. And in the case of Louis-de Broglie everything is clear.

Wittgenstein holds that[13] (in Tractatus Logico-philosophicus) without philosophy thoughts are cloudy and indistinct. Clarity and distinction of thoughts are not depended upon presence or absence of philosophy; but it's nature. It is said that the task of philosophy is to make thoughts clear and given them sharp boundaries. But also it must be admitted that different philosophers have their own clarity and their's boundaries.

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[12] James P. Hurley, Claude Garrod, Principles of Physics. (Boston : houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), p.659, quoting Niels H. Heathcote, Nobel Prize Winners in Physics, 1901-1950 (New York : Abelard Schuman, 1954), p. 291. In the case of Modern Physics, Werner Heisenberg's uncertainity principle is also highly relevant, see David Halliday, Robert Resnick. Physics Part II (New Delhi : Wiey Eastern Limited, 1960), p. 1211.

[13] Ludwing Wittgenstein, Iractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), p.25.

Philosophy without Science ?

There is no form which is not related with anything that actually exists. We know the form 'cow', which is, or was in someway related to cows actually existing or existed. Without the actual cow there is no cowness. In the same way, without the sensual world, and experiences a philosophy is absurd. An interpretation or an intuition or a logic must be the science of the development of the entire concrete content of the world and of it's cognition. It must be the some total, the conclusion of the history of the knowledge of the world. All other interpretations and intuitions which failed to be the conclusion of the history of knowledge were thrown into archives of history of thought. That is how, now we encounter with Vedic revelations concerned with the origin of man, the nature of the universe, arguments for existence of God and rationalist theories of pre-established harmony[14]. We can distinguish philosophy from science but cannot separate it. They are dialectically interconnected.

Once a fact is assumed through logic, (it) is widely accepted through other means, then it becomes a scientific or a historical fact. When Copernicus and Galileo discovered the reality of the solar system, the Catholic authorities refuted both their logic and assumptions. Once the world accepted and verified those scientists' assumptions, the method used by them and the logic (philosophy) behind that method became a scientific fact. For getting the science of sciences, theory of knowledge, man has to depend upon his power of abstraction. Bergson argues that philosophy is basically an intuitive discipline, since reason falsifies reality. The truth is quite contrary. Reason and philosophy are closely interwoven and complementary, not contradictory.

History itself will value any philosophical position[15]. But it is not a simple process. It is very difficult for mankind to abandon past methods. It is a fact that scientists of Indian space research still consult some astrologers before launching satellites, even after repeated failures. This proves that superstitions which the space research rejected before centuries is still practiced among the spaces scientists.

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[14] In this aspect opinion of D.P. Chattopadyaya is relevant. He says "Philosophical interpretations of history adds to our intelligibility of it. If primacy is given to philosophy over history, and history itself is made to S.G. Shanker, Ed. by Philosophy of Britain Today. (London : Groom Helm, 1986), p.198.play the second fiddle to philosophy, the outcome is disappointing". (Chattopadhyaya - in previously cited article in Darshana international).

[15] In this regard Mao's view point is interesting. "From the long range view, future generations ought to be more knowledgeable than we are just as men of the bourgeois - democratic era were more knowledgeable than

'Common man' and Philosophy

Fritz Waisman and Antonio Gransci have quite different views regarding, the status of philosophers. According to Waisman[16] philosophers are a special kind of people, and philosophy can be looked upon as their peculiar activity. For Gramsci, this is a widespread prejudice which is to be destroyed, and spontaneous philosophy is proper to everybody. From our analysis of scientific proposition we found that Gransci's position is more correct.

If we want to avoid confusion, we must distinguish between philosophy and philosophical views of philosophers which are being discussed by us. While the first is a universal phenomenon, the second is not so. Why don't we learn the philosophical views of a common man or a Heisenberg while we did listen to a Wittgenstein ?. The reasons are many; some of these philosophies are yet to be properly studied, some others are not new, still some others are only applied in certain field's like science and history or economics, but not explained as philosophical views by their own authors. But the case of a well-known philosopher is quite different. He is never satisfied merely with the particular, but moves from the particular to the general.

Study of Philosophy

What is the role philosophy in the human life ? Like everything that is also related with human intellect, it also reacts with the man and his surroundings. Like any other branches of knowledge it helps him to move forward, whether the direction is good or bad.

Sidney Hook points out "The study of philosophy in other words, give us perspective upon our human history and our present day experience. It reveals in John Devey's words "The predicaments, the prospects and aspiration of man".

From a different point of view Wittgenstein also repeated this opinion. "Philosophy aims at logical clarification of thoughts.... Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions. "19 Both of them are correct, so far as they

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those of the feudal ages. Their judgment would prevail, not ours..... A thousand years from now all of us he said, even Marx, Engels and Lenin would probably appear rather ridiculous (Edgar snow, China's Long revolution (Oxford, 1971), p.187.

[16] S.G. Shanker, Ed. by Philosophy of Britain Today. (London : Groom Helm, 1986), p.198.

maintained that philosophy contributes positively to towards our understanding. But we should not forget that Fascism itself had its own philosophy. Philosophy can have a progressive or a retrogressive role. If any philosophy leads one to a wrong conclusion, no doubt it's role is retrogressive. But Wittgenstein is negative when he said that most of the propositions (that can be) found in philosophical works are nonsensical. Anyway, both Sidney Hook and Wittgenstein throw light on only one half of the truth. They do not elucidate (say) what our knowledge is intended for. That is why, Marx said "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."

The Study of Philosophy

the study of philosophy should not be considered as an endeavour undertaken merely for the sake of interest. A man, who is engaged in his 'situations' will learn from and philosophize his experience. He does so because he wants to go forward. This is the real problematic of knowledge. If any person thinks the contrary, philosophy will turn out to be a mere tautology, or a futile verbal exercise or a passionate, interpretation alien to objective reality.

"The way they go about it in the universities at present is no good, going from book to book, from concept to concept. How can philosophy come from books ?

'If you read too many, we can move towards our opposites, become bookworms, dogmatists, revisionists. In the writings of confuscious, there is nothing about agriculture, Because of this, the limbs of his students were not accustomed to toil, and they could not distinguish between five grains.'

Mao's view is entirely correct. Philosophy cannot materialize merely (become from boodishness or erudition. It comes from knowledge, knowledge of hitherto existing facts, including books and research papers (Equating real) knowledge with knowledge contained in some journals or books is foolish.

If anyone wants to know the philosophy of the crisis of Marxism at present, he must observe and learn, the present history and political circumstances together with critical theories of Marxism and on Marxism. If we try to have this only from certain widely read philosophical writings, then it will lead us to mere abstractions and hence to lifeless conclusions.

Conclusion

A serious consideration of philosophy demands the three questions to be answered: What philosophy is ? what its intentions are and how a knowledge of philosophy can be attained (as a subject).

For the first question, philosophy is that branch of knowledge which deals with the minds method of summing up of its acquired experience and knowledge (and it's method of gaining new conclusions from this), the laws of development, and it's relation to the knowing mind. Freedom of man lies in his capacity for change his necessity. Philosophy is the most essential ingredient consciously or unconsciously. which helps to change himself and his surroundings. Thirdly, a knowledge of philosophy as a subject cannot be achieved if it is narrowed down to the study of some pre-existing philosophical theories; but it takes into purview everything that exists so as to reach a comprehensive undertaking.

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The Virgin Paradigm

Christopher Hills
Ayman Sawaf

A paradigm is a body of thoughts, theories, and conceptual knowledge which enables us to constructs reality out of the sensory signals from our environment.

1. A paradigm is also a way of showing a contrast between old ways of thinking by comparing thoughts side-by-side. However, it is impossible to compare an old paradigm with a new one that no one has ever seen before. Because a virgin paradigm of tomorrow could not be understood with the mind sets and logical tools of today, we are imprisoned in the dualistic thinking of our present language, the old paradigm which we use to try and explain it.

Therefore, new paradigms involve fundamental changes in perception of reality. The paradigm of democracy is a concept of self-government elected by the people, but in those countries where people have never actually experienced any democracy, they cannot fully appreciate it as a system. The scientific paradigm is a way to know and test knowledge through a validation process of theory, experiments, and objective proof called the scientific method. However, such a paradigm of dualistic thought ends up in theories of Black Holes and Big Bangs that do not account for the primeval soup that spawned them in the first place, and is virtually useless for talking about such absolutes as the origin of consciousness or God, the Goddess, and All That Is. A new paradigm is now emerging with new logic and new ways of creating and perceiving reality.

There are many paradigms which have changed over the last few thousands of years in the evolution of changing human thought processes. We can examine the old paradigm of studying how things came to be what they are. First of all, we must examine our fundamental beliefs in how things work and study why our human knowledge can explain things in opposite terms of spirit and matter, subjectivity and objectivity and other polarizations of human perception. Our present civilization validates everything through its opposite and compares right with wrong, inside with outside, high with low, etc., without realizing that these are relative concepts and are, therefore, meaningless to anyone rooted in absolute values with God, or Truth. In the scientific paradigm, Truth is only relative and temporary but in religion it is absolute and eternal. There are many paradigms for understanding the way we do business or govern ourselves. There are paradigms which we use every day without even thinking we are using certain basic assumptions about ourselves and our ways of thinking that need to be reinterpreted and relearned.

The old paradigm of human striving and insecurity brings us uncertain knowledge through measuring and comparing everything with everything else. Because humans think in parallel ways, they create dualistic realities like paradise and earth. Because a paradigm is a side-by-side comparison of old and new ways of thinking, the new way always looks so obvious that we wonder how we could ever have thought the old way.

THE PARADIGM SHIFT

The paradigm shift is happening everywhere. Old political systems such as communism, socialism, and dictatorships are falling apart rapidly. Our own definition of democracy is being redefined and fine-tuned. As we observed in our latest election, people started taking more responsibility for their reality. They realize that even the best and oldest democracy is not producing the results it used to.

The economical paradigm is shifting too. Old economic theories like socialism, common ownership, and communities have not and still are not working. They are discovering that the power is in the individual ! A free market system where the bottom line is all that counts at the expense of the motivation and the means is not producing results either. In education, we are realizing that the system we have may be good for learning, but it is in no way good for raising children. Child abuse and violence have increased dramatically. Punishment is not working as a deterrent. Values and beliefs that have long been thought to keep the family together are actually creating a massive collective denial of anger and resentment that is blowing up in violence everywhere.

In the health area, diseases are popping up like popcorn with names harder and harder to pronounce, leaving the medical community in confusion, draining our tax money in the billions with no results, and experimenting on people with drugs that do not seem to work even though they used to in the past.

Our own body systems are shifting too. The immune system, the nervous system, are failing us. They are not responding as they used to. Is it possible we are creating new systems ? and, new brains ?

The old paradigm of science as a way of validating our knowledge of the universe is rapidly changing around us. From the fixed determination of the physical world of Quantum physics. This last paradigm was trapped in the dualism of whether matter was a wave of energy or a particle. It was trapped in the theories of the Big Bang and lost in the theories of the Black Hole. Then along came the theories of Chaos and then Order out of Chaos and now fractals and the material disorder are bringing us all the beauty in the growth and design of natural forms. The old forms of thought, which saw no role for consciousness because it was indefinable, are almost gone and in its place are popular theories of what science calls a singularity. A singularity would mean something which exists totally independent of laws outside itself and therefore not dependent on any other authority or resources.

A Black Hole is a singularity because it sucks into its center all surrounding matter or energy including light. Nothing can withstand its concentrated gravitational intensity until all shapes of atoms are crushed into pure energy without shape or form. This is the image of nothingness, not in a passive form but intensely powerful, all consuming, a dynamic state of raw energy. This is the starting point of the new paradigm.

A lot of people will deny, diminish, discount, or distract themselves as a way of defending the past and history, which really never repeats itself and is of no value to us in the coming wonder years of magic and miracles.

RESISTANCE TO THE NEW PARADIGM

Fears and doubts.

1. Fear of the unknown, fear of failure, of letting go of the past; will the new one work ? Needing a guarantee. Fear of being looked at as gullible or a fool if it does not work, or even if it did ? (The devil you know...)
2. Being content and comfortable in mediocrity. It is easy to stay in the same rut that our thoughts are comfortable with. We are "normal" and "belong" in mediocrity, which is the average common denominator of humanity. Normality = Mediocrity. It is much better to go down to the bottom of the pit than stay in mediocrity, because then at least you will awaken to your reality and do something about it and hopefully turn around and go for excellence. Yes, it will be uncomfortable for those who will insist on staying with the past.
3. Arrogance / negative ego. One of the resistances to change is human arrogance. We do not want to admit the past. We will not admit that we

might not know everything, or that things can change anywhere and anytime.

4. Our shadow self. All the parts of ourself that are denied, suppressed, hurt, or in shame. The part of us that still believes we have to fix the past before we can go on, that we have to experience pain. The part that thinks it is unforgivable. It does not feel it deserves what it has now, so how about getting something better ? It is the self that insists on earning and proving its worth all the time, too busy to stop and consider a new and better way.

Our present paradigm is riddled with male chauvinism which depicts the ultimate authority as father or God. To this extent our present humanity fails to appreciate the expression of feminine energy in action as if, or she, were only part of the whole rather than being [also] All That Is. This idealistic, conceptual domination of the feminine energy in our self as well as the culture and nation cannot lead to the blending and surrender needed to create the third kind of energy where the divine magic begins. How can there be complete Trust if we do not appreciate what power we already have, but do not respect ? This power is available from the feminine energy in each of us if we can trust her love and intelligence. Only then do we feel the power of the Kingdom become real and its expression become inseparable from the creative force. Our past paradigm was to believe that the allure and beauty for the re-emergence of the feminine energy must be controlled by male-dominated institutions. We are in the midst of the transition between this old paradigm of domination over the spontaneous, the wild, the new and fresh, and a new magical supremacy of feeling over logic.

The new paradigm sparks the imagination and intuition represented by the feminine energy. as the feminine energy emerges from out of the limitations placed upon it, we will discover each individual's definition of Goddess. this feminine energy is available to every woman, but more importantly, in the new paradigm it, to appreciate it, to admire it in anyone would be the mark of someone who did not need to dominate that which is sheer loveliness, By giving freedom and dominion to this idealized feminine energy each individual could harness it and bind it to themselves only with the energy of love. The domination of others through competition and confrontation is not the way to the top of the Goddess list. It is the way in which there is no single hero or winner. In the new paradigm everyone wins because there is no domination at the expense of others.

For thousands of years business has been conducted on the basis of trust. Man's confidence in man is at the basis of all credit given in the banking and business world. In the new world this trust is no longer based on an intimate knowledge of the individual and his family background. It is based on your net worth or your job security as your ability to pay. With credit cards this is all changing into plastic money which no one ever sees.

The power of money to dominate the activities of business or governmental decisions is also changing. No longer can polluters bury vast mounts of toxic wastes for now governments impose costs and fines for carelessness and irresponsible behavior. The power of money to buy PR no longer works. Business organization now encourage employees to give individuals respect and self-esteem at the work place with time off for having children.

Boards of directors who used to look only at the bottom line are now getting high marks for putting "people value " as their greatest assets rather than placing a value on hard assets alone. Instead of regarding itself as a patriarchal provider who must be obeyed, the company today is going through a transition from being dominated by the male emphasis on bottom line results to the feminine emphasis on intuition and quality of life. Qualities are valued such as love, a stable family setting, and the value of feelings. We now have the freedom to work without coercion or harassment and the opportunity to pursue individual happiness without harming or exploiting others. Instead of regarding a business as a money machine or cash cow dominated by the profit motive, we can see it as an elegant energy system with leadership and planning and employee team skills being valuable qualities. Along with changing attitudes towards bosses and customers, which create a family feeling, we can transform our relationships between the owner of the business and the employees who work there. If people only work there for a living, then they are in the wrong job. Job satisfaction is important in the performance of employees and in the success of the enterprise.

VICTIMHOOD VS CREATING YOUR OWN REALITY

Most people think they are born with a certain destiny or fate dictated to them by God or a higher source and that is how and why things go this way or the other. In other cultures, they call it Karma, again wrongly accepted as fate or punishment. Others blame or credit realities to good luck or bad luck, to the stupidity or ignorance of people, governments, or God. People are awakening to the fact that they are not the victims they think they are and that they do have the power to create their own reality consciously and completely.

We create our reality by causing it or allowing it. To create our reality we need, like creating anything, raw materials, tools, and energy. The raw materials consist of our beliefs, attitudes, thoughts and feelings, choices and decisions.

The tools are our desire, our expectation, and our imagination. Nothing is created unless it is desired, expected, or imagined, and when it manifests better than that it is called a miracle. Faulty beliefs and thoughts would limit or stop what you really want.

You cannot win a race or land a contract if you do not believe it possible, or believe in yourself getting it. Wrong attitudes and past judgments related to certain areas in our life will definitely not manifest the desired reality. If you always cheered the underdog and put down the winner, do you think you would want to be the winner ?

Limited thinking and feeling bad with ourselves are most damaging too. Guilty feeling will surely sabotage success. With shame you will not allow yourself to get success because you feel undeserving, and if you do, the reality will surely snap back to its acceptable boundaries blamed on bad luck.

The final ingredients are choices and decisions. Most people give us one choice for doing things--- the right way ! Buying this consensus leads us to block all kinds of choices from which a potentially better decision would be made.

As for the tools, imagination is the most powerful. You cannot create something without having a certain image of it. You cannot manifest in your reality a red sports car if you have never heard of one, or seen one. Imagination triggers desire. We imagine a red sports car, and we desire it. The more we desire it, the more we start to expect it to happen or having it. The consensus warns us from having too many desires and religion makes us feel guilty, and urges us to get rid of them. The same with expectation. It is an important tool. They say have no expectation and you will not be disappointed. Of course ! Because there is nothing created to be disappointed with !

Once those raw materials and tools are enacted together, generating energies are required : trust, enthusiasm, joy, and happiness. Once the creation is in motion, it needs to be sustained by love, intimacy, ownership, and discipline.

We all create our reality with the same raw materials and tools, except some of us have higher quality materials and better sharpened tools. Successful people have much more expansive beliefs and less limited thoughts. They have a positive nonjudgmental attitude and feel good about themselves. They give themselves far more choices and make decisions based on self-esteem, not out of fear, control, or anger.

We create our reality by causing it or allowing it. What can we do about allowing all the things we do not like ?

Does everything happen for the best ? NO ! Things happen, and it is up to us to make the best or the worst of them. The more we clean up our raw material and sharpen our tools, the more we will allow ourselves the best, but there are not common denominators to all successful people. What is common among them is the clarity of their desire, their vivid imagination, and the intensity of their expectation, their healthy and unlimited thoughts.

In the old business paradigm, success and values are based on money and how hard we work to earn it. Unfortunately, most people who spend their life doing just this end up still not feeling really successful or fulfilled. The money, the diplomas, the awards, and achievements are still not good enough ! The way we evaluate success is not by money or rank anymore. It is what it adds up to, who we are, and what we are becoming. Do we feel our worth ? Is our self-esteem expanding ? Do we feel more love and respect ?

Not all of those values have to be earned. Self-worth is only realized and accepted. We all have the same worth, because we are all pieces of the Divine. We cannot earn God's love, it can only be received. We are equal in God's eyes, and we are loved completely and uniquely. Most of us spend our life trying to earn our worth with money, good deeds, sacrifices, or martyrhood, running around in circles and going nowhere, only to feel more of the shame and lack of worth.

Another value we try to earn and this is misunderstood is self-respect. Self-respect means honoring the emotion. Feelings do not have to be logical, and they have the right to be honored and expressed. Respect and honor your own emotions, and people will honor yours, and your business.

Self-esteem is a value we build, practice, and harness. It is the love we earn for ourselves with our achievement through the principles of honesty, integrity, trust, listening to the inner voices, never hurting others.

Self-confidence is a value we develop with our trust and hope, amplified by our courage.

When success is filled with self-esteem, worth, love, respect, confidence, it becomes valuable because it brings us closer and closer toward self-realization. The synergy of all other values and what could be the ultimate happiness we all are looking for.

Does all this value system mean that money is not important ? No, money is an energy-like electricity or any other. It can be used positively or negatively. It is an energy that is extremely useful. Money does not buy happiness, but happiness can generate money.

Money not only became symbolic of success but became all that counts for most of us. What counts is the bottom line --- what is the $ figure ?

In any process, there is the motivation, the why behind what we are creating, the how or the means of implementation and then the end result. In the new paradigm, the end result will take its rightful place as third in importance, after the motivation and the way, the means.

What is the real motivation ? Is it to vindicate ourself ? To compete for power ? To take revenge, to cover our shame ? Or, is it to satisfy our needs for survival, security, belongings, expression, spirituality, and our preferences of fun, joy, and pleasure. ?

The second most important part of the process is the means. Age we doing or implementing with self-esteem, with confidence, love, and respect, or did we have to lie, manipulate, and control to get the bottom line at any cost ? When we focus more on the clarity of our motivation and the means of expression form of the end result.

If we do, we are reducing the real value, thus risking a reduced end result. The higher the value infused in the implementation, the more guaranteed the end results and even more: miracles.

LOGIC AND REASON VS INTUITION

The faculty which separates humans from their fellow animals is the faculty of reason. Many animals have intuition beyond the senses which enable them to perceive what is real. All organisms in nature survive and know intuitively how to find their food. It was found that a human being is only 2.7% different in cellular structures, sensitivity of the senses, and metabolic functions to that of a chimpanzee. This 2.7% is a comparative measurement like all other relative knowledge. Animals also possess a similar nervous structure to handle pain and pleasure, hot and cold, matter and spirit, and can actually communicate more precisely and better than humans in many areas of perception. Animals build concepts, think and feel, just like humans, but they cannot reason with themselves or with each other. In order to reason we must adopt the mental levels of assumptions, axioms, deductive theory, induction of data, postulates, logical, sequential order, and experiments.

The coming of a new paradigm, or world philosophy, gives humans the power to create a unified thought form to eliminate the paralyzing effects of relativism in science and religion, which many modern thinkers feel forced to accept.

We live in a time of great transformation in traditional religious beliefs and scientific attitudes concerning the nature of what is real. The apparent slowness of physical evolution makes it difficult to see changes at the ending of life cycles. If we continue the present paradigm of dualistic ignorance, we are all doomed by the human gap in the perception of reality.

If we change our mental set and encompass the dualistic by rising above and blending opposites, we can dissolve the separations in human minds. This means solving the problem of human perception at every level. Humans have always tried to solve this problem of dualistic human perception at every level by logical confirmation of our own intellectual integrity . But, this can never work as long as we are stuck in the old paradigm of what is real.

The theory of relativity is a logical thesis written by a man who believes that Quantum Physics and the new nondeterministic physics was an escape from subjectivity. The formal logic of mathematics and philosophy does not explain the underlying intelligence which Einstein called God. Modern logic and philosophical thought, however revolutionary, cannot prove God with mathematics. Humans have always tried to measure the difference between right and wrong, spirit and matter. In fact, human consciousness has always tried to measure the differences between spirit and matter by describing an artificial split in our consciousness between the so-called objective physical universe out-side themselves and the subjective world inside our consciousness. This split is not real because it is merely the splitting off of the human ego we call the self-sense. The subjective split of the human ego is not real; although, it can be agreed to as real in words. The fact is everybody is part of the same universe, and, in fact, there is no separation because it is impossible to get out of the universe.

There are several kinds of logic which we use in order to arrive at a consensus reality. A world philosophy or paradigm has now emerged out of the chaos of subjective / objective thinking which could not understand the science of Being. It is the science of knowing how you came to be what you are. Ideas of how things get to be what is cannot be discussed in the relativist dualism of the human mind because all humans come to the planet with a certain gap in consciousness.

All cultures so far developed or evolved upon earth have been portrayed as a great struggle between good and evil. This logical polarizing of thought is common in all religions and philosophical thought even with those who speak of unity or yoga. Logically, yoga deals with the concept that humans are separate from the whole of All That Is (God) by reason of being a physical body which must be united with its source in order to be One. But, logic also says that you cannot unite something that is already united together since the separation is only a fiction in our minds. However, a new paradigm uses a more inclusive logic (note I did not say higher or lower) which rises above the dualities and blends them together as in male or female, God or Goddess. In God's world of Oneness, there would be no higher than or lower than because Oneness has no idea of up or down.

The logical difficulty of perfection and imperfection is dealt with in Buddhist reasoning as being a void or endless state of Nirvana (nonflowing) where consciousness becomes ultimately passive, peaceful, and knowledgeable about itself. However, the universe and its intelligence is active; dynamic energy is never still. This energy creates all those evolutionary changes which must happen in order to bring in new thought structures. These insights, or thought changes, are not logically perfect or truthful like we led to believe in religions. The concept of imperfection, such as original sin, is invalid if God is all there is because logically God would be everything, anywhere, anywhen.

The difficulty is that the very language by which we communicate ideas logically and grammatically obey rules for validating reality set forth by human thinkers.

The different kinds of dualistic logic by which humans validate their subjective experience will determine how you form the concepts in your mind. A discussion of this old paradigm logic at this depth is not necessary to understand the new paradigm because it is not based on any of the subjective and objective relative logics which create dualistic systems of thought. To live life without any limits seems impossible to most intellectual people because the operations in the mind create concepts. Concepts are definable and communicatable and can be logically manipulated in a sequential time line which computer people call real time.

This real time is not real but consists of events in time arranged logically. Real time is really the imaginary time of clocks sequentially starting at a point in the past and moving through the present and out into the future into prediction. In seems that events come into being and pass through certain stages from beginning to end. In fact, in reality these events only happen now because it is always now whatever time it is on your clock at this moment. This is the big jump to a new reality of the virgin paradigm which depends on "absolute logic" and makes the everyday logic of dualistic thought processes obsolete. Hence, all formal logic and mathematics are useless in discussing human perception unless we drop the relative and dualistic frame work of logic and substitute the wholistic frame work of "absolute logic."

Hence, to sum up briefly what might seem to many as an oversimplification, we can say that the real study of the subjective state of humans is intelligence. Matter, spirit, life, time, and space can only be studied objectively by human intelligence by understanding how things come to be what they really are. Such study can only be done by the intelligence of someone who is able to perceive that our self-consciousness is nondualistic. In absolute logic, we think from the viewpoint of oneness before we split off our consciousness into subjective and objective dualisms.

The fact is that consciousness cannot be known directly as long as we are trying to find out its contents. This is like trying to find out how the hardware of a computer is built by looking at its software which makes it work. The human brain has many kinds of software but what drives them all is the intelligence of the operator and an instruction book. Unfortunately, for humans the current instruction books and those handed down from the past are incomplete or just don't work. The bugs are not out of the thinking system even though the human brain has taken millions of years to get its present computing power. The answer is that we never had absolute logic before now to illuminate the mind with its own light rather than accepting hand-me-downs.

Self-consciousness which has become nondualistic automatically discovers the five processes is human personality. These are :1. Whatever we feel, so we think.

2. Whatever we think, so we plan and speak.

3. Whatever we plan and speak, that we do.

4. Whatever we do, so we become.

5. Whatever we become, that is our personality.

Our ways of knowing which we call supposition, induction, deduction, theory, dreams, logical operations, scientific validation of knowledge, philosophic thought, religion, freedom, and anything else fundamental that you can think of are all products of our divine or earthly imagination which is only limited by self. Therefore, to take all limits off self-consciousness is the first step in the new paradigm. How we image ourself as limitless beings and how we program our thoughts to produce our feelings is key to the new virgin paradigms.

IMAGINATION VS LOGIC AND REASON

The term "imagination" has several meanings in our culture. If you are a philosopher dealing with the nature of fundamental thoughts, then imagination becomes the free play of the intuition or inspiration. If you are an artist or writer or a dreamer, then we would use the creative imagination to express emotional experiences. In science, images and diagrams which represent reality in models and systems can be mathematical images like fractals, which are at the base of nature's primal forms. Or, these images are defined as secondary imagination which appears in various context such as supposition, idealistic assumptions fantasy, etc., meaning that the imagination spawns images which are not real but worked up in the mind as a formal pattern or mental image.

There is no right way to deal with the imagination because the term may be used in loose way with such a variety of meanings that it is useless for philosophical discussion.

We can use imagination to clarify these different meanings to analyze what are the differences or to show a family connection between the different meanings of this word imagination on which faculty the power of vision, art-thinkings in the mind, or sense perception is totally dependent.

Logic and reason have always been a part of, and created by, imagination which invented mathematics and numbers as a way of validating reality. In physics, we construct the theories of matter with our imagination. In our study of imagination and work of the imagination, we can use logic and reason and make basic assumptions about life, all of which springs out of the human imagination.

We use our fundamental power of imagination to form our self-image as humans, both physically and mentally, and we use it to determine our place in the universe and to create the illusions of time and space. Images also define their own space and time as in dreams and real life. The image of a gold bar and a real physical gold ingot both have little value on a desert island where there is little scarce water to drink. The water would become more valuable than the precious gold. To know the difference in values and meanings we use logic in order to discipline our mind and its power to imagine anything and everything. Even the concept of God/Goddess is worked up in our mind to imagine a Supreme Being which cannot e proved by the dualistic and relativistic logic. We use ordinary logic to define "sense perception" or "mind" but we must use transcendental logic in order to talk about God, Spirit, intelligence, beauty, loveliness, Truth, or Consciousness because none of these qualities are definable by relative logic.

Logic and reason have been so elevated out of imagination, what's left has killed the faculty of imagination. Breakthroughs in science came from people who had the most highly skilled power of the creative imagination.

People often think that logic and reason are cold hard-nosed faculties that rule out the imaginative functions of the mind and become sterile. This has been true in the past when mathematics and logic were taught by poor teachers who did not understand that logic and reason is part of the imagination. Logic, mathematics and philosophy are tools invented by the human imagination to explore reality. All these operate entirely in the imagination.

However our western culture has elevated the role of logic and reason above the creative power of imagination and almost killed direct intuition. Yet all the greatest scientific break throughs have been born out of the fertile imagination of the brightest human beings.

In spite of this there have been many attempts to kill the imagination in the name of the imaginary. Because society did not value imagination and was disturbed by its power to bring rapid change, its geniuses were put down as dangerous individuals. Dangerous to the status quo !

Nevertheless we all inherit the total sum of all the efforts, all the imaging, all the thinkers, artists, and designers who contributed their energy over thousands of years in the evolutionary patterns and images coded into the DNA of our body cells.

The new paradigm puts our knowing faculties in balance to bring imagination back into its rightful place in our reality. Instead of trying to rule it out of our experiments we can now recognize it as the precious source of all knowledge. Imagination is the foundation from the divine knowing springs. Intuition and imagination work together to create feelings. Feelings and emotions create biochemical hormones which create pain or pleasure in plants and animals. Certainly our present civilization is run on hormones, like adrenalin. Whether this same hormone used by us to enjoy high excitement in sports, or crate fear, panic, anger, or stay to fight or flight, depends on what our thoughts are imaging in the moment. Held clearly in our mind these intensely created images have the power to imagine a virgin paradigm.

EARNING VS RECEIVING

At a very early age, we get the message that we do not deserve. We're taught at home, at school, or at church that we're not good enough and that earning is the only way to prove our deservability and our realness ! We had to earn our father's approval, our teacher's respect, and even God's love. The more we struggled and martyred ourselves, the more society applauded.

It's not that earning is not important, that earning as the only validation for self-esteem is self-destructive. There are things we can't earn. You can't earn God's love or your self-worth. You can only receive it.

Earning must be balanced with receiving. You can't sit down and do the receiving along. It's a dance. Receiving is not a passive energy. It is very active. It's the higher octave of doing and earning. You don't just open your arms with a smile and receive !

Being a feminine energy, receiving has been reduced to a wimpy state of charity. We are warned and feared into not receiving.

To some, receiving is unexpectable because they fear strings attached to it. Most kids feel controlled by their parents when they're given something. Some of us don't want to feel grateful, or accept that somebody can do it better or quicker, or that we have to rely, or cocreate, with someone else at all !

Most of us feel a certain level of guilt and shame that makes us feel we don't deserve to receive. More than that, receiving threatens the paradigm of logic and reason. Receiving and miracles do not fit in there. The values of performance, competition, and comparison are threatened, and so are the hidden agendas of control, vindication, approval, punishment.

WHAT STOPS US FROM RECEIVING

The conditioning of parents and society that says receiving is charity control, weakness, or that life is a debit and credit accounting book, "there is no such thing as a free lunch" and other similar beliefs.

1. Lack of trust.
2. There is no guarantee in receiving; we have to expect receiving with flexibility. We don't always really know what's best for us or where and when. This lack of guarantee makes trust in receiving harder.
3. Judgments.

Our parents and society conditioning led us to our own judgments about receiving and those who received abundance or grace without earning and struggling. We judge them as less than, as lucky, as fake, as people without self-esteem. We put them down for having inherited wealth, won the lottery, were there in the right time or place, the family connection....What are your judgments about receiving ? Judgments freeze our reality, slow it down and even sabotage it.

Judgments are not good or bad, they just hurt.

It's important to review our past judgments about success and receiving, forgive ourselves, and replace judgments with opinions and discernment.

4. Lack of intensity.

Intensity is the tool of the alchemist. Emotional intensity is essential in receiving. Emotional intensity is not a big, loud performance. It is a genuine, intense expression of our feeling. Intensity has been discouraged by everyone, including therapists, Receiving is not a weak and wimpy energy. It is our birthright. We can obtain it with respect and love.

A PATTERN FOR RECEIVING

1. Decide on what you want to receive.
2. What are the resistances to receiving. Is it shame or guilt ? Is it the fear to be controlled ? Is it the lack of deservability ? Lack of trust in others ? What are the judgments behind receiving or those who receive without earning. Feel all these energies with intensity crushing them into raw energy.
3. How will you feel once you receive what you want ? Imagine the love, the joy, the happiness, and feel them with intensity.
4. Fusion. Blend these two energies together in your body and put them out as a feeling or in a visualization form as a ball of light and give them to higher sources or God, and demand with respect and harm to no one.

5. Feel, imagine, visualize receiving what you want.
6. Ask to receive the new paradigm.

MAGIC AND MIRACLES

hat is Magic ? What are Miracles ?

To the uninitiated, neither magic nor miracles are reality. They are omething way out there that only happen to other people, usually "weirdos."

Magic is when we create things in our reality with excellence and legance that stretches beyond the conscious reality's acceptance or definition of hat is.

It is the by product of thinking we deserve and feeling good enough. sing minimum energy, things seem to happen with ease and much, such uicker. It is rooted in the depths and in the intensity of our thoughts and elings. Negative thoughts and feelings crate negative realities.

Get rid of thoughts and beliefs that magic is casting spells and that it is o good to be true and start believing and thinking that everything is possible d things can get better all the time (though never perfect).

Miracles are when something happens better than expected or imagined ssible. Miracles come from a state of consciousness rooted in good feelings. hey will not happen if you are still controlled by your negative ego. You nnot earn a miracle; it can only be received with gratitude and appreciation.

Magic and Miracles happen outside time and space and the consensus. e must relinquish the hold of past experiences and history on us to allow em in.

Magic is achieved by the blending of power and grace. It creates onders, fun, curiosity, and joy. Miracles produce feeling of love, deserving, rgiveness, and healing added to the magic.

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Self and Ontology in Descartes and Upanishads

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In this·paper an attempt has been made to study the view of Descartes and Upanishads on self and ontology. Rene Descartes was regarded as the father of modern philosophy. His philosophical method was called as mathematical method. In the first instance he wanted to find out a fundamental principle. With the help of this principle he wanted to construct a philosophical edifice. His philosophical method was also called as doubting method. He doubted every thing in the universe except his existence. There is no idea of which one can be entirely certain. To quote Descartes : "I suppose accordingly, that all the things which I see are false; I believe that none of those things which my deceptive memory presents to me are true. I suppose that I have no senses; I beleve that body, figure, extension, motion and place are nothing but fictions of my mind what is there then that can be thought true ? Perhaps only that nothing in the world is certain".

But one thing is certain and that is that I doubt or think of that there can be no doubt. It is indeed a contradiction to suppose that which thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks. Descartes does not appeal to an empirical psychical fact, the mind's awareness of itself; but reasons logically that doubt implies a doubter, thinking a thinker, a thinking thing or spiritual substance, thus he reaches a rational or self evident proposition. To doubt, means to think, to think means to be, cogite ergo sum - I think, therefore I am. It is the first and most certain knowledge that occurs to one who philosophizes in an orderly manner. Here is the principle we have been seeking a certain, self evident starting-point for our metaphysics. This proposition also furnishes us useful a ceiterion or test of truth. This one proposition is absolutely certain, true clearly and distinctly perceived; This Descartes believes in the existence of self. His philosophical ediface is based upon this principle. Basing upon this principle he constructs his philosophy.

We now have a fundamental principle and a criterion of true knowledge. What else can we know ? It is doubtful whether anything can be certain, as long as we are confronted with the possibility of a deceiving God, we do not know as yet whether there is a God, if there is that he is not a deceiver. This difficulty must be removed. Some of our ideas appear to be innate, some are our own inventions, some of them seem to have been received from without. But all this may end in illusion. Descartes tells about the idea of God. Now nothing whatever exists must have a cause for existence, this too is a self-evident proposition. Moreover, the cause must be atleast as great as the effect, there must be atleast as much reality in it. That which contains greater reality in itself and which is the more perfect cannot be consequence of and dependent on the less perfect. Descartes tells as follows : Hence I myself cannot being, while the idea of God is the idea of God is the idea of perfect infinite being. It must have been placed in me by an infinite being, of God, and hence God must exist. This proof for the existence of God is not the ontological proof of Anselm, but a causal proof which begins with the idea of a perfect being existing in my mind. It is not agreed that such a being exists merely because we have a concept of him, but rather from the such a being as the cause of the idea imprinted on his work. If God did not exist, we could not possibiy be what we are nor could we have an idea of God.

We know more of God himself and of the human mind than we know of corporal objects reflecting upon the idea of God that we perceive that he is eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, the source of all goodness and truth; the creator of all things is not corporeal and does not perceive by means of senses as we do. He has intellect and will but not like ours, he does not will evil or sin, for sin is negation of being. Descartes believed in the existence of God, Moreover he believed in innate ideas. From the idea of God he comes to the existence of God. Descartes is a rationalist. From rational understanding reflection and speculation he tells about great truths.

There is Ontology in the Upanishads. Upanishads are the ending portions of Vedas. There are 150 Upanishads according to the opinion of Scholars. Out of these 13 Upanishads are significant ones. There are Chandogya Brihadaranyaka, katha, Kathe Upanishad, Prasna Upanishad, Iso Upanishad etc., According to these Upanishads there is Brahman and they believe in Atman also. In the opinion of Vedic seers Atman is Brahman. Brahman and Atman are identical in the Taittiriya Upanishad. It is said that there are five sheaths for Atman. These are Annamaya Kosa, Pranamaya Kosa, Manomaya Kosa, Vijnanamaya Kosa and Anandamaya Kosa. According to the Vedic and Upanishadic seers the whole universe is evolved out of Brahman. The deities such as Iswara, Vishnu, Brahma, Parvati, Lakshmi and Saraswati etc are evolved from Brahman. Besides the mountains, Seas, stars, planets, rivers and all living beings are evolved from Brahman. At dissolution all the above mentioned things go to Brahman.

Rene Descartes also believed in self, soul, God, body and mind, He started from self and proceeded to other things. According to him soul lives in the head of human being. Human body is regarded by him as a machine. There is a rationalist with the help of reason he has arrived into this understanding.

His philosophical method is called as mathematical method. He started from a self-evident principle cogite ergo sum and proceeded to other axioms for building the edifice of philosophy. In the Upanishads also there are Mahavakayas like Tatvam Asi (that thou art). From these Mahavakaya the great system of philosophy can be built up. There is every comparison between Descartes and Upanishads. Our Upanishads seers pray as follows :

"From the unreal lead me to the real
From darkness lead me to light
From death lead me to immortality".

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A debate on African Philosophy

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The need to debate over the problem of the existence and nature of African philosophy is felt, because of the dilemma in which most of the contemporary African philosophers- Professional as well as non-academic - find themselves. This dilemma is due to the fact that on the one hand they accept western philosophic tradition as the paradigm for their philosophy and on the other hand, they feel that Africa hand, they feel that Africa has always had a popular, mythical, unconscious and lived philosophy, and that such a philosophy needs to be peeled off from the African tradition, proverbs, linguistic structures of the past. For example Paulin Hountondji, one of the well-known critics of African philosophy, wants "at all costs to destroy this pervading myth" of an already existing African philosophy, while N. Otakpor, a Professor of Philosophy, is an advocate of "Folk thought-system". The problem deepens because African thinker's themselves are not very certain about the meanings of the terms "Philosophy" and "African".

In this paper I would like to attract your attention towards some of the arguments, presented in support of their views, by Paulin Hountondji, E.A. Ruch and N. Otakpor.

If we review the arguments given by Hountondji in his famous book 'African Philosophy : Myth and reality"[1], we find that he is very careful in qualifying philosophy as African, since he is of the opinion that the term "Philosophy" refers to "Universality" which has to be preserved not because

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The french version was published in 1976, and that was translated by Henri Evans and published by Hutchinson, London 1983.

philosophy has some universal themes, but essentially because "the differences of content are meaningful only and precisely as differences of content, which as such refer back to the essential unity of a single discipline; of a single style of 69Inquiry"[2]. Then he tries to define this discipline. According to him philosophy in the strict sense must be scientific, theoretical[3] and individual discipline. Hountondgi strongly opposes the tendency to confuse the popular or ideological usage with the rigorous or theoretical usage of the term "Philosophy". Ruch condemns such assumption as nothing but a pre-philosophical belief of the rationalist school of philosophy[4]. But Huntondji believes that the term usually philosophy is a misnomer mainly because what is usually taken as such is "African Pseudo Philosophy"[5], since he assumes that it has no explicit formulation except the total reliance on the ethnographic works. Thus Hountondji declares that "there are no philosophers in Africa, because what is generally referred to an African Philosophy is not essentially different from ethno-philosophy[6]. He blames placid Temples[7], a missionary for mistaking ethno-philosophy for philosophy without "terminological scruples". Hountondji maintains that African thinkers in various tones and modes "Struck up the Tempelsian theme, whereas they should have mindful of this blinding fact that Tempels, by his own admission, was addressing not them, but the European public[8]. So he is of the opinion that African thinkers must re-define their mission and reorient themselves. He, therefore, frequently demands a painstaking evaluation of all that which is so far taken as African Philosophy and which has its roots in ethnography. Hence he classified such works as those of Alexis Kagame, who attempted to extract" a complete philosophy from the grammatical analysis of Bantu languages" as "ethnographic works with philosophical pretensions"[9]. Hountondji strongly believes that until African thinkers do not abandon their reliance on ethnographic and cultural anthropological works and adopt rational procedures they can not" discover the adventure of a single and same humanity"[10].

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[2] P.J. Hountondji, African philosophy : Myth and Reality, p.56.

[3] Some of these theoretical usages in the context of Western Philosophical tradition are classified in the Encylopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6 p.216-225.

[4] E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu, African Philosophy,p.14.

[5] P. Hountondji, African Philosophy : Myth and Reality p.55.

[6] N. Otakpor, African Philosophy : P.J. Hountondji, His Dilemma and Contributions, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVII, No.2, April 1990, p.174.

[7] Placid Tempels, Bantu Philosophy, Presence Africaine, Paris, 1959.

[8] P.H. Hountondji, African Philosophy : Myth and Reality, p. 49.

[9] P.J. Hountondji, The pit falls of Being Different, pp.51-54.

Thus Hountondji defines philosophy as theoretical scientific or rational and universal while Anyanwu affirms that the idea of a universal world philosophy does not make sense. From the assertion that every philosophy has a universal appeal, it does not follow that there is a "neutral world philosophy applicable to all cultures at all times and in all places"[11].

Nevertheless Ruch assumes that to the extent that a philosophy expresses ideas of a timeless and universal value, it is scientific and therefore of International relevance for mankind, and to the extent that a philosophy expresses a value - system or an ideology, it is an art a form of wisdom, and as such is time and culture bound[12]. Yet Such tries to prove that even such a culture bound philosophy can be a contribution to the universal and common patrinomy of mankind in as much as it contributes to the mutual understanding between peoples, and to the unity of men in their cultural diversity.

Hountondji defines philosophy as an individual discipline just like Algebra and physics. Accordingly he feels that the so-called" African thought-systems are still located at the pre-scientific and pre-philosophical periods, and progress is not possible without the evolution of "critical consciousness". He exphasizes the role of critical activity in philosophy by informing that the critical activity is the beginning of philosophy in the only acceptable sense of the word.

Hountondji feels that the whole project of constituting or discovering an African philosophy has been an European project, the aim of which has been to kill the African's creative power to produce philosophical ideas. He says that "African philosophers were expected to be Archivists of their cultural traditions rather than original thinkers"[13]. So he announces that the true problem lies in "liberating the theoretical creativity of Africans". As we all know that there are two types of creativity - theoretical and practical. Under the class of theoretical creativity come scientific theory building and critical discussion. Under the category of Practical creativity we include Artistic creation and technological devices. Hountondji informs that the theoretical creativity in philosophy is possible if we have freedom of expression and discussion on the basis of unlimited information. Defining African philosophy he writes, "the creative philosophical activity must be the work of Africans themselves, because "the

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[10] Ibid, pp.52-54.

[11] E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu, African Philosophy, p.78.

[12] Ibid, p.18.

[13] E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu, African Philosophy, p.12.

Africanity of our philosophy will not consist.... in its themes, but above all the geographical appurtenance of those who produce it and in their intellectu inter-relation"[14]. This shows that philosophy according to his is an intellect enterprise.

Hountondji also refers to the popular attitude of accepting that creation of African philosophy can not be possible ex nihilo; that it compris necessarily a whole cultural heritage"[15].

Otakpor criticises Hountondji for repudiating or cultural dimension African philosophy, since according to Otakpor this dimension forms provides the true reference point. Further he says that "accounting for relative and cultural dimension is in no way obliterates the essence of philosophy, because the fundamental issues and questions remain univers irrespective of this dimension and the "geographical variable"[16].

Undoubtedly "Africanity can properly be defined as "the totality cultural features" common to all Africans, because African identifies himself his cultural personality. Such clarification of the term "African" seems m adequate in defining African philosophy, since it neither refers to Geographical boundaries of the continent known as Africa nor it gi importance to the racialistic interpretation of the term. I believe that philosopher's thoughts, however objective they may appear in their compl form, are rooted in the soil of his culture. This can easily be proved by paral development of the Indian and the Western philosophical thoughts. In fa philosophical ideas are not spontaneous products of our reason in isolation bu from our surroundings and from our culture. Here I would like to remind th scientific activity must not be identified with philosophical activity. objective the scientific thinking, because of the cultural and subjective factors that aff it. Unhesitatingly we may accept that a philosophy belongs to a particul tradition and shares its cultural climate and mental background. It has be proved by different styles of philosophizing. For example England general prefers empirical and logical methods, while American philosophers general adopts pragmatic method. German philosophers have been more speculat than other Europeans, whereas Indians generally give importance to intuiti and authority.

Here I wish to quote Professor Jecques Maquet, who tries to show h analogues existential experience of life in an isolated and difficult environm have showily produced a "Unified African World", distinct from comparable to the Western as well as to the Asian world". The unity of Afric therefore, is not racial but cultural[17] C. B. Okolo also reminds us that "Culture is also a key to the understanding of and definition of the African"[18]. But as K. C. Anyanwu admits by subordinating African cultural facts to the assumptions, concepts, theories and world-view suggested by Western culture and developed by Western thinkers, confusion ensues"[19]. According to Otakpor also "the essence of the debate lies in the conflict between" two systems of Intelligibility"[20]. So he says that Western - European philosophy should not be accepted as paradigm for defining African Philosophy. He condemns African philosophers for being victims of cultural invasion from West, while Indians, Chinese Arabs etc. are extremely cautious about this invasion. He writes "African peoples, interestingly her intellectuals, but embarrassingly her philosophers are in the forefront chanting the virtues of this invasion and arguing for it"[21] Ruch also indicates this situation of "cultural colonialism". In his view, there is nothing wrong in sharing in the universal wisdom of mankind and in studying the works of geniuses, but African thinkers and teachers of philosophy must restore and re-create a respectable body of African wisdom and express it in a language which is universally intelligible[22]. Only thus African can contribute to the common heritage of mankind. Here it is not extravagant to mention that Ruch assumes two levels or stages of culture. He conceives that "besides local or regional cultures, there is a patrimony of Universal Human Culture, whether scientific, artistic or humanistic, which has a universal and eternal value"[23].

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[14] P. Hountondji, Histories d'un mythe, in "Presence Africaine", p.12.

[15] Ibit, p.12.

[16] N. Otakpor, African Philosophy, p.187.

Ruch writes on page 15 of his book that "a philosophy which reflects over the African culture is a truly African philosophy". He believes that a philosophy built upon African cultural values and ideals is much closer to the people than the more universal and scientific mode of philosophizing. But here he is mistaking African cultural philosophy for African Philosophy.

Besides, beliefs in Gods, spirits, and occult forces have often been suggested as constituting the parameters of African philosophy. Yet according to Hountondji such beliefs could not be classified as philosophy, since philosophy is an intelligent (rational) and reflective inquiry. Thus affirms conclusively that unless we identify such moment of departurę from myth a magic etc., we can not define philosophy. In his opinion, the proponents o African philosophy generally neglect the obvious difference between scienc myth and magic. Here Otakpor asks, "but does it follow that t non-identification of this moment of rupture; of departure, ultimately rende all philosophic systems of the non-western type implausible"[24]. And he himse answers - "certainly not". He criticise Hountondji that like Wiredu, he thin that the absence of transcription the lack of rupture between myth, magic a science in African traditional thought renders all such thought system unphilosophical[25].

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[17] J. Maquet, Africanity : The Cultural Unity of Black Africa, Jr. Joan, Oxford University Press, 1972, p.4.

[18] C.B. Okolo, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.XV No.1, Jan'88, p.100.

[19] E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu, African Philosophy, p.117.

[20] N Otakpor, African Philosophy, p.185.

[21] Ibid, p.187.

[22] E.A. Ruch, African Philosophy, p.17.

[23] Ibid, p.17.

I do not agree with Otakpor's criticism, since I myself believe that t activity of Reflection or review and criticism are essential constituents o philosophizing and such identification or differentiation is not possible witho them. Accordingly the lack of identification implies the lack of philosophic activity and consequently the lack of philosophy. As Otakpor himself accep that when man became able to think, to question, to reflect, to argue, he bega to philosophise. E.A. Ruch also admits that "a lived world-view" only becom a philosophy, when it is consciously and critically reflected [26].

Ruch classifies the activity of an ethno-philosopher as a philosophical. I his view, "the ethno-philosopher who makes a critical analysis of a mythic African system is a genuine African philosopher, independently of his countr of origin, provided he does not reduce his study to a mere ethnologic description, but studies the mythical culture as a comprehensive world - view i a critical and objective way. Here again Ruch insists that an ethno-philosophe must distinguish those elements of African culture which are of universal valu from those which are culture -conditioned. Ruch assumes tha ethno-philosopher tries to give to the non-African access to an unwritten world - view. Thus making an African contribution to the universal wisdom of mankind. On the other hand, Hountondji rejects myth and "so-called" ethno-philosophy as unphilosophical by defining philosophy as scientif discourse. He assumes that only reason can give objective truth, while Ruch believes that "pure rationality and objectivity of western science and philosophy is to a large extent a myth"[27]. Man requires wisdom, which satisfies his whole being, not only his reason or will or emotion. Ruch assumes that "all wisdom is in the final analysis, prerational "[28], hence it satisfies the whole being.

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[24] N. Otakpor African Philosophy : Hountondji - His dilemma an contributions, p.180.

[25] Ibid, p.178.

[26] E.A. Ruch, African Philosophy, p.18.

[27] E.A. Ruch, K.C. Anyanwu, African Philosophy, p.22.

Perhaps, because of this attitude Ruch enlists the Mytho-poet - the anonymous author of some aspect or other of the mythical world-view in an African culture- as doing an African philosophy, but of a primitive, intimitive and uncritical kind[29]. He confesses that this mytho-philosophy or mythology is not scientific. He openly admits that such type of philosophy remains below "Critical philosophy, since it lacks the verification of his intimitive insights in terms of "logical consistency" and empirical objectivity", but he replaces this scientific verification by equally important consistency of life.

Ruch rejects theoretical thinking as the only criterion of philosophy, so he tells us that a mytho-poet goes further than the purely theoretical concerns of the classical philosophy. His intuitive insights, his explanations and devised rituals contribute to the harmony of his people's value-system.

Ruch also enlists those thinkers as African philosophers who provide a critical study of the contemporary philosophical discussions in

Africa[30]. Here Ruch is giving importance to critical activity as an philosophical activity.

It follows from the foregoing description and analysis that Ruch differentiates between two types of philosophy i.e. Intuitive and critical.

Referring to the present predicament, Ruch informs that unfortunately there exists a constant temptation among African intellectuals, either to fall under the spell of Western rationalism and consequently to reject myths and traditions as either antiquated or unscientifics, or to reject, including its scientific thinking. Ruch suggests that we do not have to choose between rejecting rationalism and accepting myth, or accepting rationalism and accepting myth, or accepting rationalism and rejecting myth, since there is a third alternative i.e. to introduce reason into the myth or to restore mythical dimension to reason. Could we accept this third alternative? If Ruch himself accepts it, then his explanation of myth philosophy becomes absurd, because he explains it without any reference to any rational activity, such as reflection, theorisation, criticism etc.

Next point to be discussed is related to the anonymity of the author of a philosophy. Sometimes an anonymous philosophy is suspected. It is admitted that a philosophy must have a recognizable author. Hence Wiredu argues that "If you want to know the philosophy of a given people you do not go to the aged peasant or priest, but to the individual thinker in person or print[31]. Therefore

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[28] Ibid, p.22

[29] ibid, p.19

[30] Ibid, p.21

[31] Kwasi Wredu, Philosophy and African Culture, Cambridge University

Hountondji defines African philosophy "as a literature produced by Africans and dealing with philosophical problems" or "as a set of tests, specifically the set of test written by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors"[32]. It seems that according to African thinkers this objection against is levelled because of the individualistic attitude of the West, which considers individual person as the measure of all things. Yet such objection can be erased by presenting the examples of Vedic and Upanishadic philosophies of India.

N. Otakpor believes that Hountondji and Wredu are misled by their own philosophical orientations, so they take philosophy as a critical, theoretical and analytic discipline. Otakpor defines African philosophy in terms of African Traditional Folk thought systems[33] Accordingly his position is approximately same as Ruch, when Ruch accepts Ethno-philosophy and mythophilosophy as African philosophies. To support his view, he quotes Omoregbe, who informs that these folk systems "are not" gratuitous assertions, since the original authors of these ideas and views obviously had their reasons for holding and advancing them. They are "fruits of reflection" and the conclusions of a reasoning process"[34].

Otakpor criticises Hountondji for his preoccupation with critical philosophy as dogmatic. He affirms that "critical and analytic philosophy is just one way of doing philosophy, but all other ways cannot be reduced to it without cultural harm[35]. Here Otakpor is confusing the types of philosophy with philosophizing. Analysis and criticism are the essential characteristic of the way of doing philosophy.

Again, Otakpor quotes, this time Bewaji according to whom :the general intellectual temper of a culture - its characteristic mode of thought, its pervasive world outlook, its unquestioned assumptions constitute its philosophy[36]. Otakpor did not bother to explain the characteristic of such mode of thought. Secondly , Otakpor overlooks that the phrase "unquestioned

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Press, 1980, pp.47-49.

[32] N. Otakpor, African Philosophy, p.188.

[33] N. Otakpor, African Philosophy, p.181.

[34] Joseph I. Omoregbe; "African Philosophy : Yesterday and Today" in "Philosophy in Africa : Trends and Perspectives (Ife - Nigeria : University Press, 1985) p.9.

[35] N. Otakpor, African, Philosophy,. I.P.Q. Vol. VXII, No.2, April 1990, p.181.

[36] J.A.I. Bewaji, African Philosophy : Some comments; The Nigerian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.3, No.2 1983, p.74.

assumptions" is a contradiction in terms, since assumptions generally means unproved or questionable beliefs.

Otakpor also accepts that the assumptions, beliefs and sentiments, which constitute a folk thought system, may not be systematically formulated or expressed[37], but they do have considerable influence on the society. Here one may question Otakpor, that if they are not systematically formulated and expressed, how could he name their totality "a thought system". Secondly, the so-called folk thought - system are "systems of beliefs" instead of "systems of thought".

It is clear that Otakpor emphasises the practical aspect of these folk thought-systems. Consequently he advocates the concept of a "living philosophy" instead of "philosophy as a discipline". I also know that for its salvation Africans need more than theories. Nevertheless theories have always been useful as guide to action and life.

Sometimes Otakpor identifies folk thought-systems with myths, and maintains that "folk thought-systemsare essentially logical, and myths are not devoid of logos"[38]. Besides, he defines "myth" as a peculiarity. These convictions of Otakpor show that he himself approves logos or reason and rational procedures and logic i.e. logical consistency to be the characteristics of philosophical thinking. It means that he accepts some universal or common features in philosophy.

Another point to be noted is that Otakpor distinguishes between the subject-matter and the method. So he writes that "the essence of folk thought-systems should not be confused with the inadequacy of its method"[39]. Thus he confesses the methodological inadequacy of folk thought-system. Now, if he concentrates on the peculiar way of philosophizing, he will be convinced of the distinction between philosophizing, he will be convinced of the distinction between philosophy and the so-called folk thought-systems. Here it is enough to mention that we must distinguish between philosophy as a system and as a way of philosophizing.

Once again the question before us is could we accept that a philosophy can only be African, if it is performed by an African? It is obvious that we cannot approve this definition, since an African Professor may propound or perform some European philosophy. Suppose an African professor is teaching Kant's philosophy or writing a book on Kant's philosophy. But "when an African or indeed a non-African philosopher writes about African wisdom,

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[37] N. Otakpor, African Philosophy, I.P.Q. Vol.XVII, No.2 1990, p.182.

[38] Ibid., p.183

[39] Ibid, p.183

African philosophy"[40]. In this context Ruch[41] refers to Okere who makes an important distinction between "an African philosopher" and "an African who is a philosopher".

Ruch also classifies the activities of those African thinkers as philosophical who are doing existential analyses of African existence[42]. Hence the works on works on Negritude[43] and African Identity are considered the works of African philosophy.

Ruch also refers to that ideological dimension[44] as African philosophy which projects a socio-political future for Africa. Under this class come L.S. Senghor's African Socialism or Humanistic Socialism[45], K. Kaunda's African Humanism[46] and K. Nkrumah's "consciencism". These contemporary systems are generally known as African salvation philosophy[47].

To end this debate, I would like to suggest that the interpreters of African philosophy must differentiate the various usages of the term "philosophy" i.e. philosophy as a discipline, as a living philosophy, as a system or as philosophizing etc. Simultaneously, they should accept that it is basically philosophizing or the peculiar way of thinking. This way of thinking is peculiar, because it essentially comprises Intuitive insights, contemplation and speculation, rational procedures such as criticism and reflection speculation or creative imagination is needed because philosophy is that aspect of human being which strives to extend the boundaries of understanding beyond its established limits. In fact, philosophy is also a survey of possibilities, yet it submits its speculation to comprehensive criticism. Criticism is needed to remove ambiguities and inconsistencies in thought and linguistic expression.

philosophizing demands an attitude of inquiry. It may be an inquiry about the ultimate problems of mankind or meta-inquiry i.e. inquiry about a previous inquiry. Thus there is sample scope for a variety of investigation. It has already been proved by the emergence of such dimension of philosophy as philosophy of culture, philosophy of science etc.

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[40] E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu, African Philosophy, p.16.

[41] Ibid, p.14.

[42] Ibid, p.20.

[43] N. Otakpor, "Negritute : A Philosophy of Withdrawal of Protest"? Africa, Revista do Centro de Estudes Africnos, 1985.

[44] Ibid., p.21.

[45] Ibid, pp.225-236.

[46] Ibid, pp.236-242

[47] Ibid, pp. 223-225

Of course, we can compare philosophical activity "with designing and building our own house than with buying a dwelling already made". Undoubtedly such an activity needs creativity, which is essential for philosophizing.

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Human Values For Sustainable Society

Dr. M.L. Dewan**

Human values play a great role in effective people's participation and any work in the field of soil conservation and watershed management, environmental control and in rural development (and also urban development) so much hinge on the under standing and practices of the human values. The author considers sustainable development, plus human values and sustainable society and the description of human values as such.

The definition of sustainable development is to allow for future generations that we preserve our remaining resources and rehabilitate the sources that have been treated carelessly in the past. To do these things systematically is to follow a path of environmentally sustainable development. The principles of sustainable development are -

1. Consult with villagers, farmers and all other participants. Reach agreements on both problems and solutions there of before taking action.
2. Plan small-scale flexible projects. A plan should be a blue-print. It should be able to incorporate new information that emerges during the execution of the project.
3. Let the people benefiting from the project make the decision. The expert's job is to share their knowledge, not impose it.
4. Look for solutions that can be duplicated in hundreds of thousands for the greatest impact on development. But the solution must still be tailored to fit local needs.

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5. Provide education and training particularly for young people and women who remain the most effective agents of change because they are bound to the realities of the family's survival.
6. Keep external inputs to a minimum to reduce dependency and increase stability Subsidies, supplements and inappropriate technology are unsustainable.
7. Build on what people are doing right. New ideas will be adopted only if they do not run contrary to local practice. New technologies must support existing ones, not replace them.
8. Assess impacts of proposed changes. A multi-disciplinary team, ideally including specialists from the same culture, should look at economic, social cultural and environmental aspects.
9. Consider both inputs and outcomes of outputs. The failure of projects focussing on a single output such as agricultural productivity has proved that more is not always better.
10. Maintain or improve the participants' standard of living. Long-term environmental improvement.

The requirements of Sustainable Development are -

1. Access and Controls,;
2. Community Resource Management;
3. Adding Value to the Product;
4. Investment and Economic situation.

Unfortunately, both moral and economic situation of the people not only in India but around the globe is going down-hill because of dilution of values and consequent depletion of resources. Thus, the linkage between Human Values and Sustainable Society is clear and can be summarised as follows :

Human Values -

"Value is all that which makes life worthy to be lived"

"The human values" are by definition, the following -

- Truth
- Right Action or
- the Moral Code
- Peace

Love

Non-violence.

These are the corner-stones of the entire philosophy of life and give us the basis for the concept of education that we wish to express. What are these values? Let us look at them.

Truth

There are two ways of talking about truth. There exists a truth founded on science, on the intellect and upon reason which is an objective truth based on matter and the sensory perceptions. When we say that "All men are mortal" we indicate a truth verified by experience, established by science and supported by reason. When, on the other hand, we say that "All men are immortal" then we say a truth that goes beyond the intellect and beyond reason to trespass on the transcendental.

We can experiment this truth through our intuition, understood as our faculty of making our own the concept of immortality. This is a faculty which springs from love. The truth about anything whatsoever reveals itself intuitively when we love it profoundly enough. Such truth presents itself to us as a 'flash' that springs from the soul. This is the truth which is an integral part of the system of values. It is thus necessary to activate intuition in the child by an exercise of introspection and by a cognitive investigation of that which is right and that which is wrong, between good and evil. Good is good even if no one does it. Evil is evil even if every one does it.

The Moral Code: The Right Action

This refers to behaviour and hence the exercise of the will comes to play. When this exercise is carried out correctly then the action is right and moral.

"Will" is different from desire. If we want something very much and feel e must have it and act under this impulse, this is desire but not will. Will is art of intuition which is a reflex coming from the depths of us; this manifests elf in the right action when this is not invalidated by desire. The truth in tion is moral behaviour.

Peace

The centre of peace is the heart when it is not agitated by emotional nflicts and by passions. On the surface of the ocean we find stormy waves, t if we go deeper we find complete calm. This value forms an essential part education. A man can be intellectually developed but if he does not control emotions he will have an unbalanced personality.

Love and Non-violence

Love and non-violence are the fireside of the soul and the psyche of man. Love is an energy working in one direction only and not a desire that leads only to its satisfaction. If is not a give and take operation but it is a giving without asking anything in exchange because it includes this in itself. This love, whose characteristic is expansion, that is a projection towards when it succeeds in embracing the entire creation becomes non-violence, the apex of all human attainments in this life.

By the practice of the values, thorough a right vision of the truth, by the understanding and practice of the will, with the peace obtained through the balance of emotions we begin to experience universal love, the result of non-violence. This universal love flows spontaneously in personality which is pure and uncontaminated by undesirable impulses.

Education in human values means to educate in these five values-the truth, the right action, peace, love, non-violence, by means of which are trained and developed in a balanced manner the body, the intellect, the mind and the heart. It is useless to saturate the minds of the students with notions that they forget. Only by educating them and all to know their deepest and innate qualities will give them the capacity to give to their lives the right meaning and the just measure.

The Environment Core for all living matter, to consider trees as holy and forests as sanctuaries, rivers and streams into values, we can save them, protect them from pollution and thus lead to Sustainable Development for a Sustainable Society. It is, therefore, suggested and recommended to promote eco-philosophy and human values in all aspects of conservation and development. For the Himalayan conservation and development the author advocates that we must be conscious that we have not done any justice to Mother Earth. We have ravaged, pillaged, destroyed and slowly drained it of vitality. We have to make peace with it now, else there will be nothing left to sustain life on this earth. This greedy parasitic and materialistic mindset has to be returned to a caring, compassionate and participatory wave-length. Unless we change our conscious thoughts and behaviour annihilation is our only fate.

The earth is a sanctuary, so are the Himalayas not only for India but entire mankind. It is not an endless storehouse of materials to satiate human hunger for temporal consumption. We have to feel our earth and for the Himalayas. We have to cultivate human values. What are these values? These human values will make us all realise that trees are holy, forests are sanctuaries, Himalayas are sacred as also the Mother Earth which must be conserved and developed.

All, people, individuals, societies, organisations are invited to join in these endeavours howsoever feeble they are at present; because through such human values and not only through technical measures or economic considerations do we march towards a sustainable society.

Mother Earth will not improve unless people have in themselves a 'spark' which says from within "We are part of this ecology, our trees, our forests our watersheds, our water resources, our streams like the Ganga, preserve them for posterity. This in essence is "Eco-Philosophy".

Finally. Human Values are the key to sustainable society. We, in India, have to revive such values which are fast eroding. We have to learn a lot and unlearn a different lot. I would like to share with the people the highlights of two centres of enquiry which brought out two publications -

1. Envisioning a Sustainable Society.
2. Human Values - A Voyage from 'I' to 'We'

To meet the increasing challenges in India, like the rest of the world, we have to give predominant place not only to problems, techniques and methodologies of watershed management and development as bricks of the structure of our society but we have to go much beyond to the principles and practices of eco-philosophy and to Human Values as a voyage from 'I' to 'We'. These will bring in real terms physical, mental, moral, psychological and spiritual sense to people's participation in meeting these challenges.

Review

Book Title : VEDIC PHILOSOPHY FOR HIMALAYAN ECO-SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Editors : Dr M.L. Dewan
and
Prof. B.D. Joshi
Release Date : February 17. 1984
Venue : India International Centre,
New Delhi
To be released by
(Chief Guest) Dr. Karan Singh
To be presided by Pro. Sher Singh
Ex- Minister of State, Education and Defence
Member Planning commission and Presently,
Chancellor, Gurukula Kangri University, Hardwar
Function Hosted by Indian Association for Advancement of Science.
President -Dr. K.P.A. Menon
Secretary General - Shri Pradeep Chaturvedi
Publishers : Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, as part of Concept Discovering Himalaya Series, No.3.

The above titled book is a compilation of research papers presented at the National Seminar on "Vedic Philosophy and Himalayan Eco-system Development held at the Gurukula Kangri University, Hardwar, during February 14-16, 1991, in association with peoples commission on Environment and Development (PCED), India, Presided by Dr. Karan Singh as its Chairman, and the Indian Academy of Environmental Sciences, Hardwar.

The book contains 25 chapters (write-ups) on various aspects of Vedic Philosophy and Himalayan Eco-system-scenario, Management, problems, prospects and sustainable development. The 25 chapters are divided into two parts. Part I contains 15 articles in English while Part II contains 10 articles in iiHindi, besides English and Hindi versions of II PCED Meet. The book is unique in the sense, that it was perhaps, for the first time that Vedic Scholars highly proficient in Sanskrit literature with deep interest in our ecological and environmental ethos and knowing the state of art of Himalayan system have contributed to the book along with environmental scientists and promoters, N.G.Os and scholars. The list of contributors includes eminent persons like Dr. Karan Singh, ex Ministry for Tourism, Health, etc. Government of India, and well-known scholar of Indian culture and philosophy, Shri Sunderlal Bahuguna (Leader of Chipko Movement), Prof. Krishna Kumar, retired professor of Sanskrit, Garhwal University, Srinagar, Acharya Ramnath Vedalankar, ex-Pro Vice-Chancellor Gurukula Kangri University, Dr. M.L. Dewan a retired Scientist from F.A.O., Prof. B.D.J. Joshi, Dean Faculty of life Sciences, Gurukula University Hardwar, Dr. Rama P. Coomarswami, a Medical Practitioner from U.S.A., Prof. Henryk Skolimowski, Professor of Eco-Philosophy from U.S.A. and Poland, Prof. Mulk Raj Chilana from N.C.E.R.T. and many others.

The book vividly describes the Vedic concepts of ecology and environmental aspects of Himalayan system in particular and how the environmental values were imbued in our routine cultural ethos - as described in ancient vedic and Sanskrit literature. Articles like Paryavaran Ved Ki Drishti Mein by Pt. Ramnath, Ved mein Paryavaran pradershan tatha use door karne ke upaya by Pt. Manohar Vidyalankar, Vaidic Vdranganaya avam Ramayan Mahabharat mein Himalaya Evam Paryavaran by Dr. Mahaveer Agarwal, Vedic Samhitaon mein Paryavaran by Dr. Bharat Bhushan, come under this category.

The articles like Traditional Values and Ecology, by Rama P. Coomaraswami, Ecological Spirituality and Reverential Development by Prof. Henryk Skolimowski, Vedanta in Nuclear Age by Dr Karan Singh and Vedic Philosophy of Education and Himalaya by Prof. M.R. Chilana present spiritual aspects of Himalayan Ecology, Indian educational ethos and Aryan concepts of environment. And then, articles like A strategy for Himalayan Eco-System Development by Dr. M.L. Dewan, Eco-System Development in Himalayan foothills : An integrated approach by Prof. B.D. Joshi - A System approach to Himalayan Eco-Development by Shri Ashwani Kumar, Present their views based on their decades of field work on how best the Himalayan Eco-system can be managed - in all its perspectives. The very important aspect of social awakening on environmental issues are described in the articles like Himalaya Prasna Phuchhta hai by Pt. Sunderlal Bahuguna, Samajik Vamikee Aur Rashtriya Vam neeti by Shri B.P. Nautiyal, Himalaya Ka Van Aushdhiya Parxyavaran - Vedonse Vartman tak by Dr. Vinoda Upadhyaya and Ecological Impact Assessment of Religio touristic activities in Himalayas pose challenging questions before us all.

In the book, each chapter begins with a Vedic Hymn-which itself in two to four lines, speaks volumes about Vedic concepts of ecology and environment, Creator and the creation, nature and its inhabitants.

The editor duo of this book Dr. M.L. Dewan and Prof. B.D. Joshi are working on various aspects of Ecology and Environment in particular. Each one of them has made a niche for himself among the most active environmentalists and scholars of this country. A number of books and hundreds of articles on myriad aspects of ecological issues have been published by the two.

Editorial

The Discontinuity of Space and Time

Miodrag Cekic

In the short article "The graininess of space and time" *New Scientist*, 4 May 1978, P. 291) we are informed that Dr. Robert Ehrlich from George Mason University in North Virginia is going to provide evidence that space and time are not continuous but discontinuous and that they can only be measured in multiples of finite units. Prof. Ehrlich also maintains that space and time may only be defined at points in a four-dimensional "lattice".

In connection with this I would like to remind that the Serbian scientist and philosopher Branislav Petronijevic (1875-1954) had the same conceptions of space and time. Petronijevic was not an experimental physicist; he built his conceptions of the discontinuous nature of space and time logically and mathematically and on the basis of this concept he produced a new discrete geometry system.

Petronijevic exhibited his conceptions in the following publications : (1) *Principien der Metaphysik*, *I*, *II*, Heidelberg 1904, 1912; (2) Uber die GroBe der unmittelbaren Beruhrung zweier Punkte, *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*, Leipzig, 1905, IV, 2, S. 239-268; (3) *Die typischen Geometrien und das Unendliche*, Heidelberg 1907; (4) A multi-dimensional space conception, *The Monist*, Chicago, 1907, Vol. XVII, No 4 (October), p. 630-631; (5) L'espace dsscret et la geometrie non-euclidienne, *Archlv fur systematische Philosophie und Soziologie*, Berliu, 1928, XXXI, 3-4, S. 297-305; (6) Elementare Ableitung der nichteuklidischen Geometrien, *Publications mathematiques de l'Universite de Belgrade*, Belgrade, 1937, VI, p. 89-112 and in other papers in Serbo-Croatian.

The following scientists and philosophers are among those who have written about his conceptions : (1) Anonymous (*Nature*, London, 1905, Vol. LXXII, No 1856 (25 May), 75-76); (2) B. Russell (*Mind*, London-Edinburgh, 1905, Vol. XIV, No 53, 128-129); (3) Paul Carus (*The Monist*, Chicago, 1907, Vol. XVII, No 2, 316-317); (4) J. Laird (*Mind*, London, 1913, Vol. XXII, No 87, 421-422); (5) L. Couturat (*Bulletin des Sciences mathematiques*, Paris, 1905, XXIX, mars, 58-60); (6) G. Milhaud (*Revue philosophiques de la France et de l'Etranger*, Paris, 1905, LX, No 12, 648-650); (7) N. Popovich (*Die Lehre vom discreten Raum in der neneren Philosophie*, Wien und Leipzig 1922, S. 77-89).

I should recommend that modern experimental physicists and mathematicians read the very useful books and articles of Petronijevic, in which his new conceptions of space and time are expounded.

If Petronijevic's conception of the discontinuity of space and time were experimentally verified, it would not be the first time that any theoretical anticipation was afterwards empirically or experimentally verified. The theoretical anticipacion of the Italian Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) about the infinite multitude of worlds is already verified. The anticipacion of the Serbian Rudjer Boskovic (1711-1787) about atoms as centers of forces has also been verified and is accepted nowadays.

I

Chronic Ego is Curable

(Sikh Religion Perspective)

Samsher Singh

The dictionary meaning of word 'chronic' is 'lasting a long time'. The word 'ego' is from the Latin root which means a conscious thinking subject. It stands for the self. It is subject consciousness stands for 'I' and 'me'. *Haumai* and *Ahankara* two synonymous words for ego are available popularly used in ***qurubani*** (Divine poetry of Guru Granth Sahib). *Ahankara* is a Sanskrit word stands for 'I maker' or 'I doer'. *Haumai* is ***prakrit*** and Panjabi from of Ahankara. Haumai is compound of two words hau+mai both indicate the meaning 'I' 'I'. Haumai creates the sense of I-ness and my-ness. The elimination of egocentricity is the only way to see the God.

> When ego is stills one destroys the sense of other.
> (Adi Granth, p. 943)

Ego is a subtle mental phenomena, a sense of individuality and create separate identity. It is a ignorance of spiritual kind makes the man self-seeking, self-assertive and selfish. The sense of I-am-ness is a mixture of price and self-centeredness: It is a subtle curtain of ignorance causes a great hindrance between man and God. Ego-centric man neither understands himself nor has good views for others. In Gurbani ego is taken as serious mental disease It is more serious and fatal for man than any other physical suffering. Most of the outer sufferings are the results of mental disharmony and tension. Where mental cure is more necessary on the otherside it is more difficult to cure also. Most of it is caused by ego.

In Guru Granth Sahib different shades of ego are mentioned by Guru-poets. Guru Angad Dev said it a 'chronic malady', Guru Amar Das named it 'great malady' and Guru Arjan Dev used word 'deep malady' for it and said that ego is the root cause of all evils. It stands for thick wall between man and God. Fourth Guru, Guru Ram Das says :

The both (jiva) and groom (Lord) hide together. But between
the two the stonewall of I-am-ness. (A. G., p. 1263)

At many places in Gurbani ego is mentioned a disastrous incurable disease. It was mentioned to make the worldly man conscious about its bad effects. Guru's teachings are always have the positive and optimistic attitude towards the aim of human life. In Asa di Var it is mentioned, ego is a serious malady yet its cure is with in ;

Ego is a chronic malady
Its remedy with in (the man) that is
The graceful Lord gives the Divine word.
(A. G., p. 466)

In most of the cases in the aim of human life Guru-poets first raises the question and then answered in a positive way. Take the case of Japuji : The problem raised before man i. e. How to become a *sachiara*' and the solution is given in the same stanza, "to follow the will of God". What is that Will ? Answer is there given :

Whosoever realises the significance of Hukam (Will)
He never takes in ego.
(A. G., p. 1)

To remember the Name of God
With body and soul
It is predestined.
(A. G., p. 199)

Ego is the creation of God. Guru Nanak says that the whole play of the Universe is caused by the sense of ego.

The whole world came into being
Through the sense of individuation.
(A. G., p. 943)

Man's body is a temple of living God. Ego is existing too in the body which makes the man unable to see God in his own self. It is called spiritual ignorance. Ego is subtle curtain between man and God.

I hear He (God) is near too near
But seeming Him not
I consider Him far.
(A. G., p. 624)

Source and Means to Cure Ego

As mentioned earlier *Nam* is the cure of ego. What is Nam ? It is continuous remembrance of God's presence in every creature. It is self-realization. Nam is a dynamic power of God prevailing everywhere as current of electricity is available in every wire. It is not solid matter realizable from outside. It is realizable from inside of mans self.

The word of Guru sheds the ego.
When ego is stilled evil is turned into good.
(A. G., p. 18)

Nam of God is not a mere word or group of letters: Nam is a vital force. When the light of Nam is lit in the mind it becomes pure and stainless. Nam and ego are two opposite forces cannot stay at one place. Both are in the same body of man. When the dynamic power of Nam dominates then ego is eliminated.

Ego-centricity and Lord's Name are inimical
Both cannot stay at one place.
(A. G., p. 560)

Nam is the exiler of life, the cure of all ills. Nam from the absolute point of view is the aim of man's life, and from the instrumental point of it is a mean to achieve that aim.

God blesses the man with Nam through the Guru. Guru in Sikhism is representative of God on this earth. He comes with the command from the Almighty to set the righteousness in the world. Guru an enlighted soul is a torchbearer to guide the man in the spiritual darkness. The torch of Nam destroys the spiritual ignorance. In Guru Granth Sahib Nam, 'Hukam' and 'word' are synonymously used. The Sabad of Guru is dispeller of duality of mind. Guru says :

The wisdom of Guru is like a mighty sword
That cleaves the fortress of one's sense of duality.
(A. G., p. 1887)

The Guru bestows the Nam for spiritual awakening of his disciple. It leads ultimately to achieve the goal of life i. e. the salvation. Nam is the essence of Truth. In Sikhism man by birth is not sinful. He was born with godly qualities. Under the effect of ego he has become the victim of lower animal passions. Nam assures the devotee to overcome the passions. The vices turns into virtues through the Nam and man becomes able to control his outgoing senses.

Nam eradicates the dirt of ego, washes the sins of the sinner. The realisation of Nam makes the man submissive and God-fearing. He surrenders to the Will of God with body and miud. With this act of humality his self becomes pure. He becomes able to discriminate between right and wrong, true and false. He surrenders all his activities in the name of God. His ego is stills and outgoing mind turns inside, I-ness and my-ness is eliminated. All sinful acts are washed.

Name is dispeller of spiritual darkness
And enlightens the dark mind.
The dirtness of ages is washable only with Name.

Sabad (Word) of Guru is Divine knowledge gives immortality to the devotee. It shows the spiritual path. It is sharper than the double edged razer which cuts all kinds of barriers like ignorance, attchment and duality. Sabad is penancea for all ills. The intoxicated ego mind is disciplined with goad of Sabad. The man who dwells upon Sabad conquers the five passions (lust, wrath, deceit, pride and attachment) and acquires five virtues (truth, contentment, compassion, righteousness and fortitude.) Sabad is a ocean of serenity that destroys all kinds of ego. The soul with the help of sabd frees itself from the prison house of finite body.

The Lord created the world and also infected it with malady of
ego
And purged only if one enshrines the word (sabad) in the mind.
(A. G., p. 1109-10)

Another effectful step to eradicate the sense of ego is to attend the congregation of holy men. It is not mere gathering of men of a community. It is a society of those dedicated souls who have surrender themselves before the enlighted (Soul) Guru with body and mind and recite only the Nam of Almighty God. The congregation of pious people is like a tank of nectar in which all kinds of sins are washes. The concept of congregation in Sikhism is unique in the sense that it realises the presence of Guru in the holy society.

The dirt of egoism of ages which soiled the soul
Will be removed only in the society of the holy
(A. G., p.)

The concept of holy society is unique in Sikhism in the other sense too. The altruistic devotee where free himself from ego there he makes the whole generation to get rid of the ego malady.

The lover of truth and holy society not purged one's inner ego
But also emancipate one's whole generation.
(A. G.; p. 1087)

The idea of servic (seva) in Sikhism is also an important factor for the eradication of ego. Seva is an act to do good for others without any reward. To be useful for others is one of the funamentals of Sikhism; Religion is an inspiration of love. To render free service to the mankind is a tree service of God. It is a unique point of Sikh religion that makes love and labour both the part of life.

Unselfish service to the people silences the ego of man and brought him to quintessence of Divine knowledge. Divine knowledge is an inner voice which keeps the devotee always awake on the right path of life. The act of selfless service is helpful for man to shed his ego With continuous service to others the goodness conquers the evil and evil habits and activities are replaced to good one. Bounds of all kinds are loosen. The mind get rid off all afflictions and works in disciplined manner.

The act of prayer also played an important role to overcome the bad effects of ego. In Sikhism prayer is a yearning of soul to merge in the Divine essence. It is an act of communication between man and God. Sikhism is a religion of prayer and prayer minded people. Guru says :

> O God rid me of the poison of ego and attachment.

The fundamental principles of Sikh Religion mentioned here were all practised by Guru poets during their lifetime. Their practical way of life with full devotion was a good example for disciples to follow. Guru-poets blest their devotees with Nam: With the realization of Nam ego dies in mind, sins are dispelled and the sinner becomes free. Guru's personality free from ego is always pure like gold. Meeting with the Guru the sinner too becomes pure. This thought repeatedly stressed in Gurubani :

> Meeting with the saint (Guru) my sins are dispelled.
> Yea, this wise all the sinner are made pure.
> (A. G., p. 624)

The image of redeemed man from ego is like a swan who pick the pearls. He gets the union with God. He swims across the ocean of life and save all the kindreds. He seases to rely on his own efforts always leaning on the Almighty God. He sees God everywhere. Ego redeemed man render all his services in the name of God. He remains detached in all his dealings of life.

> The God conscious beings have saved a myraid
> Through the word, thus they overpower their
> I-ness and mine-ness and see the light of God
> Permeating all the three worlds.
> (A. G., p. 907)

2

Survival or Super-Psi ?

Stephen E. Braude

Introduction

Two questions have dominated parapsychology since the founding of the Society for Psychical Research. The first is : "Do human beings have psychic (psi) abilities (ESP or PK) ?". The second is : "Does human consciousness survive bodily death ?" The first question, in my opinion, has been answered satisfactorily in the affirmative, and although the road to that answer has been bumpy and somewhat circuitous, the issues are relatively staightforward—at least as compared to the second question. But the question about survival is almost transcendentally recalcitrant; it may, in fact, be impossible to rule out alternative hypotheses. Unfortunately, however, most writers on survival have failed to appreciate the point. Indeed, even the most sophisticated authors tend to underestimate the enormity of the theoretical challenges facing them. The goal of this paper is to bring some of their more serious shortcomings into sharper focus.

Any satisfactory discussion of survival must proceed along two fronts, one of which is empirical and the other of which is philosophical. In this respect, the study of survival is no different from any scientific investigation, except that in most areas of science fundamental philosophical assumptions usually from part of the received conceptual background. But in the case of survival research, deep philosophical issues dominate the foreground. For example, many have wondered whether the very *concept* of survival is intelligible. And as the reader may realize, some have decided that it is not, and have therefore argued that we should reject the survival hypothesis *a priori* (see, e. g., Flew, 1976).

Now I am by no means opposed to *a priori* arguments against scientific claims. In many cases, ostensibly empirical claims rest on thoroughly indefensible philosophical presuppositions, and those presuppositions often blind researchers to alternative ways of interpreting the data. That is perhaps most conspicuously the case in the so called cognitive sciences, a great deal of which is no more than bad philosophy couched in (and obscured by) the imposing technical vocabulary of the electrical engineer. Nevertheless, some *a priori* arguments are more persuasive and profound than others. And I consider the usual arguments against the intelligibility of survival to be quite shallow. Flew's arguments, for example, trade on superficial features of language use and suspicious thought-experiments whose plausibility rests on our meager imaginative capacities. In my view it is irrelevant how much difficulty we have imagining what survival might be like. Similarly, it is hardly surprising that we have trouble describing an after-life in terms designed for dealing with an ordinary embodied existence. What really matters is that it is relatively easy to construct hypothetically ideal cases so coercive that we would have no choice but to admit (or at least to entertain seriously) that survival of some sort is a fact, no matter how much of a challenge that poses for our familiar conceptual framework. Our ability to formulate such ideal cases shows that the evidence for survival cannot be rejected for the sorts of facile reasons provided by Flew. The more pressing question is to what extent actual cases approach the theoretical ideal.

But even the best real cases—and possibly also the best ideal cases—face certain purely conceptual obstacles. These have to do with the challenge from an alternative psi-hypothesis, usually called the "super-psi" hypothesis. As I see it, the most serious obstacle to taking even the best evidence for survival at face value is the possibility that the data can be explained in terms of highly-refined psi among the living. What I shall argue below is that no case so far investigated resists explanation along these lines, and that the usual arguments against super-psi explanations are seriously inadequate.

Super-Psi and the Ideal Case for Survival

Parapsychologists and others tend to approach the study of psi with a standard set of indefensible tacit assumptions. First, they often assume that if psi occurs, it occurs only to a very modest degree. Second, they usually assume that when observable (and not merely statistically demonstrable) psi effects occur, those effects will be sufficiently overt or unusual to be identified as psi events.

Both assumptions, however, are intolerably naive. Indeed, the former is methodologically egregious. Given our current degree of ignorance concerning psychic functioning, we simply have no grounds for placing antecedent limits of any kind on its scope or refinement.

To accept this point, it does not matter whether we believe that psychic functioning occurs or whether we are simply open, minded skeptics entertaining the mere hypothesis that psi occurs If psi can occur at all, then until we have evidence to the contrary, we must assume that it can occur at any level of magnitude or sophistication. In fact, not only do we have no evidence against the possibility of unlimited psi, certain bodies of data actually support it I have argued elsewhere that probably the best evidence for psi of any kind is the evidence of physical mediumship (Braude, 1986). But the best of those cases shows that psi occurs in froms far more subtle, complex and extensive than would be suggested by any of the results reported from laboratory experiments. A sober appraisal of the mediumistic evidence can only make us more open to the possibility of even more elaborate or sweeping effects.

The second uuwarranted assumption usually appears in attempts to argue that there is simply no evidence for super-psi. Many protest that if super-psi occurred, it would make itself known to us; but (they would argue), we have no evidence that people are able to do such things as psychokinetically affect the weather or make planes crash, or carry out sophisticated and detailed psychic spying. The assumptiou lurking beneath this argument is that occurrences of super-psi in everyday life will generally be conspicuous or easily identifiable as such, and that they will not simply blend in with or be masked by the extensive network of surrounding normal events. But that assumption is clearly defective (for a detailed discussion of the issues, see Braude, 1989). As far as physical phenomena are concerned, there need be no observable difference between (say) a normal heart attack or car crash and one caused by PK. The only difference may be in their unobservable causal histories. Similarly, there is no reason to suppose that information gathered by ESP has to hit us over the head with its obviousness. It needn't carry some marker—a phenomenological analogue to a flourish of trumpets—which identifies it as paranormally derived rather than random or internally generated normally.

When we think about the possible operation of super-psi, we must be careful not to suppose that it functions in total isolation from the full range of human needs and organic capacities. Quite the contrary: it is more reasonable to suppose that psi plays some role in life, that it may be driven by our deepest needs and fears (rather than those of which we are immediately or consciously aware) and that it does not occur only when parapsychologists set out to look for it. Moreover, if psychic functioning may be a component of everyday life, we must be open to the possibility that, like manifestations of other organic capacities, occurrences of psi will range from the dramatic and conspicuous to the mundane and inconspicuous.

In fact, it may be in our psychological interest for most psi manifestations to be covert. In the case of PK, that would help to preserve the useful illusion that we are not responsible for events we might have brought about. And in fact, most of us are acutely uncomfortable about accepting the possibility that we might play an active (but covert) role in the misery and calamities that occur around us (Braude, 1986, 1989; Eisenbud, 1982). That concession would force us to accept a magical world view we somewhat condescendingly associate only with so-called "primitive" societies, a world view in which we need to take seriously the possibility of hexing (or the "evil eye') and other uses of psychic funtioning for malevolent and lethal purposes. Equally terrifying for most people is the fear that super-ESP might confer something like near-omniscience, or at the very least a far greater range of knowledge than we would be able to handle emotionally.

Let us suppose, then (if only to see where it leads), that we are not justified in ruling out the possibility of large scale or extremely refined psychic functioning. And let us consider how that complicates our assessment of the evidence for survival.

The Survival Hypothesis : Some Preliminaries

Before we can get to the heart of the issues before us, we must make some rather elementary, but very important, observations. First, we must resolve an important ambiguity in the claim that consciousness may survive bodily death. This concerns the distinction between *survival* of bodily death and mere *life* after death. To be a case of survival, properly speaking,t here would have to be a relation of *identity* between a post-mortem individual and an ante-mortem individual. In some sense, the two deserve to be considered the *same*. No doubt it will be difficult to state precise or generalizable criteria in virtue of which that sort of identity holds. Nevertheless, one might think that this sort of identity is not too different from the relatively familiar aspects in which other sorts of things remain the same through change. My body now, for example, is quite different from the body I had as an infant. Millions of cells have been lost and only some of them have been replaced; others have appeared for the first time as part of the normal growth process, and many of them have likewise been lost and occasionally replaced. Moreover, my thoughts and other mental states have evolved and changed deeply over time. In short, a person may remain the same in some important sense, despite undergoing a vast number of physical and mental changes. Similarly there is a sense in which an acorn is the same as the oak into which it evolves. But even if we grant that two things can be identical without being *strictly* identical—that is, without satisfying Leibniz's Law that every property of one is a property of the other, we must be open to the possibility that after bodily death there is life without survival. Suppose, for instance, that after death one's consciousness gets absorbed in a great universal soup of consciousness (or something of the sort). I'm not sure I understand that hypothesis; but I encounter claims like it all the time. In that case, we would say that although no ante-mortem individual is even loosely identical to (or survives as) a post-mortem individual, nevertheless there is some sort of post-mortem existence.

Another vital preliminary distinction concerns two different sorts of knowledge. Generally speaking, a case suggestive of survival is one in which one or more living persons display knowledge closly (if not uniquely) associated with a deceased person, and which we have good reason to believe could not have been obtained by ordinary means. But that knowledge tends to fall into two broad categories : knowledge *that* (information or propositional knowledge) and knowledge how (abilities or skills). For example, some cases hinge on pieces of information displayed by a living person, which could not have been obtained normally, but which would have been known to a deceased person now ostensibly communicating that information. In other cases, however, a living person (say, a professional medium or a child) displays an ability or skill she never displayed before (say, the ability to speak a certain language, or write music), or perhaps an ability or skill quite idiosyncratic to a deceased person (say, a certain distinctive style of humor or musical composition). And of course, in an impressive case of this type, we would have good reason to believe either that these abilities could not have been acquired by normal means at all (say, if they are likely to be organic endowments which only a few enjoy) or that they could only be acquired normally after a period of practice which we are quite certain never occurred.

Many would say that the cases most strongly suggestive of survival are those of the latter sort, displaying the persistence of knowledge how I tend to agree. But many mistakenly think that cases of both sorts eastly resist alternative explanations in terms of super-psi. Let us therefore, consider the issues surrounding each type of knowledge. This should help us to appreciate, first, why the apparent persistence of abilities or skills is more impressive than the mere disploy of propositional knowlege, and second, why not even the manifestation of abilities is as coercive as it might first appear.

Super-Psi and Propositional Knowledge

To simplify matters, let us assume that the cases under discussion are always well-authenticated. In other words let us assume first, that the hypothesis of fraud is highly improbable, and second, that we have good reason to believe that events occurred as reported. By assuming that testimony is honest and that observation and testimony are reliable, we may therefore concentate on *explaining* the phenomena observed and reported. And let us assume, further, that there is good reason to believe that no explanation in terms of currently understood processes is wholly satisfactory. In that case, we may jump immediately to the question of which alternative account, in terms of presumably paranormal processes, we shonld embrace.

Now in a number of cases of ostensible mediumship and reincarnation, persons exhibit unusual and surprising pieces of propositional knowledge. Some of the best examples of this sort are cases featuring what Stevenson has dubbed "drop-in" communicators. As the name suggests, "drop-in" communicators appear without inviation, and are usually unknown to both medium and sitters. In the best of these cases, the "drop-in" communicators make various statements about themselves which are later verified and which nobody present at the sitting knew to be true through any normal means.

As Gauld (1982, Pp. 58ff) has properly observed, such cases would seem to discourage super-psi explanations for two main reasons. The first concerns the identity and apparent purpose of the communicator. One would have to explain why the medium (or someone else present at the sitting) used their ESP to obtain information about an individual unknown to those present and at best only tangentially connected to one of them. One would also have to explain why the communicator supplies information of no apparent inters but of understandably serious concern to the communicator. (A good example is the case of Runki's leg, reported in Haraldsson and Stevenson, 1975.) By contrast, the survival hypothesis seems rather straight forward. To put it simply, a deceased individual needs to deal with a matter of importance to him (e.g., to console a grieving relative or take care of some unfinished business), and so he seizes the apportunity of the sitting to get his message across.

The second obstacle for super-ps*i* explanations concerns the obscurity and diffuseness of the information which the medium (or someone else) would have to acquire paranormally. To begin with, in many cases that information is quite arcane and apparently irrelevant to sitters' concerns—for example, the fact that the ostensible communicator was buried without one of his legs, which he lost in the accident that killed him. And although in most of those cases the information would need to come from only a single source (such as a written record, or one living person's memory), in others the information would have to be assembled from separate and equally obscure sources (e.g., different written records and memories). By contrast, on the survival hypothesis, the necessary information may all be reasonably attributed to the communicator.

Both of these alleged problems strike me as overrated. In fact, the second may be dispensed with rather quickly. Since we presently have no grounps for imposing any antecedent limits on the scope or refinement of psychic functioning, we are simply in no position to assert that accessing multiple sources of obscure information is any more imposing than accessing one. In evaluating the super-psi hypothesis, we must be careful not to treal the processes involved as if they were simply a collection of really good psi, of the kind we apparently see in limited forms in some lab experiments. When we do that, it is all too easy to think that psi functioning involves an *effort* of some kind, and that if one psi prrformance is difficult, several ought to be out of the question. But in fact, in all its intimidating richness, the super-psi hypothesis should perhaps be called the *magic wand* hypothesis. It asserts that (as far as we know) anything at all can happen, given the relevant need for it to happen. For example, we needn't suppose that refined PK must be accompanied by constant ESP vigilance of the results of one's activities, in the way that driving a car requires sensory feed-back. It may be enough simply to wish for something to happen, and then it does. Task complexity is simply not an issue. (Ironically, the irrelevance of task complexity has been emphasized even in laboratory experiments on random number generators; see Braude, 1979; Schmidt, 1975, 1976).

The first problem, that of explaining the identity of the communicator, raises a rather different set of issues. Gauld notes correctly that the survival hypothesis has obvious advantages when it comes to explaining why the medium selects one unknown deceased person rather than another unknown deceased person as the subject for her extrasensory researches. The deceased person selects himself. (1982, p. 61) Indeed, as Stevenson once remarked, "Some 'drop-in' communicators have explained their presence very well" (1970, p. 63). But according to Gauld, on the super-psi hypothesis 'we seem reduced... to supposing that selection of communicator depends upon the random operation of wholly unknown factors. (1982, p. 59). Stevenson concurs, and his way of stating the point brings its weakness squarely into the open. He writes, since the [super-psi] theory assumes that discarnate personalities do *not* exist, it has to attribute motive for a particular mediumistic communication or apparitional experience to the subject. But evidence of such a motive is not always available, and we should not assume that one exists in the absence of such evidence. (1984, p 159)

The proper reply to this has two parts : first, that we should not assume such evidence is absent unless we look for it, and second, that hardly anyone looks for it, except in the naive way we expect questionnaires or causal conversations to reveal the deepest secrets of one's soul, or the half-hearted or superficial way searches are usually conducted by the lazy or frightened. If the motives in question exist, they are unlikely to reveal themselves to the sorts of surface investigations Stevenson and others conduct. Without an extensive and penetrating examination into the lives of clearly relevant (and perhaps even seemingly peripheral) personnel, we are simply in no position to reject explanations in terms of motivated super-psi.

Some might feel that this criticism is unfair. After all, our goals and interests are often unconscious and difficult to discern, and in actual case investigations we may have no real prospect of ferreting out potentially relevant deep needs and concerns. That is especially true for the older cases, where we are no longer able to interrogate medium and sitters. Now I grant that in many (if not most) cases, we may never get a clear feel for the pertinent underlying psychodynamics, no matter how hard we try. But that is no reason for not trying, and often we do not have to probe very far to glimpse some of the significant psychological activity simmering beneath the surface. Indeed, some case studies reveal clearly how muah we stand to learn from depth-psychological detective work. Probably the best example is Eisenbud's brilliant analysis of Mrs. Chenoweth's Cagliostro persona (1983). The case is complex and deserves to be read in its entirety. But in a ntshell, here is what it is about.

In 1914 James Hyslop held a series of sittings with one of his favorite mediums, Mrs. Chenoweth. Also present was Doris Fischer, whom W.F. Prince described exhaustively in his monumental study of her multiple personalities (W. F. Prince, 1915/16) and in Hyslop was interested because of his suspicion that multiple personality might be a disguised form of mediumship (Hyslop 1917). One of the most interesting of Mrs Chenoweth's trance personalities was a "drop-in" who emerged on several occasions over the series of sittings. He claimed to be Count Alessandro Cagliostro, the notorious eighteenth-century mystic, healer, and (as some have alleged) con-artist. His behavior at the sittings was vivid and flamboyantly salacious, but nevertheless rather one-dimensional. Cagliostro came through as a vigorousdefender of sexual freedom, including that of women, and as a severe critic of Christianity--indeed, "as a reckless blasphemer who wouldn't have lasted forty-eight hours in the Bhurch-nominated Europe of the time" (. 230). More importantly; however, the behavior of this trance personality corresponded to nothing in any of the accounts of his life published up to the time of the sittings.

The real Cagliostro was arrested in Rome in 1789 and brought to trial by the Holy Inquisition. Charged with freemasonry, heresy, and promulgating magic and superstition, he was condemned to death. That sentence was later reduced to life imprisonment. But it was not until 1972 that an account of Cagliostro appeared which presented the Vatican's version of the trial (the account was translated into English in 1974). That characterization was based on a digest of charges obtained in 1955 by the National Victor Emmanuel Library of Rome. The original was still held in secret by the Vatican. For various reasons surveyed by Eisenbud, it is highly unlikely that any of the sitters had normal access to the mat rial in the National Libriary, and Eisenbud's sleuthing turned up no publications citing the Vatican's version prior to 1972.

But again, perhaps the most striking feature of the trance persona was that it did not correspond to the picture of Cagliostro painted by all the reliable sources available not only at the time of the sittings but until the precent time as well. Not even critical accounts of Cagliostro accused him of being lascivious or religiously cynical. Indeed, there is reason to think that Cagliostro's trial was rigged, and that it was simply expedient for the Vatican to charge him with blasphemy and rampaging licentiousness.

Hence, there is no good reason to regard this case as presenting evidence for the survival of Cagliostro. But in that case, what was the function, psychodynamically speaking, of the Cagliostro persona ? Why should a colorful but historically inaccurate trance personality emerge who was so flagrantly sexual and religiously cynical ? Eisenbud offers numerous intriguing reasons for thinking that the Cagliostro persona had a great deal to do with, among other things, the sitters' sexual repressions and religious upbringing.

For example, Hyslop, who "apparently devoted much of his life to spiritual and moral development" (Pp. 233—4), predictably found the Count to be a deplorable figure. Hence, it seems both interesting and significant that, by his own admission, Hyslop repeatedly encountered non-spiritual "sensuous" characters in sittings he conducted. Moreover, Mrs. Chenoweth displayed a surprisingly intense attachment to the Count when it looked as if other communicators might banish him from the scene. Crying to the other ostensible communicators who tried to exercise him, she said, "You give him back [Pause] You give him back......Give the Count back to me." Hyslop asked who wanted the Count, and Mrs. Chenoweth replied, "We all do. We are lost. We are lost, we are lost, we are lost [Pause] Oh, Devils, to take him aways from us. [Distress and crying]... I won't stand it [Pause] I don't want your old God.I want the Count." Furthermore, Doris (like Hyslop) was a model of moral propriety. In fact, she seemed almost to be a caricature of naive virtue. According to W. F. Prince, "A purer, more guileless soul it was never the writer's good fortune to know". Prince also notes that Doris had a "notable lack of sex-instinct."

Now it apparently never occurred to Prince (or, apparently, Hyslop) that Doris' lack of sexuality may have indicated an inhibition of powerful sexual desires. And in 1914 nobody considered seriously the possibility of experimenter-influence, or more generally the possibility that persons other than the medium might play an active role in shaping the material presented by a medium. Eisenbud proposes, for these and many other reasons, that the Cagliostro persona might have been a composite "dream figure omnibus for the repressed unconscious hankerings of all the principals at the sittings" (pp. 237-8). And considering some of the startlingly close correspondences between the trance personality and the behavior attributed to Cagliostro by the Church, it appears as if one or more of Mrs. Chenoweth, Hyslop, and Doris Fischer psychically raided an extremely obscure portrayal of Count Cagliostro to provide some material for the sitting.

For present purposes, it does not matter particularly whether Eisenbud's psychoanalytic conjectures are correct. What matters is the level at which he attempts to evaluate the data. Still, Eisenbud's proposals do make very good sense of the evidence, including peculiar and otherwise unexplained bits of behavior on the part of the sitters. Hence, his analysis demonstrates clearly the potential benefits of depth-psychological probings. And, of course, since the Cagliostro persona corresponds only to a false characterization of the Count apparently cooked up by Vatican officials, the case is not even a remotely plausible candidate for the survival hypothesis. On the contrary, it strongly suggests the operation of a high level of dramatic creativity and some pretty dandy psychic functioning. But with this sort of evidence staring us in the face, it is both presumptuous and naive to rule out super-psi conjectures in cases where no comparable depth-psychological study has been conducted. Regrettably, however, by comparison to Eisenbud's standard of analysis, most other case investigations are unacceptably superficial.

Consider, for example, Stevenson's treatment of the Sharada case of ostensible reincarnation (Stevenson, 1984). Since the most striking feature of this case is the evidence it offers for responsive xenoglossy—hence, the persistence of an ability or from of knowledge *how*, it does not exemplify the sort of case we are currently considering. On the other hand, since we are presently focusing on the need for depth-psychological investigation in connection with the evidence for survival, discussion of the Sharada case is quite apt. The subject, a woman named Uttara, began to have apparent memories of an earlier life when she was in her thirties. These memoris occurred during dramatic changes in Uttara's personality, at which time she spoke a language (Bengali) which she apparently neither spoke nor understood in her normal state, and which she apparently never had an opportunity to learn.

Stevenson and his associates did a great deal of valuable and careful investigative work to rule out explanations in terms of normal processes. Most of that investigation was devoted to uncovering the extent to which Uttara might have learned normally about Bengali history and customs, and whether she was ever exposed to the Bengali language in a way that would explain her apparent facility in speaking it. But despite all the detail Stevenson provides, the reader gets no feel whatever for Uttara and other relevant individuals as persons. We have no idea what moved them or what their needs and desires were. We get no sense of the profound personal issues that shaped their lives and actions. In fact, it is quite remarkable how little effort Stevenson apparently made to dig beneath the surface of their concerns, either in the actual course of investigation or in his subsequent evaluation of the case material.

A couple of examples should make this clear. One of the most glaring concerns Uttara'g relationship with a homeopathic physician which began prior to Sharada's first appearance. The physician, Dr. Joshi (a pseudonym), had been treating Uttara for a variety of physical ailments. For several years he treated her as an outpatient, and then (since her condition was not improving) he admitted Uttara to his private hospital. Uttara clearly felt strongly attracted to Dr. Joshi, and at times she behaved toward him like a jealous spouse rather than a patient. Eventually, Uttara's behavior became to annoying that Dr. Joshi had her removed from the hospital. Moreover, when Sharada finally appeared she claimed that the doctor was her bhusand from her "previous" life in Bengal.

Although Stevenson notes that Uttara's relationship with Dr. Joshi may have contribted to the appearance of Sharada, he has strikingly little to say about the nature of Uttara's interest in the doctor, or in the doctor's reaction to her affection. This is especially regrettable, since there are good reasons to think that there is more to their relationship than meets the eye. For example, Stevenson claims that Uttara had been "strangely moved" (1984, p. 105) when she first met Dr. Joshi, Now to put it bluntly, Stevenson offers no reason to think that there was anything strange about it, and in the absence of serious probing into Sharada's feelings toward the doctor in particular and toward men in general, that is a surprising choice of words. Indeed, it is out of character in a prose style that otherwise aims at being quite neutral (it may effectively reveal Stevenson's antecedent inclination to treat the case as indicative of reincarnation). Perhaps Uttara's feelings could justifiably be termed strange if they were really those of a deceased individual who had not yet clearly manifested in Uttara's behavior. But. Stevenson has given us no reason to think they were anything more than the common sort of attraction one feels suddenly for another, which we often later learn has quite pedestrian origins in our various hidden needs and agendas

Perhaps most notably, Stevenson tells us that despite Uttara's annoying displays of affection, Dr. Joshi visited her at home "a few times" (p. 105) after she had been discharged from his hospital. Stevenson attributes these visits to Dr. Joshi's "interest and perhaps compassion", but he says the doctor "indicated no deeper attachment to either Uttara or Sharada" (p 105). But Stevenson also notes that Dr. Joshi was evasive and unrevealing during attempts to examine the nature of his relationship with Uttara. The only explanation Stevenson offers for that evasiveness was that the doctor found Sharada's attentions embarrassing

But that explanation is hardl compelling, and Stevenson offers nothing to support it in the face of rather obvious sorts of doubts. To begin with, why should Uttara's affection and attention toward the doctor be embarrassing ? Patients often fall in love with their doctors. Why would Dr, Joshi not simply take Uttara's interest in stride ? And if Uttara's behavior was so embarrassing and her attention "discomfiting and potentially compromising" (p. 105), why did the doctor visit her several times at home ? That could not have helped to quell the affections of his former patient, and it could only have offered further opportunity for embarrassing confrontations. If Stevenson is correct that the doctor's motive was interest or compassion, then one would think that either the embarrassment was not all *that* acute or else the doctor's interest and compassion were strong enough to overcome it. But if the latter, why would he have been evasive in an interview ? If he was feeling ordinary human compassion and a strong (but merely professional) interest in the case, might he not have been more cooperative and forthcoming in his interview ? Moreover, it is not particularly helpful to learn simply *that* Dr. Joshi denied feeling attracted toward Uttara (or Sharada). *How* did he deny those feelings ? What were his tone and his manner ? Might they have indicated that he had something to hide ? Stevenson tells us only that the doctor "practiced masterly evasion" (p. 106) during their interview.

Stevenson sheds equally little light on the subject of Uttara's feelings for men. He note that there may be some significance in the fact that Uttara never married and that Sharada claimed to be married. He concedes that "frustrated aspirations for an independent domestic life may have found fantasied satisfaction in the role of Sharada" (1984, p. 144). But since Sharada "hardly satisfies all the criteria of the idealized, fulfilled, married woman," (p. 144), Stevenson dismisses that possibility with the rhetorical question, "why did she not complete the fantasy with a happy ending ?"

The proper reply to that question should be, "You tell me !" Certainly, Stevenson reveals nothing about Uttara's fantasy life to help us make those conjectures for ourselves. But in any case there is no reason to think that we generally express our fantasies in the straight forward and flagrant way Stevenson apparently expects. If a person were living out a fantasy in too obvious a manner, it loses much of its psychological utility. Moreover, our fantasies may simultaneously represent our feelings on a number of different issues. How, exactly, did Uttara feel about men, children, or marriage, or her parents' marriage in particular ? And how might that *constellation* of feelings have expressed itself in fantasy ?

Stevenson is equally unhelpful in his examination of Uttara's long standing interest in Bengal and her preference for Bengali culture over her own Marathi culture. But we needn't consider those issues here. I must also emphasize that the doubts I have been raising may come to nothing, and that Stevenson has actually interpreted the facts correctly. But on the basis of what little he has given us or has attempted to uncover, how is one to know ? One would think that the individuals interrogated in case investigations are, like the rest of us, teeming cauldrons of issues, hopes, and fears under the surface. But since there are many reasons for thinking that psi functioning is deeply need-determined, Stevenson's perfunctory peek into the heads of his subjects simply will not do. And unfortunately, that sort of skimming of the psychological surface is not limited to Stevenson's work. It is characteristic of virtually every treatment of the evidence suggesting survival.

Super-Psi and Knowledge How

Some writers on survival (including Stevenson) grant that we cannot rule out, *a priori*, explanations in terms of super-ESP. Even so (they would say), such explanations can only handle cases of apparent knowledge *that*. Hence, they would still fail to accommodate certain forms of knowledge *how*—in particular, the apparent persistence of a deceased person's abilities or skills. The general line of reasoning behind this position is as follows. Mere information or propostional knowledge is the sort of thing which can be acquired simply through a process of communication (normal or paranormal). But skills, such as playing a musical instrument or speaking a language, cannot be accounted for so easily. Granted, obtaining information is often a necessary part of skill development; but it is hardly sufficient. That is because skills are the sort of things which persons develop only after a period of *practice*. But since the subjects in survival cases who display anomalous skills have had no opportunity to practice them first, it is reasonable to reject explanations in terms of super-ESP and resort to survivalist explanations instead.

Although this familiar argument is superficially rather appealing, it is defective nevertheless. To see why, consider first how the argument has been applied to the evidence for responsive xenoglossy. Many have felt that if a person can carry on a conversation in a language never learned through normal means, and if that is the language of an ostensible communicator expressing himself through that person, then this would constitute good *prima facie* evidence for survival (see Gauld, 1982; Stevenson, 1974, 1984). Now as Stevenson has observed, this bit of reasoning rests on a crucial and usually tacit principle—namely, that "if skills are incommunicable normally, it follows that they are also incommunicable paranormally" (1984, p. 160). According to Stevenson, it was Ducasse (1962) who first applied this principle to the evidence for survival, and Stevenson apparently considers it to be self-evident, or at least not worthy of a defense. But in fact, Ducasse's principle is not nearly as obvious as Stevenson suggests.

Consider : if Ducasse's principle is true, that is not because it is an instance of the more general principle, "if any bit of knowledge *x* is incommunicable normally, then x is incommunicable paranormally. That general principle, in fact, seems quite clearly to be false.

Indeed, if we accepted it, we could conclude *a priori* that ESP is impossible. It is reasonable to assume, then, that Stevenson (and others) do not accept this more general principle.

Hence, if Ducasse's principle is true, it would presumably be true only of skills. But why ? Every time we learn a new skill we must do considerable bit of unlearning, if only of acquired motor and cognitive habits which would interfere with manifesting that skill. Moreover, learning of any kind (whether of skills or information) is often highly resistance-laden; it can be hampered by an endless number of interfering belief, insecurities, and other fears. But these sorts of physical, cognitive, and emotional obstacles are often overcome relatively easily in hypnotic or other profoundly altered states. But in that case, learning a skill might even be *facilitated* if the process bypasses the normal states in which our resistances to learning are strongest.

Actually, there are two crucial sets of issues here. The first concerns the possibility of expressing and acquiring skills by sidestepping our customary resistance-laden modes of cognition. And the second concerns the difficulty in generalizing about skills or abilities, including the ability to speak a language. These two sets of issues overlap somewhat, but I will try to keep them distinct.

To begin with, in order to decide whether skills can be communicated or acquired paranormally, one must first evaluate the rich and suggestive literature on dissociation.[1] For example, cases of multiple personality suggest that dissociation facilitates the development or acquisition of personality traits and skills which might never be developed or displayed under normal conditions. Alternate personalities exhibit wide varieties of behavioral and cognitive styles which are not explainable simply in terms of propositional knowledge (Braude, 1991). Those cognitive styles encompass various sorts of abilities and skills, such as artistic and literary ability, and the skills of drawing, sculpting, and writing poetry. Differences also manifest commonly as changes in handedness and handwriting. (And of course these abilities and skills, like those of a normal person, might occur in quite distinctive or idiosyncratic forms.) But since alternate personalities appear quite suddenly and sometimes evolve rather quickly, their distinctive traits might emerge without any practice. (I realize we are very close here to the second set of issues—namely, whether Ducasse's principle applies to *every* skill, or just certain kinds of skills, and whether there are, accordingly, relevant differences between kinds of skills, I shall return to these issues shortly).

Moreover, until one decides what to make of the case of Patience Worth (Cory, 1919; Litvag, 1972; W.F. Prince, 1927/1964; Braude, 1910), it is premature to dismiss super-psi—or simply non-survivalist—explanations of responsive xenoglossy. The medium in this case, Pearl Curran, with only an eigth-grade education, no apparent literary ability, and no apparent interest either in literature or in arcane areas of scholarship, suddenly began producing a steady stream of poetry, novels, and remarkably pithy and witty conversation through a ouija board. The material purportedly came from a personality named Patience Worth, who claimed to be a seventeenth century English woman. But there is little reason to think that the evidence supports the hypothesis of survival. Although Patience offered various clues regarding her origin and identitity, subsequent investigation revealed nothing to indicate that a Patience Worth ever existed.

A more reasonable interpretation of the case is that it demonstrates; even more dramatically than the usual good cases of hypnosis, the power of dissociation to liberate otherwise hidden or latent abilities. Although all the Patience Worth communications exhibit a distinctive and consistent personality as well as common verbal traits, Patienee expressed herself in several different linguistic styles. In fact, one of her works was a Victorian novel, despite the fact that (as the book's dust jacket wryly noted) Patience was a pre-Victorian author. Most of the time, however, Patience communicated in a quite unprecedented style rooted in archaic Anglo Saxon idioms. Much of her uocabulary was appropriate to the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, but some seemed to belong to a period several centuries earlier. Moreover, certain of the words she used on those occasions were tracked down by scholars only *after* they appeared in the Patience Worth scripts.

Many view Patience's literary works as being of exceptional quality, quite probably the best literature ever produced in a case of mediumship. But quite apart from issues of literary criticism, what matters here is that Patience Worth's poems and novels—and, indeed, her entire vivid personality—betray an intelligence and psychological style profoundly different from that displayed by Mrs. Curran. Furthermore, Patience's abilities and skills go well beyond anything Mrs. Curran (and, arguably, anyone else) ever exhibited. Patience was able to compose (often exquisite) poems on the spot, in response to requests to write poems on particular topics. She could compose several works (sometimes in distinct literory styles) on the same occasion, alternating passages of one wfth those of another. She could write part of a novel for a while, leave off in mid sentence to converse or work on something else, and then return to the novel the next day exactly where she had left off. More impressively still, with the exception of a beautiful child's prayer written haltingly and with a few revisions, Patience produced her entire corpus of thousands of poems and several novels without ever making a correction. She also performed astonishing compositional stunts. On one occasion she was asked to compose a poem, each line of which would begin with a different letter of the alphabet, from A to Z (omitting X). After a pause of a few seconds, the poem came through the ouija board as fast as the scribe could take it down.

The literature on dissociation, then, indicates that a person may apparently acquire, develop, or manifest novel abilities and skills under various kinds of abnormal circumstances. We are hardly in a position, then, to assert that the sudden appearance of new abilities and skills is impossible under even more extraordinary (i.e., paranormal) conditions. In fact, it seems we must plead ignorance here for reasons similar to those mentioned in connection with ostensibly paranormal propositional knowledge. We simply do not know what human beings are capable of under conditions we can scarcely comprehend.

Another (possibly deeper) set of problems concerns the way even sophisticated writers on survival (such as Stevenson and Gauld) generalize about skills. For example Stevenson asserts, "Practice does not just make perfect; it is indispensable for the acquisition of any skill" (1984. p. 160). There are at least two related problems with that claim The first is that skills can differ dramatically from one another in many respects, one of which is the importance of practice in skill development. I shall return to this point shortly. The second problem is that the *acquisition* of skills is not clearly the issue. All one is entitled to discuss, strictly speaking, is the *manifestation* of skills. We have no idea whether or to what extent new skills have been acquired by mediums or by the subjects of reincarnation investigations. This is not a trivial distinction, because practice is clearly not always needed to manifest skills for the first time.

To see this, one needs only to consider child prodigies and cases of savantism. In fact, typical musical prodigies such as Mozart, Mendelssohn, and Schubert, and mathematical prodigies such as Gauss, manifest exceptional skills *prior* to their being perfected or developed through practice. Moreover, it is of no use to protest that those prodigious skills were quite rudimentary when they first appeared, and that they simply evolved with amazing rapidity. For one thing, that seems simply to be false. For example, Mozart was able to write down a complex piece of music while composing another one in his head; but to my knowledge there is no evidence that he first had to practice that skill. But more importantly, we have no reason to think that the subjects in survival cases demonstrate levels of expertise more impressive than (say) Mendelssohn's initial displays of musicianship. Quite the contrary: the suddenly emerging skills of child prodigies often far exceed anything displayed by the subjects investigated in xenoglossy cases or other cases suggesting survival. But then, how do we know to what extent certain conditions (e.g., dissociation) may unleash prodigious capacities latent in many (or all) of us ?

Of course, we do not need to consider prodigies and savants to appreciate this point. Ordinary folk demonstrate it all the time. Consider; for example, the skill of playing tennis. Many people are naturally athletic, even though they may not be prodigiously gifted. And to the occasional consternation of those who are less precocious athletically, natural athlets can, on their first try, play a game of tennis reasonably well—at least without looking hopelessly foolish. In fact, on their first try they might even play as well or better than others who have played for years, taken lessons, etc. More importantly, however, the initial tennis-playing skills of natural athletes would—at the very least –match the rather unimpressive linguistic skills displayed in the best cases of responsive xenoglossy. (There is even an interesting parallel between conversing in a language and playing tennis. Responsive xenoglossy involves more than the ability to form sentences in a new language; it also involves understanding and responding appropriately to sentences in that language. Similarly, the skill of playing tennis goes beyond being able to get the ball over the net and in bounds. It also requires being able to return shots.)

To complicate matters further, when Stevenson argues that skills cannot be communicated or manifested without practice, he mentions riding a bicycle, dancing, and speaking a foreign language as examples. Similarly, Gauld writes,

> Th ability to play bridge will is not simply a matter of learning (whether normally or by ESP) the rules (considered as a set of facts together with the precepts given a some manual). It can only be acquired by practising intelligently until things fall into place. And it is the same with learning a language (1982, p, 102)

It appears, however, that there may be serious disanalogies between linguistic competence and these other skills. In fact, it is unclear whether one can even generalize about how difficult it is to learn a new language.

Let us take second things first and consider some aspacts of language learning: To begin with, learning a second language may be a significantly different process from learning a lauguage for the first time. And if the new language is not radically different from one's own, the sort of minimal linguistic competence displayed in cases of xenoglossy may require little more than some knowledge (that) of vocabulary and grammar, possibly paranormally acquired. After all, once one already speaks a language, a major part of learning a new language is exposure to it, whether that is through listening to actual conversations, or by watching movies, or listening to audio tapes in one's sleep (or while falling asleep). And of course, since we are entertaining paranormal hypotheses, we cannot rule out the possibility that subjects might have had the requisite exposure unconsciously and psychically. Sharada's mastery of Bengali, T. E.'s command of Swedish (or Norwegian), and certainly Gretchen's German (Stevenson, 1974, 1984) does not seem outlandish for an adult who might have been exposed to those languages extensively, but unconsciously (and even psychically), especially if we leave open the possibility that one's linguistic skills may be enhanced under dissociative or other unusual conditions. Moreover, the linguistic competence of Sharada, Jensen, and Gretchen is not as much of a feat as demonstrating a similar competence in a language *radically* different from one's own.

(I should note that there are cases in which mediums speak in languages (e. g , Hungarian, Chinese) which are quite different from their own and to which they presumably had no normal exposure. But quite apart from serious questions concerning the reliability of the data in those cases, in every case I'm familiar with some sitter present knew the language, and either they or someone else benefitted psychologically in rather obvious ways from receiving communtcations in those languages. At best, then, the possibility of sitter influence (including sitter-PK) and unconscious sitter-collaboration in these cases would be so strong that we are not justified in making much of the medium's apparently surprising linguistic competence.)

At any rate, if my earlier suggestions about language use are on the right track, then linguistic competence may differ significantly from other sorts of skills—for example, riding a bicycle, dancing, or playing the piano, expertise in which may be rather more independent of one'e other abilities and skills. Of course; if one who can already dance performs a kind of dance he never learned before, that is considerably less impressive than a dance performed by someone previously lacking in muscular coordination and rhythmic finesse. That is why the musical compositions of Rosemary Brown are less than compelling. They are clearly continuous with musical abilities she had already displayed, just as Uttara's command of Bengali is clearly continuous with her already well-developed linguistic skills in another Indian dialect.

Apparently then, what would be impressive *prima facie* evidence for survival is not merely the manifestaion of a novel ability or skill, but rather an ability or skill substantially different from and discontinuous with those one has already displayed. But in that case, it is irrelevant to point out how difficult it might be to acquire (or manifest) such skills as playing the piano or dancing without practice (ignoring, for the moment, the problem posed by child prodigies). The evidence for the persistence of skills suggesting survival contains nothing better than the evidence for responsive xenoglossy, and the best of those cases do not demonstrate the manifestation of skills radically discontinuous from the subject's other abilities. Hence, until someone does something comparable to playing piano, never before having played a musical instrument or exhibited any musical ability, I think we must conclude that this portion of the evidence for survival is considerably less impressive than its proponents have claimed.

Notes

1 Both Stevenson (1974) and Gauld (1982) do this to some extent. But both authors are saddled with an impoverished picture of multiple personality disorder (see Braude, 1991). Moreover, they both fail to discuss some of the more impressive cases of dissociation, such as Patience Worth.

Acknowledgments.

The final section of this paper is adapted from my Presidential Address at the 34th Annual Convention of the Parapsychological Association, Heidelberg, Germany, Aug. 9, 1991.

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3

The Philosophy of Samuel Fredrick Hahnemann—A Perspective

Shyam Deo Kumar Sinha

Hahnemann was very curiously anxious because no scientist or thinker had understood as Kant wanted them to do within the boundries of experience. Hahnemann said: "My fight to-day with the reform in Medical science would have been easier one" from the inspiration he got from Kant's critique of pure reason.

Dr. Hahnemann like Aristotle has a study of man's life in relation to his environmental situation, may they be sociological, ecnonomical, psychological etc.

The great anxiety for Hahnemann in the study of man's life and prospect was very much physiological which gradually entails his spiritual existence because Hahnemann had got this intution that man is essentially divine. But owing to its association with the physical body, it has many fold suffering.

Since philosopher both from East and West, have elaborately dealt upon the principles of good and evil, so Dr. Hahnemann cannot keep himself in exception. Like the great thinkers, he also dialated upon the prollem of evil and nature's abnormal and accidental situations which sometimes promote disease, pain and suffering in various ways.

Hehnemann was born at the time when there was a great upsurp of different philosophical and scientific thoughts which seem to dominate the European mind by turns. Idealism and materialism were the two schools of thoughts, each of which drew a large number of people under its respective fold. With this growth of human thought, socialism became inevitable and each scientific specialist was busy with his own particular sphere of knowledge and activity, but he was neverthe less, influenced by the general ideas of different philosophical schools which happened to capture the mind of the people for the time being the erudite scholar, the double headed prodigy of philosophy and learning was conversant with all these currents and cross currents of ideas and ideological conflicts. But as a man, imbued with true scienctific spirit, be kept himself free from being observed with any of those one sided theories—and vague concepts. On the other hand, he never committed the philosophical crime of "confusion of categories" of different orders of existence; What particular philosophical system he supported can be asscertained from his writings. It seems probable that he did not support any system 'in toto'. He accepted the reality of mind, life and matter, whereby. he supported name of the idealistic the materialistic the vitalistic schools-each exclusively to the rejection of other. But he seems to be learning towards vitalism Theoretical speculation for the sake of mentally constructing a consistent world negative the paradoxical nature of the actual perceptible universe had no charm for him. He was not prepared to assume anything which was not justified by sense experience. Matter he could not deny as it was perceptible to him. Life and mind he could not reject as their working phenomena were perceptible to him. To him, it was a fact that man, possessing a material body, is nevertheless a living, conscious being. He never bothered to discern how mind, life and matter each belonging to different orders of existence, got mixed-up in the consciously living organism. He did not bother his head to speculate on the metaphysical nature of life and mind. He was satisfied with observation that the material organism without the vital force is capable of no sensation, no function and no self-preservation. To him, organism is the fact and all that he needed is the correct and complete observation of all the phenomena manifested in and through the organism. Health is a condition of EASE and disease is a condition of suffering DISE-ASE) of the living organism. He does not go an inch beyond this factual observation. Sense-experience is the bed-rock of which he takes his firm stand. Philosophically speaking, he may be classed under the school of empricism with certain reservation. In fact, he was a vitalist too. In the words of Hahnemann . "Life can only be known empirically from its phenomena and manifestations...Human Life, in short, is in no respect regulated by purely physical laws which obtain among inorganic substances. They are definitely regulated by the laws peculiar to vitality alone."

Hahnemann is not basically a theoretical mataphysician, rather he applies his mataphysical ideas to the diagnosis and cure of human diseases. The system that developed for this purpose based on his philosophical ideas is known as Homoeopathy. He has depicted his philosophy of homoeopathy in his monumental work Organon. and 'Lessers-Writing'.

Organon as well an 'Lessens-Writing' is a Homeopathic philosophy in which Hahnemann mean to eradicate the total human suffering. In fact, he serves as a balm to the suffering humanity. All the aphorism contained in its the message as conveyed by Hahnemenn toward the homoeopathic discipline in order to enunciate his fundamental philosophical idea which entail the idea of EASE from DISEASE. As such the aphorisms so enunciated therein are just like the sayings of the Bible. There is neither the descriptions of a medicine even, nor the talk of a particular disease. It is mere the description of laws which allow us to follow the "Laws of Nature". Laws of Organon, which are philosophical laws are the explanation of the laws of Nature. It describes the relations between matter and consciousness and the ways of complete cessation of sufferings. It introduces the cardinal principles of Homoeopathy confining to life force or the vital force, the dynamic action of diseased force, dynamization i e. potentization of a substance and its action upon the plain of dynamic force (life force). Every substance of Nature can be used as a remedy for a sick one and Hahnemann finds that the substence into which Nature had packed the vibration corresponding to the vibration of the disease and the former wins over the latter. Such types of different attributes, known as symptoms' are found in every substance of Nature which correspond with the different morbid actions. The certain substance and a diseased man—both inherit similar characters of Dynamic force corresponding to each other, the Dynamic force of a potentized substance eradicates the morbid action of de-arranging the Dynamic force (vital force) of man.

Materia Medica is a book in which the total signs and symptoms of each well proved substance in different orders known as medicines, has been incorporated therein. The symptoms of a medicine will be the character of an individual substance which is mentioned in Materia Medico, not in philosophy of Homeopathic i.e. "Organon". A philosopoical approach stuck him in order to root out the cause of disease through the process of studying a man individually. He had the only mission to do some good to mankind through evolving a new theory of diagnosis i.e. Homoeopathy which he has depicted in his epoch-making book "Organon". He has left a foot print on the sands of time through the philosophy of his work organon, the law of "Similiar Similinus Curenter" i.e. like cures like totality of symptoms and the Invisible Nature of Disease in the context of the study of a whole. He gave the law of minimum and the law of potentizattion of medicines to act as Dynamic power, which is dealt within organon.

Disease is an invisible thing in Hahnemann's concepetion. It is a de-arrangement of the invisible vital force. To use a modern Simiia (similar) the symptoms constitute a moving picture like the figures on the screen of a cinema The vital and tangible part of the human body is the screen, the appearances and sensations of the diseased vital force are "Syptoms" and are analogous to the moving figures: but the operators producing the appearances are hidden from the audience. All the same, it is by locking on the screen that one can be able to defect the changes in the invisible life force in a way without going behind the screen. Hence the totality of symptoms' constitutes the disease as our sensus apprehend it. The academic name we give to it is a 'secondary matter'. As Hahnemann once said to a patient who asked him what disease was, and what he was going to give him, The name of your disease is no concern of mine and the name of the medicine I give is no concern of yours. The totality of the sign; paives and sensations as if, is for practical purposes, the concrete problem and less we trouble about the film and the light, the more clearly shall we able to follow the story discern our actual task.

We don't observe life but only living beings. We can study the the properties of a living organism and can, at best, differentiate them from those of non-living entities speculation about the essential nature of life belongs to the domain of metaphysics, whereas observation and systematisation of knowledge regarding the perceptible phenomena of life come under the field of science. We should not make confusion science of life with metaphysics of life. Hahnemann contends that as practical physicians, we are more concerned with the scientifica aspect of life; and that this condition of categories is the cause of failure in the are of the treatment. The chif source of complxity and difficulties in observing life-phenomena are due to the fact that life, though imgerceptible to our senses as life, always expresses itself through a material body. The result is that physicochemical phenomena are inseperahly mixed up with the vital noumena. All that it means is that both sets of phenomena and noumena exist together.

Hahnemann expressed in his work 'Organon', thus :

"In the healthy condition of man, the spiritual vital force (autocracy). the dynamic that animaterial body (organism), the rules with unbounded sway, and retains all the part of the organism in admirable harmonious, vital operation, as regards both sensations and functions, so that our indwelling, reason-gifted mind can freely employ this living, healthy instrument for the higher purposes of our existence."[10] "The material, organism, without the vital force, is capable of no sensation, no function, no self preservation, it derives all sensation and performs all the functions of life solely by means of the immaterial being (the vital force) which animates the material organism in health and in disease."[11]

Hahnemann observe one fundamental difference between a living and non-living body. The living body is endowed with sensations and functions and power of self-preservation (within certain limits) and reproduction.

Science is very much akin to materialism and its actions and reactions causes and effects and their impact on the environment; but if pondering with sufficient acumen and penetration, matter seems to be nothing but the experssion of spirit itself. It no longer remain a matter as ordinarily perceive by us. Here we want to make it more clear by taking recourse to the Vedantic conception of existence, consciousness (Satchidananda) in that spirit Matter loses its superficial meaning and it becomes as good as consciousness rather Matter, life, and mind are but different formations of that basic stuff of Satchidanada i.e. Existence. Existence is bliss in that respect the Universe is not a simple creation but a triple formulation of one Supreme Reality as Matter, Life and Mind. Each is as real as the other. The laws of nature and phenomenon of each category are as relatively valid as the other. Each plane of creating lends itself to the same method of scientific investigation. But there is a system of hierarchy in the scale of existence. Mind comes first, Life second, and the Matter lowest in the order.

He observed keenly that material substances used as medicine, which seems to be lifeless and spiritless; but it has the Dynamic spirit similar to the spirit of human being thrives into which has ascertained by Hahnemann by taking purin bark which produced Ague like fever. Again and again it has been proved by him in a healthy body, and found the same manifestation produced unnatural malady, and he (Hahnamann) came to the conclusion, the bark erradicates the suffering of the man, who would the symptoms or natural diseased manifestation similar to that. Material substance is the lowest order of Existence, has the dynamic spirit which cures the suffering virtually and dynamically. In this connection Hahnemann said— medicines could never care disease if they did not possess the power of altering man's state of health which depends on sensations and functions, indeed, that their curative power must be owing solely to this power they possess of altering man's state of health." "The spirit like power to alter man's state of health (and to cure diseases) which lies hidden in the inner nature of medicines can never be discovered by us a mere effort of reason, it is only by experience of the phenomena it plays when acting on the state of health of man that we can become clearly cognizent of it."

Hence it is obvious that the diseases excited by the dynamic and special influence of morbific injurious agents can originally be only dynamical (caused almost solely by a spiritual process) derangements of the vital character (principle) of our organism.

"We readily perceive that these dynamic derangements of vital character (vital principles) of our organism which we term diseases, since they are nothing also than altered sensations and functions; can also express themselves by nothing but by an aggregate of symptoms (totality of symptoms) and only as such are they cognizable to our observing power."[14] But Kant propogates that the noumena or the thing-in-itself is unknown and unknowable.

Hahnemann uses the word, 'spiritual' to qualify the phrase vital force', meaning thereby that the vital force is not perceptible to our senses and is therefore immaterial as opposed to sense perceptible matter. Hahnemann also said that it is only a metaphor and it is cognizable only by action which is actuated by intellectual energy. Hahnemann termed intellectual energy as 'soul' or vital-force. He said that it is the ignorance of a philosopher and scientist who have prided themselves on the cultivation of philosophy and medical science, not single step has been made towards an a-priori knowledge of the vitality of the bodily frame or of the intellactual energy (the soul) which actuate it. In this regard Hahnemann advised the wise teacher (Thinker or philosopher) to aware of this speculative ideas. Many medical thinkers are such who only value the conclusion based upon a-priori knowledge. One can understand the existence of supersensual realm but cannot perceive as matter. Disease force (except mechanical injury) is as spiritual as life force (vital-force), thus it could not be eradicated as material things. It should be eradicated dynamically by the process of phenomenal study (study of mental and physical symptoms) of noumenal existence (vital force) in the human organism, on the principle of 'Similia Similibus Curentur' [(drug which is already proved in healthy human body) and disease similarity]. Disease force is also noumena. It cannot be studied as Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics (because they are within the boundries of a-priori reasoning). Its (an a-priori) method is not psychophysical but on purely physical.

Hahnemann was a theist as well as scientist. For him God is not only the creator but does repair works whenever needed. Only tho e spiritualist physician can be the real healers who like God have real love for humanity thus Hahnemann was a spiritualist and a philospher of a eminence. He has given the philosophy of life of man kind.

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* Purvin is a plant. It is known as Cinchona (China) in the botany or in medical field. p. 478 (Lesser writings : S. F. Hahnemann).

** Ague fever—It is known as Malarial fever. It appears with chilliness and shivering (Bhargawa's Dictionary p. 23 & Lessers-writing's : S. F. Hahnemann, p, 523.

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4

Sprigge's Argument For Absolute Idealism

A. D. Naik

In his book *The Vindication of Absolute Idealism* Sprigge argues that reality is one mind-body complex which experiences itself as one all-inclusive whole. The argument is highly original and referishingly, brilliant. Sprigge in a novel manner combines his view with panpsychism. I am in great sympathy with his sort of absolute idealism. But here I shall be concerned with some possible objections to his argument for what he takes to be absolute idealism. At the end I shall briefly comment on panpsychism as it relates to his argument. 1. The main points on which the whole argument seems to rest is that (i) probably all actual relations are holistic, and (ii) probably all holistic relations are strongly holistic. A relation is holistic if it unites the terms into a greater whole. It is strongly holistic if the unity of the greater whole is such that the character of the whole suffuses every part such that no part could wholly retain the same character without that whole. (1983, p. 218)

It would follow then, as the main conclusion, that all physical things relate to form a larger whole and all psychic things relate to form a larger whole. It would also follow as part of the main conclusion that the physical whole would relate to the psychic whole to form a comprehensive whole. It could then be said that the psychic whole forms the inner filling of the physical whole so that reality is one mind-body complex which experiences itself as one all-inclusive whole.

The argument for relations being strongly holistic seems to rely on three examples, namely (i) spatial (ii) temporal and (iii) experiential. (1983, p. 220) The former two are basic to all physical objects. The latter two are basic to psychic objects. The physical and the psychic are the only kinds of concrete objects. Thus since all physical objects possess spatio-temporal properties they will be strongly holistically related. Since all psychic objects will be temporally and psychically related they will be strongly holistically related. All relations then will be strongly holistic. The psychic whole will then form the inner filling of the physical whole since the two wholes will be strongly holistically related. Consider my reconstruction of Sprigge's examples.

(i) If a cup is placed on a saucer it forms a relational whole of the sort called cup-on-saucer. The cup-on-top is one aspect of the relation and saucer-beneath another. A change in the spatial relation will result in a different relational whole. If the saucer is placed on top of the cup a relational whole of the sort saucer on-cup is formed. (1983, p. 194) In each case the character of the whole suffuses the parts. For they are part of a differently shaped object. But the shape of the cup or the saucer does not change.. In the first case, so we might suggest in an effort to clarify Sprigge's idea, the shape is a sort of flower, the cup being the bud and the saucer the leaves, in the second case it is a sort of face with a hat, the cup being the face and the saucer a hat. The parts do not seem to undergo any physical change. The parts do not change their essence. The change of position does not change the possibility of arranging cup and saucer so that the cup can be used to drink tea and the saucer to hold the cup in. But in the two cases each part makes up a different spatial part as determined by the shape of the differing whole.

(ii) Several musical notes succeeding each other in time result in a melody. If the temporal order of the notes is changed a different melody results. Do re-me-fa-so-la-ti-do, the simple one we all begin with for example is a different melody from do-ti-la-so-fa-me-re do. The notes in both cases are the same. But the notes themselves in the two cases will be suffused with different melodies. The melody is a temporal whole. Note however it is the different temporal order of the notes that gives a different melody.

(iii) One is basically a continuous consciousness, experienced as such, which is full of phases which are suffused with the consciousness which one is. If the phases of the flow of experience were not suffused with a single consciousness as an experiential whole they would be outside the flow of experience and so not experienced at all.

If the predecessor to an experienced consciousness and its successor were numerically different experiences than even though a given experience of consciousness emerges from its predecessor and merges into its successor, there would be no continuity in the experience of consciousness. For all three will be numerically different rather than numerically identical. But than each succeeding experience would have no consciousness of its emergences from the previous one nor would it be conscious of its merger into the next. We thus have to conceive of a larger whole of which the predecessor and successor to a given experience of consciousness are integral phases, which the whole, a numerically continuous but cumulatively expanding experience of consciousness, suffuses. This must be a numerically identical consciousness. (1983, pp. 6-9, p. 217)

(iv) It can than be concluded that if all relations are strongly holistic, as the above three examples suggest, then not only do the totality of physical things form a whole but the totality of psychic things also form a whole. For the most important strongly holistic relation is that of belonging together in a single experiential whole. (1983, p. 198) The whole of physical things then unites with the whole of physical things than unites with the whole of psychic things, and the psychic whole forms the inner filling of the physical whole. Together they become one all-inclusive whole. (1983, pp. 215-216, pp. 223-224)

2. (i) If there is a general argument apart from the use of the three examples above showing that a relation by its nature is strongly holistic it is not to be found in the book. Such an argument must show that a relation as a matter of logical truth is strongly holistic. Perhaps such an argument would have to utilize the relations of difference and identity and show that since these basic relations are strongly holistic, all relations necessarily are since all others are logically dependent on them. Or one may perhaps argue that there is a basic conceptual contrast which forms a whole from which all conceptual contrasts are derivable. Or one might try and find a necessarily self-referring strongly holistic truth from which all truths are derivable as only being strongly holistic.

(ii) To say that what is meant by a relation is something which connects the terms and thereby unites them into a larger existent is, it seems to me, no argument. For the logical relations of difference and negation, and the ontological relation of separatjon seem not of this kind, for they seem to disconnect the terms or objects. It could be said that difference is always in terms of qualities, and these whether affinities or contrasts may be holistic. A room decorated with shades of blue will form an aesthetic whole and so will a room full of shades of black and white. But as already stated the logical relations of negation and difference do not seem to be holistic. Nor does the ontological relation of separation. Even the basic relation of conjunction in logic is conceived non-holistically. It might even be argued that since logical relations hold between all objects and form the basic structure of the world all objects in the world are non-holistically related.

3. All relations do not seem to be holistic nor strongly holistic, and they do not seem to generate a larger whole of the same kind (in this case a self-conscious kind), as Sprigge's argument requires. Consider the following example.

The members of the Aristotlelian Society form a larger existent, a whole of interacting parts for the society is not an aggregate or collection. (1983, p. 145) In my pocket is an aggregate of things, a knife a comb, keys, coins bubble gums and a pen. They do not from a larger whole in virtue of being in my pocket. The relation here is non-holistic.

The parts of the Aristotlelian Society are self-conscious beings but the whole, which is not an aggregate of things as the contents of my pocket are, is not a self conscious being nor therefore is there a self-consciousness which suffuses the parts. Whereas if the relation were to be strongly holistic the whole would itself be a self-conscious ness suffusing the parts.

In so far as the members imbibe the values of the society the value-whole suffuses the parts. But this is a matter of degree and some may be members without imbibing most of the values. Yet the society is not an aggregate, despite the possibility of Britain having been occupied by the Nazis had the Aristotlelian Society been infilterated by members with opposite values during the second world war. Moreover the values would not turn the whole into a self-conscious one.

If the whole is not necessarily self-conscious but suffuses the parts then how do different finite centres of experience form a greater centre of experience ? The whole even in the case of strongly holistic relations need not be of the same kind as the parts.

It may not only be not of the same kind it may be larger and qualitatively superior For isn't the whole that is of the sort formed by the Aristotlelian Society of a superior quality because it is itself non-psychic ? For it is a society in which all are freely bound by the same strong rules which allows maximum freedom of thought generating greater quantity of superior quality work. The Aristotlelian Society is a better philosopher than God. Perhaps it is the essence of holistic relations that in some cases it generates larger existents of the same kind while in others it generates wholes of a different generic kind.

4. There are possible counter examples to the three examples in 1. All (i) spatial, (ii) temporal and (iii) experiential relations do not seem to be holistic and consequently strongly holistic.

(i) If three cubic objects x, y and z are placed a few inches apart in a straight line on a table they are related by the spatial relation 'next to'. But the relation is neither holistic nor strongly holistic. For the three objects do not from a larger existent nor therefore one which suffuses the parts. y is between x and z- The three termed relation between does not unite the three objects into a larger whole. They form a single spatial whole with the table but not with each other. If they are placed side by side touching each other they seem to form one perceptible thing. In this case 'next to' generates a whole but in the former it does not. The same spatial relation is in one case holistic and in the other not. If one is put on top of another then the three form a tower. A whole is generated by the spatial relation 'on top'. The relation in this case is holistic but not in the case where they are separate and next to each other.

If every relation is strongly holistic then any two stars must form a larger whole. It is hard to see how a star millions of light years away forms a larger existent with the star that is our sun. They do not form one star or any other kind of larger physical object though both may be part of the same galaxy.

(ii) World War II was an event which can be thought of as a whole comprised of inumerable smaller part-events such as the Battle of Britain and the Normandy invasion. But it is difficult to see how events further off in time from each other can form a whole even if they are parts of a chain of possible necessary events. Without the Greek triumph in the Greco-Persian wars the future of the world perhaps would have been considerably different. But these wars and World War II do not form a larger war-event. We might think of them as contributing to a larger non-war event. But if the relation between all actual things is holistic then any two objects must form a larger whole apart from other much larger wholes that the two may be part of It does not help to say that all wars are phases of one perpetual war for the survival of civilization. For it is these two wars, World War II and the Greco-Persian wars, that must form a larger war or some other kind of particular larger event by themselves aside from being phases of a perpetual war for the survival of civilization.

(iii) Experiences of mine from the distant past do not form a whole along with present experiences though they determine present ones and though there is a continuity of consciousness from the past to the present. Memories are contingent present occurrences and come to us haphazardly. At a given moment consciousness is not always a smooth transition from the past to the future but sometimes it is a groping forward with a lot of halts and backward steps. Each moment consciousness is not a larger cumulatively comprehensive coherent growth as the argument requires since each relation is supposed to be holistic. The truth is that the contents of consciuousness gather and dispel haphazardly at each stage.

To these counter examples it is possible for Sprigge to claim that holistic relations have unnoticed features or that our ordinary ways of thinking about them are defective. However Sprigge cannot claim that such features are beyond human perception. To any perceptive individual who makes the effort the features must be visible. The counter examples show that even for the perceptive individual the holistic features are not visible. If the holistic features are in principle beyond human perception they are of no value to us. They may as well not be. If they suffuse the parts they should be perceptible.

5. Sprigge's argument is based either on the premiss that all relations are holistic or that only some are holistic. If the former then the counter examples in 4 and the consideration of logical relations may refute the argument. If the argument is not based on this premiss then a specific argument is required to the effect that finite centres of experience add up to a greater single centre. But in either case my first example in 3 shows that finite self-conscious beings do not seem to add up to a greater self-conscious being.

6. One may object that the whole formed between any two objects does not have to be of the same generic sort. Thus the whole that unites two physical objects is not necessarily a perceptible physical object. What unites any two physical objects into a larger existent may simply be that some mind is experiencing them as a unit, but this may have no bearing on their status as genuine units in the visible world. This leaves room for objects very unlike each other and even contradictories to be holistically related. (1983, p. 145) But on the same grounds then the finite psychic centres may form a generically different larger whole, which is superlative but non-psychic.

Further if the all-inclusive whole is really the central experience alone which suffuses all things, then the totality of physical things may not form a single physical whole. But then the world may be constituted of a multiplicity of independent physical things each of which individually may have its own psychic centre. But this is an atomistic form of panpsychism. How can the all-consummating experience suffuse them all without turning them into one physical whole ? If it is transcendent to them then it my not turn them into a larger visible whole, but as immanent it presumably must.

7. Sprigge seems to argue for the possibility of a comprehensive experience rather than its actuality or even necessary actuality. For he does not argue that all relations are actually holistic but are probably so. If all relations are not necessarily holistic then they are contingently holistic. But then the relation between finite centres of experience and the centre which includes all finite centres in one is contingent. In that case either it may not exist or if it does it could cease to be. How is it then possible to argue that only some relations are necessarily holistic ? What argument can there be then that finite centres necessarily unite into one centre of experience ?

8. Sprigge's argument is from an emprirical standpoint. It is from an inductive standpoint. But arguments from an empirical-inductive standpoint are in principle incapable of showing that an experiential whole necessarily exists. It may show that it is possible. But then since the idea of a comprehensive experience is not self-contradictory it is a possibility anyway. Infaet any such procedure could add up finite centres only into a larger finite centre never an infinite or comprehensive centre.

Nor does Sprigge argue that more than one comprehensive experience is impossible. It may be that there is one self-existent material substance containing an infinity of comprehensive experiential centres each with a non-trivial unique perspective such that they all complement each other and influence each other but do not form a single most comprehensive centre.

9. Cannot there be two sorts of strongly holistic relations, contingent and necessary ? In the case of contingent ones the whole suffuses the parts but the parts could have formed a different whole and still that different whole would have suffused those very parts. In the case of necessary ones not only is it that the whole suffuses the parts but the parts could not have formed another whole than the one it did.

10. Why is it not possible for any one part to suffuse every other part and the whole ? Why is it that only the whole suffuses the parts ? The character of one of the proper parts of a whole can suffuse the whole while still remaining just one of several parts without being or becoming the whole it is a part of. At a given moment the state of my consciousness is determined by the part that dominates it. What may be a peripheral content of consciousnes may become focal and permeate the entire consciousness as when background emotion

may suddenly permeate one's entire consciousness. But in this case the part does not become that whole nor another whole nor does the whole become the part. Similarly the finite consciousness may suffuse and experience the comprehensive consciousness without becoming it or the comprehensive consciousness becoming the finite consciousness If so defining a strongly holistic relation as one in which the whole generated permeates the parts is insufficient to distinguish whole from part. It does not give us a necessary or unique characteristic of a whole.

11. There seem to be purely destructive relations in the world, and perhaps there has to be if the world of empiricisty and contingency has to be at all. There are relational activities and processes which destroy wholes rather than sustaining or building them. If all relations were stronly holistic there wouldn't be purely destructive relations. Even if actual destructive relations contribute to the formation of larger wholes by allowing new stronger foundations in place of unsound ones they are not in themselves part of larger wholes.

Still while dividing and separating are cases of destroying a given whole they perhaps involve reducing wholes to their constituents parts as wholes- There is reduction to lesser wholes, more dependent wholes. So paradoxically all relations may form wholes but not necessarily be holistic and form larger wholes. By holistic we must then perhaps mean the formation of wholes larger or smaller. Perhaps every relation though not actually holistic has then a tendency or impulse towards holism, including perhaps even the relations of difference and separation.

12. (i) In chapter 6 it is stated that the argument for a monism which unites the totality of physical things and the totality of psychic things based on the argument that all relations are strongly holistic is independent of the argument for panpsychism. (1983, p. 252) But the totality of physical things may unite with the totality of psychic things to form one physical thing in such a way that not all physical things have a psychic centre, only some do which form a whole that is locatable in some one region. For without a sort of brain no psychic existence is possible. Thus the argument based on strongly holistic relations requires the argument establishing panpsychism if the whole is supposed to be such that within each physical thing is a phychic centre no matter how primitive.

(ii) All physical things form a spatial whole. All experiential wholes form a psychic whole. Both are also temporal wholes. But the temporal whole is common to both. It is the temporal whole which then unites both into one all-inclusive whole. This premiss seems to be missing from Sprigge's argument. The temporal whole need not be intepreted as being constituted of successive phases, it may be taken as a comprehensive present, though I do not think this is intelligible in the end. For it implies that the totality of events, including contradictory ones are actual simultaneously in the same present. (1983. pp. 30-33, pp. 238-239)

13. In defense of strongly holistic relations we may however perhaps use the following general argument. A relation between more than one term inheres in each of the terms and beyond them as well. For if it inhered only in its terms it would not connect the terms. Take a pictorial analogy. Let two poles standing apart stand for terms. Let a rope tied between the two stand for a relation. The rope has part of its being around each pole and part between and beyond both. Similarly a relation has part of its being in each term and part beyond them. If a relation had its being only in the terms it would be like the two poles having a rope tied around each but not connected together. And if the being of the relation were wholly beyond the terms it would be like a rope not tied to either pole hanging in mid air between the poles. But does the rope turn the two poles as tied together into a third object ? Perhaps it does. For now we have possibly what functions as a net over which we can volly our tennis ball or badminton shuttle, or perhaps it is a construction for high jumps. But the rope then is an instrument of creation in which it is part of a larger existent itself and shares in the characteristic of the whole i. e. the net-like thing. It has generated a whole of which it is itself a part and shares in the character of the whole. A relation by nature seems strongly holistic.

Still as some of my considerations to Sprigge's argument indicate, it is hard to see how one can claim to have established that all relations are strongly holistic. It may simply be that while some are strongly holistic the rest only have a tendency towards holism.

Sprigge, T. 1983 : *The Vindication of Absolute Idealism.* Edinburgh : University of Edinburgh Press.

5

The Place of Morality in Karma Yoga

P. Srinivasa Rao

Karma means action. Yoga means the union with the divine or evenness of mind of skilfull action. On the whole karmayoga means the skilfull performance of action or the actions performed with the evenness of mind. Almost all Indian philosophers observe that ignorance is the root cause for bondage and to overcome such ignorance is the ultimate aim of the individual. Jnana and Bhakti yogas are suggested as the means for liberation or to overcome ignorance. But a common aspirant can not follow Bhakti and Jnana yogas at the very instance. He has to train his mind to be able to receive both Bhakti and Jnana yogas.

Karma which generally means action is of four types viz. obligatory deeds, voluntary, deeds optional deeds and prohibited deeds. Obligatory deeds are the actions to be performed daily and they are determined by the inner self of the being. Voluntary deeds are the actions performed voluntarily without the interference of mind or will. For example the reactions of the physical organisms to the natural impulses. Some philosophers feel that even in voluntary actions the agent entertains the freedom of choice. Actions performed to get any desired result or the actions having desire as an end are called optional deeds. Prohibitary deeds are the actions which are abandoned in view of the well-being of the beings.

Whatever action may be, entertains a motive either the motive may be egoistic or non-egoistic. So also every action gives rise to certain consequences desired or not desired. The quality of action from the point of moral values is to be judged on the basis of the observance of both means and ends. The motive arises in the mind. The mind through the sense organs collects the sensations, analyses them and passes the judgements which motivate the actions. The quality of the motive depends upon the quality of mind. The mental structure differs from man to man. Indian philosophers believe that the mind is constituted of three gunas viz. Sattva, rajas and tamas. One of the three gunas dominates the other two and determines the quality of the mind. The quality of the action depends upon the quality of the mind from which it receives instruction. The value of action depends upon the consequences produced by that particular action besides its quality.

Any action whatever it may be in general develops attachment in the mind obscuring its discriminative power. The obscuration of the discriminative power results in ignorance and develops ego sense and the actions become egoistic. The egoistic actions cause much misery because when an action is egoistic the agent or the performer of the action with over-confidence expects more and when his expection or desire fails to be fulfilled he becomes disappointed and feels as if he were in bondage. Metaphysically the self is pure and non doer. But its associalion with the physical body is often misunderstood by the individual due to ignorance and drags the soul into bondage whose nature is free. Either in metaphysical or in emperical fields ignorance is the root cause for all miseries. Removal of the ignorance liberates one from all miseries. Jnana Yoga and Bhakti yoga are believed to be the best means for liberation and a common aspirant cannot follow these paths at the very instance. For both Jnana and Bhakti yogas, a disciplined mind is necessary.

A common man in day-to-day life cannot remain silent without performing actions in order to avoid attachment, the root cause for ignorance and egosense. His very nature tempts him to act. To make an aspirant fit for the spiritual development karma-yoga is suggested by philosophers. Here the aspirant while performing the actions purifies his mind and develops his spirituality.

Here we have to observe the moral significance of the karma-yoga. The fundamental problem is, is man free to choose his actions from the ethical point. He is free to choose his actions, other wise he cannot be held responsible for his actions and at the same time he becomes an escapist. But he is not completely free, all his actions are determined by his own innerself. He is answerable to his innate nature or svabhava. Besides the free choice man should possess the knowledge of good and evil and this depends upon the motives and consequences.

When life is full of activity none can perform all actions and thus needed the observance of certain codes of conduct and also division of labour. Ancient philosophers as a first step divided society into four social orders viz. Brahmana, Kshatriya, Vaisya and Sudra. Each class thus classified was prescribed to observe certain moral principles and duties. This classification is not final. Again the life of the individual is classified into four groups viz. Brahmacharya, Grihasta, Vanaprasta and Sanyasa. The individual has to observe the duties of that particular stage.

At the brahmacharya stage individual has to observe certain moral disciplines and equip himself with knowledge in order to become qualified for further leap. Grihasta is the next stage. Here the individual marries a girl and leads the life of householder. At this stage he has to serve his parents, hold all the responsibilities of family, show reverence to elders and become a good host to the guests. This stage is a critical stage and it is the stage of karma yoga; The individual should not relinquish his duties. It is a chance for him to build up his moral character. He has to help the dependents viz. brahmacharis and sanyasis. The next stage is vanaprasta. Here after fulfilling the duties of the householder and enjoying all sorts of pleasures, the individual develops urge for liberation. He becomes somewhat detaches and tries to work disinterestedly. He also tries to realise the divinity in all. At the end of this stage he becomes a perfect disinterested worker. Sanyasa is the lost stage of life. Here the feeling of renunciation is much. The egosense is destroyed and the aspirant becomes a true sanyasi not in the sense of relinquishing all the duties or becoming an idle man but relinquishes the ego desires and works as a social worker. He receives both suffering and joy with equal feeling. He finds equality in all beings, in all things and in all works.

Gita's karma-yoga gives us a more detailed picture of the philosophy of karmn-yoga. Gitacharya observes that none can sit idle, the nature of the being tempts to act, due to the ignorance man falsely identifying himself with the nodes of Prakriti becomes egoistic. So long as he is egoistic he can not come out of miseries. Every body is free to act but at the same time he should not hope for results, as the hope is the main cause for suffering. As a first step Gitacharya demands us to follow svadharma dictated by the inner-svabhava. To have a clear picture of svadharma, Sri Krishna classifies the society into four social orders viz. Brahmana, Kshatriya, Vaisya and Sudra on the basis of the theory of Gunas.

As already noted the character of the being is influenced and determined by the prakritic gunas viz. Sattva rajas and tamas and the actions which are the expressions of character are also coloured by the gunas. In Brahmanas, Sattva guna predominates and makes him to observe the duties of serenity, calm, peace, learning and preaching. Rajas the symbol of activity or emotion overwhelms in Kshatriyas and they have to observe battle craft, defending the people from internal and external dangers and governing the people-as the dictates of their own svabhava. Rajas and tamas conjointly influence the character of Vaisyas and prepare them to follow cattle rearing, agriculture and trade as their svadharma. Tamas the symbol of dullness is the chief quality of Sudra and the principle duty of Sudras is to serve or attend the needs of all others. Thus the duties prescribed are called svadharma, karma yogi in order to perfect himself has to follow the duties ordained by his station and the stage of life as a preliminary step.

The observance of Svadharma is mainly intended to check the survival of the fittest and also to substitute the division of labour. Here there is no complete check for the survival of the fittest. The ethical development of the individual progresses with the observance of svadharma and it is partial. The ego self in individual still persists due to the attachment produced by actions and their results. Hence Gita introduces the concept of Nishkama-karma into Karma yoga as the best alternative. Nishkama-karma means to perform the duties disinterestedly. Desire is the root cause for all miseries and moral degeneration. For example a poor man with a weak mind. after the observation of pleasures enjoyed by his fellow-mates for a long time desires those pleasures for himself also. To appease his desire of seeking such pleasures he tries to earn the money which is needed by a right means first, but when he could not, he adopts even the evil means and faces much troubles. The desire for pleasures make him to suffer and degrade himself morally. When there is no desire for any thing there cannot be any binding tie or misery. Disinterested action if properly understood and followed purifies the mind and heart of the aspirant, removes the ego feelings and develops universal perspective.

But it is not possible to act disinterestedly in absolute sense because there is no action which is not motivated. That is the reason why desire or kama is included in the purusharthas. Sri Aurobindo in his Essays on Gita observes that disinterested does not mean completely desireless but the replacement of lower impulses by higher impulses or a leap from individual good to social good. One has to cultivate the habit of working for the benefit of his fellow beings in order to overcome the feeling of I and mine or ego self. Here also the Karma yogi faces a difficulty, as the attachment to the good result makes him to suffer when the result is adverse though the motive is good. For example a devoted and good mannered doctor who uses all his efforts to save a patient in danger, when he fails to save that patient suffers from the mental agony which in unimaginable. His motive is good, his work is self-less but he suffers due to the attachment to the good result. The repetition of such instances may make him to relinquish his duties which in turn leads to the moral degeneration of his profession and also cause the patients to suffer who are in need of his services. Swami Vivekananda observes that the results either good or bad born of the attachment produce impressions on mind and lead to suffering. Hence every action should be performed with the feeling of detachment.

But a common aspirant cannot work detachedly as his mind is under the spell of desires, and prakritic gunas. Gitacharya in order to solve this riddle introduces Divine—determinism into Karma—yoga which demands each of us to work as the instrument of Divine, leaving the results to God. In the opinion of Krishna every work, every thing, every being—all are divine. Working as a divine instrument we are loosing nothing of our freedom. While working as the divine instrument the aspirant slowly realises the divinity every where and develops universal vision. He at the end becomes completely detached which is the highest goal of karma-yoga. Then the perfect Karma-yogin attaining the highest mental perfection sees everything with an equal feeling. A Karma-yogin is he who follows svadharma as a divine instrument disinterestedly and detachedly.

The moral significance of Karma-yoga will become clear if we compare it to the Plato's philosophy, Kants "categorical imperative" and Bradley's my station and its duties".

On observing the evils of society Plato thought of an ideal state on the basis of the nature of the individual. Plato observes that every individual has three parts viz. Rational, emotional and appetite. The influence of these parts varies in degrees in individuals. These three parts have to work in a harmonious way for the well-being of the individual. On the basis of the influence of these parts Plato classifies society into three classes viz. guardians or philosophers, soldiers and workers. In the guardians the rational element predominates and are self-less workers. They govern the state. Emotional element, predominates in Soldiers and they defend the state from internal and external dangers. Apetitise element over whelms in workers and they perform the remaining duties. All have to work in a harmonious way for the well being of the State. This conception of ideal state resembles the Gita's theory of gunas, but the difference is that Gita classifies society into four classes where as Plato into three. Kant's doctrine of categorical imperative' somewhat resembles the Svadharma and "Niskamakarma" of Karma-yogas of Gita. According to Kant moral laws are absolute and they should be followed without any hesitation. Man has to perform his duties without hoping for any result. He has no exception. Gita also speaks of desireless-action and also shows the way how to follow it but whereas Kant has not given any rational explanation. Gita does not want the doer to follow the duties blindly. F. H. Bradley dissatisfied with the existing theories formulated his own theory on the spitirual basis. According to him individual has to realise himself with a universal vision. He observes that Every individual has his own station of life and that particular station prescribes him certain duties. These duties are to be followed with a universal perspective for the harmonious functioning of the society. Following the duties of his own station individual can realise his true nature and also his proper place in the society. He can not see himself apart from the society. But Bradley fails to give an explanation as to how one has to realise his station whereas the Gita passes its theory of svadharm on guna theory.

Karma-yoga is prescribed for the moral discipline of the aspirant. Some people in their enthusiasm to achieve liberation relinquish their duties and sit idle in excluded place and fail to get liberation. But it is all due to ignorance. None can sit in-active. Besides human being is a rational and social-being. He has to work for his well-being and also for the well-being of the society. Without the Purification of mind one can not attain liberation. In order to purify his mind he has to perform actions and step by step cultivate the habit of performing disinterested actions. These disinterested actions not only purify the mind, help the aspirant to see him in all and all in him; At that stage he can attain knowledge and get liberated himself from the clutches of ignorance. Karma-yoga with its ideals of disinterested action and Svadharma develops the morality of the being which is needed for the spiritual development of the beings and the society. Thus Karma-yoga though the preparatory stage for liberation holds its moral significance and occupies a proper place in moral philosohoy.

Karma yoga with the introduction of theistic element shows how to perform disinterested action in order to overcome ego self and to develop the moral behaviour among the beings with a rational and spiritual outlooks.

6

The Beginning of Sorrows: The Ecological Crisis and the Prospects of Human Survival

Joseph Wayne Smita

> "For nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom : and there shall be famines, and pestilences, and earthquakes, in divers places. All these *are* the beginning of sorrows". (Matthew 24 : 7-8)

1. The Crisis

It is the aim of this paper to discuss the philosophical significance of the global environmental crisis. It is not my intention to review primary scientific, empirical or physical evidence here. Rather, I wish to take as my point of departure the conclusions of a number of books and articles which indicate that our whole planet is in crisis and that human civilisation may well perish. From this starting point I will then comment upon the philosophical significance of our conjectured impending doom.

P and A Ehrlich in their book *The Population Explosion*[1] point out that the world's population was 5.3 billion (at the time that they wrote their book) and rising. Each year there are 95 million more mouths to feed, hundreds of billions fewer tons of topsoil and hundreds of trillions fewer gallons of ground water, then the world had in 1968 The slowdown of the annual growth rate of around 2.1 percent in the early 1960s to around 1.8 percent in 1990, has only meant that the doubling of world population has gone from 33 years to 39 years. If death rates don't rise from global ecological collapse, the world's population will *expand* at a *decreasing* rate for another century. This occurs in a world where eco-systems *may* be approaching ecological limits for food production, regardless of technological innovation.

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[1] P. R. Ehrlich and A. H. Ehrlich, *The Population Explosion*, (Simon and Schuster, Brookvale, NSW. 1990).

Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute is of this opinion. He notes that Japanese farmers, who are scientifically oriented and have access to the world's cheapest capital, were only able to increase rice yields by 0.9 percent per year since 1970. The ecological limits of food production are set by water and soil It is the problem of erosion, and with water it is the problem of falling water tables. Brown up sums his position as follows :

> "......at a time when demand for various biological products is rising rapidly, the earth's biological production is shrinking. The even greater annual additions to world population in prospect for the nineties will further reduce the earth's ability to supply our food and raw materials. These two trends cannot continue indefinitely. At some point, the continuing decline in the photosynthetic product will translate into a decline in the economic product."[2]

The Ehrlichs' predictably, are even more pessimistic :

> "...starvation and epidemic disease will raise death rates over most of the planet...social problems will proliferate with population growth, and that democracy as a form of government will be at risk. A recent study by former Ambassador Marshall Green and Patricia Barnett compared measures of population pressures and the political stability of nations. They found that, in general, rapid population growth, particularly in notions with sharp ethnic divisions, 'places enormous strain on political institutions.' It threatens political stability by promoting rapid urbanization, increasing the proportion of youths in the population, and expanding labor forces more rapidly than jobs are created. The study found that 'only a handful of countries with serious demographic pressures managed to maintain stable constitutional governments with good records on civil and political rights't'[3].

The socio-political consequences are also immense :

> "Even if largescale war can be avoided, it seems likely that regional conflicts will become more frequent as disputes over

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[2] L. R. Brown, "The Illusion of Progress", in L. R. Brown (et al), *State of the World 1990*, (W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1990), pp. 3-16. Citation, p. 7.

[3] Ehrlich and Ehrlich, op cit note 1, p. 138; S. Camp (ed.), *Population Pressures—Threat to Democracy*, (Population Crisis Committee, Washington D. C., 1989).

> land, dwindling water and energy sources, environmental refugees, and 'who's to blame' become more frequent......... The changes in our environment see over the last fifty years will be dwarfed by those of the next fifty, and those changes are likely to be accompanied by an enormous rise in death rates. ...... The deaths of many hundreds of millions of people in famines, for example, will present utterly unprecedented problems—especially when the nations in which they are dying have the capability of threatening nuclear terrorism. ......The Whimper thus could lead to a collapse of civilisation just as surely as the Bang. Populations of human beings could be greatly reduced, and national governments could be so weakened that they would be replaced by something resembling feudalism with a strong overlay of tribalism. Large cities with ethnically mixed populations could suffer fates similar to that of Beirut."[4]

The apocalytic view of the Ehrlichs has been more recently stated by Robert Kaplan in an article in February 1994 edition of *The Atlantic Monthly*. Kaplan's preview of the first decades of the Twenty-First Century reads like a survivalist's nightmare:

> "Nations break up under the tidal flow of refugees from environmetal and social disaster. As borders crumble, another type of boundary is erected—a wall of disease. Wars are fought over scarce resources, especially water, and war itself becomes continuous with crime, as armed bands of stateless marauders clash with the private security forces of the elites."[5]

The idea the ecological stress will contribute to social instability and civil strife is a position accepted by Homer-Dixon (et al) in their February 1993 article in *Scientific American*[6], by Paul Kennedy in *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*[7] and by Garrett Hardin in *Living Within Limits*[8].

The eco-apocalyptic view is not peculiar merely to the writers mentioned. In November 1992 1575 scientists, including 100 Nobel

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[4] ibid. pp. 179-180.

[5] Cover, *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994; R. D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", *The Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1994, pp. 44-76.

[6] T. F Homer-Dixon J. H. Boutwell and G. W. Rathjens, "Environmental Change and Violent Conflict". *Scientific American*, February 1993, pp. 38-45

[7] P. Kennedy, *Preparing for the twenty-First Century*, (Random House, New York, 1993)

[8] G. Hardin, *Living Within Limits : Ecology, Economics, and Population Taboos*, (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1993).

Prize winners' released a "Doomsday Alert". They warned that if exponential population growth and threats to the Earth's atmosphere, oceans and fish, water resources, soil, forests and living species did not stop, and if responsible steward ship of the Earth did not occur, then the global environment would be irretrievably mutilated by the year 2030. One of the worlds' leading soil scientists, Dr Marc Latham, director-general of the International Board for Soil Research and Management, stated in his visit to Australia in February 1994, that if the Asia-Pacific region and the world cannot overcome land and water degradation, then the decay of food supplies, pollution of city water, urban migration, goods of environmental refugees, political destabilisation and even war may occur.[9]

2. The Philosophical Dimensions

Therefore various philosophical questions raised by a confrontation with ecoapocalytic arguments. Would it in fact be a morally good thing for human kind to disappear from the face of the Earth ? What does "morally good" mean in this context ? Is there a spurt of moral value distinct from that of humans and their evaluations ? Deep ecologists believe that there is, and that traditional ethics is "speciesist" because of its discriminatory view of the value of humans over other animals and eco-systems. One could argue from a deep ecological position that the extinction of human beings would be a good thing for nature. But such a debate, although of technical interest is of little practical relevance. The scenarious contemplated above for the demise of human kind would disturb the whole biosphere exterminating many other species.[10] It is hardly likely that human kind could be utterly removed from the Earth without in turn devastating nature. So having said this, I will assume that the extinction of the human race, or even a large part of it is a bad thing. However it does not follow from this, that all of those projected to exist in the future, can or should be saved. With expanding populations and the declining quality of biophysical resources, there will exist a point of crash where human population growth outstrips existing ecological resources. This will be a time of great dying. We cannot conclude that the human species itself will be extinguished—although the evolutionary record documents that in the very long run all species are dead—but we can conclude that hundreds of millions of people will die and political instability will occur as a result of the alleged eco apocalypse.

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[9] J. Cribb, "Science Leader Warns of Disaster", *The Australian*, February 18, 1994, p. 2.

[10] B. Medlin, *Human Nature Human Survival*, (Board of Research, The Flinders University of South Australia, 1992), pp. 22-23.

I suggest that the environmental crisis illust rates the bankruptcy of a number of metaphysicl and political ideologies, some of which have been with us for a long time, and others, for not such a long time. John Carroll in his provocative book *Humanism : The Wreck of Western Culture*[11] begins his trealise with these powerful words :

> "We live amidst the ruins of the great, five-hundred-year epoch of Humanism. Around us is that 'colossal wreck'. Our culture is a flat expanse of rubble. It hardly offers shelter from a mild cosmic breeze, never mind one of those icy gales that regularly return to rip men out of the cosy intimacy of their daily lives and confront them with oblivion. Is it surprising that we are run down ? We are desperate, yet we don't care much any more. We are timid, yet we cannot be shocked. We are inert underneath our business. We are destitute in our plenty. We are homeless in our own homes
>
> What should there be to hold our hands, is not. Our culture is gone. It has left us terribly alone. In its devastation it cannot even mock us any more, sneer at the lost child whimpering for its mother. That stage too is over. Our culture is past cruelty. It is wrecked. It is dead."[12]

The myth that has failed in Carroll's opinion is the humanist attempt to replace God bv man, to place man at the centre of the universe. Pico della Mirandola in 1416 expressed this belief simply as: "We can become what we will". Humans can create themselves as they choose. Carroll attempts to show in his book that the humanist program was doomed from the beginning containing within its heart the seeds of its own destruction. Carroll's approach is based on a "history of ideas" analysis, but I believe that a simpler, more conclusive refutation of humanism is delivered by eco-apocalyptic considerations.

Humanism and liberalism view human nature as not fixed, but changing and changeable, with an infinite pontial for "good" development and that there is nothing intrinsic to human nature that would prevent the achievement of the "good society". Humanism and liberalism are forms of rationalism, maintaining that reason and science without an appeal to tradition and culture are sufficient for understanding the world. Humanists and liberals are the enemies of authority: prejudice and tradition. They are believers in progress and are hisiorical optimists. As there is nothing intrinsic to human nature to prevent the achievement of the good society, the obstacles can only be ignorance or bad social institutions. There are no social or political problems for which there are no solutions at all. The humanist liberal concept of equality, with its opposition to political, economic or social distinctions based on race, colour or religion, leads to internationalism as James Burnham in his *Suicide of the West* explains :

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[11] J. Carroll, *Humanism : The Wreck of Western Culture*, (Fontana Press, London, 1993).

[12] ibid, p. 1.

> Modern liberal doctrine tends naturally toward internationalist conceptions and the idea of a democratic world order based through one mode or another on the majority will of all mankind. The logic of the liberal principle units with the normal bias of liberal temperament to incline modern libera s favourably toward ideas, movements and organisations that can be thought of as steps toward world cooperation, federalism, unification and government : world courts, world league of nations; worldwide cultural exchanges; world congresses and parliament; world conventions and committees. To the liberal it has become self-evident that 'national sovereignty is an outworn concept' that mut be drastically modified if not altogether abandoned."[13]

Ecological considerations have naturally enough led internationalists to appeal for the creation of a world government or a world federation to solve so-called environmental problems. But as Garrett Hardin has noted, there is no reason at all to believe that *globalizing* these problems will lead to their solution. He has said :

> "...let's look at the potholes in the streets. There are potholes all over the civilized world, but is that any reason for setting up a global pothole authority to fix our potholes ? Would the pothole in your street be filled sooner if we globalized the problem ?
>
> The moral is surely obvious : *never globalize a problem if it can possibly be solved locally*. It may be chic but it is not wise to tack the adjective *global* onto the names of problems that are *merely widespread* -for example' 'global hungery, 'global poverty', and 'the global population problem'.
>
> We will make no progress with population problems, which are a root cause of both hunger and poverty, until we deglobalize them. Populations, like potholes, are produced locally, and, unlike atmospheric pollution, remain local—unless some

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[13] J. Burnham. *Suicide of the West: An Essay on the Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism*, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1965), p. 79.

[14] G. Hardin, "There is No *Global* Population Problem", *The Humanist*, vol. 49, no. 4, July/August 1989, pp. 11-13, 32. Citation p. 32.

> people are unwise as to globalive them by permitting population excesses to migrate into the better-endowed countries; Marx's formula, 'to each according to his needs', is a recipe for national suicide..
>
> We are not faced with a *single* global populalion problem but rather, with about 180 separate national population problems. All population controls must be applied locally; local governments are the agents best prepared to chose local means. Means must fit local traditions. For one nation to attempt to impose its ethical principles on another is to violate national sovereignty and endanger international peace. The only legitimate demand that nations can make on one another is this : 'Don't try to solve your population problem by exporting your excess people to us'.".

In any case, internationalism, by making things bigger and more centralized, makes things more vulnerable in themselves, because of the gigantic scale at which operations occur. The law of diminishing returns can be applied to *scale* itself by making scale the variable factor, so that increases in scale of an activity or process, will result in diseconomies of scale, past a certain threshold.[15] Internationalism contains in its heart, as well, the seeds of its own destruction.

The core view of humanism and liberalism, that all social and political problems have a (happy) solution, is also refuted by eco-apocalyptic thought. If these pessimists are right, then there is every reason to believe that the "good" socity will simply *not* be built. Indeed civilization as we know it may well be doomed. Progress will cease and lead to degeneration; peace will end in war—if not between nations—then between warring ethnic groups within nations[16] and authority, prejudice and tradition will replace the rule of reason[17] Yet this belief in the perfectibility of man has been the cornerstone of

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[15] D. Elgin, *Voluntary Simplicity*, (William Morrow and Co., New York, 1981) and T. La Porte (ed.), *Organised Social Complexity*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975).

[16] D. P. Moynihan, *Pandemonium : Ethnicity in International Politics*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993); K. M. De Silva and R. J. May (eds.), *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict*, (Pinter Publihers, London, 1991).

[17] As Isaiah Berlin has noted : "In our modern age, nationalism is not resurgent; it never died. Neither did racism; They are the most powerful movements in the world today cutting across many social systems." Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Nationalism : An Interview with Isaiah Berlin", *New York Review of Books*, November 21, 1991,p. 19.

Western civilization for the last five-hundred years. Without it, our, culture is indeed an expanse of rubble John Carroll has noted.

It is tempting to offer in conclusion some words of hope and some prospects for the end of sorrows. Indeed, there is an extensive literature charting what an alternative green sustainable world would be like. Such a world would be smaller, cleaner, greener, self-reliant, decentralized, strongly democratic, just—and wise, rather than being merely technically sophisticated. But the present direction of all nations in the world is away from a "smaller is beautiful" world, towards internationalism, global integration, regional trading blocs, and ultimately a one world government backed with coercive powers to force disobedient nations to be integrated into collective global decision making at every level. This view is becoming increasingly popular with environmental leaders. Consider for example Jacques Cousteau's comments made prior to the Earth Summit in his journal *Calypso Log* :

> "Here I am referring to the necessity of creating an international environmental police, 'green helmets', who would be under the direction of the United Nations. Our planet needs guardians, independent organisations, free of the constraints of profit or national sovereignty, and responsible for making up an almost daily bill of health of our common habitat, our Earth."[19]

In an interview that appeared in the November 1991 *UNESCO Courier* Cousteau said :

> "Our society is turning toward more and more needless consumption. It is a vicious circle that I compare to cancer...... Should we eliminate suffering, diseases ? The idea is beautiful, but perhaps not a benefit for the long term. We should not allow our dread of diseases to endanger the future of our species.
>
> This is terrible thing to say. *In order to stabilize world population, we must eliminate 350,0000 people Per day It is a horrible thing to say, but it's just as bad not to say it*".[20]

This, I believe is a clear example of a "cure" being worse than the disease. But we should not be surprised to find intellectuals and

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[18] For a review of. J. W. Smith, *The High Tech Fix : Sustainable Ecology or Technocratic Megaprojects for the 21st Century ?*, (Avebury, Aldershot, 1991).

[19] quoted from W. F. Jasper, "Shackling Planet Earth", *The New American*, Fall, 1993, pd. 48-54. Citation p. 49.

[20] ibid, p. 54, emphasis added.

elites willing to contemplate the genocide of the masses to champion their pet ideologies. John Carey in his *The Intellectuals and the Masses*[21] argues that early 20th Century intellectuals, the Founders of modern culture,(viewed the masses as ripe for extermination. Carey composes a surprising list of villains, including George Bernard Shaw, Ezra Pound, D.H. Lawrence, E.M. Forster, Virginia Woolf, H.G. Wells, Aldous Huxley and W. B. Yeats. For example, Shaw said in the Preface to *On the Rocks* that :

> "Extermination must be put on a scientific basis if it is ever to be carried out humanely and apologetically as well as thoroughly...if we desire a certain type of civilization and culture, we must exterminate the sort of people who do not fit into it."[22]

The "end of the masses" theme is also expressed by D. H. Lawrence as well : "To learn plainly to hate mankind, to detest the spawning human-being, that is the only cleanliness now".[23] Further appalling examples are given in John Carey's book.

One would not be paranoid to suspect that as the eccological crisis intensifies, as nations break down and the global elites protect themselves with their own high tech armies, that the majority of ordinary people, people like you and me, will be regarded as useless eaters fit only for extermination. As the blood-thirstiest century in human history comes to an end, can we have any confidence at all, that the 21st Century will not be for humanity a further march through rivers of blood ? All indications are, in my opinion, that we are entering a new dark age, the beginning of sorrows. We will be fighting for our lives as civilization crumbles.

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21 John Carey, *The Intellectuals and the Masses*, (Faber, and Faber, London, 1992)

22 ibid, p. 63.

23 C. f. J. T. Boulton and A. Robertson (eds), *The Letters of D. H. Lawrence*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984), vol. 3, 1916-21, p. 160. A character in D. H. Lawrence's *Kangaroo*, (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1971), p. 294, also says : "The mass of mankind is soulless...... Most people are dead, and talking in the sleep of death."

7

On Wittgenstein's Way of Doing Philosophy

Narendra Nath Gupta

Wittgenstein's reflections on the nature of philosophy, as expressed in some of his aphoristic remarks in his later work, the *Philosophical Investigations*, tend to refer to two different brands of doing philosophy : one, which Wittgenstein (throughout this paper 'Wittgenstein' signifies 'later Wittgenstein') subscribes to, and another which is to be exposed by the former.

Wittgenstein's remarks in the above mentioned concern, expressed in terms of his celebrated clinical analogy or in terms of other types, of analogy,[1] are generally under-stood to suggest that the way of doing philosophy, which he subscribes to, confronting the censured one is devoted to the task of clarifying linguistic confusions. It is supposed that these confusions come into being only when one engages in philosophizing in a way typical mostly to the traditional philosophy. Thus, Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy is seen in confrontation with the way philosophy was generally practised before him.

This paper intends to show that Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy is not entirely opposed to the traditional way of doing philosophy. The initial phase of philosophizing, which we propose to call 'problem-phase', is inevitably shared by both the ways of doing philosophy. If we could see unity on this point between the traditional way of doing philosophy and Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy, it would also help us in locating the general nature of their difference which further raises a number of questions. This paper does not attempt to answer those questions, though the questions are important ones.

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[1] For Wittgenstein's clinical anology see his *Philosophical Investigations* (henceforth referred to as *PI*), sectsr 133, 255 and 593; for other types of analogy see *PI*, sects. 109, 194, 309, etc.
All the references to *PI* cited in this paper are from G. E. M. Anscombe's translation (2nd ed. Oxford : Basil Blackwell), 1958.

In regard to the initial phase of philosophizing which consists in arising of a philosophical problem, Wittgenstein's view is supposed to be as follows: The philosophical problems, according to Wittgenstein, 'arise when language is misused. Conceptual confusions and metaphysical speculations are the symptoms of such misuses'.[2] For such an understanding of Wittgenstein's view about the origination of philosophical problems, some of his own remarks are responsible. "The confusions which occupy us arise when language is an engine idling, not when it is doing work".[3] "For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday".[4] These remarks suggest that philosophical problems have something to do with the confusions traceable to mishandlings of language.

To have a comprehensive picture of this phase, it has to be appreciated that the confusions associated with philosophical problems are made by the philosophers *only when they do philosophy.* David Pears rightly observes that "·········a person who had not reflected on the problems would not be in a position to make that kind of confusion, and a person who had reflected on them would already have made his entry into philosophy".[5] Here it may be observed that making one's entry into philosophy, i. e., one's starting with reflecting on some philosophical problem, and one's making conceptual or linguistic confusions are not disconnected phenomena. Whenever someone starts reflecting on some philosophical problem, he is in the grip of conceptual confusion. Thus, these two phenomena always seem to occur simultanleously. But more important thing about them to be noted is that they are not identical too. A philosopher intends to reflect on some philosophical problem, but no philosopher would say that he intends to make confusion or to misuse the language. It is not that it is in the power of a philosopher to intend to make confusion or to misuse the language but he refrains from them out of some good sense. The very logic of the word 'confusion' or 'misuse' prevents him from intending such things. There is a logical oddity in saying that 'I intend to make confusion' or 'I intend to misuse something'.

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[2] J. J. Katz, *The Philosophy of Language*, p. 75, (New York : Harper and Row), 1966.

[3] *PI*, sect. 132.

[4] Ibid., sect. 38.

[5] David Pears, *Wittgenstein*, p. 121, (Fontana : Collins), 1971.

It should be then clear that a philosopher intends, neither confusions nor misuses, but to reflect on something that he finds philosophically interesting. That is all. If now he is in a state of confusion of some kind or doing mistake of some kind, unbeknownst to him, it is perhaps because of the very nature of what he has undertaken to do. Wittgenstein might have very sound reasons to concentrate on the unintended side of the phenomenon of a philosophical problem, which consists according to him, in linguistic or conceptual confusions. He might be justified in locating causes of these confusions in the language we use and in certain propensities of the phil.sophers. So we need not disagree with his remark : :'A *picture* held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably."[6] Nor do we need underrate Wittgenstein's kind of philosophical endeavour of bringing 'words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use'[7] or of showing 'the fly the way out of the fly-bottle'.[8]

The crucial question relating to the intentional side of the problem- phase of philosophizing is : What it is to reflect philosophically ? It seems that philosophical reflection, at its earliest stage, is not a matter of deliberate effort. Nevertheless, it is a matter of one's having certain kind of logical and imaginative abilities, which is far from being a case of cognitive inertness. One cannot enter into this earliest stage, if he does not possess the ability to ascend to a realm where one can logically inspect the thoughts, or propostions (as many analytical philosophers would prefer to say) of certain kind. Those and only those, who have the imaginative ability of second-order thinking along with certain logical skills, may, on some occasion, feel some reaction or disagreements or simply a kind of unrest, which cannot, in anyway, be foreseen either by themselves or by others. The response felt by them is not merely a psychological response. It is in fact a logical response, however vaguely felt. For it would be impossible to describe such a response as 'philosophical' without, at the same time, taking into account certain kind of logical and imaginative abilities of the person who is feeling the response in question. This feature of the response felt at the earliest stage of philosobical reflection distinguishes it from a similar condition often felt by poets, novelists, etc., just before their act of creation. The intelligibility of a poet's response does not necessarily depend upon his having logical abilities.

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[6] *PI*, sect. 115.

[7] Ibid., sect. 116.

[8] Ibid., sect. 309.

Now the very logical and imaginative nature of a philosophical response felt by a philosopher at the earliest stage of philosophizing may lead him to a step further, that is the step of gaining clarity over his vaguely felt response. He now deliberately engages in the act of finding out what has been puzzling him so far. His imaginative ability makes him consciously reflect over the thoughts or propositions which he was vaguely feeling previously. In course of this reflective activity, his logical ability too assumes rigour, resulting in the logical inspection of the thoughts. This logical inspe tion of the thoughts of certain kind, by bringing into light inadequacy or incoherence or flaw of some kind, makes him able to see the problem clearly. That is all how a philosophical problem arises.

We have seen that logical activity and imaginative activity are the two major elements that constitute the intentional side of the problem-phase. This account of the problem phase does not oblige us to deny that the thoughts or propositions on which philosopher's logical and imaginative abilities exert may themselves be confused or mistaken. But these confusions or mistakes made in course of philosophical reflection pertain only to the unintentional side of the problem-phase of philosophizing.

Now it is not difficult to see that the problem phase as explained above, is necessarily shared by both the ways of doing philosophy, the traditional as well as the Wittgensteinian one. For philosophizing, whether it be theory-oriented kind or mere clarification—oriented kind, seems to be impossible without first perceiving a philosophical problem. Theories or systems in the history of philosophy have not been devised for their own sake; they have been devised rather to solve certain philosophical problems

It may be objected that there have been different varieties of philosophy—such as, 'realist', idealist', 'empiricist'. 'rationalist'. and above all 'analytic-clarificatory' variety—having different aims, methods, doctrines or views. In the face of such a diversification in the area of philosophy, how can it be said that all these varieties of philosophy share a common initial phase of philosophizing ?

The question may be replied in the following manner. After passing through the problem-phase, i. e , perceiving *clearly* the philosophical problem, a philosopher may go in any direction to solve his problem. Not only this, he may even decide to see *more clearly* the very philosophical problem. Thus he may proceed to clarify the linguistic or conceptual confusions involved in his perceiving of the problem, provided that he believes like Wittgenstein in certain doctrines or views regarding language, philosophy and other things. So it seems that the path adopted after perceiving of a philosophical problem depends upon one's doctrines or views regarding a host of things.[9] But passing through a problem-phase is a must for all philosophers, whatever their doctrines or views may be. If it is so, then all the varieties of philosophy must share a common initial phase of doing philosophy which consists, as we tried to show, in the exercise of logical and imaginative abilities of the philosopher. But to say this does not commit us to hold that all the varieties of philosophy must have the same sorts of particular philosophical problems. The particular sort of a philosophical problem, which happens to come into the focus of a philosopher's attention, may be due to his doctrines or views. However, the way a philosophical problem arises (as we have tried to show) is logically independent of the fact of a philosopher's having certain doctrines or views.

Now we come to the question how Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy necessarily involves the problem-phase. Wittgenstein firmly announces that the goal of his philosophy is to gain clarity, 'the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language'.[10] Some of his remarks announce that his philosophy does not attempt to devise any theory or system. "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything".[11] "It leaves everything as it is".[12] Obviously Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy claims only to dissolve or clarify conceptual confusions made in course of arising of philosophical problems. He explicitly says; "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness".[13] But, can his way of doing philosophy afford standing aloof from the conceptual confusions it attempts to treat ? A philosophical problem is not something 'given' to be treated from without. One cannot make sense of a philosophical problem without understanding it. And to understand it is to allow oneself to undergo all the intricacies lying behind the problem. Thus Wittgenstein's clarificatory philosophy is bound to pass through what we have called 'problem-phase'. It is another thing that it, instead of going further to construct any theory or system, just stops at the point where a philosophical problem is perceived, and returns back to discover 'bumps' or 'nonsenses' lying behind the problem. This brings us to the question what distinguishes Wittgen's timestine's way of doing philosophy from the traditional way of doing philosophy. These ways of doing philosophy are generally differentiated from each other by saying that in case of the former there is no occasion for arising of a philosophical problem, while in case of the latter philosophical problems always trouble the philosophers due to their conceptual confusions. But this differentiation is not acceptable to us because we believe in the necessity of passing through the problem-phase for every variety of philosophy including that of Wittgensteinian one. The distinguishing feature of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy does not consist in its standing outside of the things which give rise to confusions, nonsenses, bumps, etc., but in its stopping at the termination point of problem-phase and looking back into the phase for the confusions, bumps or mistakes involved therein. The philosophy has always been self-critical, logical and second-order enterprise, at least, in its problem phase; but Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy extends all these qualities to their heights by looking backward into the very philosophical problem already perceived or understood to some extent. The philosophers have always tried different ways to solve their problems. It is perhaps unique to Wittgenstein that he urges upon to stop at the initial stage of doing philosophy and reflect in a more searching way on what one was doing so far.

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[9] To account for a philosopher's decision concerning the mode of philosophizing after his perceiving a philosophical problem, it seems necessary to suppose that his decision, if not arbitrary, is governed by certain doctrines or views he subscribes to.

[10] *PI*, sect. 119.

[11] Ibid., Sect. 126.

[12] Ibid., sect. 124.

[13] Ibid., sect. 255.

Was it possible for traditional philosophy to be so cautious and self-critical as Wittgenstein's doing philosophy seems to be ? Perhaps not. Because, the traditional philosophers doctrines or views regarding languae, truth, etc., were entirely different from those of Wittgenstein. It was Wittgenstein's views regarding language and other things that enabled him to say that 'when we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it.[14] These views made him more cautious and self-critical in his way of doing philosophy, with holding him from going beyond the point of problem-phase in the direction of theorizing which was mostly pursued by traditional philosophers. However, Wittgenstein's way of doing Philosophy could not dispense with the kind of philosophical attempt which had always occupied philosophers at the initial stage of their enterprise. This continuity of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy, at the point of the initial stage of philosophizing, with that of traditional one could be possible for the simple reason that such a point of philosophizing is logically independent of any philosophical doctrines or views. But the difference between these two ways of doing philosophy is, according to our hunch, due to their respective doctrinal commitments.

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[14] Ibid., sect. 194.

We have seen that both ways of doing philosophy start philosophical enterprise *logically* in the same manner and travel *logically* in the same direction upto a certain point, then all of a sudden, as it were, they move in quite opposite ways. How is this divergence to be explained ? Is it merely accidental, a matter of simply liking or disliking beyond any rational appraisal ? Or, can it be explained in terms of their respective doctrines or views or theses ? If possibility of explaining the divergence in terms of their doctrines, etc., is granted, then can Wittgenstein undertake the task of justifying those doctrines without engaging, at the same time, in the kind of task which he denounces in his proclamations ? Or, are Wittgenstein's those doctrines so obvious that 'it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them'. Is it really the case that Wittgenstein's those doctrines are so obvious that they do not need to be debated ?

These are some of the questions raised by the conclusion we just reached. Here, it is not possible to discuss these questions. However, it seems reasonable to believe that Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy is not entirely opposed to the traditional way of doing philosophy. Upto a certain point it has unity with the traditional way of doing philosophy, though it also differs from the latter in the respect shown above. But whether or not Wittgenstein can be forced to engage in the kind of task which is peculiar to the traditional way of doing philosophy will be determined by the way the questions raised above are answered.

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15 Ibid., sect, 128.

16 Special thanks are owed Dr. S. P. Ver (Reader, Department of Philosophy, Kurukshetra University, urukshetra, Haryana); who read an earlier draft of this paper a nade many constructive suggestions.

8

Mysticism and Phenomenology

William Neblett

INTRODUCTION

My aim in this essay is to set out implications anyone sympathetic to phenomenology ought to draw in regard to mysticism or mystical experience. I have selected three central subjects to discuss; (i) Intuition and Feelings of Certainty (ii) the Concept of a Person, and (iii) Materialistic Metaphysics. My intention is not to argue that certain philosophical positions are true or false, but rather that certain unusual and unpopular philosophical positions are deserving of more serious interest and attention than they presently receive. I do not believe one must be an advocate of phenomenology, or even a serious student of phenomenology, to find what I have to say interesting; however, I do believe that a half-way sympathetic reading of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, or Merleau-Ponty will give my arguments a pointedness not easily discerned by those unitiated to the movement of phenomenology.

By (further) way of introduction, let me say a few words about the use of fantasy in elucidating the subjects we will shortly discuss.

In philosophy we not uncommonly fantasize that something we believe to be true is not true at all, that is, we pretend that we doubt something that we really believe. This particular use of skeptical fantasy can be carried to an art, and has even been advanced by some philosophers as an epistemological methodology-witness Descartes. Of course, we sometimes forget that it is available to us not only to suspend belief in favor of pretending doubt, but also to suspend doubt in favor of pretending belief. Such sympathetic fantasy can facilitate our understanding of views that differ from our own, and certainly, sufficient experience in the pursuit of philosophy teaches us the virtues of gullibility and the vices of an inflexible scepticism.

It is especially important, it seems to me, to cultivate sympathetic fantasies for philosophical positions that take their origin in experiencces, in a background of experience, alien to our own. For example, where our own history is lacking in phenomenological or meditative experiences an effort of imagination is almost indispensable in overcoming the odd and disturbing character of phenomenological and mystical views. A genuine student of phenomenology cultivates experiences which set conscious states into sharp relief, and from this store of phenomenological experience develops a keen sensitivity to the variety and subtlety of states which human beings undergo, and to consciousness in general. Philosophers bred in traditions that encourage and develop the skills for entering into and sustaining out-of-the-ordinary meditative experiences quite naturally articulate their philosophies against the background of these experiences. Of course, any individual's experience can be limited, or if not obviously limited, misleadingly interpreted, and we can, as many philosopoers do, quickly dismiss the phenomenologist's experience as non-veridical and the mystic's experience as merely hallucinatory. But there is nothing worthwhile to gain from such hasty judgments and nothing whatsoever to lose from a deliberate attempt to self-consciously articulate the limitatlons, and possible misinterpretations, of our own experience. In fact, the extent to which our own store of experience circumscribes the parameters of our philosophical views is a central theme of our first topic on intuition and Feelings of Certainty, to which we can now turn.

SECTION I

INTUITION AND FEELINGS OF CERTAINTY

A familiar, and it seems to me cogent, point insisted upon by contemporary epistemologers, is that someone's having a feeling of certainty that P does not at all warrant his claiming to know that P. A feeling of certainty alone is insufficient to warrant a knowledge claim. If it were sufficient, then it would follow that certain persons have warrantedly claimed to know propositions which were not true but false-since there have been persons who have felt certain that certain false propositions were true. Now, insisting upon this point has the virtue of directing us to look beyond feelings of certainty for other pre-requisites of knowledge, however, it can also mislead us into thinking that the subject of feelings of certainty is once and forever disposed of, when, on the contrary, this subject demands to be explored. It demands to be explored, it seems to me, under the general rubric of intuition understood in a philosophical sense, as immediate, or non-mediated, knowing.

Our curiousity concerning intuition ought to be revived if only because Husserl insists that we are capable of special intuitive acts in which essences or essential traits of the being of consciousness can be immediately apprehended and known, and because Heidegger portrays knowing along the metaphor of seeing, as primarily a matter of being-in-a-certain-state in which what has formerly been concealed is now revealed. Even more importantly, the extent to which a student of phenomenology becomes intimate with the details of the vast variety of conscious experiences which human beings undergo, the more questionable becomes the assumption that normal waking sense consciousness constitutes a perfectly secure ground, and the sole ground, for an adequate epistemology. Of course, the continental phenomenological tradition does not differ in this regard from the tradition of British Empiricism. In fact, if we take the skepticism of Britism Empiricism seriously, we are forced to doubt our own feelings of certainty about the world, or at least, to throw them in sharp relief. For in addition to our feelings of certainty that the world, in general outlines, is as we experience it, we ordinarily believe that there exist reasons which are supportive of, and which warrant, these feelings. And a sincere skepticism undermines these reasons and leave us, not so happily, alone with our feelings.

Curiously, even though these feelings become suspect under the scrutiny of skepticism, most of us never cease to believe in them. In other words, our belief that the world, in general outlines, is such-and-such a way rests on repeatedly experiencing it that way and not on philosophical arguments. Moreover, even if we are ready to admit the tenuous nature of our belief assumptions about the world we are nevertheless quick to dismiss the beliefs of others that arise from a store of experience different from our own. It is on this point, this very odd point, that I wish to dwell.

Many of us believe that certain unusual individuals, e. g.. Zen Roshi, attain unusual spiritual states that markedly transform their person. We may even imagine that the day to day experiencing of such individuals is radically different from our own. And we can believe and imagine all of this without ever presupposing a particular theology or a belief in supernatural beings at all. However, we do not believe these individuals then they report that the states they attain are in part realizations or intuitions of the nature of, or some aspect of, reality. We fully believe that; (i) their reports are honest, (ii) they did experience the world in a manner quite different from ordinary experience, and (iii) they did feel certain that this quite different world was, or was some aspect of, the real world. But after saying that, we then classify the cognitive content of their experience as "hallucinatory" and observe that their sense of certainty not only fails to guarantee the veridity of their experience, but perhaps even argues against its constituting a state of, or a grounds for, knowing. For there seems to be a peculiar sense of conviction that regularly accompanies certain religious, and for that matter, certain psychotic states. But what really is the difference between their feelings of conviction and our own ? Isn't it ultimately that our ordinary experiences coincide with the experience of the majority of other ordinary persons, and that persons who experience the world in exceptional ways are suspect because they and their experiences are the exception ? Most of us, I suspect, would agree on the general character of the world, i.e. do believe that it is independent of us, roughly the same for all of us, and that it is constituted of various kind and sizes of material entities that sometimes casually affect one another, and that are aggregated in space along with, at least on this planet, persons and other living things. Perhaps we are not so exceptional in our basic views after all.

Let us suppose, however. to the contrary, that we are exceptional but in the special sense of having had exceptional intuitive experiences of our own. Employing our sympathetic fantasy, let us imagine that we have experienced at least one of the following states; (i) an idealist state in which the objects we perceive, though sustaining their relationship to one another, no longer retain their character as substantial, dense, material entities, (ii) a poetic state in which we experience the world (or nature) as a creative event of intrinsic beauty, and (iii) a oneness-with-nature state in which we lose our sense of identity and are unable to distinguish between ourselves and the world as we experience it. It is important to add to our suppositions that these states are experienced as profoundly moving and as utterly convincing, that is, that as we experience them we feel absolutely certain that; (i) Materialism is false, (ii) beauty is and inherent property of reality, and (iii) our ordinary experience of ourselves as a separate existence among many other existences together constituting the world is an illusion, or at least is metaphysically misleading.

Now, if we were to have such an "intuitive" experience, particularly if we were to have such an experience repeatedly, our ordinary feelings of certainty about the world would be subject to a challenge different in kind from the challenge of traditional skepticism. These feelings would be challenged, not by a critique of the reasons alleged to support them, but rather, on their own grounds, by other feelings, or. if one prefers, by other intuitions. The challenge would come, in other words, from our experience, from experiencing non-ordinary feelings about the world when our ordinary feelings were suspended.

Of course, having our feelings of certainty about the world challenged by other feelings of certainty would naturally confuse us as to what we ought to feel certain about. On the one hand, we would hesitate to option for those feelings that we felt in the idealist, or poetic, or one-with-nature state no matter how convincing to us they seem to be; on the other hand, we could not outrightly dismiss such feelings as hallucinatory in favor of our old and familiar feelings merely because they were old and familiar. To put this differently, we could not refuse to question whether the world really was the way we had all along felt that it was, since if we were rationally affected by our new feelings of certainty, we could no longer feel certain that it was that way.

At this point, it might seem natural to object thar our views of the world do not rest merely on our (familiar) experience of it, that we do indeed have good grounds and reasons over and above our feelings which warrant our metaphysical views, and which warrant rejecting the views of the mystic. But at least in phrasing the beginnings of an argument against the mystic we have consented to attend to his position, and have admitted that our case against him turns to some considerable degree upon our success in defending our own method of access to knowledge, and our own brand of metaphysics. Moreover, generalizing these considerations, we would naturally renew our interest in the subject of intuition as a method of non-mediated access to knowledge, and not only as it is represented in the realization experiences of Eastern Mysticism, but also as we find it articulated in the views of such insightful Occidental Philosophers as Plato, Bergson, Husserl, and Whiteheed.

A revival of the study of the subject of intuition, and in particular of the realization states of mystics, can be greatly facilitated, it seems to me, when approached from the vantage of phenomenology, construed generally as the study of experience qua experience. For (i) a phenomenologically oriented review of the panorama of ordinary states of consciousness dispells some of our misconceptions about extraordinary states of consciousness by breaking down the distinction between these two sorts of states, and (ii) phenomenology revises our conception of the real, and by so doing, suggests a method of knowing based on an empiricism grounded in immediate experience quite different from an empiricism of the external world grounded in sense experience or sense data. Let us consider each of these briefly in order.

(i) **Extraordinary and Ordinary Experiences** We are inclined to think of mystical experiences as extraordinary in the sense that they can be classified with experiences that occur only exceptionally, and perhaps only to exceptional persons. Within this class of extraordinary experiences we might include, for example; hypnotically induced experiences such as regression to early childhood, religious experiences such as having "visions" of deities, accident induced experiences such as total amnesia or severe shock, curious psychological experiences such as being-out-of-one's-body, or even psychotic experiences such as paranoia. Everything other than an extraordinary experience is an ordinary experience, that is, an experience that is non-exceptional and familiar. Ordinary experiences themselves we are inclined to think of simplistically in terms of such states as; "looking at a colored object", "tasting a Piece of steak as we eat it", "hearing a bird call", or if we are imaginative enough to venture beyond mere sense experience; worrying about being late, attempting to think through a problem, having a conversation with friends, feeling sleepy, etc. A list such as this, of course, hardly begins to dent the truly vast and varied array or ordinary experience, which, when grasped from some overview, seems to merge continuously with extraordinary experience. Certainly, we do undergo a variety of quite striking experiences that are not, however, extraordinary in the sense of being exceptional. Consider only such experiences as; picturing an image before one's mind's eye' with one's eyes closed, daydreaming, hypnagogic imaging, dreaming, feeling vertigo, feeling lonely and somewhat depressed for days, feeling very embarrassed and blushing with shame, experiencing sexual orgasm, falling in love, being (completely) surprised, solving a problem in a 'flash of insight', playing a competitive sport to the limit, concentrating our attention so that we can even hear a pin drop, experiencing a painting as beautiful, etc.

Phenomenology gives us a relief upon our conscious experience; it directs us to the detail, the varied and striking detail, and breaks down any simplistic divisions we may have drawn of our experience into the ordinary and the extraordinary. It also therefore has the consequence or ought to have the consequence, of teaching us not to play fast and loose with the (epistemological) label "merely hallucinatory." even when taking under review extraordinary mystical states which are alleged to yield genuine intuitions.

(ii) **The Real and the Not-Real**. From the point of view of phenomenology, the usual boundaries by which the real and not-real are distinguished appears arbitrary and misleading. In the usual way of marking the distinction the real is identified with: material objects of various sorts and sizes, environments of various kinds, the entire (physical) world encompassing all material objects and all environments, living organisms from the most microscopic to the most complex, events or happenings that occur within the physical world, etc. The "non-real" is identified with objects, environments, worlds, organisms, events, or entities of any sort that are or were thought to exist by someone at sometime, but which do not, In fact, exist; with the objects of illusions and hallucinations that do not delude those who undergo them, etc.

From the point of view of phenomenology, however, any and everything that constitutes the content of a human experience is, in the most primary sense of "real," real. The experience and the content of an hallucination, for example, is as real as the experience and content of an ordinary visual perception; having a belief that p where p is false is as real as having a belief that p where p is true; hearing a melody "run through one's head" is as real as hearing an orchestra play a symphony; etc. For some reason, we are inclined to treat experiential states that do not accommodate neatly whith the external world as somehow not quite real, to treat only what occurs in the external world as really real and to deny that reality to whatever occurs in the interior of our experience : Human experience is only mental and merely subjective; it lacks the objective and substantive reality of material objects, including our bodies, that exist and endure in the environment of physical space.

We might feel that we ourselves are not guilty of a conception of the real so blatantly biased against human experience. But when we list the various kinds of entities we believe finally constitute reality, even while disavowing a strict materialism, and even while remembering to include sense experiences and thoughts, we often forget altogether pains and pleasure, feelings, needs, beliefs and atttudes, illusions and hallucinations, dreams, and of course, so-called altered states of consciousness. Moreover, when we are confronted with a conflict between the reality of the external world and the reality of human experience our usual inclination is to option for the former at the expense of the latter. Imagine, for example, that a Yogi capable of entering into unusual states seats himself and meditates for a period which lasts, according to our watches, for fifteen minutes, but which he reports he experienced as lasting for many hours. We have a ready account for the discrepancy between his report and our watches : Since we know-from our watches that his experience lasted fifteen minutes, we conclude that he only imagined that his experience lasted for many hours. In other words, we classify his experience as a delusion; he falsely believed that it lasted longer than it did. To clinch our account we might even venture the hypothesis, to explain his delusion, that the content of his experience transpired or flaspəq by much faster than it does in ordinary conscious states. If he protested and said that he nevertheless experienced sitting for many hours, which is what he really did, we would still insist that his experience really only lasted for fifteen minutes. We would probably add that, in only fifteen minutes, he could not even have experienced sitting for many hours : He only thought that he did because he was deluded by his experience, that is, the experience itself was a delusion.

Now, a student of phenomenology, on the contrary, would or at least ought to give a very different account of this unusual meditative experience. For his attention is directed to describing and elucidating the world as it is lived, and he conceives of experience as it is experienced as real in the very first sense of "real." Thus' an individual may very well experience living for many hours in a period which we clock by our watches as fifteen minutes, and what is real in the foremost sense of real in the case under consideration in a many houred experience and not a short-lived and deluded one. And all of this is not too remarkable. We need not invoke some science fastasy time dimension to render this experience intelligible, for we all know that time as it is experienced, so-called "subjective time," does not always correspond to our watches, that sometimes time passes very slowly and at other times very quickly.

From the vantage of phenomenology, than, since human experience is not a shadow of the reality of the external world, but a reality unto itself that demands to be discerned, described, and perhaps known in some manner intuitively, the content of unusal mystical experiences as reported by those who undergo them is of independent interest as part of the real. And, in so far as these experiences are alleged to yield immediate knowledge or intuitions of reality that conflicts with our ordinary experience and our basic, usually materialistic, metaphysics, phenomenology advises us not to dismiss these alleged intuitions and the feelings of certainty that accompany them as obvious hallucinations, but rather to rethink our metaphysical assumptions (based on our ordinary experience) and to review, in general, the possible role of intuition as a method of access to knowledge.

I should add, that I have myself experienced what I have described as the idealist and poetic state as well as several variations of the oneness-with-nature state. I have also experienced a variety of other states in meditation as well. These experiences were temporary and I have not been convinced by them. Nor has it been my intention to argue that mysticism is, after all, true, and that intuition of some voilation or another is the ultimate method of access to the natnre of reality. However' I do not believe that I can dismiss these experiences merely on the grounds that they were temporary and that they contrast with the ordinary and the familiar.

SECTION II

THE PUBLIC ACCESSIBILITY OF HUMAN STATES

When the subject of intuition is engaged from the point of view of phenomenology it leads naturally, it seems to me, to a consideration of some more radical views of our person and our ego commonly attributed to mysticism. From the point of view of phenomenology, construed generally as the attempt to describe the world as it is lived or experienced, it follows or ought to follow that the emotional and mental states of other human beings are directly accessible to observation. This view of our observation and experience of one another's person may not seem to require a revision in our concept of persons themselves, and it may not appear to relate in any way to mysticism; Nevertheless, a central aim of my discussion will be to argue; (i) that we sometimes directly observe the mental and emotional states of other human beings, (ii) that phenomenology does incline us to accept this view of the accessibility of other persons's states, (iii) that accepting this view marks a radical departure from the prevailing philosophical conception of our experience of one another and also from the prevailing philosophical conception of a person, and (iv) that along one line of reasoning, this revised conception of a person leads to the view prevalent in Eastern Mysticism and present in the philosophies of James, Bergson, and Sartre, that the ego, conceived as a substance, is an illusion.

We make a mistake when we imagine that mental and emotional states always first occur within some inner immaterial self surrounded by the shell of an exterior material body, and then manifest themselves through bodily states which are the "effects" of which they are the cause. For suppose that I am mentally and emotionally distracted, I tell you that I am, and as I recount my difficulties, I pace nervously about, speak quickly and with emotion, and sometimes forget my train of thought. It would be terribly misleading to describe my agitatedly pacing about as an outward sign that I am experiencing a state, the state of distraction, which is otherwise hidden and incapable of being observed. No. My distracted state is there, in public view, for all to see : even I may see it by watching myself in a mirror. It is as public a property of my person as are my hands and feet. It is no more hidden than the properties of an ordinary worldly object; others can see that I am distracted as well as they can see that a desk is rectangular.

Others can see "that I am distracted" because they "see my distraction", My distraction is not a conglomerate of three (independent) states, an outward bodily state accessible to observation, and a mental and emotional state concealed within the inner recesses of my consciousness. My distraction is not divided into three parts, with the really "essential" parts, what I think and feel, forever inaccessible to the observation of others. No. I am in one state, the state of distraction, and it is this state which others may observe if they care to do so. When we see a pen we see the pen even though we do not see the backside of it, even though we only see part of it. For to see something we need not see every angle and aspect of it. And that is true of persons and their states as well. When a person comes forward to greet us, we "see that person" even though we do not see his every feature. Even if we see him only from the shoulders up, we still see him : We see him no less than we would see him declothed and surrounded by mirrors revealing every part of the surface of his body at once.

It would miss the mark at this point to object that even though a person's body may be public, his feelings, as uniquely felt by him alone, must be private. For although a person's feelings are private in the sense that only he, uniquely, feels them, it does not follow that they are always private in the sense that they cannot be observed. For your feelings to be observable to me I need not have the numerically same feeling that you have, nor even corresponding to your feeling a very similar feeling; nor need I even feel empathy for your feeling. For consider once again the case of distraction. Imagine that as I pace agitatedly about I turn to you and say, with considerable emotion in my voice and with my head twisting from left to right, "I just don't know what to do." The emotion in my voice is public, just as the sound of my voice is public. And you need not feel my feelings nor even empathize with my feelings to observe what I am feeling. Observation does not require that sort of coincidence of minds: To observe, I do not have to become, or become like, the object or property or action I observe. Obviously, someone may observe my distraction and yet not recognize the state I am in, that is, not know what they have observed. For example, a small child might observe my distraction, but lack sufficient experience to recognize it as distraction, or someone whose perceptive faculties have been dulled, say by inebriation, may mistake my distraction for something else, say elation. But such mistaken observations are not peculiar to our observations of other person's emotional states. It is not in the least uncommon to observe something without knowing what it is; "I saw it streak across the sky, but never did figure out what it was", or to think we have observed something to be a certain kind of thing, when it is not that kind of thing at all, "I thought it was a bird, but later realized it was a flying squirrel".

Now, someone might consider the case I have selected for illustration, the case of distraction, to be a most atypical instance of human feeling and emotion, and therefore, quite misleading to serve as an example. However, it is quite adequate as a challenge to the position which I am here concerned to refute, that feelings are in principle private. Moreover it is not after all unusual. For consider only the human capacily, and propensity, to speak emotionally and with feeling in audible and intelligible sentences, phrases, or words. Suppose, for example, that a father who is angry at his chid for having once again failed to close the door, shouts, Dammit ! Shut the door !" His emotion (and his thought) are exposed to public view; that is his very intention. This fact, that we can and do "speak out with emotion" incontrovertibly proves the publicity of both feeling and thought, and undermines any bias we might have for relegating either one but not the other to the inaccessible interior of a private consciousness : We might have assumed that because thought is communicated through the vehicle of language, it can be public, whereas feeling, bacause it is peculiarly intimate, can only be private. Or we might have assumed that because feeling is sometimes expressed through the medium of the body, it can be public: whereas thought, because it occurs "in our mind," can only be private. But when someone shouts angrily, "Dammit ! Shut the door ! " his anger and his thought, his angry thought, is no less observable then his hands, his pajamas, or the alarm of the alarm clock ringing next to the bed. The phenomenon of his shout is not two separate phenomena, his angry feeling and his thought. His thought, "Shut the door", is not a public effect of his having felt a private angry feeling, nor is his feeling angry a public effect of his having had the private thought, "He's left the door open again".

Of course, when we shout with emotion we may be feeling feelings or thinking thoughts which we do not expose to public view, and in fact, on a variety of occasions we keep some, or even all, of our feelings and thoughts concealed from others. But we should not be tempted, as I think we often are, to extend this fact about our capacity for concealment into the philosphical thesis that feelings and thoughts are intrinsically private, i. e., in principle inaccessible except indirectly. No. Sometimes they are private and sometimes they are public. And, to say that they are sometimes private is not to pinpoint a mysterious property peculiar to feeling or to thought. For I can keep scars on my backside and letters in my desk concealed from the observation of others too.

In opposition to the entire line of discussion up to this point, someone might still protest, even angrily, that my choice of examples prejudices the argument, and that other more fitting examples would prove once and for all that feelings are intrinsically private, that they are accessible to others they are so only indirectly. A paradigm counter-example that comes to mind here is the experience of pain. For when we feel pain, e. g. feel a pain in our stomach, it seems we do so in the enclosed interior of our own consciousness, and that although others may warrantedly "conclude" that we are in pain, they can do so only through a practiced interpretation of bodily gestures and bodily produced sounds. But I have not denied that there are instances in which the states,feelings, and thoughts of others are known only indirectly; I have only wanted to argue that there are instances in which they are know directly. Moreover, I must confess uneasiness over the analysis of even this presumably paradigm case. It may be a satisfactory analysis of some species of painful experiences, e. g. I feel a sudden slight pain in my foot and my mouth twitches in a responding grimace. But what about others ? Suppose, for example, that I suddenly experience a severe pain in my stomach, that I double over in a violent wrench of my body, grasp my stomach with my hands, and "yell out in pain." How do we carve up the phenomenon, "my being in pain?" And what is it that someone observing me observes ? I hesitate to say that he observes only effects of my pain or only signs of my pain. I hesitate to describe my pain as an inner phenomenon separate and distinct from my anguished bodily gestures and anguished yell. In regard to this case at least, it seems as reasonable to say that others can "observe my pain," since my bodily behaviour is part of what constitutes my being in pain, as it is to say that others can infer from my bodily behaviour that I am in pain." The trick here is to see that other persons can observe my pain without feeling it, without feeling anything like it, and without observing all and every aspect of it. Others can observe my pain, just as they can observe my sadness or my happiness, or my surprise, or my shame, or my fear, etc.

To put this point differently, others can observe my feelings "from one perspective" just as they observe ordinary material objects from one perspective. If I feel sad, and do not try to conceal but rather express my sadness, others can observe my sadness "in my sad face" or "in my crying," or "in my voice." These features of my bodily behaviour constitute part of my sadness. Others need not infer from observing tears in my eyes that I am sad. No. They observe me, from one perspective, "weeping sadly".

Of course, we sometimes believe that another person is feeling something that he is not; we sometimes make guesses, both accurate and inaccurate, about another person's feelings on the basis of behavioural clues; and we sometimes cannot tell at all what a person is "really" feeling. Nevertheless, these various facts represent only one facet of the complex character of the nature of the communication of human feeling, and, we are considerably more exposed to one another than many philosophers would have us believe.

Indeed, in my judgment, it is more instructive to conceive of our feelings and our thoughts as first of all public, and as only secondarily private, and to emphasize how we generally, though not always, succeed in communicating the feelings and thoughts we wish to convey. The most common technique we employ to communicate feeling and thought, of course, is by emitting patterned sequences of sounds of conventionalized meanings in various emotional entonations and intensities, accompanied by facial and bodily gestures.

SECTION III

PHENOMENOLOGY AND PERSONS' EXPERIENCE OF ONE ANOTHER

The view that human states, feelings, and thoughts are publicly accessible is indeed controversial. Personally, I suspect that it is controversial because we have a deeply ingrained materialistic-physicalistic conception of reality which colors our conception of the relation of our person to our body and to other persons. But whether or not that suspicion is correct, it is a curious fact that if we view the over-riding aim of phenomenology to be the description of experience as experience, and in that spirit attend to the details of our experience of others as we experience them, we will naturally arrive at some such account as I have set forth above. For what we have as given in our experience of others as we experience them is just persons of different sizes, shapes, sexes, and personalities. along with a considerable variety of states, feelings, and, of course, thoughts.

A sense data theorist will, of course; insist that persons and their states are not present immediately in our experience, and that we have, as given in our experience of other persons and their states, only sense data. (It is for this reason that we my have grounds for challenging our knowledge not only of the states of, but even of the existence of, other minds.) But none of this agrees with our experience of other persons in so far as we undergo that experience. If we take as our guide the classical account set forth by Husserl in Ideas : An Introduction to Phenomenology, a description of our experience of walking around a desk while looking at it must record not only a series of immanently given and momentarily concrete visual shapes of varying hues, but also a single (non-immanent) entity that we apprehend as continuous through out the experience—the entity which, within the perspective of the natural standpoint, we would label "the desk."[1] All one has to do is to walk around a desk while looking at it to verify that what Husserl reports is true.

Persons are apprehended as single and continuous in a similar way. In fact, from the point of view of phenomenology persons can be present as an item of our experience without being visually observed : We hear them moving about in the next room. In fact, they can even be present as an item of our experience when they are in no way present to our senses : We left them sleeping in the upstairs bedroom and remain aware that we do not inhabit the house alone. We apprehend persons, as it were, from one perspective just as we apprehend desks. We apprehend other persons' states, feelings and thoughts from one "perspective" too. I observe your sadness first "in your sad face" from one angle, then "in your sad face" from another angle. I also observe your sadness "in your crying" or "in your voice" (or in all of these together.) Your bodily behaviour constitutes part of your sadness. I do not infer from observing tears in your eyes that you are sad. No. I observe you, from one perspective, "weeping sadly".

When you and I sit and chat, your states, and your feelings and thoughts, become part of the content of, and constitute significant items within, my experience. Naturally, your states enter in as items of my experience in a very different way than do my own. If you feel sad, I experience that sadness as someone else's sadness, as lacking in that intimate ownership relation in which I stand to my own emotional and mental states. Despite their differences in character, however, your states, as I observe and experience them, are just as much a part of the content of my experience as are my own.

You as a person enter in as an immediate item of my experience, as part of the content of my experience, as well. Obviously, if persons are conceived (under some variation of materialism) as consciousness enclosed in physical bodies, this way of describing the relation between persons will conjure pictures of bodies within bodies. But if we assume the phenomenologist's perspective and conscientiously attempt to describe our life as it is lived and our experience of other persons as we do experience them, we will be led to conceive of persons as the sum of the content of all the experience they undergo, including, as they enter into this content, the states, feelings and thoughts of other persons, as well as other persons themselves. In other words, our revising our conception of how persons stand in relation to one another requires a revision in our very conception of a person. If we resist any view in which persons experience one another only indirectly through cues from the exoskeletons of their souls called "bodies," and accept the line of thinking argued above that persons must be described as directly entering into and becoming part of the experience of one another, then, in order to made such a description intelligible, we will be forced to conceive of persons as constituted of the sum of the history of their experience, and to speak even more starkly of one person becoming part of the composite of another person.

SECTION IV

THE EGO IS A FICTION

I have attempted to keep the view that as experiencing beings we mutually participate in the composites of one another's person clearly distinguished from any position that suggests a coincidence of consciousness and a collapse of the distinction between persons- For the first view only seems plausible if this distinction is kept in mind, and if we continue to record that I experience my states in a very different way than I experience your. However, even while retaining these distinctions, it is quite natural to wonder how intimate the relationship between persons can become, and how far this mutual participating in the experience of one another, in the person of one another, can go. What ought we to say, for axample, about a very sensitive person feeling empathy for the felling of someone else ?

We find ourselves at this juncture brought abruptly to a consideration of mysticism. For we are reminded that within some traditions of mysticism the distinction between persons is judged an illusion, and that even though a sense of our own persons, is ordinarily part of our experience of other persons, a recurring theme of the experience of the mystic is just the loss of this sense. Let us therefore press on in the direction of mysticism utilizing our revised conception of a person, along with the vantage of phenomenology, to examine the experience of "losing the sense of one's person."

If we persist in conceiving of persons as the sum of the content their experience, it will seem natural to record the outstanding, though indeed obvious, fact that we have a sense of ourselves as an individual agent, self-consciously separate and distinct from other agencies in the world. It is just this primitive sense of our self as a self that for Husserl constitutes definitive evidence of our existence as an independent and enduring being-as a "transcendental pure ego."[2] Husserl thus remains with a view of our person, which though in many respects radical, traces its history back through Kant to the Greeks. In a different development, and a sharp divergence within the movement of phenomenology itself, Sartre concludes that the ego viewed as a substance is a fiction. Sartre therefore aligns himself with Bergson and James, two philosophers particularly concerned, each in his own way, to study human experience. He also finds himself in a curious agreement with the view, prevalent in various traditions of (Eastern) mysticism, that the personal ego is an illusion.

But suppose that we do agree that we have an ego because we experience ourselves as having one. If we stay within the spirit of phenomenology striving to be sensitive to the variety in our experience, and we also do not prejudiciously rule out from consideration unusual experiences that human beings do indeed undergo, we will be forced to wonder how we should construe our evidence for the ego—the sense of ourselves as having one—when that sense is no longer present in "loss-of-ego" states. Clearly, if we had thought that our experience of our self as a self constituted our ego, that the reality of our ego consisted in that special self-consciousness, it would follow that there must be time when our ego does not exist at all. Of course, the ego's coming and going is not a notion unfamiliar to Sartre. He argues that the "ego"—in his sense of the ego—is absent during those periods when we are "lost in what we are doing", for example, when we are lost in looking through the keyhole at someone undressing. And he also observes that the ego when acsent may once again become present, for example, when we hear someone's footsteps down the hall.

We may wish to insist, to the contrary, that a sense of our-selves as a person is always present in our experience, that even where we are "lost in what we are doing" we still retain some, at least implicit, sense of ourselves as an individual agency. But even if that position can be made intelligible, which those inclined to describe our experience exactly as it is experienced may disagree, we cannot neglect to take into consideration those experiences, reported in the tradition of mysticism, in which the sense of one-self as a distinct person or agency is totally absent.

The problems which such "loss-of-ego" experiences raise for the concept of personal identity cannot be lightly dismissed. We cannot simply insist, in the face of such experiences, that a person is an enduring ego, a "substance" which undergoes modifications of its "accidental" properties while remaining in its "essential" nature continuous in time. Perhaps Sartre's view that the ego is a fiction demands a serious review: Perhaps our conception of our person and personality does lack a correlate substance in reality, and perhaps our conception of our person does not necessarily reflect the facts of the history of our experience better than the conception of our person fabricated by someone else—no matter that we are intimately involved with that experience in a way which no one else is or can be.

After observing that loss-of-ego mystical experiences ought to prompt us to reconsider the view that the ego, as a substance, is a fiction, we ought to observe further that this view is a recurring theme within the tradition of mysticism itself. Of course, we would expect it to be, since we earlier emphasized how critically our experience, both ordinary and extraordinary, influences our philosophical conceptions. Perhaps we can even imagine how our own conception of our own ego might undergo a radical change if we were to experience a loss-of-ego state ourselves.

Certainly, there are some striking similarities between; (i) the Buddhist doctrine of Anatta (of the non-reality of the ego) and Sartre's rejection of "the psychologist's ego", (ii) Sartre's analysis and the Buddhist (or Hindu) analysis of the nature of desire and of emotion, and (iii) the mystic's conception and Sartre's conception of the mutable, and to some degree, perfectable nature of our person. Sartre even confronts mystical states themselves, of at least one variation, when he comments sympathetically upon Russeau's experience of being "one-with-all".[3] Sartre refers to this kind of experience as a "pantheistic intuition", and in the context of discussing intuition in general, characterizes it as having "nothing", no "mediator" (no ego) , between the knower and the known. He does, however, resist Rousseau's literal account of his experience, and by implication any similar account of such an experience, as a fusion of consciousness with the world. For this possibility is antithetical to Sartre's fundamental conception of consciousness, which in the tradition from Brentano through Husserl, treats consciousness in its intrinsic nature as a two-sided intentionality : If consciousness were to "fuse" with the world on this conception, it would follow that it had collapsed.

No matter how interesting the fact that Sartre, a phenomenologist, shares with many mystics the view that we have no enduring egos, such a view does present serious problems if we conceive all reality *other than* persons or consciousnesses to be composed of enduring, and probably material, substances. For then we are forced to embrace a fundamental metaphysical dualism of streams of experience—or something of the sort—on one side and substances on the other. Of course, if we are impressed by the uniqueness of persons, or more generally consciousness, we may find such a dualism not only palatable but necessary—as does Sartre when he distinguishes being-for-itself from being-in-itself. However, there does exist an alternative in which we can retain the view that a person is a history of experience and not a substance ego, while yet avoiding a dualistic matasphysics : We can give us substance metaphysics altogether and take experiences, or perhaps preferably events, as the ultimately real constituents not only of persons, but of all reality. If we do choose this alternative, with a consequent emphasis upon time, change and process, rather than space, permanence, and substance, we will find ourselves much closer in spirit to the metaphysics and psychology of the philosophical traditions of Eastern Mysticism. And, of course, we will need to return once again to a study of the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead.

SECTION V

A CONCLUDING REMARK

I would like to bring the discussion to a close by making the following summary observation : The study of phenomenology ought to make us receptive to mystical experiences by; (i) removing the stigma of their extraordinary character by treating many ordinary states and capacities of consciousness as already striking and in their own way extraordinary, and (ii) by treating conscious experience as fully real, as having at least as much ontological significance as anything else. The more intensively we engage the subject of consciousness qua consciousness, the more consciousness begins to take on a life of its own, to become distinctive and important in its own right. And the more familiar and intimate we become with the *phenomenon* of consciousness, the better are we able to appreciate a parallel development of familiarity and intimacy which naturally accompanies the special states of consciousness sustained by certain mystics in daily meditation practices repeated over many years.

Moreover, the more we set-off-in-relief the variety and detail of the capacities of consciousness, the more readily are we able to grasp and render intelligible particular accounts of mystical experiences. For we can imagine how someone might manipulate consciousness by a practiced concentration or by a shattering of such concentration to bring about such an experinece Mystical experience, therefore, becomes for us merely another mode in which consciousness manifests itself. And we are no longer inclined to quickly pass over such experiences and the philosophies associated with them as, by their own-pronouncement, ineffabte, that is, as lacking in any philosophical import that could ever be stated or put into words.

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Next International ISNS Congress

All members of the society in oll countries are invited to attend ond submit papers for the eleventh international conferences of this society to be held in Vanderbilt University, Nashville; Tennessee. May 25-28, 1995 on the theme "Neoplatonism and Contemporary Thought." The conference is sponsored by our Center for Neoplatonic Studies, located in Vanderbilt University. R. Baine Harris and John Lachs will serve as co-directors. Essentially, the conference is to be a critique of Neoplatonism from a contemporary perspective, namely, what part of it is (or should be) dead and what element of it is still relevant in our age. A few notable Neoplatonic scholars and/or highly qualified critics of Neoplatonism will be invited to give special lectures during plenary sessions of the conference. Each day will have a basic theme around which papers in the various sections will be organized, namely,

Thursday the 25th : "Contemporary Science"
Friday the 26th : "Contemporary Social and Moral Theo ry'
Saturday the 27th : "Contemporary Fine Arts" and
Sunday the 28th : "Contemporary Spirituality."

A six member program committee has been formed Proposals for papers should include a brief abstract of the proposed paper and should be sent as soon as possible to Prof. R. Baine Harris, Department of Philosophy, Old Dominion University, Hampton Blvd., Norfolk, Virginia, 22529, USA. Purely historical studies of Neoplatonism will not be scheduled unless they are studies of the Neoplatonic element in the thought of someone who lived some of his or her life in the Twentieth Century; and hopefully such studies will still fit under one of the generic themes for the day.

The conference will begin at 9:00 A.M. on Thursday, May 25th and end about 4:30 P.M. on Sunday, May 28th. Nashville is a large enough city to have numerous planes leaving for major U.S. cities on Sunday evening, but it is anticipated that many of the participants may wish to stay over Sunday night as well in order to have time to tour the city on Monday the 29th. (No scholar should come to Nashville without spending a few hours visiting the full scale replica of the parthenon with its giant stature of Athena, located in a park adjacent to the Vanderbilt cam All inquiries concerning housing travel, etc. should be addre the conference host, Prof. John Lachs, Department of Philo , Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, 37235—tel: 61 2637, FAX 615-343-7259.

THE DHARMA

May all beings who see, heat, or read this book
In this life and all successive lives
Obtain the precious human body and meet with
Friends of Virtue.
Having completely perfected the paths and stages
of Bodhisattva conduct,
May they complete the Two Objectives: benefitting
themselves and others.

Kalu Rinpoche

... ...

The Bodhisattva is like
the mightiest of warriors;
But the enemies are not
common foes of flesh and bone.
His fight is with the inner delusions,
the afflictions of self-cherishing
and ego-grasping,
Those most terrible of demons
That catch living beings in the
snare of confusion
And cause them forever to wonder
in pain, frustration and sorrow.
His mission is to harm ignorance and delusion,
never living beings.
These he looks upon with kindness,
patience and empathy,
Cherishing them like a mother cherishes
her only child.
He is the real hero,
calmly facing any hardship
In order to bring peace, happiness
and liberation to the world.

—The Thirteenth Dalai Lama
from his “Discourse on the Great *Lam Rim*”

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